THE PEOPLE, Plаintiff and Respondent, v. JERMAN FLORES, Defendant and Appellant.
F081903
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Filed 4/12/22
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Super. Ct. No. BF177597A)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John R. Brownlee, Judge.
Matthew Aaron Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Jeffrey A. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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On September 20, 2019, defendant Jerman Flores was charged by information with one felony count of possession of a controlled substance for sale. (
Defendant raises one claim on appeal: entitlement to relief under Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1950 or Assem. Bill 1950), effective January 1, 2021. Assembly Bill 1950 amended former
Defendant requests modification of his probation term on review to a term no greater than one year. The People‘s main contention is that remand is required to afford the prosecutor the opportunity to withdraw from the plea bargain or the trial court to rescind its approval, restore the felony charge, and allow the parties to renegotiate the
Based on the plain language and legislative intent underlying Assembly Bill 1950, we conclude that defendant is entitled to modification of his probation term from three years to one year on review. A contrary result would frustrate legislative intent and, as explained herein, the California Supreme Court‘s decision in Stamps is distinguishable. Therefore, the remedy approved there does not apply. We shall reduce defendant‘s term of probation to one year and otherwise affirm the judgmеnt. (
DISCUSSION
I. Summary of Assembly Bill 1950
Defendant entered a plea of no contest to one misdemeanor count in 2020. At that time,
Subsequent to defendant‘s plea and the imposition of probation, Assembly Bill 1950 amended
“(a) In all counties and cities the courts therein, having jurisdiction to impose punishment in misdemeanor cases, may refer cases, demand reports, and to do and require anything necessary to carry out the purposes of Section 1203, insofar as that section applies to misdemeanors. The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence and make and enforce the terms of probation for a period not to exceed one year.
“(b) The one-year probation limit in subdivision (a) shall not apply to any offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions.” (Italics added.)
The parties agree that the exception set forth in subdivision (b) of
II. Retroactivity
““It is well settled that a new statute is presumed to operate prospectively“” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 698; accord, People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 627-628 (Frahs)), and “[t]he
Pursuant to Estrada, “[n]ewly enacted legislation lessening criminal punishment or reducing criminal liability presumptively applies to all cases not yet final on appeal at the time of the legislation‘s effective date.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 852, citing Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744-745; accord, People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673 & 675-676; Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 699.) “This presumption ‘rests on an inference that, in the absence of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.‘” (People v. Gentile, supra, at p. 852; accord, People v. Esquivel, supra, at p. 675; Stamps, supra, at p. 699.)
This court and other appellate courts considering the issue have concluded, universally, that the change in the law under Assembly Bill 1950 is ameliorative and, therefore, applies retroactively in all cases not yet final on appeal. (People v. Schulz (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 887, 895 (Schulz); accord, People v. Butler (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 216, 220-221 (Butler); People v. Scarano (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 993, 1003 (Scarano); People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 627; People v. Czirban (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1095; People v. Lord (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 241, 245; People v. Stewart (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 1065, 1072-1073, review granted June 30, 2021, S268787 (Stewart); People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943, 960-961 (Sims); People v. Quinn (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 874, 881-882 (Quinn); People v. Burton (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 14-16 (Burton);
III. Remedy
A. Background
The People argue, in effect, that notwithstanding undisputed retroactive application of Assembly Bill 1950 to all cases not yet final on review, defendant lacks entitlement to reduction of his probation term under the change in the law. As stated in Stamps, “[t]he Estrada rule only answers the question of whether an amended statute should be applied retroactively. It does not answer the question of how that statute should be applied.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 700.) The critical inquiry is one of legislative intent. (Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 991 (Harris).) The People‘s argument for remand, and possibly withdrawal from the plea bargain, is based on the remedy advanced by this court in People v. Ellis (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 925, 943-946 (Ellis) and subsequently approved by the California Supreme Court in Stamps. Application of that remedy in this case cannot be viewed in isolation from the California Supreme Court‘s decisions in Harris and People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 214-217 (Collins). Therefore, we first summarize the principles underlying plea bargains and the high court‘s relevant decisions in Collins, Harris, and Stamps.
