THE PEOPLE,
S283305
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
October 9, 2025
Second Appellate District, Division Six, B329457; Santa Barbara County Superior Court, 1183843
Justice Evans authored the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Liu, Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred.
Justice Corrigan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Guerrero concurred.
In 2009, the trial court sentenced Edgardo Ortiz Guevara to an indeterminate term of 28 years to life following his third strike conviction, as then required by the “Three Strikes” law. (See
In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3), which retroactively invalidated certain sentencing enhancements and requires courts to recall and resentence defendants with invalid enhancements. In newly enacted
Guevara sought resentencing pursuant to
We granted review to consider whether
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background.
As originally enacted, the Three Strikes law provided that a defendant previously convicted of a serious or violent felony would be sentenced to a term of “twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction.” (Former
In 2012, voters enacted the Reform Act (Proposition 36), which amended state law to authorize indeterminate third strike life sentences only when the third felony conviction is “serious or violent,” subject to enumerated disqualifying factors. (
The Reform Act‘s prospective provisions exclude certain defendants from this change in law. A “defendant does not qualify for this ameliorative change, however, if his current offense is a controlled substance charge involving large quantities ([
Retrospectively, the Reform Act establishes a resentencing procedure “intended to apply exclusively to persons presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12, whose sentence under this act would not have been an indeterminate life sentence.” (
Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1) prospectively limited the application of one-year prior prison term enhancements to individuals convicted of sexually violent felonies. In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3), which codified
Under Senate Bill No. 483, where a now-invalid enhancement was imposed, “the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (
B. Facts.
In 2009, Guevara was convicted of felony corporal injury to a coparent and misdemeanor child endangerment under
In 2013, after the passage of the Reform Act, Guevara petitioned for resentencing under
In 2023, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified Guevara as a “person[] in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes” now-invalid prior prison term enhancements. (
The Court of Appeal reversed. Writing for the majority, Justice Gilbert, joined by Justice Yegan, concluded that the trial court‘s interpretation of
In dissent, Justice Baltodano argued that
We granted review to consider whether the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act may constitutionally apply at a resentencing pursuant to
The Santa Barbara District Attorney, respondent in this court, accepts that
strike sentence, respondent urges that it is an unconstitutional legislative amendment of Proposition 36. Real Party in Interest Guevara and the Attorney General disagree. They argue that the trial court‘s application of
We solicited supplemental briefing regarding whether construing
A. Legal Standard.
1. Amendment of Voter Initiatives.
We begin with the governing standards. “The Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute
that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without the electors’ approval.” (
A statute amends a voter initiative where it “prohibits what the initiative authorizes, or authorizes what the initiative prohibits.” (People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 571 (Pearson).) An amendment “change[s] an existing initiative statute by adding or taking from it some particular provision.” (People v. Cooper (2002) 27 Cal.4th 38, 44.) But “this does not mean that any legislation that concerns the same subject matter as an initiative, or even augments an initiative‘s provisions, is necessarily an amendment for these purposes.” (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571.) “[T]he Legislature remains free to enact laws addressing the general subject matter of an initiative, or a ‘related but distinct area’ of law that an initiative measure ‘does not specifically authorize or prohibit.’ ” (People v. Kelly (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1008, 1026, fn. 19.)
2. Statutory Interpretation Principles.
Whether
“If the language is not ambiguous, we presume the voters intended the meaning apparent from that language, and we may not add to the statute or rewrite it to conform to some assumed intent not apparent from that language.” (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571; accord, Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) Where the text is ambiguous, courts may consider ” ’ “other indicia of the voters’ intent,” ’ ” including ” ’ “the analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet.” ’ ” (Robert L., supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 901.)
Our background principles of statutory interpretation also demonstrate respect for the legislative process. ” ‘Statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with
B. Voters Did Not Intend for the Reform Act To Be the Sole Vehicle for Nonserious, Nonviolent Third Strike Defendants To Seek Recall and Resentencing.
