THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL CERVANTES, Defendant and Appellant.
2d Crim. No. B298077 (Super. Ct. No. 1260902)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX
Filed 1/30/20
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; Santa Barbara County
Daniel Cervantes was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. (
In 2012, Cervantes had been charged with murder. He entered a no contest plea to voluntary manslaughter. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 13 years in state prison.
In 2019, following the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), Cervantes filed a
DISCUSSION
Section 1170.95 and Voluntary Manslaughter Convictions
Cervantes contends that
In interpreting a statute, we first look at the words the Legislature used. ” ’ “[I]f the statutory language is not ambiguous, then . . . the plain meaning of the language governs.” ’ ” (People v. Colbert (2019) 6 Cal.5th 596, 603.)
Here the language of the statute unequivocally applies to murder convictions. There is no reference to the crime of voluntary manslaughter. To be eligible to file a petition under
Of course, ” ‘language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.’ ” (People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898.) But that is not the case here. The plain reading of the statute is consistent with the legislative goal of Senate Bill No. 1437. That bill was enacted to correct the unfairness of the felony murder rule so that murder convictions could be vacated by filing
Cervantes contends the failure to include voluntary manslaughter convictions in
The first step in an equal protection analysis is to determine whether the defendant is similarly situated with those who are entitled to the statutory benefit. (People v. Barrera (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1555, 1565People v. Morales (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 800, 808.) “[O]nly those persons who are similarly situated are protected from invidiously disparate treatment.” (Barrera, at p. 1565.)
Cervantes contends Senate Bill No. 1437‘s underlying goal was to eliminate harsh sentences and to reform the law to make punishment related to actual culpability. He claims it is an irrational discrimination to provide
When the Legislature reforms one area of the law, it is not required to reform other areas of the law. (Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 488.) It may elect to make reforms ” ’ “one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Here the legislative focus was centered on the unfairness of the felony murder rule. The Legislature could rationally decide to change the law in this area and not be currently concerned with crimes not involved with that rule. (Ibid.) It also could reasonably decide that the punishment for voluntary manslaughter was appropriate, but the punishment for murder based on the felony murder rule could be excessive and reform was needed only there. (Williams v. Illinois (1970) 399 U.S. 235, 241 [“A State has wide latitude in fixing the punishment for state crimes“].) Legislators in making this choice could also consider a variety of other factors including the number of prisoners subject to the change and its impact on the “administration of justice.” (Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 310.)
The decision not to include manslaughter in
We also reject Cervantes‘s claim that he was denied substantive due process. “[S]ubstantive due process requires a rational relationship between the objectives of a legislative enactment and the methods chosen to achieve those objectives.” (California Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (1988) 66 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1330.) Here there was such a relationship. The legislative goal was to eliminate the sentencing disparity caused by the felony murder rule. That goal was properly achieved by the
DISPOSITION
The order denying the
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J.
PERREN, J.
Brian E. Hill, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Michael R. Johnsen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.