““The process of plea bargaining which has received statutory and judicial authorization as an appropriate method of disposing of criminal prosecutions contemplates an agreement negotiated by the People and the defendant and approved by the court. [Citations.] Pursuant to this procedure the defendant agrees to plead guilty in order to obtain a reciprocal benefit, generally consisting of a less severe punishment than that which could result if he were convicted of all offenses charged. [Citation.] This more lenient disposition of the charges is secured in part by prosecutorial consent to the imposition of such clement punishment [citation], by the People‘s acceptance of a plea to a lesser offense than that charged, either in degree [citations] or kind [citation], or by the prosecutor‘s dismissal of one or more counts of a multi-count indictment or information.... But implicit in all of this is a process of “bargaining” between the adverse parties to the case—the People represented by the prosecutor on one side, the defendant represented by his counsel on the other—which bargaining results in an agreement between them.“” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 705, quoting People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 942-943; accord, People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 569-570; People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 929-930.)
“Judicial approval is an essential condition precedent to the effectiveness of the “bargain” worked out by the defense and prosecution.“” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 705, quoting People v. Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 942-943; accord, People v. Clancey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 570; People v. Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 930.) As provided in
2. Collins
In Collins, the California Supreme Court considered the appropriate remedy in a case that was resolved by plea bargain, but, prior to sentencing, the Legislature decriminalized the conduct to which the defendant pled, undermining the basis for the parties’ bargain. (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 213.) The defendant in Collins was charged with 15 felony offenses, including three counts of forcible oral copulation in violation of former
Criminal proceedings were thereafter reinstated, at which time the defendant objected to the trial court‘s jurisdiction to sentence him for conduct that was no longer criminal. (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 211.) The trial court ovеrruled the defendant‘s objection and imposed sentence. (Id. at pp. 211-212.) On review, the California Supreme Court concluded that its decision in People v. Rossi was controlling and agreed
Beginning with the plea bargain principles articulated in People v. Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pages 942-943, summarized in Stamps and set forth above, Collins stated, “Critical to plea bargaining is the concept of reciprocal benefits. When either the prosecution or the defendant is deprived of benefits for which it has bargained, corresponding relief will lie from concessions made.” (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 214, italics added.) The legislative change at issue decriminalized the conduct underlying the sole count to which the defendant pled guilty, thereby eviscerating the plea bargain and leaving the defendant invulnerable to any criminal consequence. (Id. p. 215.) In that context, Collins explained, “When a defendant gains total relief from his vulnerability to sentence, the state is substantially deprived of the benefits for which it agreed to enter the bargain. Whether the defendant formally seeks to withdraw his guilty plea or not is immaterial; it is his escape from vulnerability to sentence that fundamentally alters the character of the bargain.” (Ibid., italics added.) Where a defendant “seeks to gain relief from the sentence imposed but otherwise leave the plea bargain intact[,] [t]his is bounty in excess of that to which he is entitled.” (Ibid.)5
However, “the defendant is also entitled to the benefit of his bargain. This is not a case in which the defendant has repudiated thе bargain by attacking his guilty plea; he attacks only the judgment, and does so on the basis of external events—the repeal and reenactment of [former] section 288a—that have rendered the judgment insupportable.” (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216, fn. omitted & italics added.) Collins concluded, therefore, that where “external events and not [the] defendant‘s repudiation undermined
This sentencing limitation was grounded in double jeopardy principles from past cases, which served to “preclude vindictiveness and more generally to avoid penalizing a defendant for pursuing a successful appeal.” (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216.) The court explained, “The defendant should not be penalized for properly invoking Rossi to overturn his erroneous conviction and sentence by being rendered vulnerable to punishment more severe than under his plea bargain. [\P] The disposition herein substantially restores the agreement previously negotiated. It permits the defendant to realize the benefits he derived from the plea bargaining agreement, while the People also receive approximately that for which they bargained.” (Id. at p. 217.)