Respondent argues the Reform Act is the sole avenue for third strike defendants to pursue recall and resentencing relief from an indeterminate term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to the Three Strikes law. Respondent cites language from the Reform Act indicating that its petition process is “intended to apply exclusively to persons presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12, whose sentence under this act would not have been an indeterminate life sentence.” (
The Reform Act‘s savings clause bolsters this interpretation.
A conclusion that
Notably, the majority below did not grapple with the role of
As respondent acknowledges, other recall and resentencing avenues were available to defendants like Guevara at the time of the enactment of Proposition 36. For example, former
Concluding that the Reform Act was the exclusive means to obtain sentencing relief would require ignoring
Nor does
The statutory reference to “any rights or remedies otherwise available to the defendant” is a prototypical reference to a general “body of laws.” (
Nor, despite Real Party‘s assertions, does Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th 646 suggest
Conley‘s reasoning does not compel the conclusion that
The dissent suggests that the
the substantive requirements of
But defendant‘s reliance on Conley is also misplaced. Defendant argues that our acknowledgement in Conley that
C. As a Matter of Constitutional Avoidance, Section 1172.75 Incorporates Section 1170.126‘s Discretionary Public Safety Determination.
Pursuant to
1. Constitutional avoidance principles.
” ‘If a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will . . . raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it . . . free from doubt as to its constitutionality.’ ” (Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 548 (Wendland).) In these circumstances, courts have a ” ’ “duty . . . to construe [the] statute as to save its constitutionality.” ’ ” (Palermo, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 60.) “[A] statute should not be construed to violate the Constitution ’ ” ‘if any other possible construction remains available.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Garcia (2017) 2 Cal.5th 792, 804 (Garcia); accord, People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal. 5th 318, 339 (Miracle) [” ‘[A] statute must be construed, if reasonably possible, in a manner that avoids a serious constitutional question’ “].)
“This approach not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that [the Legislature], like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that [the Legislature] intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it.” (Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (1988) 485 U.S. 568, 575 (DeBartolo); see also Garcia, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 804, quoting DeBartolo, at p. 575.)
2. Constitutional doubt.
Proposition 36‘s legislative history suggests the voters were distinctly aware of the threat to public safety posed by any blanket repeal of the Three Strikes Law. Ballot materials assured voters that the Reform Act‘s public safety valve addressed these concerns. Ballot arguments in support of the initiative told voters: “Criminal justice experts and law enforcement leaders carefully crafted Prop. 36 so that truly dangerous criminals will receive no benefits whatsoever from the reform.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, argument in favor of Prop. 36, p. 52, italics added.) Likewise, the analysis of the Legislative Analyst explained that a court would be required to resentence otherwise eligible defendants ”unless it determines that resentencing the offenders would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. . .
There can be no question that the voters who enacted the Reform Act were focused on reforming Three Strikes sentencing without undermining public safety.
Taking as a given that the voters were concerned with public safety,
The dissent recognizes that the Reform Act contemplated “and was not intended to exclude other recognized rights and remedies like habeas corpus.”
But adopting Real Party in Interest‘s reading of
The dissent claims that, under our holding, the Legislature could, by a bare majority, simply “do away with” the good cause requirement for late-filed
Ultimately, we need not establish the precise relationship of
3. Interpreting section 1172.75 to avoid constitutional doubt.
The Attorney General argues that construing
Guevara argues that he is entitled to the application of the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act without a discretionary public safety inquiry, because
Guevara finds support for his proposed selective incorporation in former
But that the voters were aware of these narrow, preexisting resentencing mechanisms does not mean they anticipated the kind of mass resentencing relief, untethered to
Perhaps more importantly, Guevara‘s analogy fails to grapple with the fact that the canon of constitutional avoidance applies in cases involving an ” ’ “ambiguous statute that raises serious constitutional questions.” ’ ” (Leiva, supra, 56 Cal. 4th at p. 507.)
