People v. LewisPeople v. Lewis
In this case, we are asked to decide two questions specific to
Here, the trial court considered the record of conviction without appointing counsel and summarily denied defendant Vince E. Lewis’s
Nevertheless, we conclude that the deprivation of Lewis’s right to counsel under
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual and Procedural History
In 2012, defendant Lewis, along with codefendants Ariana Coronel and Mirian Herrera, were convicted of killing fellow Easy Riders gang member Darsy Noriega for her apparent disloyalty to their gang.2 At their trial, former codefendant Amy Aleman testified that Noriega was ordered to attend a gang meeting, which had been called by Lewis, on the night of her death. During the meeting, Lewis told Aleman, Coronel, Herrera, and Noriega to accompany him to buy beer, which they did. After leaving the liquor store, Lewis drove around, eventually parking on a street near an alley. After Lewis parked, Aleman, Herrera, and Noriega got out of the car and walked down the alley; Lewis and Coronel remained in the car. In the alley, Herrera shot Noriega to death; Noriega was hit by approximately ten bullets. The prosecution’s gang expert offered testimony that “in general a gang meeting is required to decide whether a member needs to be disciplined and only one person in the gang, the ‘shot caller,’ can call such a meeting.” (Lewis I, supra, B241236.)
The jury convicted Lewis, Coronel, and Herrera of Noriega’s first degree murder. (
Lewis, Coronel, and Herrera appealed. (Lewis I, supra, B241236.) While their appeal was pending, we decided People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu). Chiu “held that natural and probable consequences liability cannot extend to first degree premeditated murder because punishing someone for first degree premeditated murder when that person did not actually perpetrate or intend the killing is inconsistent with ‘reasonable concepts of culpability.’ ” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 838, quoting Chiu, at p. 165; see generally Chiu, at pp. 165–166.)3 Chiu further
jury on two theories of guilt, one of which was legаlly correct and one legally incorrect, reversal is required unless there is a basis in the record to find that the verdict was based on a valid ground.” (Chiu, at p. 167.) Stated differently, “[d]efendant’s first degree murder conviction must be reversed unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury based its verdict on the legally valid theory that defendant directly aided and abetted the premeditated murder.” (Ibid.)
In relevant part, the Lewis I court agreed with Lewis that, under Chiu, the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could convict him of Noriega’s murder if he aided Herrera in an assault on Noriega with force likely to produce great bodily injury and that murder was the natural and probable consequence of the assault. (Lewis I, supra, B241236.) However, quoting Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at page 167, the Lewis I court concluded the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the record showed that Lewis directly aided and abetted Herrera in the deliberate, premeditated murder of Noriega. (Ibid.)
We denied Lewis’s petition for review of Lewis I.
B. Senate Bill 1437
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed
Pursuant to
Where the petition complies with
If the trial court determines that a prima facie showing for relief has been made, the trial court issues an order to show cause, and then must hold a hearing “to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not . . . previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence.” (
C. Section 1170.95 Petition
On January 7, 2019, Lewis filed a petition complying with
Lewis appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s summary denial. (Lewis II, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th 1128.) The court rejected Lewis’s claims that the trial court erred by not appointing counsel and relying on the record of conviction to summarily deny his petition. We granted Lewis’s petition for review.
A. Principles of Statutory Interpretation
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. (United Educators of San Francisco etc. v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 805, 812; People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71.) “ ‘ “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.) “ ‘[W]e look to “the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . [Citation.]” [Citation.] That is, we cоnstrue the words in question “ ‘in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute . . . .’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] We must harmonize “the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.” ’ ” (People v. Arroyo (2016) 62 Cal.4th 589, 595 (Arroyo).)