3. Harris
More recently, in Harris, the California Supreme Court considered Proposition 47 in the context of a plea bargain and concluded the electorate intended the change in the law to apply without affording the People the opportunity to rescind the plea bargain. (Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 987Ibid.) After Proposition 47 was enacted, the crime to which the defendant pled guilty became a misdemeanor and he filed a petition under section 1170.18 seeking recall of his sentence, reclassification of his felony to a misdemeanor, and resentencing. (Id. at p. 988.) The People argued they would be deprived of the benefit of their bargain and sought to rescind the plea agreement and reinstate the robbery charge. (Ibid.) The trial
In Harris, the high court considered the principles articulated in two relevant decisions. First, the court summarized the remedy under Collins, which, as just discussed, provided that the People could withdraw from the plea agreement and reinstate one or more counts, but the defendant could not be subject to more severe punishment than under the plea agreement. (Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 989-990Doe v. Harris, that “requiring the parties’ compliance with changes in the law made retroactive to them does not violate the terms of the plea agreement, nor does the failure of a plea agreement to reference the possibility the law might change translate into an implied promise the defendant will be unaffected by a change in the statutory consequences attending his or her conviction. To that extent, then, the terms of the plea agreement can be affected by changes in the law.” (Harris, supra, at p. 991, quoting Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 73-74 (Doe).)
After considering the intent of the initiative, Harris concluded the rule of Doe applied (Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 991), and the electorate bound the People to the plea agreement without affording them the opportunity to withdraw, “based on the unambiguous language of section 1170.18 and the expressed intent of Propоsition 47” (id. at p. 992). The court reached this conclusion on several grounds. First, the petition process provided for by Proposition 47 expressly referred to convictions “whether by trial or plea,” and “[b]y expressly mentioning convictions by plea, Proposition 47 contemplated relief to all eligible defendants.” (Id. at p. 991, quoting
Third, the court considered that “[o]ne of Proposition 47‘s primary purposes is to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing prison on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative” and “[a]cсepting the People‘s position would be at odds with that purpose.” (Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 992.) “If a reduction of a sentence under Proposition 47 results in the reinstatement of the original charges and elimination of the plea agreement, the financial and social benefits of Proposition 47 would not be realized, and the voters’ intent and expectations would be frustrated.” (Ibid.)
For additional support, Harris looked to Doe, which provided that “the Legislature [or here, the electorate], for the public good and in furtherance of public policy, and subject to the limitations imposed by the federal and state Constitutions, has the authority to modify or invalidate the terms of an agreement.” (Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 992, quoting Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 70.) Relying on this language, Harris concluded, “[t]he electorate may bind the People to a unilateral change in a sentence without affording them the option to rescind the plea agreement. The electorate did so when it enacted Proposition 47.” (Id. at p. 992.)
Harris also made clear that Doe did not impliedly overrule Collins, and it distinguished Collins on the grounds that the legislative change there “eviscerated the
4. Stamps
Finally, in Stamps, the California Supreme Court considered the appropriate remedy where the defendant was entitled to seek the benefit of an ameliorative change in the law, but the change at issuе pertained to the trial court‘s sentencing discretion under
The court addressed three issues in Stamps. (Id. at p. 692.) First, the court considered whether a certificate of probable cause under
Next, the court concluded that Senate Bill 1393, in eliminating the restriction prohibiting courts from striking serious felony enhancements under
The court explained that ”
The court concluded “the legislative history [did] not demonstrate any intent to overturn existing law regarding a court‘s lack of authority to unilaterally modify a plea agreement.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 702, italics omitted.) The court explained that “Senate Bill 1393 was intended to bring a court‘s discretion to strike a five-year serious felony enhancement in line with the court‘s general discretion to strike other
Stamps distinguished Harris, on which the defendant relied, explaining that Proposition 47 “created a mechanism to allow defendants to seek relief under the new law, even though they had already been sentenced. [Citations.] The resentencing provision applied to those ‘serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea’ [citation] and drew ‘no express distinction between persons serving final sentences and those serving nonfinal sentences, instead entitling both categories of prisoners to petition courts for recall of sentence.’ [Citation.] The provision also allowed defendants who had already completed their sentences to have their offenses designated as misdemeanors. [Citation.] The electorate thus evinced an intent that these offenses be treated as misdemeanors no matter how or when a defendant suffered the conviction. As Harris reasoned, to allow the prosecution, in response to a successful resentencing petition, to withdraw from a plea agreement and reinstate dismissed charges would frustrate electoral intent to treat these offenses uniformly as misdemeanors, essentially denying meaningful relief to those convicted through plea bargains.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 704, citing Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 992.)
