IN THE INTEREST OF D.S., A CHILD
No. 18-0908
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
May 8, 2020
Argued February 27,
JUSTICE GUZMAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE LEHRMANN filed a concurring opinion, in which JUSTICE DEVINE and JUSTICE BUSBY joined.
When parental rights are terminated based on an affidavit voluntarily relinquishing those rights,
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).3 The court held that construing
We hold
I. Background
D.S., a minor child, was born in January 2015 in Boston, Massachusetts. Her parents were married in Texas about eight years before her birth and lived in Texas for most of their marriage. However, shortly before D.S.’s birth, Father moved to Boston to pursue a job opportunity. Mother
remained in Texаs, maintaining employment at the same law firm and living in the family home, but she routinely visited Father in Massachusetts.
After D.S. was born, the family stayed in Massachusetts until Mother’s maternity leave expired. Mother then moved back to Texas to resume her job, and D.S. split time between homes in both Texas and Massachusetts. In September 2015, when D.S. was eight months old, Mother filed for divorce in Collin County, Texas. She alleged that D.S. (1) was a child born of the marriage, (2) was not under the continuing jurisdiction of another state court, and (3) lived with Mother in Collin County. Father did not deny these allegаtions.7
At some point during the divorce proceedings, Father executed an affidavit voluntarily relinquishing his parental rights. Father’s unrevoked affidavit provided the basis for Mother’s amended divorce petition seeking to sever the parent–child relationship. Because Father was not a Texas resident at the time, Mother had the burden of pleading facts demonstrating the trial court’s authority to exercise jurisdiction
After considering the evidence,9 the trial court found it had jurisdiction over the proceeding and the parties involved and that no other court had сontinuing, exclusive jurisdiction over D.S. The court also found termination of Father’s parental rights was in D.S.’s best interest. The court signed the agreed order terminating Father’s parental rights on October 21, 2015. A few days
later, the court issued a nunc pro tunc order bearing Father’s signature. Mother was appointed D.S.’s sole managing conservator.
Six months later, Father filed two bill-of-review suits: one seeking to set aside the trial court’s termination order and the other arguing, in part, that revisiting child custody would necessitate a new division of the parties’ marital estate. Only the former is at issue in this appeal, and in that bill-of-review proceeding, Father claimed, for the first time, that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Massachusetts—not Texas—was D.S.’s home state when the termination proceeding commenced.
The trial court denied relief in both bill-of-review suits following a bench trial. In written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court determined Father “failed to prove any element of his bill of review,”10 so his “challenge to the Agreed Order of Termination of Parent–Child Relationship [was] a collateral attack rather than a direct attack.” Concerning D.S.’s home state, the trial court found that extrinsic evidence established (1) D.S. had no home state when the termination proceedings commenced; (2) Massachusetts had been D.S.’s home state within six months of commencement; and (3) under Family Code section 152.201, Texas courts lacked jurisdiction “to make an initial child custody determination.” However, because the underlying termination proceeding did not reveal any jurisdictional defect, “the clear and definite recitals” on jurisdictional matters in the Agreed Order of Termination of Parent–Child Relationship were
“conclusive of all issues of jurisdiction” in a collateral challenge.11 The court further concluded that (1) Father failed to prove his “unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment
Father appеaled the disposition of both bills. As to the termination order, Father focused exclusively on collaterally attacking jurisdiction, pointing out that the bill-of-review court’s home-state findings materially differed from the trial court’s original jurisdictional findings.12 Claiming the new findings rendered the termination order void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Father persuaded the court of appeals to reverse and vacate the termination order.13 Relying on the extrinsic evidence Father offered in the bill proceeding, the court of appeals adopted the bill-of-review court’s home-state findings, concluded Texas was not D.S.’s home state, and held the termination order was void and susceptible to collateral attack.14 Though section 161.211(c) of the Texas Family Code expressly limits the grounds for challenging a voluntary-relinquishment termination, the court declined to construe the statute as precluding Father from challenging the termination order on jurisdictional grounds, opining that such a
construction would create a conflict with the jurisdictional requirements in Chapter 152 of the Family Code.15
On appeal to this Court, the parties disagree about several matters, including (1) whether Father’s collateral attack on the termination order was proper even though section 161.211(c) specifically constrains such challenges to grounds that were decided adversely to Father and then abandoned; and (2) whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to collaterally challenge an agreed termination judgment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when no jurisdictional defect is apparent from the record and the record establishes that the trial court considered jurisdictional evidence, concluded it had jurisdiction, and rendered a judgment regular on its face. Because the first issue is dispositive of the appeal, we do not reach the second.
