In re JACK WAYNE FRIEND on Habeas Corpus.
S256914
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
June 28, 2021
First Appellate District, Division Three, A155955; Alameda County Superior Court, 81254A
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Groban, and Jenkins concurred.
Opinion of the Court
Proposition 66, the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016 (as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) § 1), made wide-ranging changes to the procedures for challenging convictions and sentences in capital cases. Among other things, Proposition 66 introduced new restrictions on the presentation of habeas corpus claims in what the measure refers to as “successive” petitions: Individuals who file successive petitions must
We answer this question by reference to background principles of habeas corpus law. The traditional rules governing the handling of successive petitions have long distinguished between the presentation of newly available claims and the presentation of claims that could have been raised earlier; the law has traditionally limited only the latter, forbidding consideration of repetitive or pretermitted claims except in a few, narrowly defined circumstances. Proposition 66 modified these rules by further narrowing the circumstances under which courts may consider repetitive or pretermitted claims in capital cases. But properly understood, Proposition 66‘s successiveness restrictions do not limit the consideration of claims that could not reasonably have been raised earlier, such as those based on newly available evidence or on recent changes in the law — claims that have not previously been thought subject to successiveness limitations. Thus, under the law as amended by Proposition 66, habeas corpus petitioners must make a showing of actual innocence or death ineligibility if they seek a second chance to make an argument they could have made earlier. No such requirement applies to the habeas petitioner who raises a newly available claim at the first opportunity.
I.
Petitioner Jack Wayne Friend was convicted of the 1984 robbery murder of Oakland bartender Herbert Pierucci and sentenced to death. On automatic appeal, we affirmed the capital convictions and sentence. (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 10.) Friend filed a habeas corpus petition in this court, which we denied in 2015. Friend then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. In 2017, the federal court stayed proceedings to allow Friend to exhaust six claims in state court. The following year, Friend filed a second state habeas petition raising the six unexhausted claims in Alameda County Superior Court.1
We granted Friend‘s petition for review, specifying three issues for briefing: the meaning of the term “successive” in
II.
A.
Proposition 66 enacted a number of statutory reforms in an effort to make the system of capital punishment “more efficient, less expensive, and more responsive to the rights of victims.” (Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 831.) Among these reforms were various changes to the procedures for handling and resolving habeas corpus petitions in capital cases. (Id. at pp. 823–825.) The bulk of these changes are found in newly added
a new one-year deadline for filing an “initial” habeas petition after the appointment of counsel (
To put this set of reforms in context, we briefly describe the law as it existed before Proposition 66 (and as it continues to exist in noncapital cases). Restrictions on the consideration of successive habeas petitions are not new. Several decades ago, California courts identified presentation of
To determine whether the successiveness bar applies under traditional habeas principles, a court conducts a two-step analysis. (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750 (Clark).) First, the court asks whether the habeas petitioner who files a second or subsequent petition has adequately justified his or her failure to present his or her claims in an earlier petition. (Id. at pp. 774–775.) Adequate justifications include the inability to bring the claim earlier, as where the claim depends on newly available evidence or on a change in the law that has been made retroactively applicable to final judgments. (Id. at p. 775.) In the rare instance in which the petitioner is able to adequately justify not having raised the claim earlier, the successiveness bar does not apply. (Ibid.)
If there is no adequate justification for the petitioner‘s failure to raise the claim earlier, the court proceeds to the second step of the analysis. At that step, the court must generally apply the successiveness bar to preclude consideration of the claim. But there is narrow exception for claims alleging “facts demonstrating that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred.” (Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 775.) In Clark, we identified four situations in which the fundamental miscarriage exception is satisfied: (1) a highly prejudicial error of constitutional magnitude; (2) the petitioner‘s actual innocence; (3) presentation in a capital trial of a grossly misleading and highly prejudicial profile of the petitioner; or (4) conviction or sentencing under an invalid statute. (Id. at pp. 797–798; accord, Reno, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 455–456, 472; Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 788, fn. 9, 811.) To determine whether a habeas petitioner should be given a second chance to make a claim that could have been made earlier, a court considers whether the petitioner has made a showing that would bring the claim within this four-part fundamental miscarriage exception. If so, the court proceeds to consider the merits; if not, then not.
