*1 STATES DEAL UNITED May 17, 1993 Argued March 1993—Decided No. 91-8199. *2 Dola J. Young argued the cause for With her petitioner. E. Dahlin II and H. Michael on the briefs were Roland Sokolow. A. Estrada the cause for the
Miguel United States. argued Starr, Assist- on the brief were Solicitor General him With Mueller, ant General Solicitor Attorney Deputy General and Robert J. Erickson. Bryson, delivered the Court. opinion
Justice Scalia Between and committed six January April petitioner six different in the bank robberies on dates Houston, Texas, In each he used a robbery, area. Petitioner was con gun. 2118(a) victed of six counts of robbery, §§ bank 18 U. S. C. six counts of and a firearm (d), carrying using during and in violence, 924(c), § relation to a crime of and one count firearms, § a felon in Title 18 being possession 922(g). 924(c)(1) (1988 III) § U. ed., S. C. Supp. provides: “Whoever, relation to crime of during vio- lence ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to punishment provided such crime ..., of violence sentenced imprisonment for five years .... the case of his second or conviction under this subsection, such shall be sentenced to im- person prisonment for twenty years ....” District Southern District Court for States The United on to 5 years’ imprisonment sentenced petitioner of Texas other 924(c)(1) on each of the years and to § count the first 924(c)(1) to run counts, consecutively. terms five Fifth Circuit affirmed for the States Court Appeals (1992). F. 2d 262 We and sentence. the convictions sec- whether petitioner’s on the question certiorari granted 924(c)(1) single in this convictions under sixth through ond second or subsequent the ease his arose “[i]n proceeding 924(e)(1). U. S. within the (1992). *3 924(c)(1) is fa- of language that the
Petitioner contends in his construed and should therefore ambiguous, cially His lenity. argument to the rule of principal favor pursuant according the “conviction” can, is that word in this regard of a “either the return have two dictionary, meanings, the of a final on that or the entry judgment verdict of guilt jury the “second Brief for Petitioner verdict,” 4; phrase ‘an addi- “mean or conviction” could therefore ” (which would time’ tional of rendered finding guilt sixth on the second convictions through include petitioner’s “ here) of or ‘a con- the single proceeding judgment counts in (which not include time,’” entered at a later viction entered convictions, since the District Court those id., at counts), of 7. on all judgment single mean It is correct that the word “conviction” can certainly or of a final on judgment either the of finding guilt entry meanings well, has other finding. many word error, of or of convincing compelling of including “[a]ct state truth”; convinced; admission of a of being esp., “[s]tate of or one’s being sin, conscience”; strong of convicted by “[a] convictions; as, or one’s an belief; up to live persuasion of conviction.” Webster’s Interna- thorough New intensity (2d 1950). But Dictionary tional 584 ed. of course suscepti- of of all these does not render the word “con- bility meanings viction,” used, whenever it is all but one of the ambiguous; 132
meanings ordinarily There is not context. eliminated § 924(c)(1), example, slightest which deals doubt, for punishment not next, this world rather than does being to mean the state of convicted of sin. use “conviction” overlooks, think, we this fundamental Petitioner’s contention (and, statutory principle itself) indeed, of of construction a word that the of cannot be determined it is must be the context in which isolation, but drawn from King Hospital, v. St. Vincent’s 502 U. S. used. See (1991); Treasury, Michigan Dept. Davis v. U. S. of (1984). (1989); Morton, 822, 828 United States v. U. S. §924(c)(1), unambiguous that In the context of we think it finding guilt by jury judge refers to the “conviction” necessarily entry precedes judgment a final judgment conviction. A of conviction includes both the ad- judication guilt and the Fed. Rule Crim. sentence. See 32(b)(1) (“A judgment Proc. of conviction shall set forth adjudication plea, findings, the verdict or and the and sen- added)); Dictionary (emphasis tence” see also Black’s Law 1990) (6th 32(b)(1) (quoting defining “judg- ed. Rule conviction”). 924(e)(1) ment Thus, if “conviction” “judgment provision meant would be inco- conviction,” the prescribing already that a herent, sentence which has been *4 (the “conviction”) imposed subsequent defendant’s second or years longer shall be 5 or 20 than it was. by
