THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VINCE E. LEWIS, Defendant and Appellant.
S260598
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
July 26, 2021
Second Appellate District, Division One B295998; Los Angeles County Superior Court TA117431
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuellar, Kruger, and Jenkins concurred.
In this case, we are asked to decide two questions specific to
Here, the trial court considered the record of conviction without appointing counsel and summarily denied defendant Vince E. Lewis’s
Nevertheless, we conclude that the deprivation of Lewis’s right to counsel under
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual and Procedural History
In 2012, defendant Lewis, along with codefendants Ariana Coronel and Mirian Herrera, were convicted of killing fellow Easy Riders gang member Darsy Noriega for her apparent disloyalty to their gang.2 At their trial, former codefendant Amy Aleman testified that Noriega was ordered to attend a gang meeting, which had been called by Lewis, on the night of her death. During the meeting, Lewis told Aleman, Coronel, Herrera, and Noriega to accompany him to buy beer, which they
The jury convicted Lewis, Coronel, and Herrera of Noriega’s first degree murder. (
Lewis, Coronel, and Herrera appealed. (Lewis I, supra, B241236.) While their appeal was pending, we decided People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu). Chiu “held that natural and probable consequences liability cannot extend to first degree premeditated murder because punishing someone for first degree premeditated murder when that person did not actually perpetrate or intend the killing is inconsistent with ‘reasonable concepts of culрability.’ ” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 838, quoting Chiu, at p. 165; see generally Chiu, at pp. 165–166.)3 Chiu further explained, “When a trial court instructs a
jury on two theories of guilt, one of which was legally correct and one legally incorrect, reversal is required unless there is a basis in the record to find that the verdict was based on a valid ground.” (Chiu, at p. 167.) Stated differently, “[d]efendant’s first degree murder conviction must be reversed unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury based its verdict on the legally valid theory that defendant directly aided and abetted the premeditated murder.” (Ibid.)
In relevant part, the Lewis I court agreed with Lewis that, under Chiu, the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could convict him of Noriega’s murder if he aided Herrera in an assault on Noriega with force likely to produce great bodily injury and that murder was the natural and probable consequence of the assault. (Lewis I, supra, B241236.) However, quoting Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at page 167, the Lewis I court concluded the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the record showed that Lewis directly aided and abetted Herrera in the deliberate, premeditаted murder of Noriega. (Ibid.)
We denied Lewis’s petition for review of Lewis I.
B. Senate Bill 1437
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed
Pursuant to
Where the petition complies with
C. Section 1170.95 Petition
On January 7, 2019, Lewis filed a petition complying with
Lewis appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s summary denial. (Lewis II, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th 1128.) The court rejected Lewis’s claims that the trial court erred by not appointing counsel and relying on the record of conviction to summarily deny his petition. We granted Lewis’s petition for review.
A. Principles of Statutory Interpretation
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. (United Educators of San Francisco etc. v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 805, 812; People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71.) “ ‘ “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.) “ ‘[W]e look to “the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpоse of the provision . . . . [Citation.]” [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question “ ‘in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute . . . .’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] We must harmonize “the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.” ’ ” (People v. Arroyo (2016) 62 Cal.4th 589, 595 (Arroyo).)