The successiveness provisions of Proposition 66 changed existing law by forbidding courts from considering successive petitions that are unaccompanied by a showing of actual innocence or ineligibility for the death penalty. This is a more stringent standard than any standard applicable under traditional habeas corpus law. The issue before us concerns the scope of the change. A broad reading of Proposition 66 would apply its stringent successiveness standard to all second or subsequent capital habeas petitions, thereby eliminating the traditional carveout for claims based on newly available evidence and other claims that could not have been raised earlier. A narrower, alternative reading of Proposition 66 would apply this successiveness standard only to those petitions raising repetitive or pretermitted claims — that is, those claims that are generally subject to the traditional successiveness bar. Under this narrower reading, Proposition 66 preserves the traditional two-step inquiry described in case law, but at the second step it replaces the four-part fundamental miscarriage of justice exception with just two grounds — actual innocence or death ineligibility — that will justify giving a habeas petitioner a second chance to raise a claim that was unjustifiably omitted from a prior petition.
On this question, the parties are in agreement; each maintains that Proposition 66‘s stringent successiveness standard does not apply to claims that could not have been raised in earlier petitions. Friend contends that this narrower reading of Proposition 66 is not only consistent with the usual use of the term “successive” in habeas corpus law, but also avoids serious questions about the constitutionality of a law that would bar potentially meritorious habeas claims that could not have been raised in prior petitions. The Attorney General concurs. He observes that though the term “successive” might naturally be read in a colloquial sense to encompass all petitions subsequent to the first, Friend‘s narrower reading is the better one because it avoids serious constitutional doubts.
By contrast, two amici curiae — the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (CJLF) and a group of legal scholars (the Constitutional Law Amici) — argue that the term “successive” in Proposition 66 should be broadly construed to refer to any petition after the petitioner‘s first.4 These amici divide, though, on the constitutionality of sections 1509(d) and 1509.1(c) so construed. The Constitutional Law Amici argue that insofar as Proposition 66 eliminates the traditional safety valve for claims that could not have reasonably been raised earlier, the measure violates habeas petitioners’ federal and
When we interpret statutes, we usually begin by considering the ordinary and usual meaning of the law‘s terms, viewing them in their context within the statute. (People v. Colbert (2019) 6 Cal.5th 596, 603.) Here, as both the Attorney General and amici curiae note, dictionaries define the term “successive” to mean “[f]ollowing in uninterrupted order; consecutive.” (American Heritage Dict. (4th ed. 2000) p. 1728.) If this dictionary definition controls, then Proposition 66‘s restrictions on successive petitions would apply without exception to any habeas petition that follows the initial habeas petition.
When, however, a term has developed a particular meaning in the law, we generally presume the legislative body used the term in that sense rather than relying on ordinary usage. “It is a well-recognized rule of construction that after the courts have construed the meaning of any particular word, or expression, and the legislature subsequently undertakes to use these exact words in the same connection, the presumption is almost irresistible that it used them in the precise and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts.” (City of Long Beach v. Payne (1935) 3 Cal.2d 184, 191; accord, In re Derrick B. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 535, 540; People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 231 [principle applies to statutes adopted through initiative]; see
As explained above, successiveness restrictions have a long history in habeas corpus law, and the concept of successiveness has acquired a particular meaning in that context. We consider that legal background in discerning the meaning of the restrictions on successive petitions in Proposition 66. (Cf. Panetti v. Quarterman (2007) 551 U.S. 930, 943 [the term “second or successive” as used in a federal habeas statute “is not self-defining,” but “takes its full meaning from our case law” applying general habeas corpus principles].)
California habeas law traditionally has not imposed blanket restrictions on the consideration of every petition filed after an initial petition, as the dictionary definition of the term “successive” might suggest. The traditional successiveness bar instead prevents a habeas corpus petitioner from abusing the writ process by presenting claims in a repetitive or piecemeal manner.