Petitioner contends that this absurd result is avoided beginning “[i]n provi- the the case of” at the [a defendant’s] He sion. maintains that a case is the “case of subsequent” entry judgment second or of conviction even judgment the before court has entered that of conviction and imposed even before the eourt has the sentence that the is prerequisite entry judgment to the of conviction. We “entry judgment think not. If “conviction” meant of con- surely a “case” would viction,” not be the of his second “case judgment or conviction” until that of conviction by was entered, which time a lower sentence than that which And been 924(c)(1) imposed. already would requires still, displays contention fundamentally petitioner’s
more words construing the regrettable penchant once again legal refer to a assuredly can The word “case” isolation. by is if “in the case of” followed the phrase proceeding, the Madison,” apparent that is name, “Marbury a such as “in however, an event, followed act or by When meaning. think “in event of”—and we case of” means the normally its here. that is 924(c)(1) follows the immediately sentence of
The “con- of the term reading at issue here our one confirms “Notwithstanding That sentence viction.” provides: on the court shall not law, place probation other provision of a viola- convicted sentence any person or suspend the one before That like provision, tion of this subsection.” meant to control terms of ease, us is obviously if the term But give to be we yet imposed. sentence contends similar what petitioner “convicted” meaning is, entry connoting, “conviction” —as by is meant confront again once which includes sentence —we judgment, a sen- of the terms of which the prescription a situation in e., i. until after late, until is too tence cannot effective been already pronounced.1 sentence has are confirmed our conclusion recognition also We unreview- give prosecutor that petitioner’s to waive the enhanced either to or able discretion impose 924(c)(1) §of by opting charge sentencing provisions under either in separate prosecutions the defendant try a multicount indictment. Although present prosecution argues “subsequent” admit “second” and also that the terms 1 Petitioner or succession. meanings in time and next in order of at least two —next “judgment,” since ambiguity pursuing worth if “conviction” means That (as here) multiple, counts. judgment entered once-in-time can include (as however, irrelevant, “conviction” means point becomes when we *5 counts, hold) findings of finding guilt. judgment Unlike a on several successively time. necessarily at guilt on several counts are arrived sentencing, permitted if the same enhanced not would separate prosecutions charges for into six had been divided sentencing separate enhanced robberies, six bank give disposed clearly required. to not areWe have been consequences.2 strange produces that such statute 924(e)(1) must be read to im- that contends dissent only committed pose for an offense sentence the enhanced Though in- previous has final. this sentence become after a petitioner’s terpretation briefs, mentioned in was not position petitioner’s put as a forward fallback was Arg. argument, 4, the dissent thinks it of Oral oral see Tr. rejection post, constitutes at our “obvious,” so post, triumph at sense,” over “common of “textualism” parsing,” in sentence of “an exercise and the result elaborate begin most the textual dis- note, to with, ibid. We up point— opinion this of them to made tinctions —all argument petitioner principal respond to elaborate judgment.” “entry It takes not that “conviction” means quite parsing” reject argu- to different much “sentence “subsequent that the offense” and ment the dissent terms exactly mean the same conviction” “second or thing, means offense “first after so “second earlier an conviction.” disagree assertion that one can dissent’s “Con-
No slightly convey gress to sometimes uses different message,” post, at 137—but when it does so the same it uses “slightly language” thing. different means the same “Representative,” of the “Member House” instead of for 2The reading statute, dissent contends that even under our enjoy will “prosecutors deciding continue to considerable discretion how E)24(c) many § charge in to a offenses to relation criminal transaction or Post, discretion, however, pertains series of transactions.” 145. That charge to the prosecutor’s universally power available unvoidable charge not an offense. Petitioner’s would confer the ex charged punishment to determine the traordinary power new offense by simply modifying charging. the manner of *6 example. But “criminal offense” instead of “crime.” Or thing “subsequent say as “sec- means the same offense” that degree requires subsequent a of verbal ond or legisla- government by know-nothingism that would render terminology impossible. quite “second Under tion it is en- subsequent here, in context at issue conviction,” (without any tirely parsing”) that a defend- “sentence clear pre- who has crime committed ant convicted viously in 1993, of crime been convicted committed the enhanced sentence. receive extensively quotes v. United
