People v. RogersPeople v. Rogers
A. Factual Background3
On May 9, 1997, defendant Robert Wayne Rogers entered a sandwich shop with a shirt wrapped around his hand. He went behind the register, pressed his hand into the manager‘s ribs, and told her to open the register. After the manager complied, Rogers took the money from the register and fled.
On May 12, 1997, Rogers entered a bakery with a piece of clothing wrapped around his hand. He told a bakery employee that he needed her to do him a favor, asked her if there was a safe, and ordered her to open it. Once she opened the safe, Rogers took bags out of it and ordered her to open the register. After she opened the register, Rogers took the money and ordered the employee to go into the back office.
On June 18, 1997, Rogers entered a pharmacy. He approached the counter with something wrapped around his hand, told the two cashiers he had a gun inside the bag he was carrying, and demanded money. A cashier began handing Rogers money from a register, but Rogers proceeded to reach over the counter and grab more money on his own. Rogers exited the pharmacy and fled the scene in a vehicle. One of the cashiers obtained the license plate number of Rogers‘s car.
The robbery victims identified Rogers as the perpetrator.
1. Charges, Verdict, Original Sentence, and Appeal
In October 1997, the district attorney filed an information charging Rogers with four counts of robbery (
On February 13, 1998, the jury convicted Rogers of three counts of robbery (counts 1, 4 & 5) and false imprisonment (count 2). The jury found Rogers not guilty of one count of robbery (count 3) and found not true the firearm use allegation attached to count 5. The jury was unable to reach a decision on the firearm use allegations attached to counts 1, 2, and 4. The trial court declared a mistrial on those allegations and subsequently struck them at sentencing.
On February 23, 1998, the trial court held a bench trial and found true each of the prior conviction and prison prior allegations stated in the information.
On March 30, 1998, the trial court heard argument on Rogers‘s Romero motion and denied it. The court sentenced Rogers to consecutive terms of 25 years to life for each of the three robbery counts and stayed a two-year prison term for the false imprisonment count (
Rogers appealed. He raised several claims of error, including that the trial court erred in denying his Romero motion. (Rogers I, supra, H018398, at pp. 23–28.) This court affirmed the judgment. (Id. at p. 31.)
2. Section 1170.126 Petition
In 2014, Rogers filed a petition to recall his sentence pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Reform Act, Act, or Proposition 36) and
a. Rogers‘s Motion
On June 29, 2023, Rogers, through counsel, filed a “resentencing motion pur[su]ant to Penal Code [section] 1172.75” (some capitalization omitted) (hereafter motion).6 Rogers asked the trial court to invalidate his legally invalid prison priors and conduct a full resentencing hearing.
Rogers asserted that after his sentence is recalled under
Rogers specifically asked the trial court to apply various “ameliorative laws” that had been enacted since his original sentencing, including: (1) Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81), which amended
Regarding Senate Bill 81, Rogers asserted that that bill applied to his prior serious felony enhancements (
In his motion, Rogers proposed five potential sentences for the trial court‘s consideration. Four of the proposals involved the imposition of a determinate sentence following the granting of Rogers‘s Romero request as to all but one of his strike priors.
b. District Attorney‘s Opposition
The district attorney opposed Rogers‘s motion, urging the trial court to reject Rogers‘s “attempts to bootstrap two
c. Initial Hearing
On October 4, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the matter. The prosecutor stated that the People were “absolutely fine with every prison prior enhancement, including the five-year enhancement being struck.” However, the prosecutor requested “that there be no additional modification to [Rogers]‘s sentence.” The prosecutor argued that although the court “has the authority to modify all of the one-year and five-year priors,” under “additional authority” (referring to a recent appellate court decision which the district attorney had not cited in his opposition), Senate Bill 483 could not be used to “modify a three-strikes sentence.”
Rogers‘s defense counsel noted that a petition for review was pending on the recent decision and reiterated the defense position that the trial court “has the authority to do a full resentencing” of Rogers.