We have mainly used the term “successive petition” to refer specifically to a petition subject to the successiveness bar — that is, one raising claims that could have been presented in a previous petition. (Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 836, fn. 14.) In Clark, for example, we used the term “successive petitions” as a shorthand for subsequent petitions “seeking relief on the basis of the same set of facts” or “raising claims that could have been raised in a prior petition.” (Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 770.) We explained that “[e]ntertaining the merits of successive petitions is inconsistent with our recognition that delayed and repetitious presentation of claims is an abuse of the writ” (id. at p. 769), and that the consideration of such petitions “unreasonably delays execution of judgment” and “waste[s] scarce judicial resources” (id. at p. 770). We went on to explain that the same is not true of second or subsequent petitions raising claims that could not reasonably have been raised before. (Id. at pp. 774–775.)6 Echoing this point in Reno, we observed that ” ’ [e]ntertaining the merits of successive petitions is inconsistent with our recognition that delayed and repetitious presentation of claims is an abuse of the writ.’ ” (Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 455.) And we used the term “successive” in the same way in Robbins, where we drew a distinction
True, our cases have not always been consistent in their use of terminology. As the Attorney General and amici curiae point out, we have also sometimes used the term “successive” to refer to any second or subsequent petition, while referring to those petitions subject to the successiveness bar as both successive and unjustified. (E.g., Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 774 [” [b]efore considering the merits of a second or successive petition, a California court will first ask whether the failure to present the claims underlying the new petition in a prior petition has been adequately explained, and whether that explanation justifies the piecemeal presentation of the petitioner‘s claims“]; Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 517 [referring to the court‘s “proposed limit of 50 pages for successive petitions“].)
Despite these variations in our terminology, however, the substantive principle has remained constant: When we have barred a claim as “successive,” it is because we have concluded that the claim was omitted from an earlier petition without justification, and its presentation therefore constitutes abuse of the writ process. We have not, by contrast, considered the filing of a claim that could not have reasonably been raised in an earlier petition to be an abuse of the writ subject to the bar on successive petitions.
Amici curiae acknowledge the scope of the successiveness bar in California habeas jurisprudence, but contend that statutory context makes clear Proposition 66 voters intended a distinctly different approach. Amici emphasize that
It is possible, as amici curiae say, that Proposition 66 refers only to “initial” and “successive” habeas corpus petitions because voters believed that all second or subsequent petitions should be treated as “successive” — and therefore barred unless the petitioner is able to show actual innocence or
Amici curiae‘s argument would have more force if we were convinced that voters intended Proposition 66 to supply comprehensive instructions for the handling of capital habeas petitions, but we are not so convinced. The question of how timeliness of a subsequent but nonsuccessive petition may be determined is beyond the scope of this case, but suffice it to say that Proposition 66 did not provide a new timeliness rule for any kind of petition other than initial petitions (and nothing in the measure appears to preclude continued application of the traditional timeliness standards that have been developed and applied in this court‘s habeas cases (see Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780)). And although Proposition 66 may not speak specifically to procedures for appealing rulings on subsequent but nonsuccessive petitions, its appellate provisions appear capable of being applied to such petitions, as explained in greater detail below. (See pt. IV., post.) Simply put, the fact that Proposition 66 does not contain explicit instructions for the handling of subsequent nonsuccessive petitions does not mean that no such category of petitions exists.
Amici curiae also point to the use of the term “successive” in a different subdivision of
We are unpersuaded. As we explained in Briggs,
In short, the text of the statute contains no definitive indication that by introducing a new stringent standard for the presentation of claims in “successive” petitions, voters intended to eliminate the traditional carveout for claims that could not feasibly have been presented earlier. Given the legal backdrop against which voters enacted Proposition 66, it is entirely plausible that voters intended Proposition 66‘s stringent standard for considering successive petitions to capture only petitions raising claims that would have traditionally been considered abusive and therefore subject to the successiveness bar — that is, claims that were omitted from prior habeas petitions without justification.