The dissent from Gonzalez (CA1 1955). post, at 138-139. But States, 224 F. 2d See approach supporting favored the “text-insensitive” far from construing acknowledges “[i]n by that that case dissent, ... the decisions the courts offender statutes particular depending upon involved.” statute have varied says; points out, at 434. It as the dissent 2d, 224 F. “uniformly” it to the rule that a courts have held federal can after for the second offense occur conviction first. holdings disregard were not arrived Ibid. But those goes statutory contrary, To text. Gonzalez on explain: “ legally be known that an offense has been Tt cannot until there has been conviction. A second committed is offense, statutes, as used the criminal one has conviction for a first been committed after offense/” (CA5 Ibid, (quoting Owens, Holst v. 24 F. 2d 1928)). present does not use the term statute, however, “of- possibly requires it
fense,” so cannot be said it crimi- requires is a nal act after the first conviction. "What con- utterly after the first viction conviction. There no ambiguity that, hence no occasion to invoke rule (The lenity. erroneous lower-court decisions cited post, at see do dissent, 142-144, assessment; not alter by- ambiguous judges to become clear text cannot cause a it.) ignoring personal supports nothing the dis but intuition end,
In the at those who the statute is directed sent’s contention “ ” punishment,’ the initial to learn their lessons from Tañed *7 2d post, (quoting 601, 603 F. Neal, 976 United States at 1992) (CA9 (Fletcher, dissenting)). intuitions, Like most J., Congress intuitor thinks have what the it finds to intended Congress ought it is intuitions, intend.3 And like most to very precise. “[Flailed from the not to learn their lessons serving suggest punishment” that the to initial would seem punishment, pronouncement of the mere of the rather than necessary repeat the be is criminal will deemed it, before position certainly appeals inadequate that to an student —a to the sense,” Elsewhere, however, if not text. “common says taught that lesson is once “an earlier convic dissent post, at 142—so that the felon who final,” tion has become escapes during a that in a becomes trial results conviction though eligible punishment crimes, for his later for enhanced taught seemingly except no lesson that the law he has been easy abandoned, is beat. But no Once text is to matter. to one will as well as other. choose intuition serve We gives no statute, follow the of the which indication punishment those fail to learn the of that who “lesson” punishment prior purpose or of the sole conviction is §924(e)(1), penal goals the exclusion of other such as taking repeat especially long pe offenders off the streets for simply visiting society’s upon repeat riods, or of retribution severely. agree fenders more We not dissent’s do with suggestion goals defy that these “common sense.” It seems eminently punish to us murder, sensible second for quotes ungarnished policy approvingly dissent view e., “‘punishing first not yet [i. offenders offenders been who twenty-five-year an offense] convicted of earlier sentences not does ” Post, much deter crime as as it ruins 10 (quoting lives.’ n. Jones, States (CA8 1992)). F. 2d a term of years— than rather with life prison example, .in (or completion first murder of the or not conviction whether murder) occurred. has yet for the first the sentence contention over petitioner’s we not tarry need Finally, sentence his for because 105-year is called of lenity rule cannot but question the Court unjust so glaringly “is such an application intended Congress whether conviction.’” his ‘in the case of second phrase, 24. under the dissent’s Petitioner Even Brief for of six offenses consist whose only some criminals 924(c)(1), total sentence of 105 would receive a armed bank robberies is un- see no reason why “glaringly We years prison. be- here, similarly simply treated just” petitioner and con- detection, prosecution, to evade cause he managed ultimately five offenses and was tried the first viction for a single all six in proceeding. affirmed. Court Appeals
The judgment *8 so ordered.