The trial court stated that it did not want to act beyond its authority and continued the matter to “see what happens with the petition [for] review.”
d. Supplemental Briefing
On October 13, 2023, Rogers‘s defense counsel filed a supplemental brief addressing the decision that the prosecutor had raised at the hearing, People v. Kimble (July 14, 2023, C097389) (Kimble I) [previously published at 93 Cal.App.5th 582].
In reply, the district attorney noted that Kimble I had been ordered depublished and the matter transferred to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of the Attorney General‘s reversal of his previous position on the issue presented.7 Nevertheless, the district attorney objected to any determinate sentence for Rogers and asserted that Senate Bill 483 and
e. Further Hearing and Resentencing
On October 30, 2023, the trial court held a further hearing on the matter. At the hearing, Rogers‘s defense counsel reiterated the defense contentions regarding full resentencing, striking the strike priors under Romero, and the inapplicability of the conclusion stated in Kimble I. Counsel further noted that Rogers was currently in his early sixties and had had “some major surgeries.” Counsel argued that Rogers was not a
In response, the prosecutor maintained that Rogers is a public safety risk and the trial court should “decline to exercise its discretion in striking any of the enhancements, other than the prison priors.” The prosecutor argued further that the court did not have the authority to strike Rogers‘s strike priors as part of a Senate Bill 483 resentencing because the Legislature did not expressly provide for such discretion in the language of the statute, and
The trial court decided that it had the discretion to strike Rogers‘s strike priors and resentence Rogers. When the prosecutor asked the court to provide “for the record” its “discretionary reasons for striking the strikes,” the court responded, “Because of the changes in the three-strike law that I believe had this case come before this [c]ourt now [sic], I think that the [c]ourt would have had the discretion to get rid of the strikes, and probably would have, at least one or two of them -- at least one of them anyway.” The prosecutor replied by noting that the original sentencing court had the discretion to strike Rogers‘s strike priors under Romero but declined to do so. The prosecutor inquired further about the precise change in the law that “has resulted in a reevaluation of the three strikes in this case.” The court responded, “It‘s not so much a change in the law as a
When pronouncing Rogers‘s sentence, the trial court stated that one strike prior “remains. I‘m striking any other strike priors.” The court also struck the legally invalid prison priors. The court resentenced Rogers to a total determinate term of 39 years, comprising 10 years (upper term, doubled because of the remaining strike prior9) on count 1 (robbery); two years (middle term) on count 2 (false imprisonment), stayed pursuant to
The district attorney appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
In his opening brief, the district attorney raises two primary contentions. First, he contends the trial court erred in striking Rogers‘s strike priors because the plain language of Senate Bill 483 and
Second, the district attorney alternatively contends that if
Rogers responds that the trial court is authorized to conduct a full resentencing hearing under
After completion of the appellate briefing, this court requested supplemental briefing from the parties regarding the impact of the decision of a different panel of this court in People v. Superior Court (Williams) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1242 (Williams), review granted August 28, 2024, S286128.11
In his supplemental brief, the district attorney asserts that Williams supports the contentions he raised in his earlier briefing. By contrast, Rogers contends that Williams is inapposite because he “has never qualified for relief under
This court subsequently requested additional supplemental briefing on whether, under the circumstances of Rogers‘s
In his second supplemental brief, the district attorney asserts that Monroe “held that a full resentencing was required, but always under the terms of
Rogers maintains that
A. Standard of Review
The interpretation of a statute and the determination of the scope of a trial court‘s authority under relevant statutes are questions of law that we review de novo. (People v. Jimenez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 53, 61; see also People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 308, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189; City of Desert Hot Springs v. Valenti (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 788, 793.)
In interpreting a statute, ” ’ ” ’ “our fundamental task [] is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute‘s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ’ “[W]e look to ‘the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question ’ “in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We must harmonize ‘the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961; see also B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 9 [same principles apply to interpretation of a statute enacted by voters].)
” ’ “[W]e review the [trial court‘s] ruling, not the court‘s reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm.” ’ ” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 39.)