Friend, joined by the Attorney General, argues that this narrower understanding of Proposition 66‘s successiveness provisions is not only plausible, but compelled by the canon of constitutional avoidance. This rule of interpretation instructs that “[i]f a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other construction is equally reasonable. [Citations.] The basis of this rule is the presumption that the Legislature intended, not to violate the Constitution, but to enact a valid statute within the scope of its constitutional powers.” (Miller v. Municipal Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 828; accord, People v. Lopez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 254, 276 [applying
50 Cal.4th 1131, 1161; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 509.)
Friend contends that reading “successive” petition in
The broad reading of
Friend further maintains the broad reading of “successive” would encompass potentially meritorious claims that could not have been brought in the initial petition for procedural reasons — such as a petition challenging an execution method, which would have been deemed premature at the time of
In Friend‘s view, interpreting
We need not definitively resolve the constitutional debate here. For present purposes it is enough to observe that the constitutional questions Friend raises are both novel and serious. The California Constitution has protected the right to seek relief by habeas corpus since our state‘s founding. (
If Proposition 66 were construed to preclude even claims of constitutional error that could not have been raised earlier with reasonable diligence, it would mark the first time that the law has closed that long-standing safety valve for newly available claims. The statute would instead apply the same exacting innocence or ineligibility standard to all claims raised in a second or successive petition, whether justifiably or not. It is a significant question whether such a drastic restriction on the effectiveness of the habeas corpus remedy would comport with the principles of substantial justice that lie at the core of our state Constitution‘s habeas protections.
The due process implications of this approach are likewise substantial. Under the broad reading of
When we consider procedural due process claims under the California Constitution, we weigh four factors: “‘(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the government‘s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail; and (4) the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible government official.‘” (People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 862–863.) Considering the weighty private interest at stake in a capital habeas corpus proceeding, the risk of error created when potentially meritorious claims are barred even if presented as promptly as reasonably possible upon discovery, and the dignitary significance of ensuring the validity of death judgments before execution, it is at least questionable whether governmental interests in finality of judgments and conservation of judicial resources can justify a rule barring all but a very narrow class of claims presented in second or subsequent petitions regardless of whether barred claims could have been presented earlier.12
Amicus curiae CJLF argues that the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Felker v. Turpin (1996) 518 U.S. 651 (Felker) disposes of any questions that might arise about the scope of Proposition 66‘s successiveness provisions. The high court in Felker considered the constitutionality of a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA; Pub.L. No. 104-132 (Apr. 24, 1996) 110 Stat. 1214) that generally requires dismissal of “second or successive” habeas applications raising claims based on newly discovered evidence except where “(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and [¶] (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” (
We are unpersuaded that Felker disposes of the constitutional questions surrounding
In California law, procedural bars to habeas corpus claims serve an important interest in finality of judgments. But these procedural bars have always been subject to exceptions “designed to ensure fairness and orderly access to the courts.” (Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 452.) A successiveness bar lacking an exception for claims that could not with reasonable diligence have been presented in an earlier petition threatens the guarantee of fair access to courts that has traditionally been central to habeas corpus procedure in this state, and in so doing raises significant questions under the California Constitution. As between the two possible readings of
As amici curiae CJLF and the Constitutional Law Amici both argue, it is clear that voters did intend to expedite habeas corpus proceedings in capital cases. (Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 823–825.) But while it may be true that a broad reading of
In any event, “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice — and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute‘s primary objective must be the law.” (Rodriguez v. United States (1987) 480 U.S. 522, 525–526; accord, e.g., Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1167.) We see no evidence that Proposition 66 was intended to speed up the process of review to the maximum extent possible, no matter the costs to the principles of substantial justice that lie at the core of the Constitution‘s habeas corpus and due process guarantees. Rather, stating its purposes in uncodified findings and declarations, Proposition 66 was specifically focused on curbing “frivolous and unnecessary claims” that have “wasted taxpayer dollars and delayed justice.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 66, § 2, subd. 7, p. 213 (Voter Information Guide).) Making a claim of constitutional violation that could not reasonably have been made in an earlier petition is not by its nature a frivolous, unnecessary, or wasteful act. We cannot assume the voters were so single-handedly determined to expedite capital habeas corpus proceedings that they would pass a statute systematically precluding many such claims and thereby raising serious doubts about the measure‘s constitutionality.15