II. Discussion
“Collateral attacks” on orders terminating parental rights based on affidavits voluntarily relinquishing those rights are limited to “fraud, duress, or coercion in the execution of the [relinquishment] affidavit.”16 By limiting collateral attacks to grounds relating to “whether the parent’s waiver of parental rights was knowing and voluntary,”17
In a collateral challenge to the agreed order severing his relationship with D.S., Father abandoned the three statutorily authorized grounds in favor of one not enumerated in the statute—lack of jurisdiction under Chapter 152. Father argues that
only if the trial court had jurisdiction to make a custody determination under Chapter 152 and does not preclude his collateral attack on the agreed termination order because (1) Texas was not D.S.’s home state when
Mother contends the court of appeals judicially amended
A. Collateral Attacks
Collateral attacks on final judgments are generally impermissible because “it is the policy of the law to give finality to the judgments of the courts.”19 Such attacks are disfavored because they “run[] counter to [our] strong policy of finality” by “attempt[ing] to bypass the appellate process in challenging the integrity of a judgment.”20 “A collateral attack seeks to avoid the binding effect of a judgment in order to obtain specific relief that the judgment currently
impedes.”21 “Only a void judgment may be collaterally attacked.”22 A judgment is void, rather than voidable, “when it is apparent that the court rendering judgment ‘had no jurisdiction [over] the parties or property, no jurisdiction [over] the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act.’”23
Finality is uniquely important in family law matters, especially parental-termination proceedings.24 “[T]he private interest affected [in parental termination proceedings] is commanding” for all litigants involved.25 Indeed, “[f]ew judgments have more substantial future ramifications than those affecting parentage.”26 Like their parents, children have a compelling interest in finality and stability. As we have long acknowledged, children’s lives cannot be “kept in limbo while judicial processes crawl forward[.]”27 The State has important interests as well, including protecting the welfare of the child and reducing the cost and burden of parental-termination
B. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
The UCCJEA, which has been adopted by most states, helps ensure custody determinations are “rendered in [the] State which can best decide the case in the interest of the child.”29 The law is designed to deter child abductions and minimize “the shifting of children from State to State,” which can adversely affect their well-being.30 The UCCJEA advances an overarching objective of expediency and stability in an increasingly mobile world by helping prevent manipulation of the system and undue complication of child-custody disputes, which can occur when a child is moved from one state to another.
Though Texas district courts have general jurisdiction ovеr child-custody matters,31 our Legislature adopted the UCCJEA in 1999 as Chapter 152 of the Family Code,32 and the UCCJEA articulates circumstances under which a court has, or loses, “jurisdiction” over child-custody determinations.33 Jurisdiction is statutorily withdrawn if neither the UCCJEA’s home-state provision nor any statutory alternative basis for jurisdiction is satisfied.34 For purposes of the UCCJEA, jurisdiction is determined at the time child-custody proceedings commence.35
Under section 152.201, a Texas court has jurisdiction to make initial child-custody determinations (1) if Texas is the child’s home state; (2) in certain situations where a court of another state does not have jurisdiction or declines to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more convenient forum; or (3) no court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria set out in the statute.36 The statute defines “home state” as the state where the child has lived with a parent or guardian “for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.”37 To determine a child’s home state, the key inquiry is the child’s physical presence in the state; the parents’ legal residency is a lesser consideration.38 Texas courts also have temporary emergency jurisdiction over a child present in this state when it is “necessary . . . to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or
On appeal to this Court, Mother primarily argues the trial court’s home-state determination was conclusive and binding under
the statute.40 Whatever meaning “jurisdiction” may have in Chapter 152, the collateral attack here is statutorily barred.
C. Section 161.211(c)
Statutory construction is a question of law we review de novo.41 Our objective is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent,42 and “the truest manifestation of what lawmakers intended is what they enacted.”43 In construing a statute, we assume the Legislature chose statutory language with care,44 included each chosen word for a purpose, and purposefully omitted all other words.45
When parents have chosen to surrender their rights to their children,
A direct or collateral attack on an order terminating parental rights based on an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights or affidavit of waiver of interest in a child is limited to issues relating to fraud, duress, or coercion in the execution of the affidavit.46
The permissible grounds for collaterally challenging a termination order help ensure voluntary relinquishments are, in fact, voluntary “while also addressing the need for finality and promptness in these proceedings.”47 Our recent decisions examining
Like this case, In re K.S.L. involved the interplay between
whether or not the determination was correct.54 Because the termination order was based on affidavits of vоluntary relinquishment,
The analysis in Moore v. Brown, a case from the Third Court of Appeals, is even more on point.56 In Moore, a child, M.K.B., was born in Virginia.57 Before M.K.B.’s birth, the biological parents found a Texas family—the Browns, who were distant relatives of M.K.B.’s biological parents—to adopt the child.58 M.K.B. was given the surname “Brown,” which was also listed on the child’s birth certificate.59 The biological parents executed various documents laying the groundwork for adoption and undertook several steps for interim custody with a court in Virginia.60 An agreed order granted the Browns custody of M.K.B., authorized the hospital to discharge M.K.B. to their care, and gave them permission to return to Texas with the child.61
One document the parties executed was, as here, an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights that satisfied the Texas Family Code’s exacting requirements.62 As a predicate