THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRITZ PAIGE, Defendant and Appellant.
A157494
Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two
June 25, 2020
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 162904)
BACKGROUND
In 2010, the Alameda County District Attorney charged Paige with murder. The prosecution contended that Paige, although not the actual killer, aided and abetted an armed robbery in Oakland, California during which a man was shot and killed.1
The record, which largely consists of Paige‘s own statements to police, indicates that in December 2005, Paige suggested to a person he referred to as his “partner,” a long-time friend who needed money, that some day they should rob the attendees of a local dice game in which Paige regularly played and thousands of dollars were being wagered. The partner called Paige on the morning of the incident and complained about his need for money. Paige told him to find two “youngsters” to act as accomplices, obtain a couple of handguns, and conduct an armed robbery of the game‘s attendees, who would include Paige, that evening at an Oakland park. Paige told him the attendees would be unarmed and have about $10,000 with them, and that his partner should not shoot anyone.
At about 6:15 p.m. that evening, Paige‘s partner and two accomplices arrived at the dice game armed with two handguns and a rifle and announced their hold-up. Paige was attending the game. Another man turned a flashlight on Paige‘s partner, who shot the man, resulting in his death. Paige ran from the scene. Subsequently, he met with his partner and received a share of the stolen money.
After being held to answer on the murder charge, Paige entered into a negotiated disposition of his case in 2010, which led to his conviction for voluntary manslaughter and other charges and a 20-year prison sentence. This sentence consisted of an 11-year term for manslaughter, a one-year term for an arming enhancement allegation, and two consecutive four-year terms for other charges unrelated to the incident.2 The court ordered that he receive certain custody and conduct credits, and imposed various fine and fees.
The court appointed Paige counsel and directed the district attorney‘s office to file a response. The district attorney‘s office subsequently argued that: (1) based on documents it submitted, including Paige‘s statements to police, Paige could still be convicted of murder under the new laws as a major participant who acted with reckless disregard for human life, and (2) Paige was ineligible for relief because
Paige filed further briefs. Among other things, he argued that
The trial court heard arguments at a hearing in which it also considered two petitions by other persons that raised the same issue—whether a defendant charged with murder but convicted of voluntary manslaughter pursuant to a plea agreement could petition for resentencing under
Paige filed a timely notice of appeal.
I.
The Superior Court Correctly Interpreted Section 1170.95 .
A. Legal Standards
Where a question of statutory interpretation based on undisputed facts is presented, we conduct an independent review of the statute in question. (People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1166.) “In doing so, ’ “our fundamental task is ‘to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “We begin by examining the words of the statute, affording them ‘their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context’ [citation], for ‘if the statutory language is not ambiguous, then . . . the plain meaning of the language governs.’ ” (People v. Colbert (2019) 6 Cal.5th 596, 603.) “We . . . must, if possible without doing violence to the language and spirit of the law, interpret it so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions.” (People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 14.)
We turn to extrinsic aids to assist in our interpretation “when the statute‘s language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.” (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103.) Extrinsic interpretative aids include the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1369.) ” ‘Ultimately we choose the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute.’ ” (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
The relevant part of
“(a) A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner‘s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply:
“(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
“(2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder. “(3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to
Section 188 or189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (a) , italics added.) The part of subdivision (a) that we have italicized limits relief under the statute to “person[s] convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory,” and the nature of the relief afforded is the right to petition “to have the petitioner‘s murder conviction vacated.” (Italics added.)
The People assert, and our research confirms, that our appellate courts have repeatedly rejected the argument Paige makes here regarding his voluntary manslaughter conviction. As the Fourth Appellate District observed earlier this year in People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428 (Turner), courts, “[r]elying on the clear language of [
As did Turner, Paige focuses on language in subdivision (a)(2) of
Read in isolation,
Even having concluded the statutory language is unambiguous, we may nonetheless consult legislative history to ” ‘determine whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose.’ ” (Turner, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 436, quoting California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 340.) That said, we reject
Beyond these legislative findings, which further undermine Paige‘s argument, the Turner court examined the full history of
” ‘Courts may, of course, disregard even plain language which leads to absurd results or contravenes clear evidence of a contrary legislative intent.’ (Ornelas v. Randolph (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1095, 1105.) But our interpretation does neither. The uncodified legislative declarations and findings in Senate Bill [No.] 1437 make repeated references to ‘murder,’ underscoring the need to amend the natural and probable consequences doctrine ‘as it relates to murder,’ but include no references to manslaughter. The petitioning prerequisites and available relief all presuppose a murder conviction. And the legislative history underscores that the Legislature did not intend to extend relief to persons like Turner, who were convicted of manslaughter by plea.