The dissent takes issue with our conclusion that there exists ambiguity in
This interpretation does not eliminate the ambiguity we have identified. The dissent‘s recognition that different provisions of the Reform Act appear to have different primary focuses — one aimed at retroactive relief and one aimed at prospective reform — in fact highlights why this interpretive question is a difficult one. How and whether these different components should be applied in a resentencing mechanism entirely distinct from the Reform Act is precisely why uncertainty exists in construing the Legislature‘s directive to apply “changes in law that reduce sentences” in
Nor is it accurate to read
Even assuming the dissent‘s characterization — that only
The dissent asserts that we are misapplying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance by “rewriting”
In sum, as
4. Other provisions of section 1170.126 do not conflict with section 1172.75.
Respondent argues that simply construing
We agree with respondent that it would raise significant constitutional questions to interpret
a. The filing of a petition under section 1170.126.
The Court of Appeal concluded that allowing Guevara to proceed under
Respondent attempts to obviate this distinction, equating various procedures relevant to defendants seeking relief through a
Harmonization does not require that
The question of whether the voters intended a given provision as a substantive requirement for relief can only be answered by determining whether satisfying a particular condition fulfills the twin purposes of the statute we have previously identified — effecting ameliorative reform while protecting public safety. (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 658 [finding that the voters enacted the Reform Act to “strike a balance between these objectives of mitigating punishment and protecting public safety“].) Interpreting
Nor does the legislative history offer support for such a claim. Proposition 36‘s legislative history discusses the timing of eligibility determinations only in relation to permitting resentencing, and does not even mention recall of sentence. (See Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) analysis of Prop. 36 by Legis. Analyst, p. 50 [“Courts conducting these resentencing hearings would first determine whether the offender‘s criminal offense history makes them eligible for resentencing. The court would be required to resentence eligible offenders unless it determines that resentencing the offenders would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety“].) The timing of recall under
b. Two-year deadline.
Respondent and amici curiae suggest that the statutes cannot be harmonized by construing
recall and resentencing petitions under
Respondent and the dissent point to the Legislative Analyst‘s analysis, which described a “one-time cost to the state and counties related to the resentencing provisions of this measure,” and anticipated that “counties would incur jail costs to house inmates during resentencing proceedings. These costs could be a few million dollars statewide over a couple of years.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) analysis of Prop. 36 by Legis. Analyst, p. 50.) Both argue that the voters therefore understood there would be “one-time” resentencing expenses, and those expenses would only last “a couple of years.” (
This legislative history does not suggest the electorate understood the two-year petition deadline as a condition on resentencing for defendants like Guevara, who sought relief under a distinct statutory mechanism. The Legislative Analyst‘s estimate reflects the anticipated expenses associated with standalone petitions for resentencing under
The Reform Act itself contemplated that resentencings pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes law would be conducted beyond the two-year window.
Moreover, analyses of a law‘s fiscal impact cannot always anticipate costs that might arise due to laws not in effect at the time such analyses were undertaken. Such estimates are, instead, merely a snapshot in time. For instance, the dissent accepts that habeas corpus petitions might lead to resentencing of defendants serving indeterminate terms under the Three Strikes law. (Dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 12.) Yet when the Reform Act was enacted in 2012, no one foresaw the significant expansion of the scope of habeas corpus later created as a result of the Racial Justice Act and its subsequent amendments, for example. (See
Legislative history materials and the statutory text enacted by the voters thus counsel against “assum[ing] that [the Legislative Analyst‘s] brief comments,” as narrowly construed by respondent, “accurately reflected the full intent of the drafters or the understanding of the electorate.” (Carman, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 331.)