B. Language and Structure of Section 1170.95, Subdivision (c)
The two issues before us turn on the interpretation of
The Court of Appeal and the People read
We reject this interpretation of
Such a reading does not “disregard” the first sentence of
Notably, whether a petitioner “requests the appointment of counsel” is part of the information that must be included in a petition for it to satisfy the court’s
Nonetheless, the People and the Court of Appeal adopt a position that interprets
The People rely on Verdugo, which, elaborating on the reasoning in Lewis II, attempts to support a two-step process by underscoring that the first reference to a prima facie showing in
Though the structure envisioned by the People and the Court of Appeal assumes that the trial courts will “promptly rule on eligibility” (Tarkington, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 904, fn. 9, review granted), there is nothing in the statute that compels them to do so and, predictably, our busy trial courts may be unable to turn to these petitions in less than 60 days. There is no time limit by which the trial court must make a ruling. This means that courts can rule, and have ruled, on the so-called first-step prima facie review after 60 days have passed. The effect of the People’s interpretation is that the prosecution may be compelled to file its response before the court makes its “first-step” prima facie determination. Creating this artificial first step (which is unencumbered by any time limits) means that the trial court can, and sometimes does, wait for the prosecution’s response and then deny the petition before the petitioner even files a reply. Furthermore, since the briefing deadlines are triggered by the filing of the petition, the parties will likely begin preparing their briefs at the same time the court is conducting its first-step review, the result of which is that the court and the parties may be duplicating their efforts by conducting essentially the same type of review of the same documents at the same time. Moreover, if the trial court awaits full briefing on its first-step prima facie review and then decides that the petitionеr has met his or her burden, the subdivision, by its
In addition, the People assume (as they must in order to avoid the illogical conclusion that the petitioner must file a written reply to the prosecution’s response without the aid of counsel) that the petitioner’s counsel will assist in preparing a reply. But, again, there is no time limit for the trial court to conduct its so-called first step review, which means that, absent a ruling from the trial court, petitioners may be forced to file their reрly briefs without the assistance of counsel. (See Cooper, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 121, fn. 8, review granted [“If the Legislature intended an initial prima facie review before the parties submitted briefing, surely a better way to ensure that a trial court conducted it promptly would be to impose a deadline on the court, not the prosecution”].) Thus, the People’s interpretation risks creating a highly disorganized and uncertain briefing schedule, whereby the parties have no idea whether the court will rule before their statutory deadlines come due. This means that the parties may prepare their briefs even if the court rules before they are filed. Under our reading, the parties can be confident that the court will not act on a petition until after briefing is complete.4
All of this, of course, lays bare the fallacy of the so-called first-step prima facie framework: because the briefing schedule is tied tо the filing of the petition itself and because there is no time limit by which courts must make this purported “first step” analysis,
The People’s interpretation also raises serious questions about how to distinguish between the so-called first-step and second-step prima facie analyses. The Court of Appeal
The People admit that “[t]he substantive question in step two is the same as in step one — whether the record of conviction shows the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.” However, they argue that the so-called steps “may be distinct in time and manner of presentation even if the legal question they pose is the same.” While the Peoрle accept that there “is no textual basis” to distinguish between the steps, they posit that appointing counsel “at step two may be helpful for practical reasons.” More specifically, the People argue, “at step two, ‘the prosecutor may be able to identify additional material from the record of conviction not accessible to, or reviewed by, the court during its first prima facie determination (for example, jury instructions) that establish the petitioner is not eligible for relief. In a reply the petitioner, represented by counsel, may rebut the prosecutor’s claim of ineligibility.’ (Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 330, fn. 9, review granted.)”
According to the People’s argument, the substantive question in step two is the same as step one and the court may rely on precisely the same information it relied on in step one.
In sum,
C. Other Interpretive Aids
Even if we considered the language and structure of
As previously noted,
However, noncomplying petitions may be quickly screened out under
Of course, these devices will not screen out all meritless petitions.
Indeed, the legislative history of
On the other hand, there could also be significant cost savings for the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The Senate Appropriations Committee observed that, depending on the number of individuals who could successfully petition for reduced sentences under Senate Bill 1437, the proposed legislation could result in “[u]nknown, potentially major out-year or current-year savings in reduced incarceration expenses,” and “[w]hen these averted admissions are compounded, the savings could reach into the millions of dollars annually.” (Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2018, p. 1.)
In apparent recognition of the expenses accompanying its implementation, Senate Bill 1437 provides: “If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 5.)
This legislative background shows the Legislature did, in fact, engage in the exact type of cost-benefit assessment and policy determination it was entitled to make. (See Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“The judiciary, in reviewing statutes enacted by the Legislature, may not undertake to evaluate the wisdom of the policies embodied in such legislation; absent a constitutional prohibition, the choice among competing policy considerations in enacting laws is a legislative function“].)