Regarding a trial court‘s decision to dismiss or strike a strike prior under
B. Legal Principles
1. Section 1172.75
Once a trial court has received information from CDCR and determined that a defendant‘s current judgment includes a prior prison term enhancement that is now legally invalid, “the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (
Regarding resentencing,
“(2) The court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.
“(3) The court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant‘s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that
“(4) Unless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
2. Three Strikes Law
“The Three Strikes law was ‘[e]nacted “to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses” [citation], [and] “consists of two, nearly identical statutory schemes.” ’ [Citation.] In March 1994, the Legislature codified its version of the Three Strikes law by adding
“Under the [Three Strikes] law, defendants who commit a felony after two or more prior convictions for serious or violent felonies were sentenced to ‘an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of’ at least 25 years. [Citation.] In 2012, Proposition 36 narrowed the class of third-strike felonies for which an indeterminate sentence could be imposed. Now a defendant convicted of a felony outside of that class can receive at most a sentence enhancement of twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for that felony. [Citations.] But Proposition 36 makes a defendant ineligible for this limitation on third-strike sentencing if one of various grounds for ineligibility applies.” (People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1061–1062.)
As mentioned ante (pt. I.B.2.), in Proposition 36 (the Reform Act), ” ‘the voters also established a procedure for “persons presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment” under the prior version of the Three Strikes law to seek resentencing
3. Section 1385(a) and Romero
The power of dismissal provided in
In Romero, our Supreme Court concluded that
The Three Strikes law “not only establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial court‘s power to depart from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its decision to do so.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) “[W]hen facing a motion to dismiss a strike allegation, the trial court ‘must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant‘s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of [the defendant‘s] background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme‘s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.’ ” (People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 641, italics omitted.)
C. Analysis
1. Trial Court Authority to Strike a Strike Prior Under Section 1385(a) and Romero When Resentencing Under Section 1172.75
There is no dispute that the trial court received information from CDCR about Rogers‘s prison priors (see
The district attorney asserts that a defendant who qualifies for relief under
We are not persuaded.
In Monroe, the Court of Appeal addressed the following circumstance: “In 2020, [the defendant] filed a petition for relief under 2017 legislation granting the trial court discretion to strike the firearm enhancements [(Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.))], and when in 2021 further legislation provided for resentencing to strike the one-year prior [prison] term enhancements [(Senate Bill 483)], [defendant] filed a second petition seeking relief under that statute as well. The trial court resentenced [defendant] and struck the three [one]-year enhancements, but concluded it was without jurisdiction to strike the firearm enhancements.” (Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 395.) Defendant appealed. He argued that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and was entitled to a remand for resentencing so that the trial court could consider whether to exercise its discretion under Senate Bill No. 620 to strike the firearm enhancements, as well as to consider whether to exercise its discretion to strike the five-year serious felony enhancement under Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.). (Id. at pp. 398–399.)