In sum, the two-year deadline in the Reform Act is most naturally understood as a procedural deadline for filing petitions under
1. Harmonizing sections 1170.126 and 1172.75 is consistent with subdivision (l).
As amicus curiae, the California District Attorneys Association, suggests applying the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act through
The dissent, citing People v. Valencia (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 641, 649, which held that “rehabilitative progress” alone does not constitute good cause under
Furthermore,
2. The meaning of “presently serving” in section 1170.126.
Real Party in Interest and the Attorney General argue that “the plain terms of [
The phrase “presently serving” is ambiguous. In ordinary parlance, “present” means “now existing or in progress,” “being in view or at hand,” “now existing; at hand” and “presently” means “at once,” “at the present time,” or “now.” (Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2012) p. 982; Black‘s Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) p. 1302.) “Current” means “presently elapsing” or “occurring in or existing at the present time.” (Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2012) p. 306.) Because these dictionary definitions overlap, Guevara concludes that “presently serving” means “currently serving.” But “currently serving” could either refer to defendants “currently serving” at the time the Reform Act took effect, or those “currently serving” at the time of their
Guevara argues that the two-year deadline in
Because
The neighboring provisions of
Ultimately, we need not decide this question. The ambiguity of the phrase “presently serving” does not disturb the initiative‘s legislative history, which suggests the electorate contemplated that previously sentenced nonserious, nonviolent third strike offenders would not be entitled to resentencing under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act if the trial court, in its discretion, determined that resentencing would pose an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (
3. Real Party in Interest‘s reading is not required to avoid absurd results.
Guevara argues that it would be an absurd result for “people convicted of extremely violent crimes,” albeit people not previously sentenced to Third Strike indeterminate terms, to be “eligible for ‘full resentencing’ consideration by virtue of
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeal with instructions to remand the case to the superior court.16 If the superior court determines that resentencing Real Party in Interest pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act would “pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” the court shall reimpose an indeterminate term.17 (
EVANS, J.
We Concur:
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
The voters by initiative enacted the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)) (Prop. 36 or the Initiative) “to reduce the punishment prescribed for certain third strike defendants.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 651 (Conley).) Conley held the voters intended that those defendants who had already been sentenced by the time of the Initiative‘s passage “are not entitled to automatic resentencing, but instead may seek resentencing by petitioning for recall of sentence under [Penal Code]
The principles of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 and its progeny are not involved here. Guevara‘s sentence has long been final. It is also important to note that the Initiative added a statute providing for a single two-year petition procedure. Voters were explicitly told they were voting for a temporally defined, one-time resentencing system. The Legislative Analyst‘s statement described the resentencing procedure as a “one-time cost” that would only last for “a couple of years.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) analysis of Prop. 36 by Legis. Analyst, p. 50; see People v. Superior Court (Williams) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1263; People v. Valencia (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 641, 650 (Valencia).)
Under the Legislature‘s newly-added code section, a recall and resentencing procedure is automatic when the court receives notice from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). (See
In rewriting the statute to permit full resentencing of pre-Prop. 36 Three Strikes cases under the guise of constitutional avoidance, the majority allows the Legislature to change the Initiative in constitutionally prohibited ways. The majority permits the Legislature to do something that was never intended by the voters and to take that action without the Legislative procedures constitutionally required to amend the electorate‘s Initiative.
The issue here is that
The majority purports to solve this problem by simply rewriting
It is important to be clear just what constitutional principle is involved here. The various changes to the Three Strikes schemes on which Guevara relies do not flow from constitutional provisions barring excessive punishment or to any other challenge to its alternative sentencing scheme. (Cf. In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 560.) Instead, in 2012, the electorate passed the Initiative to mitigate some of the more stringent provisions of the original Three Strikes scheme. It did so, however, by exercising its authority to limit legislative attempts to further modify the specific reforms contained in Prop. 36. The voters’ authority to do so, by requiring a specified legislative majority, is not contested here. It is the legislative attempt to undermine the voters’ action that is the constitutional issue.
The initiative power is “not . . . a right granted the people, but . . . a power reserved by them. Declaring it ‘the duty of the courts to jealously guard this right of the people’ [citation], the courts have described the initiative and referendum [authority] as articulating ‘one of the most precious rights of our democratic process.’ [Citation.] ‘[I]t has long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is challenged in order that the right be not improperly annulled. If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve it.’ ” (Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591 (Associated Home Builders); see Castellanos v. State of California (2024) 16 Cal.5th 588, 601-602.)