B. Language and Structure of Section 1170.95, Subdivision (c)
The two issues before us turn on the interpretation of
The Court of Appeal and the People read
We reject this interpretation of
Such a reading does not “disregard” the first sentence of
Notably, whether a petitioner “requests the appointment of counsel” is part of the information that must be included in a petition for it to
Nonetheless, the People and the Court of Appeal adopt a position that interprets
The People rely on Verdugo, which, elaborating on the reasoning in Lewis II, attempts to support a two-step process by underscoring that the first reference to a prima facie showing in
The briefing schedule established by
In addition, the People assume (as they must in order to avoid the illogical conclusion that the petitioner must file a written reply to the prosecution’s response without the aid of counsel) that the petitioner’s counsel will assist in preparing a reply. But, again, there is no time limit for the trial court to conduct its so-called first step review, which means that, absent a ruling from the trial court, petitioners may be forced to file thеir reply briefs without the assistance of counsel. (See Cooper, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 121, fn. 8, review granted [“If the Legislature intended an initial prima facie review before the parties submitted briefing, surely a better way to ensure that a trial court conducted it promptly would be to impose a deadline on the court, not the prosecution”].) Thus, the People’s interpretation risks creating a highly disorganized and uncertain briefing schedule, whereby the parties have no idea whether the court will rule before their statutory deadlines come due. This means that the parties may prepare their briefs even if the court rules
All of this, of course, lays bare the fallacy of the so-called first-step prima facie framework: because the briefing schedulе is tied to the filing of the petition itself and because there is no time limit by which courts must make this purported “first step” analysis,
The People’s interpretation also raises serious questions about how to distinguish between the so-called first-step and second-step prima facie analyses. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that “[i]t is not clear from the text of subdivision (c) what, if any, substantive differences exist between” the two prima facie showings the court identified. (Lewis II, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1140, fn. 10.) The Court of Appeal ultimately concluded that: “We need not decide this issue because the court properly concluded that defendant was neither within the provisions of the statute, nor entitled to relief, as a matter of law based on the record of conviction.” (Ibid.) We share the Court of Appeal’s reluctance to distinguish the “first step” prima facie review from the “second step,” but we come to a different conclusion: the reason the steps sound virtually indistinguishable is because there are not two steps at all.
The People admit that “[t]he substantive question in step two is the same as in step one — whether the record of conviction shows the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.” However, they argue that the so-called steps “may be distinct in time and manner of presentation even if the legal question they pose is the same.” While the Pеople accept that there
According to the People’s argument, the substantive question in step two is the same as step one and the court may rely on precisely the same information it relied on in step one. At core, the People’s position is that the only difference bеtween the two steps is that under the first step the trial court can act without giving petitioner an opportunity to be heard and without giving petitioner a lawyer. We disagree.
In sum,
C. Other Interpretive Aids
Even if we considered the language and structure of
As previously noted,
The Court of Appeal concluded it was “sound policy” to delay the appointment of counsel in the manner it described because it “ ‘would be a
However, noncomplying petitions may be quickly screened out undеr
Of course, these devices will not screen out all meritless petitions.
Indeed, the legislative history of
on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2018, p. 1.)
On the other hand, there could also be significant cost savings for the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The Senate Appropriations Committee observed that, depending on the number of individuals who could successfully petition for reduced sentences under Senate Bill 1437, the proposed legislation could result in “[u]nknown, potentially major out-year or current-year savings in reduced incarceration expenses,” and “[w]hen these averted admissions are compounded, the savings could reach into the millions of dollars annually.” (Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2018, p. 1.)
In apparent recognition of the expenses accompanying its implementation, Senate Bill 1437 provides: “If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 5.)
This legislative background shows the Legislature did, in fact, engage in the exact type of cost-benefit assessment and policy determination it was entitled to make. (See Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“The judiciary, in reviewing statutes enacted by the Legislature, may not undertake to evaluate the wisdom of the policies embodied in such legislation; absent a constitutional prohibition, the choice among competing policy considerations in enacting laws is a legislative function“].)
Permitting trial courts to summarily deny relief before the appointment of counsel would not significantly conserve judicial resources. “[E]ven assuming the practice leads to short-term efficiencies, those savings are a false economy that shifts work from trial counsel to appellate counsel and from the trial courts to the appellate сourts.” (Tarkington, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 925 (dis. opn. of Lavin, J.), review granted.) Leaving it to an appellate court to
Indeed, the two-part process contemplated by the Court of Appeal can create unnecessary inefficiencies. It can be inefficient to ask the trial court to make these threshold legal determinations without the aid of briefing. It is inefficient to expect prosecutors to start briefing the question of whether a petitioner may be eligible for relief under
Consider a situation where the trial court, without briefing, summarily denies a petition, but does so on an improper basis. Petitioner then obtains counsel on appeal who must argue that the trial court made a legal error. The Court of Appeal is able to decipher the legal error (despite the absence of a fully developed record below) and then must remand to the trial court to reassess the question of whether the record entitles the petitioner to an order to show cause. This is exactly what happened in Cooper. (See Cooper, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 123–126, review granted; id. at p. 110 [observing that, whilе some documents were in the appellate record, “it is unclear what other documents the court may have considered“].) That sequence of events is far from efficient.
