Opinion
Ajit Bеrnard Rajanayagam appeals from a judgment after he pled guilty to elder and dependent adult abuse (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (b)(1))
FACTS
On August 20, 2011, Rajanayagam grabbed his octogenarian mother by the neck, pushed her to the ground, and restrained her by holding her neck. Police officers arrested him the following day.
On October 31, 2011, the trial court reduced counts 1 and 2 to misdemeanors, and Rajanayagam pled guilty to both offenses. In his sentencing brief, Rajanayagam asserted he was entitled to section 4019 conduct credit under two formulas: (1) from the date of the offense to September 30, 2011, at the rate required by the prior law, and (2) from October 1, 2011, forward at the rate required by the current law. He claimed that pursuant to principles of statutory construction
DISCUSSION
In his opening brief, Rajanayagam argues the operative date for determining whether a defendant is eligible for enhanced conduct credits pursuant to the current versiоn of section 4019 is the sentencing date, and not the offense date. The Attorney General, relying on principles of statutory construction, responds Rajanayagam was not entitled to enhanced conduct credits because he committed his offense before October 1, 2011. The Attorney General also notes Rajanayagam did not raise any constitutional claims. In his reply brief, Rajanayagam concedes he is not entitled to enhanced conduct credits based on statutory construction principles. He asserts, however, denial of enhanced conduct credits violates his equal protection rights and he is entitled to retroactive enhanced conduct credits of 37 days.
After the California Supreme Court filed People v. Brown (2012)
The Orange County Public Defender filed a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief, which we granted. The Orange County Public Defender argues that pursuant to equal protection principles, Rajanayagam was entitled to enhanced presentence conduct credits for time served beginning on October 1, 2011, the operative date of the amendment. The public defender claims that regardless of whether a defendant commits an offense before or after October 1, 2011, all defendants whо are in local custody on and after October 1, 2011, have the same incentive to work and behave, and there is no rational reason for treating the two groups differently. Rajanayagam filed another supplemental letter brief joining in the public defender’s argument. The Attorney General responds Rajanayagam is not entitled to enhanced conduct credits based on a plain reading of the statute. Additionally, the Attorney General states that assuming the two groups are similarly situated, the selection of an operative date was rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
A. Statutory Construction
A defendant is entitled to actual custody credit for “all days of custody” in county jail and residential treatment facilities, including partial days. (§ 2900.5, subd. (a); see People v. Smith (1989)
Section 4019 provides that a criminal defendant may earn additional presentence credit against his or her sentence for performing assigned labor (§ 4019, subd. (b)), and for complying with applicable rules and regulations (§ 4019, subd. (c)). These presentence credits are collectively referred to as conduct credits. (People v. Dieck (2009)
Before January 25, 2010, under section 4019, defendants were entitled to one-for-two conduct credits, which is two days for every four days of actual time served in presentence custody. (Former § 4019, subd. (f), as amended by Stats. 1982, ch. 1234, § 7, pp. 4553, 4554.) Effective January 25, 2010, the Legislature amended section 4019 to accelerate the accrual of presentence conduct credit such that certain defendants earned one-for-one conduct credits, which is two days of conduct credit for every two days in custody. (Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 28, § 50.) The Legislature increased the accrual rate to reduce expenditures in response to Governor Arnold Schwarzеnegger’s declaration of a fiscal emergency. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 3X 18 (2009-2010 3d Ex. Sess.) Jan. 12, 2009; People v. Garcia (2012)
Effective September 28, 2010, the Legislature again amended section 4019. (Stats. 2010, ch. 426, §§ 1, 2, 5.) Subdivisions (b) and (g) restored the less generous one-for-two presentence conduct credit calculation that had been in effect prior to the January 25, 2010, amendment. Thus, all local prisoners
The Legislature next amended section 4019 in Assembly Bill No. 109 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) (hereafter referred to as Assembly Bill No. 109), which was part of the Realignment Act. The Legislature’s stated purpose for the Realignment Act “is to reduce recidivism and improve public safety, while at the same time reducing corrections and related criminal justice spеnding.” (People v. Cruz (2012)
Before Assembly Bill No. 109’s operative date of July 1, 2011, Governor Brown signed Assembly Bill No. 117. Assembly Bill No. 117 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) (hereafter referred to as Assembly Bill No. 117) retained the enhanced conduct credit provision but it changed the effective date to October 1, 2011. (Former § 4019, subd. (h), as amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 39, §53.)
On September 20, 2011, Governor Brown signed Assembly Bill No. IX 17 (2011-2012 1st Ex. Sess.) (hereafter referred to as Assembly Bill No. IX 17), which was enrolled by the Secretary of State on September 21, 2011. (Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011-2012, ch. 12, § 35.) Assembly Bill No. IX 17 is the current version of section 4019. Assembly Bill No. IX 17
In Brown, supra,
The court later reiterated: “[T]he language of section 3 erects a strong presumption of prospective operation, codifying the principle that, ‘in the absence of an express retroactivity provision, a stаtute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature . . . must have intended a retroactive application.’ [Citations.] Accordingly, ‘ “a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed ... to be unambiguously prospective.” ’ [Citation.] . . . . Where the Legislature has not set forth in so many words what it intended, the rule of construction should not be followed blindly in complete disregard of factors that may give a clue to the legislative intent. It is to be applied only after, considering аll pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent.’ [Citation.]” (Brown, supra,
Subdivision (h)’s first sentence states: “The changes to this section enacted by the act that added this subdivision shall apply prospectively and shall apply to prisoners who are confined to a county jail, city jail, industrial farm, or road camp for a crime committed on or after October 1, 2011.” (Italics added.) After declaring itself to operate “prospectively,” the first sentence explicitly states the conduct credit amendment applies only to defendants whose crimes were committed “on or after October 1, 2011.” (Subd. (h).) By the first sentence’s plain language, section 4019 would not apply to Rajanayagam because he committed his crime prior to October 1, 2011. Thus, the first sentence leads unmistakably to the conclusion Rаjanayagam is not entitled to conduct credit at the enhanced rate. Subdivision (h)’s second sentence, however, confuses matters. But the application of well-settled principles of statutory construction confirms our conclusion Rajanayagam is not entitled to enhanced conduct credits for time served on or after October 1, 2011, because he committed his crime before the effective date.