The Monroe court agreed with the defendant that he was entitled to have the trial court consider whether to exercise its discretion under the new laws as part of his resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill 483. (Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 399.) The court explained “there is no dispute that [defendant] was entitled to resentencing under
Regarding the defendant‘s request for a remand for resentencing, the Monroe court rejected the Attorney General‘s argument that defendant was “not entitled to a full resentencing on remand because his judgment of conviction was final and the prior prison term enhancements have already been stricken, such that no enhancements are being stricken on [appellate] review.” (Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 401–402.) The court explained, “By its plain terms,
The Monroe court did not conclude that the requisite ” ’ “full resentencing” ’ ” under
The language of
Additionally,
Similarly, the mandatory directive in
We agree with the Monroe court that ”
We turn to the district attorney‘s argument that, even if Rogers qualified for a full resentencing under
Although
We likewise are not persuaded that interpreting
As for the Reform Act‘s resentencing procedure (
It is true that, broadly speaking, some defendants serving a Three Strikes sentence might fall within the eligibility criteria for potential relief under both sections 1172.75 and 1170.126. That was the case, for example, for the defendants in Williams, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at page 1270, review granted (conc. & dis. opn. of Greenwood, P. J.), Kimble II, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at page 750, review granted, and Guevara, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page 982, review granted. (See also Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 654.) However, that is not always the case, and it is not so here. Rogers has never been eligible for relief under
It is well established that, even where a statute addresses a similar area to a prior initiative, ” ’ “[t]he Legislature remains free to address a ’ “related but distinct area” ’ [citations] or a matter that an initiative measure ‘does not specifically authorize or prohibit.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Rojas (2023) 15 Cal.5th 561, 568.) The application of
There is nothing in the Reform Act that specifically authorizes or prohibits a recall of Rogers‘s sentence and his resentencing. The voter information guide for the Reform Act explicitly acknowledges the limited applicability of the initiative. It states, “This measure reduces prison sentences served under the [T]hree [S]trikes law by certain third strikers whose current offenses are nonserious, non-violent felonies. The measure also allows resentencing of certain third strikers who are currently serving life sentences for specified nonserious, non-violent felonies.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) analysis of Prop. 36 by Legis. Analyst, p. 49.) Rogers is not one of the “certain third strikers” that falls within the parameters of the initiative. Because the Reform Act is silent on individuals in Rogers‘s situation,
We are similarly unpersuaded by the district attorney‘s argument that it would be improper to permit a resentencing court to consider a renewed Romero motion if such a motion were denied at the defendant‘s original sentencing. The Court of Appeal in Alberto stated the “general rule” that “the power of one judge to vacate an order made by another judge is limited.” (Alberto, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 427.) The Alberto court explained the rationale for this rule as follows: “For one superior court judge, no matter how well intended, even if correct as a matter of law, to nullify a duly made, erroneous ruling of another superior court judge places the second judge in the role of a one-judge appellate court.” (Ibid.)
In sum, we conclude the trial court had the authority to exercise its discretion under
2. Trial Court Erred by Failing to State Reasons for Striking the Strike Priors Under Section 1385(a) and Romero
Notwithstanding that the trial court had the authority to strike the strike priors at Rogers‘s
A trial court “must explain its reasons for striking a prior.” (In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550; see also People v. Williams (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 828, 835;
As detailed ante (pt. I.B.3.e.), when the prosecutor asked the trial court to provide its “discretionary reasons for striking the strikes,” the trial court suggested its decision was motivated by “the changes in the three-strike law” and said it “probably would have” struck some of Rogers‘s strike priors had it conducted his original sentencing. Upon
We agree with the district attorney that the trial court offered “no reasons that would justify the extraordinary relief it bestowed by striking six of [Rogers]‘s seven strike allegations.” The “great power” to deviate from the Three Strikes law “should only be used in ‘extraordinary’ circumstances, when the ends of justice demand it. [Citations.] [¶] In determining whether such circumstances exist in a given case, the trial court must balance society‘s legitimate interest in imposing longer sentences for repeat offenders and the defendant‘s constitutional right against disproportionate punishment. [Citation.] It must also consider the nature of the defendant‘s present felonies and prior strike convictions, as well as his background, character and prospects. [Citation.] And, of course, the court must remember the Three Strikes law is not discretionary in nature. Rather, the law must be applied when the defendant has two or more prior strikes, unless the court concludes an exception to the law should be made because, for articulable reasons that can withstand scrutiny for abuse, the defendant lies outside the spirit of the law such that he should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more strikes.” (People v. Mayfield (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1105.)
The trial court‘s articulated reasons for striking Rogers‘s strike priors amount to general statements affirming its authority for and the propriety of imposing a lesser sentence under
The trial court‘s error in failing to set forth its reasons for striking Rogers‘s strike priors requires a reversal of the trial court‘s resentencing order and a remand for a hearing at which the trial court must state its reasons in accordance with
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court‘s resentencing order is reversed, and the matter is remanded for resentencing under
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P. J.
Wilson, J.