It is Blackmun Stevens, with whom Justice Justice join, dissenting. O’Connor Justice different to sometimes uses slightly Congress Thus, uses the same terms message. Congress convey offense,” or offense,” subsequent “second “subsequent various or conviction” in sections “second subsequent for re- Code, all to authorize enhanced sentences Criminal occasions, meticulously Congress offenders.1 On some peat the chosen term those offenses committed identify defines to after become final”;2 a conviction “has more frequently,
1 See, g., e. § of ("subsequent mailing 18 U. S. C. offense” to 1302 related (“second lottery tickets); sexually § to subsequent offense” related or 844(h) (“second § advertising); subsequent for felo oriented explosives). nious use See, g., 859(b) (distribution (1988 III) e. ed., § drugs 21 U. Supp. S. C. 860(b) (1988 Ill) (distribution minors); ed., Supp. drugs to 21 U. S. C. substances). schools); 962(b) (importation near 21 U. S. C. of controlled sense to and the reader’s common usage it relies on settled same meaning. impart definition, a even absent Code,
In certain sections the word “subse- clear that makes perfectly the context after committed a prior those offenses describes quent” for in- Title 18 U. S. C. has become final. conviction authorizes tickets, of lottery stance, mailing which prohibits offense.” A “any subsequent sentence for 5-year prison like the one phrase, adopted literal of five would justify imposition majority today, presumably if a who sold six tickets lottery sentences defendant 5-year But in a indictment. single the mail were charged through intended to treat such it is to think that Congress absurd enhance- to offender, subject penalty defendant as a repeat detection, evade he to managed prose- because ment, “simply was ulti- for the first five offenses and cution, and conviction Ante, all six in 137. single tried for proceeding.” mately is less sections, illuminating, Code where context other to dis word usage “subsequent” long-established recidivists is sufficient between first offenders and tinguish familiar with federal to misunderstanding by anyone avoid in a Thus, construing criminal practice.3 opinion the First Circuit noted offense,” undefined term “subsequent had been construed that most offender” statutes “subsequent con offense “committed provide Gonzalez United viction calls for the increased penalty.” (1955). States, The court continued: 431, 434 F. 2d “In the courts this has been uniformly United States *9 States, held to United Singer [278 rule. v. F. 415 the Third (1922)], the Court for Circuit Appeals a considered similar statute to that substantially pres- us before and held that second offense within the ently 3See, e.g., (“subsequent robbery), §2114 18 U. S. C. of mail as offense” (CA7 Cooper, States interpreted 259, United F. 2d 580 261 1978) (“obvious”“subsequent only applying offense” must be read as offense). prior offenses committed after conviction on a
139
convic
after a
occur
of the statute could
g., United States v.
See,
first offense.
e.
tion for the
(WD
1921)],
Lindquist, [285
Biddle v.
F. 447
Wash.
(CA8 1926)].
Appeals
[11 F.
Court of
2d 235
Thiele,
[24
2d
Owens,
F.
the Fifth Circuit said Holst v.
for
(1928)]:
legally be known that an of
Tt cannot
100, 101
until
has been a convic
committed
there
fense has been
statutes,
used in
criminal
offense,
A second
tion.
has
after conviction for
is one that
been committed
any subsequent
of
Likewise, a third
first offense.
previous
implies
repetition
after
of crime
each
fense
Similarly,
[41
States,
v. United
conviction.’
Smith
(CA9 1930)], the court stated: Tn order
215,
2d
217
F.
subsequent
penalty
conviction
affect
shall
of the of
it must be
to the commission
offenses,
” Ibid.
fense.’
Congress
“subsequent
not define
term
did
924(e)
presume,
fair
in 1968. It is
how-
enacted
when
usage uniformly
Congress
was familiar
ever, that
NLRB Amax
followed in the federal courts. See
Coal
(1981);
States,
Co.,
322,
329
Perrin v. United
444
U. S.
(1979).
given
settled
Indeed,
42-45
construc-
U. S.
hardly surprising
provisions,
offender
it is
tion of
Congressman
proposed
who
the floor amendment
Poff,
924(c),
unnecessary to
that became
felt it
elaborate further.
(1952)
States,
Cf. Morissette v.