Stamps concluded that “[n]othing in the language and legislative history of Senate Bill 1393 suggests an intent to modify section 1192.5‘s mandate that ‘the court may not proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the plea’ without the consent of the parties. As discussed, Senate Bill 1393‘s amendment of section 1385 now allows a trial court to strike a serious felony enhancement just as it may do with any other enhancement. Unlike in Harris, the remedy [the] defendant seeks, to allow the court to strike the serious felony enhancement but otherwise retain the plea bargain, would frustrate the Legislature‘s intent to have
Nevertheless, “[a]t the time the court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced [the] defendant, the law did not allow it to consider striking the serious felony enhancement in furtherance of justice under section 1385. Senate Bill 1393 changed the law to allow such discretion, and we have now concluded that provision applies retroactively. If he desires, [the] defendant should be given the opportunity to seek the court‘s еxercise of its section 1385 discretion. If the court on remand declines to exercise its discretion under section 1385, that ends the matter and [the] defendant‘s sentence stands.” (Id. at p. 707.) “However, if the court is inclined to exercise its discretion, ... such a determination would have consequences to the plea agreement” given that “the court is not authorized to unilaterally modify the plea agreement by striking the serious felony enhancement but otherwise keeping the remainder of the bargain.” (Ibid.)
“[T]he court [might also] withdraw its prior approval of the plea agreement.” (Id. at p. 708.) “The court‘s exercise of its new discretion to strike the serious felony enhancement, whether considered a new circumstance in the case or simply a reevaluation of the propriety of the bargain itself, would fall within the court‘s broad discretion to withdraw its prior approval of the plea agreement.
Stamps concluded that ““[g]iven that defendants in criminal cases presumably obtained some benefit from the plea agreement, ... there will be defendants who determine that, notwithstanding their entitlement to seek relief based on the chаnge in the law, their interests are better served by preserving the status quo. That determination,
B. Analysis
As previously stated, all appellate courts and the one superior court weighing in on the issue have concluded that Assembly Bill 1950 is ameliorative within the meaning of Estrada and, therefore, it applies retroactively to all cases not yet final on review. Given the People‘s position on remedy, we first consider whether there is any indication the Legislature intended to exclude from the broad reach of Estrada those cases resolved by plea bargain. The answer to that question is one of legislative intent, and the framework guiding our analysis is well established.
“We review de novo questions of statutory construction. [Citation.] In doing so, “our fundamental task is ‘to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.‘” [Citation.] We begin with the text, ‘giv[ing] the words their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], while construing them in light of the statute as a whole and the statute‘s purpose [citation].’ [Citation.] ‘If no ambiguity appears in the statutory language, we presume that the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls.‘” (People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1123; accord, Walker v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 177, 194; People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1105-1106.)
““If, however, the statutory language lacks clarity, we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. [Citation.] In such situations, we strive to select the construction that comports most closely with the Legislature‘s apparent intent, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the statute[‘s] general purposes. [Citation.] We will avoid any interpretation
At the outset, we are not the first court to observe that the law has undergone substantial transformation within the past decade and within the past several years in particular in California, leaving courts at every level to determine how to implement an array of changes in the absence of express legislative or voter intent. Many of the questions raised are not susceptible to a single or simple answer. We empathize with the frustration voiced by our colleagues in Scarano and urge greater clarity from the Legislature and electorate on these matters. (Scarano, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 999-1000 & fn. 2 (maj. opn.).)