Subdivision (h)'s second sentence provides: “Any days earned by a prisoner prior to October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the ratе required by the prior law.” (Subd. (h).) Arguably the statement “[a]ny days earned by a prisoner prior to October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate required by the prior law” implies any days earned by a defendant after October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate required by the current law, regardless of when the offense was committed. But tti read the second sentence in this manner renders meaningless the first sentence. This we cannot do.
“ ‘ “It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute.” A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error.’ ” (Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1993)
As we explain above, subdivision (h)’s first sentence reflects the Legislature intended the enhanced conduct credit provision to apply only to those defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011. Subdivision (h)’s second sentence does not extend the enhanced conduct credit provision to any other group, namely those defendants who committed offenses before October 1, 2011, but are in local custody on or after October 1, 2011. Instead, subdivision (h)’s second sentence attempts to clarify that those defendants who committed an offense before October 1, 2011, are to earn credit under the prior law. However inartful the language of subdivision (h), we read the second sentence as reaffirming that defendants who committed their crimes before October 1, 2011, still have the opportunity to earn conduct credits, just under prior law. (People v. Ellis (2012)
We recognize the Legislature in drafting subdivision (h)’s second sentence used the word “earned.” And it is impossible to earn presentence credits for an offense that has not yet been committed. But reading the first and second sentences together, the implication is the enhanced conduct credit provision applies to defendants who committed crimes before October 1, 2011, but who served time in local custody after that date. To isolate the verbiage of the second sentence would defy the Legislature’s clear intent in subdivision (h)’s first sentence and contradict well-settled princiрles of statutory construction. In conclusion, we find the enhanced conduct credit provision applies only to those defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011.
The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. (People v. Hofsheier (2006)
Here, the two affected classes are as follows: (1) those defendants who are in jail on and/or after October 1, 2011, who committed an offense on or after October 1, 2011, and (2) those defendants who are in jail on and/or after October 1, 2011, who committed the same offense before October 1, 2011.
These two groups are similarly situatеd for purposes of the October 1, 2011, amendment to section 4019, which increased conduct credits from two days of conduct credit for every four days spent in local presentence custody to two days of conduct credit for every two days spent in local presentence custody. These two groups committed the same offenses and are serving time together in local presentence custody but the current version of section 4019 treats them differently by awarding them different conduct credits based entirely on the dates they committed thеir offenses. Nothing distinguishes the efforts of a prisoner who committed a crime after October 1, 2011, to earn conduct credits from the efforts of one who committed the same crime before that date. Both classifications of prisoners, pre- and post-October 1, 2011, offense defendants, are aware of the conduct credit provision and have an incentive to perform assigned work and comply with rules and regulations because both classifications have the opportunity to earn conduct credit, just at different rates. To argue thаt a defendant who committed an offense before October 1, 2011, but was in local custody on or after that date was not aware of the conduct credit provision and did not have an incentive to work and behave is unpersuasive. Both classes have an incentive to work and behave but a defendant who committed a crime before the effective date is rewarded
The Attorney General relies on Brown, supra,
Brown is inapposite on this point as it did not involve a situation where a defendant sought enhanced conduct credit for time served after the amendment’s operative date. Instead, Brown concerned whether the amendment was retroactive, i.e., whether a defendant who served time before the operative date was entitled to enhanced conduct credits. Here, we are faced with the issue of whether the current version of section 4019 operates prospectively as to a defendant who committed an offense before the amendment’s effective date. We read the language of Brown, supra,
With respect to the judicial scrutiny of the classification, we must determine whether there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. It is undisputed the purpose of section 4019’s conduct credits generally is to affect inmates’ behavior by
Thus, we must determine whether the amendment to section 4019 awarding fewer conduct credits to those defendants who committed their offenses between September 28, 2010, and September 30, 2011, than those defendants who committed their offenses on or after October 1, 2011, bears a rational relationship to the Legislature’s legitimate state purpose of reducing costs. We are mindful the rational relationship test is highly deferential. (People v. Turnage (2012)
We conclude the classification in question does bear a rational relationship to cost savings. Preliminarily, we note the California Supreme Court has stated equal protection of the laws does not forbid statutes and statutory amendments to have a beginning and to discriminate between rights of an earlier and later time. (People v. Floyd (2003)
More importantly, in choosing October 1, 2011, as the effective date of Assembly Bill No. 109, the Legislature took a measured approach and balanced the goal of cost savings against public safety. The effective date was a legislative determination that its stated goal of reducing corrections costs was best served by granting enhanced conduct credits to those defendants who committed their offenses on or after October 1, 2011. To be sure, awarding enhanced conduct credits to everyone in local confinement would have certainly resulted in greater cost savings than awarding enhanced conduct credits to only those defendants who commit an offense on or after
Finally, In re Kapperman (1974)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Moore, J., and Fybel, 1, concurred.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 13, 2013, S207285.
Notes
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Rajanayagam did not raise an equal protection claim in his sentencing brief.
We understand Rajanayagam concedes he is not entitled to additional credits pursuant to section 4019, subdivision (h)’s plain lаnguage, but a thorough discussion of the credit issues requires that we discuss its statutory construction.'
Brown, supra,