U. S.
(“[W]here Congress
borrows terms
absence of con-
art...
may
trary
widely
be taken as
direction
satisfaction with
ac-
them”).
cepted
departure
definitions, not as a
from
It is also
unsurprising
appears
that there
to have been no misunder-
standing
term
“second or
conviction” for
924(c).
years
almost
after the
enactment of
924(e)
was
Section
construed
this Court for the first
Simpson
(1978),
time in
States,
v. United
S. 6
a case
U.
involving sentencing of a defendant who had committed two
apart.
sepa-
robberies,
bank
two months
Convicted
two
*10
in each for bank
was sentenced
trials,
the defendant
rate
924(c),
§
then the max-
to 10
under
and in each
robbery,
years
Id., at 9.
for a
offender.
term
first-time
imum authorized
that
the de-
considered
nobody
possibility
Apparently,
offender at his
been treated as
fendant
have
might
924(c)’s
§
or subse-
under
“second
trial, and sentenced
second
’
event,
In
the fact
despite
conviction”
quent
provision.
have author-
statute would
that
the literal
id.,
924(c)
J.,
at 16-17
dis-
sentences,
§
ized the
(Rehnquist,
them
the rule of
aside,
lenity
the Court set
applying
senting),
did not intend enhancement
concluding
Congress
924(c)
case,
as in
defendant
is also
when,
§
under
Simpson’s
for an en-
under a substantive statute providing
sentenced
Id.,
for use of a firearm.
at 14-15.
hancement
States,
v. Busic
(1980),
the Court
U. S.
924(e)
even more nar-
portion
construed the first offender
Simpson,
a literal
than in
again rejecting
rowly
text that would
re-
supported
contrary
statutory
In his
Justice Stewart
opinion,
succinctly
sult.
dissenting
924(c)
enhancement
“general
described
as a
provision—
first offenders and even stiffer
with its stiff sanctions for
sanctions
for recidivists.”4
This
understanding
term
used to
“second
was
describe
recidivism
was shared
other
as several
by
seemingly
judges,
were to
before the construction adopted
years
elapse
Rawlings,
United States Eleventh
Circuit
821 F. 2d
S.,
446 U.
at 416. His full comment:
Simpson
agree
holding
“I
with the
Congress
did not intend to
‘pyramid' punishments
single
a firearm in
use of
criminal transac-
quite implausible
proposition
Congress,
tion. Yet I find
in enact-
ing 924(c)(1),
general
provision
did not intend this
enhancement
—with
its stiff sanctions for first offenders and even stiffer sanctions for recidi-
vists —to serve as an
punishment
alternative source of enhanced
for those
felonies,
who commit
robbery
assaulting
officer,
as bank
such
a federal
that had
previously singled
by Congress
warranting special
been
out
enhancement, but for which a lesser enhancement
than
sanction
that im-
924(c)
by §
posed
had been authorized.”
*11
and endorsed
(1987),
979
U. S.
denied, 484
cert.
1543,
judicial opinion.
in
reported
appeared
today,
Court
tell
unable to
us
was
the Government
At oral argument,
of
conviction”
or subsequent
the “second
how
§,924(c)
Government prosecutors
construed by
was
Rawlings
27-28.
Arg.
Tr. of Oral
decided.
was
when
1987,
1987,
until
likely
me, however, quite
seems to
It
of
section
or subsequent”
“second
read the
Government
as
just
recidivist
924(e)
provision,
a straightforward
§
as
would
reading certainly
in
That
did
1980.
Stewart
Justice
to this Court
submissions
the Government’s
comport
supra,
Simpson, supra,
Busic,
of which describe
both
in
in
of
terms
conviction” provision
“second or
with the
consistent,
too,
reported
would
It
recidivism.5
that the
924(c)
make clear
which
sentencing,
§
involving
cases
5-year
consecutive
routinely imposing
were
district courts
of two separate
were convicted
defendants
when
sentences
from
without
924(e),
objection
§
under
apparently
offenses
warranted
second conviction
the Government
Henry,
g.,
States v.
e. United
878 F. 2d
See,
sentence.
longer
Jim,
United States
2d
211,
865 F.
(CA6
v.