The analysis provided by the Legislative Analyst did touch on the topic of limits on successive petitions (though without using that particular term). Discussing restrictions on habeas corpus in light of Proposition 66‘s newly introduced time limits, the analysis stated: “In order to help meet the above time frames, the measure places other limits on legal challenges to death sentences. For example, the measure does not allow additional habeas corpus petitions to be filed after the first petition is filed, except in those cases where the court finds that the defendant is likely either innocent or not eligible for the death sentence.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 66 by Legis. Analyst, p. 106.) And in its discussion of fiscal effects, the analysis observed that “the limits on the number of habeas corpus petitions that can be filed” could reduce the time and resources spent on postconviction proceedings in capital cases. (Id. at p. 107.) Neither of these passages, however, brought to voters’ attention the specific problem of claims that could not reasonably have been brought in a prior petition. Though the analysis suggests the proposed statutes would place limits on the number of habeas corpus petitions that a condemned person could file, it does not establish the voters intended the measure as operating so strictly as to preclude a condemned prisoner from seeking relief on grounds of a prejudicial constitutional error that, even with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered and presented earlier. Again, given the significant constitutional doubts that would be raised by such a reading, and in the absence of any substantial evidence to the contrary, we presume this was not the voters’ intent.
We instead conclude that the voters’ intent in using the term “successive” in
We turn next to the question of whether Proposition 66‘s limits on successive petitions are applicable where, as here, the petitioner‘s previous habeas corpus petition was filed before Proposition 66 took effect. We conclude they are.
As a rule, courts presume that newly enacted legislation is intended to operate prospectively and not retroactively. (See, e.g., Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn‘s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 230; Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1208–1209.) Friend contends that in cases where the first petition was filed before Proposition 66, applying
The parties have briefed this issue as arising principally if
Applying these principles, we conclude that when
Under Clark and Reno, counsel has the duty, in the initial petition, of investigating and presenting all claims that could be discovered and presented at that time through due diligence. (Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 452; see Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 775 [“A petitioner will be expected to demonstrate due diligence in pursuing potential claims. If a petitioner had reason to suspect that a basis for habeas corpus relief was available, but did nothing to
Analogizing to federal law, Friend relies on a federal decision holding that AEDPA‘s limits on second or successive petitions (
In other cases, federal appellate courts have discerned no retroactive effect in application of AEDPA‘s provisions. (U.S. v. Villa-Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2000) 208 F.3d 1160, 1163; Mancuso v. Herbert (2d Cir. 1999) 166 F.3d 97, 101.) And still others have rejected AEDPA retroactivity claims in particular cases because the petitioner did not show objectively reasonable reliance in omitting claims from the first petition. (See Pratt v. U.S. (1st Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 54, 59; Graham v. Johnson (5th Cir. 1999) 168 F.3d 762, 786; Alexander v. U.S. (7th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 312, 314.)
We therefore conclude that applying
On its face,
IV.
Finally, we consider the procedures for appellate review of a trial court‘s determination that one or more claims in a subsequent petition are successive within the meaning of
As noted above, Proposition 66 did not explicitly address this point.
Friend contends first that a dismissal for successiveness should be appealable under the provisions of
Alternatively, if a successiveness dismissal is appealable only under subdivision (c) of
The Attorney General embraces Friend‘s alternative suggestion — that a certificate may issue on the successiveness question itself — as “giv[ing] force to the certificate of appealability requirement, while at the same time assuring review of a superior court‘s determination that a petition is successive.” At the same time, the Attorney General urges us to reject Friend‘s primary argument — that the certificate requirement can be avoided through application of
We further agree with the Attorney General that
As a procedure for appellate review of a superior court‘s determination that a subsequent petition‘s claim or claims are successive within the meaning of
V.