Indeed, the two-part process contemplated by the Court of Appeal can create unnecessary inefficiencies. It can be inefficient to ask the trial court to make these threshold legal determinations without the aid of briefing. It is inefficient to expect prosecutors to start briefing the question of whether a petitioner may be eligible for relief under
Consider a situation where the trial court, without briefing, summarily denies a petition, but does so on an improper basis. Petitioner then obtains counsel on appeal who must argue that the trial court made a legal error. The Court of Appeal is able to decipher the legal error (despite the absence of
In sum, “other aids” resolve any conceivable ambiguity in the statutory language of
III. RECORD OF CONVICTION
Having concluded that a petitioner is statutorily entitled to counsel, if requested, upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition, and that subdivision (c) describes only one prima facie showing, we now turn to the question of whether a trial court can rely on the record of conviction in determining whether that single prima facie showing is made. The answer is yes. In fact, Lewis agrees that “the court may — with the benefit of advocacy for both sides — consider the record of conviction at [the prima facie] stage.” In Lewis‘s view, appointed counsel and the prosecutor “can and should make use of the record of conviction.” Notably, there is no disagreement amongst the Courts of Appeal regarding the propriety of the parties and the trial court looking at the record of conviction after the appointment of counsel. (See Cooper, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 122, review granted, italics added, footnote omitted [explaining that the legislative history of Senate Bill 1437 indicates “the Legislature intended for the
The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court‘s prima facie inquiry under
While the trial court may look at the record оf conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for
Appellate opinions, like Lewis I, are generally considered to be part of the record of conviction. (See People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 454–455.) However, as we cautioned in Woodell, the probative value of an appellate opinion is case-specific, and “it is certainly correct that an appellate opinion might not supply all answers.” (Id. at p. 457.) In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in “factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.” (Drayton, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 980.) As the People emphasize, the “prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.”
In sum, the parties can, and should, use the record of conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief under subdivision (c).6
A. Standard of Review
Lewis contends that a trial court‘s “consideration of the record of conviction in connection with a
1. The failure to appoint counsel was error under state statutory law only.
There is no unconditional state or federal constitutional right to counsel to pursue collateral relief from a judgment of conviction. (See In re Barnett (2003) 31 Cal.4th 466, 475 [no federal or state “constitutional right to counsel for seeking collateral relief from a judgment of conviction via state habeas corpus proceedings“]; People v. Shipman (1965) 62 Cal.2d 226, 232 [observing the same in the context of coram nobis relief]; Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 556, 557 [observing that “[p]ostconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial” and concluding that respondent had “no underlying constitutional right to appointed counsel in state postconviction proceedings“].) However, we have held that “if a
For the same reasons, a petitioner is not constitutionally entitled to counsel at the outset of the subdivision (c) stage of the
2. The error is reviewed for prejudice under Watson.
Typically, when an “error is purely one of state law, the Watson harmless error test applies.” (People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29; see Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
Lewis likens the deprivation of counsel in his case to that in Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 699–700, wherein we held the trial court‘s failure to appoint counsel to represent a defendant during a mental competency proceeding, in violation of
Lewis‘s reliance on Lightsey proves unpersuasive; no similar analogy to the “total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial” (Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 699) can be made when a
Lewis contends that “[e]ven if this Court, like the Court of Appeal in Daniel, [supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 676, review granted] leaves open the possibility of harmless error, the error was not harmless in this case. Counsel could have assisted Mr. Lewis in making a prima facie factual case that his conviction for murder rests on now-forbidden natural and probable consequences reasoning.” The People disagree. We decline to resolve this dispute аnd remand the cause to the Court of Appeal for an evaluation of prejudice under Watson in the first instance.
V. DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The cause is remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
GROBAN, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
JENKINS, J.
Name of Opinion People v. Lewis
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 43 Cal.App.5th 1128
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S260598
Date Filed: July 26, 2021
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Ricardo R. Ocampo
Counsel:
Robert D. Bacon, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Sara Ross, Stephen Dunkle and John T. Philipsborn for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Kate Chatfield for Senator Nancy Skinner and The Justice Collaborative Institute as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Sean Riordan, Summer Lacey and David Loy for American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California and American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties as Amici Curie on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Mark Zahner and Nicole C. Rooney, Deputy District Attorney (San Diego), for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Robert D. Bacon
484 Lake Park Avenue, PMB 110
Oakland, CA 94610
(510) 834-6219
Idan Ivri
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 269-6168