In sum, “other aids” resolve any conceivable ambiguity in the statutory language of
III. RECORD OF CONVICTION
Having concluded that a petitioner is statutorily entitled to counsel, if requested, upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition, and that subdivision (c) describes only one prima facie showing, we now turn to the question of whether a trial court can rely on the record of conviction in determining whether that single prima facie showing is made. The answer is yes. In fact, Lewis agrees that “the court may — with the benefit
The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court‘s prima facie inquiry under
While the trial court may look at the reсord of conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for
In sum, the parties can, and should, use the record of conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief under subdivision (c).6
IV. PREJUDICE
A. Standard of Review
Lewis contends that a trial court‘s “consideration of the record of conviction in connection with a
1. The failure to appoint counsel was error under state statutory law only.
There is no unconditional state or federal constitutional right to counsel to pursue collateral relief from a judgment of conviction. (See In re Barnett (2003) 31 Cal.4th 466, 475 [no federal or state “constitutional right to counsel for seeking collateral relief from a judgment of conviction via state habeas corpus proceedings“]; People v. Shipman (1965) 62 Cal.2d 226, 232 [observing the same in the context of coram nobis relief]; Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 556, 557 [observing that “[p]ostconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial” and concluding that respondent had “no underlying constitutional right to appointed counsel in state postconviction proceedings“].) However, we have held that “if a [habeas] petition attacking the validity of a judgment states a prima facie case leading to issuance of an order to show cause, the appointment of counsel is demanded by due process concerns.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 780.) When “an indigent petitioner has stated facts sufficient to satisfy the court that a hearing is required, his claim can no longer be treated as frivolous and he is entitled to have counsel appointed to represent him.” (Shipman, at p. 232; see also People v. Fryhaat (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 969, 980–981 [due process requires appointment of counsel when defendant establishes prima facie case for postconviction relief under
For the same reasons, a petitioner is not constitutionally entitled to counsel at the outset of the subdivision (c) stage of the
2. The error is reviewed for prejudice under Watson.
Typically, when an “error is purely one of state law, the Watson harmless error test applies.” (People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29; see Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) However, state statutory error may amount to structural error if it is ” ‘analogous to’ . . . ‘the total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial.’ ” (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 699 (Lightsey), quoting Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279.)
Lewis likens the deprivation of counsel in his case to that in Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 699–700, wherein we held the trial court‘s failure to
Lewis‘s reliance on Lightsey proves unpersuasive; no similar analogy to the “total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial” (Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 699) can be made when a
Lewis contends that “[e]ven if this Court, like the Court of Appeal in Daniel, [supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 676, review granted] leaves open the possibility of harmless error, the error was not harmless in this case. Counsel could have assisted Mr. Lewis in making a prima facie factual case that his conviction for murder rests on now-forbidden natural and probable consequences reasoning.” The People disagree. We decline tо resolve this dispute and remand the cause to the Court of Appeal for an evaluation of prejudice under Watson in the first instance.
V. DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The cause is remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
GROBAN, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
JENKINS, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Lewis
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 43 Cal.App.5th 1128
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S260598
Date Filed: July 26, 2021
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Ricardo R. Ocampo
Counsel:
Robert D. Bacon, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Sara Ross, Stephen Dunkle and John T. Philipsborn for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Kate Chatfield for Senator Nancy Skinner and The Justice Collaborative Institute as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Sean Riordan, Summer Lacey and David Loy for American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California and American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties as Amici Curie on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, Idan Ivri and Amanda V. Lopez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Mark Zahner and Nicole C. Rooney, Deputy District Attorney (San Diego), for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Robert D. Bacon
484 Lake Park Avenue, PMB 110
Oakland, CA 94610
(510) 834-6219
Idan Ivri
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 269-6168