The Court of Appeal‘s order denying a certificate of appealability is reversed, and the matter is remanded to that court for it to address the successiveness question under the standard and procedures we have described. For each claim of the petition, the Court of Appeal is to determine
KRUGER, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
Notes
“(a) This section applies to any petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of death. A writ of habeas corpus pursuant to this section is the exclusive procedure for collateral attack on a judgment of death. A petition filed in any court other than the court which imposed the sentence should be promptly transferred to that court unless good cause is shown for the petition to be heard by another court. A petition filed in or transferred to the court which imposed the sentence shall be assigned to the original trial judge unless that judge is unavailable or there is other good cause to assign the case to a different judge.
“(b) After the entry of a judgment of death in the trial court, that court shall offer counsel to the prisoner as provided in Section 68662 of the Government Code.
“(c) Except as provided in subdivisions (d) and (g), the initial petition must be filed within one year of the order entered under Section 68662 of the Government Code.
“(d) An initial petition which is untimely under subdivision (c) or a successive petition whenever filed shall be dismissed unless the court finds, by the preponderance of all available evidence, whether or not admissible at trial, that the defendant is actually innocent of the crime of which he or she was convicted or is ineligible for the sentence. A stay of execution shall not be granted for the purpose of considering a successive or untimely petition unless the court finds that the petitioner has a substantial claim of actual innocence or ineligibility. ‘Ineligible for the sentence of death’ means that circumstances exist placing that sentence outside the range of the sentencer‘s discretion. Claims of ineligibility include a claim that none of the special circumstances in subdivision (a) of Section 190.2 is true, a claim that the defendant was under the age of 18 at the time of the crime, or a claim that the defendant has an intellectual disability, as defined in Section 1376. A claim relating to the sentencing decision under Section 190.3 is not a claim of actual innocence or ineligibility for the purpose of this section.
“(e) A petitioner claiming innocence or ineligibility under subdivision (d) shall disclose all material information relating to guilt or eligibility in the possession of the petitioner or present or former counsel for petitioner. If the petitioner willfully fails to make the disclosure required by this subdivision and authorize disclosure by counsel, the petition may be dismissed.
“(f) Proceedings under this section shall be conducted as expeditiously as possible, consistent with a fair adjudication. The superior court shall resolve the initial petition within one year of filing unless the court finds that a delay is necessary to resolve a substantial claim of actual innocence, but in no instance shall the court take longer than two years to resolve the petition. On decision of an initial petition, the court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision.
“(g) If a habeas corpus petition is pending on the effective date of this section, the court may transfer the petition to the court which imposed the sentence. In a case where a judgment of death was imposed prior to the effective date of this section, but no habeas corpus petition has been filed prior to the effective date of this section, a petition that would otherwise be barred by subdivision (c) may be filed within one year of the effective date of this section or within the time allowed under prior law, whichever is earlier.”
“(a) Either party may appeal the decision of a superior court on an initial petition under Section 1509 to the court of appeal. An appeal shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal in the superior court within 30 days of the court‘s decision granting or denying the habeas petition. A successive petition shall not be used as a means of reviewing a denial of habeas relief.
“(b) The issues considered on an appeal under subdivision (a) shall be limited to the claims raised in the superior court, except that the court of appeal may also consider a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel if the failure of habeas counsel to present that claim to the superior court constituted ineffective assistance. The court of appeal may, if additional findings of fact are required, make a limited remand to the superior court to consider the claim.
“(c) The people may appeal the decision of the superior court granting relief on a successive petition. The petitioner may appeal the decision of the superior court denying relief on a successive petition only if the superior court or the court of appeal grants a certificate of appealability. A certificate of appealability may issue under this subdivision only if the petitioner has shown both a substantial claim for relief, which shall be indicated in the certificate, and a substantial claim that the requirements of subdivision (d) of Section 1509 have been met. An appeal under this subdivision shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal in the superior court within 30 days of the court‘s decision. The superior court shall grant or deny a certificate of appealability concurrently with a decision denying relief on the petition. The court of appeal shall grant or deny a request for a certificate of appealability within 10 days of an application for a certificate. The jurisdiction of the court of appeal is limited to the claims identified in the certificate and any additional claims added by the court of appeal within 60 days of the notice of appeal. An appeal under this subdivision shall have priority over all other matters and be decided as expeditiously as possible.”