1989);
937, 938
United States
denied,
(1989);
phrase Code, clearly the phrase the Criminal many counterparts an conviction for offense committed to refer to a is intended States, v. United 1979, T. No. Busic O. See Brief for United States (“Section 924(c) mandatory sentences, 78-6020, minimum p. 19 establishes (without possibility for recidivists requires increasingly severe sentences sentencing”); Brief suspension probation), prohibits concurrent States, Simpson v. United 76-5761, T. O. No. for United States (discussing application sentencing provisions gun- pp. “[i]f 13-14 recidivist”). wielding bank robber were is, short, final; an conviction has become after earlier provision. is that sensible construction recidivist When po- grammatical adopted, and the difficulties course, major- manipulation prosecutorial that trouble the tential for entirely. ity, ante, 181-134, are avoided See see (CA9 1992) (Fletcher, J., Neal, 976 F. 2d States v. (“common-sense 924(c)” dissenting) as recidivist statute). 924(c)’s assuming, re however, that the
Even peat provision his think, as I its not as obvious offender *12 only reading, tory text admits of one belies the notion that its Rawlings. Surely argued adopted in cannot be surfacing years en for the first time 19 after a construction even Indeed, actment available construction. Rawlings, point; no this some after there is consensus on prosecutors to courts—and some Government —continue 924(c) § apply States v. recidivist statute.6 United (CA6), denied, 2d 498 871 Nabors, 901 F. 1351 cert. U. S. Ap (1990), ease of instance, 1990, for decided Court Rawlings, actually peals purported follow but affirmed 5-year imposition on two of two sentences for convictions 924(c) § Similarly, distinct States v. violations.7 United 6 pre-Rawlings, as a eases, Dismissing these as well as those decided ante, long decisions,” explain of at cannot line “erroneous lower-court why years passed interpretation 19 before the of a statute of correct ibid., “utterly ambiguity,” reported appearance. no its made first 7There is some tension between the notion that the text of the'statute unambiguous Appeals’ explanation is clear and Court for its and the of holding: 924(c)(1) is, best, § simple English, we
“While at hard to follow in concur Rawlings reasoning with the statute that two distinct violations of the 924(c)(1). § trigger subsequent provisions sentence of enhancement Thus, 924(c)(1) § the commission of two of violations would result a five- year ten-year consecutive sentence for the and a first conviction consecu- 924(c)(1) § However, tive sentence for the second conviction. because of complexity issue, of this we find the district court’s failure to sentence 924(c)(1) ten-year § Nabors consecutive sentence for his second con- Nabors, clearly 2d, erroneous.” United States viction not 901 F. at 1358-1359.
143 denied, 502 U. S. Luskin, 926 F. 2d (CA4), cert. of later, the Court upheld Appeals decided (1991), year 924(c) com § for three violations sentences 5-year three the minimum manda even dates, though on separate mitted was for a “second tory penalty did the Government of trial. Significantly, at the time years third on the second and sentences challenge 5-year not convictions.8 on the those least, very equivocation part
At the § under- combined 924(c), with enforcing charged 924(c) current when provisions offender standing repeat 924(e) sufficiently enacted, render the construction was Simp- apply. the rule should Cf. lenity uncertain Abreu, States see son, 14-15; U. S., banc). (CA10 (en 1992) one Dis- As 2d 1450-1451 F. of a 1991 in the course 924(c), trict Court said judge sentencing: not a model of Its use clarity.
“The statute is of- rather than wording describing word ‘conviction’ recidivists an intent to reach who fense suggests conviction in the judicial system conduct after *13 history suggests offenses. The Con- legislative ‘if to draconian impose punishment was gress trying Cong. he it second time.’ 114 Rec. does a (1968). unclear whether means a second time It is this a has not as a recidivist or second time offender who stat- faced deterrence sentence. Criminal by prior construed. Nabors 2d, must at strictly utes F. [901 repeat “The 1988 raised the penalty amendment for violators twenty years. to the the time of statute version that was effect at repeat present crimes, penalty Argua the for was ten years. violators bly, judge the district appellant five-year should sentenced to one ten-year imprisonment and two consecutive terms of his convictions' through However, V VII. not under Counts since the United States has States counter-appealed on it.” United point, we not address will Luskin, F. 2. 2d, at n. 924(c)(1) best, hard follow in ‘§ to is, at said that 1358] me, I in front of Mr. Godwin . .With simple English diffi than one found to test decline to hold him higher v. God United States court judges.” cult by appellate win, 758 F. Supp. 1991). (ED 281, 283 Pa. 924(c) § the Court any ambiguity,
In an
to cure
effort
em-
with an
analysis,
an intricate grammatical
undertakes
Court,
to the
“conviction.”9 According
on the word
phasis
924(c)
§
to
must be
finding
referred
the “conviction”
because sen-
final
entry
judgment,
guilt, preceding
if
“conviction”
judgment;
tence is
final
imposed
there
be no
itself,
to
op-
referred
the final judgment
Ante, 132.