“Nor does our construction produce absurdity by undermining the Legislature‘s goal to calibrate punishment to culpability. The punishment for manslaughter is already less than that imposed for first- or second-degree murder, and the determinate sentencing ranges of 3, 6, or 11 years for voluntary manslaughter and 2, 3 or 4 years for involuntary manslaughter permit a sentencing judge to make punishment commensurate with a defendant‘s culpability based on aggravating and mitigating factors. (
Pen. Code, § 193, subds. (a) -(b) ; see Munoz, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 757-758, rev. granted.) Providing relief solely to defendants convicted of murder under a felony-murder or natural and probable consequences theory does not conflict with the Legislature‘s stated objective to make ‘statutory changes to more equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (b).)” (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 438-439; see also Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 993 [although manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder, it is ” ‘clearly a separate offense,” andsection 1170.95 “limits relief only to qualifying persons who were convicted or murder“].)
In short, we agree with our colleagues in the Second, Fourth and Fifth Districts holding that defendants charged with felony murder but convicted of voluntary manslaughter pursuant to a plea agreement are not eligible for relief under
Paige‘s Equal Protection Argument Is Without Merit.
Paige also argues that an interpretation of
“The first step in an equal protection analysis is to determine whether the defendant is similarly situated with those who are entitled to the statutory benefit. [Citation.] Cervantes was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a different crime from murder, which carries a different punishment. Normally ‘offenders who commit different crimes are not similarly situated’ for equal protection purposes. [Citation.] ‘[O]nly those persons who are similarly situated are protected from invidiously disparate treatment.’ [Citation.] [¶] . . . [¶]
“When the Legislature reforms one area of the law, it is not required to reform other areas of the law. (Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 488.) It may elect to make reforms ’ “one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” ’ (Ibid.) Here the legislative focus was centered on the unfairness of the felony murder rule. The Legislature could rationally decide to change the law in this area and not be currently concerned with crimes not involved with that rule. (Ibid.) It also could reasonably decide that the punishment for voluntary manslaughter was appropriate, but the punishment for murder based on the felony murder rule could be excessive and reform was needed only there. (Williams v. Illinois (1970) 399 U.S. 235, 241 [‘A State has wide latitude in fixing the punishment for state crimes‘].) Legislators in making this choice could also consider a variety of other factors including the number of prisoners subject to the change and its impact on the ‘administration of justice.’ [Citation.]
“The decision not to include manslaughter in
section 1170.95 falls within the Legislature‘s ‘line-drawing’ authority as a rational choice that is not constitutionally prohibited. (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 283.) ‘[T]he Legislature is afforded considerable latitude in defining and setting the consequences of criminal offenses.’ (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 887.) A classification is not arbitrary or irrational simply because it is ‘underinclusive.’ (Ibid.) ‘A criminal defendant has no vested interest ” in a specific term of imprisonment or in the designation [of] a particular crime [he or she] receives.” ’ (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74.) ‘Courts routinely decline to intrude upon the “broad discretion” such policy judgments entail.’ (Ibid.)” (Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 888-889.)
In Sanchez, the court likewise addressed an equal protection challenge to
We agree with the Cervantes and Sanchez courts’ analyses and adopt them here. Paige‘s equal protection argument also is without merit.
DISPOSITION
The ruling appealed from is affirmed.
STEWART, J.
We concur.
KLINE, P.J.
RICHMAN, J.
People v. Paige (A157494)
Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Morris D. Jacobson
Counsel:
Robert H. Derham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share and Alisha M. Carlile, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.