for sentence enhancement.
portunity
ibid., which,
I
has thus
situation,
“absurdity]”
note,
of this
924(c)
courts to
a recidivist
far eluded all of the
apply
“conviction,”
than
that use
suggests
The Court also
of the word
rather
“offense,”
repeat
provisions
offender
distinguishes
this statute from
(CA1
States,
1965), supra,
It is out in defense its as the Court “offense” and are not What is at words “conviction” identical. here, however, thing issue is not whether the terms mean the same in all they they usages, but mean the thing whether same when are used identify to Congress subject the class of offenders enhanced sentences. (context ante, “conviction”). gives meaning Cf . at 131-132 to word used, If there is difference between as so the terms lends 924(e) support provision. further to the conclusion recidivist As above, repeat discussed offender statutes couched of “offense” terms 924(c)’s were identify understood at the time enactment offenses conviction. supra, fortiori, at 138-139. A committed after a See “use of the wording describing word ‘conviction’ rather than the offense *14 suggests an intent to reach recidivists who conduct after conviction Godwin, judicial prior United States system in the v. for offenses.” 1991). 281, 283 (ED Supp. F. Pa. supra, sentencing if we assume see statute, evaporates understand sense to common enough with are gifted judges en- final a second judgment, entry they may, upon event, the therein. incorporated hance sentence convic- or subsequent that a “second conclusion majority’s question leaves unanswered a is finding guilt tion” (finding conviction that second here: whether dispositive if it or to enhancement subject is entry judgment) guilt has conviction committed after not an offense become final. conclusion in the for its additional support finds
The Court 924(c) §of contrary readings some fact that at least to impose either unreviewable discretion a prosecutor “give provisions” through enhanced sentencing or to waive the Ante, at crime or crimes. she charged manner in which the majority’s par out already I pointed 133. 924(c) is §if treated not concern is implicated ticular supra, 142-143; at recidivist provision, a straightforward commits second a defendant who construction, under that be 924(c) eligible. the first would not before trial on offense tried the two counts were whether enhancement for sentence would add Court’s I together. separately does not solve broader problem alternative see Tr. of Oral concedes, Government As the identifies. will continue considerable 31-32, enjoy prosecutors Arg. 924(c) offenses to deciding many charge how discretion or series of transactions. to a criminal transaction in relation and, time, robs bank at same An armed defendant who 924(c) two § to one or assaults a guard, may subject is the and the the choice charges; prosecutor’s, consequence, a 15- the difference between a 5- and holding, under today’s States Jim, 2d, 865 F. at enhancement. Cf. year (defendant three counts 924(c), under each charged United States episode); from same criminal arising Fontanilla, (same). 2d, F. *15 924(c) enhanced,
Section of the Criminal Code mandates an sentence for Between 20-year repeat offenders. when the statute was enacted, and when textualism replaced common sense in its the bench and interpretation, bar seem to have understood that applied defendants provision who, once been under having 924(c), convicted “failed to learn their lessons from the initial punishment” and com- Neal, See United States mitted a offense. 2d, J., F. at 608 (Fletcher, contrary read- dissenting).10 ing today, Court driven an adopted by by elaborate exer- cise in sentence parsing, responsive neither historical context nor common sense. I cannot Because agree this unwarranted harsh construction unnecessarily 924(c), should, minimum, of which at a in- formed the rule I lenity, respectfully dissent.
10“However, punishing first twenty-five-year offenders with sentences does not deter crime as If, much as it ruins lives. after arrest and convic tion, a first offender is warned that he a mandatory will face twenty-year sentence if he again, commits the same crime then the offender will know penalty. Having already years prison, served at least five he will have strong to stay incentive out of trouble. Discouraging recidi by people vism already who have been in prison and been released serves a far more purpose valuable than deterring yet offenders who have to be arrested no knowledge penalties.” the law’s United States Jones, 1992) 1507, 1521 (CA8 (internal 965 F. 2d omitted). citation