As we shall discuss, the majority of criminal cases are resolved by plea, and determining whether and how ameliorative changes in the law apply within the context of a plea bargain has proven challenging. The answer will necessarily be informed by the specific nature of the change, its effects, and underlying legislative or voter intent. Courts have agreed that the Estrada presumption applies to Assembly Bill 1950 and have agreed on the legislative intent underlying the bill. However, courts have split on what that means in terms of remedy and, more specifically, whether the remedy articulated in Stamps is confined to its facts or applies more broadly. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Legislature, in enacting Assembly Bill 1950, reduced the maximum probation term in felony and misdemeanors in all nonfinal cases, except for the express exceptions provided for in
a. Language of Bill
As a threshold matter, the Legislature or the electorate may, through express reference to plea bargains, convictions by plea, or resentencing provisions, speak directly to its intent that the change in the law apply to all cases and bind the parties to their plea agreements. The еlectorate did so when it enacted Proposition 47, as discussed in Harris. (Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 992.) The Legislature also did so when it recently enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483 or Sen. Bill 483), which, subject to certain exceptions, invalidates prior prison term and prior drug conviction enhancements imposed under
Senate Bill 483 provides, “The Legislature finds and declares that in order to ensure equal justice and address systemic racial bias in sentencing, it is the intent of the Legislature to retroactively apply Senate Bill 180 of the 2017-18 Regular Session and Senate Bill 136 of the 2019-20 Regular Session to all persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these repealed sentence enhancements. It is the intent of the Legislature that any changes to a sentence as a result of the act that added this section shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.” (Legis. Counsel‘s Dig., Sen. Bill 483, Stats 2021, ch. 728, § 1, p. 2, italics added.)
To effect the Legislature‘s intent, Senate Bill 483 added sections 1171 and 1171.1 to the Penal Code. Section 1171 provides that “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2018, pursuant to Section 11370.2 of the Health and Safety Code, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction of violating or
conspiring to violate
Proposition 47 and Senate Bill 483 spoke specifically to plea bargains and resentencing. However, they also expressed intent to bind the parties to their plea bargains, and were designed to extend relief beyond the already broad Estrada presumption to include convictions in final cases and to allow trial courts to considеr the risk to public safety in determining the availability or scope of relief, adding new sections to the Penal Code to effect this purpose. (
As the California Supreme Court has explained, “[b]ecause the Estrada rule reflects a presumption about legislative intent, rather than a constitutional command, the Legislature (or ... the electorate) may choose to modify, limit, or entirely forbid the retroactive application of ameliorative criminal law amendments if it so chooses.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656.) “Our cases do not ‘dictate to legislative drafters the forms in which lаws must be written’ to express an intent to modify or limit the retroactive effect of an ameliorative change; rather, they require ‘that the Legislature demonstrate its intention with sufficient clarity that a reviewing court can discern and effectuate it.‘” (Id. at pp. 656-657, quoting In re Pedro T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041, 1048-1049.)
Therefore, we next consider the exclusions the Legislature expressly included in the bill. As previously stated, the Legislature provided that if the court granted probation, the probationary period may not exceed two years in felony cases and one year in misdemeanor cases. (
This safety valve was added to the third and final version of the bill, and its inclusion represents the Legislature‘s express determination that certain offenses—violent offenses, select offenses resulting in a high-dollar loss amount,11 and offenses
b. Legislative Intent
““Probation is generally reserved for convicted criminals whose conditional release into society poses minimal risk to public safety and promotes rehabilitation.“” (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 402, quoting People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) It is “an act of clemency in lieu of punishment [citation], and its primary purpose is rehabilitative in nature [citation].” (People v. Moran, supra, at p. 402, quoting People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1092.) Given the purpose of probation and the subset of criminal defendants for whom it is an appropriate disposition, the legislative history for Assembly Bill 1950 reflects, at bottom, concern “that lengthy probationary periods do not serve a rehabilitative function and unfairly lead to reincarceration for technical violations.” (Quinn, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 879; accord, Stewart, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1073-1074, review granted; Sims, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 961-962; Burton, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th Supp. at pp. 17-18.)12
As Harris recognized, “[m]any criminal cases are resolved by negotiated plea.” (Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 992.) Indeed, “plea bargaining is an integral component of the criminal justice system and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of our courts. [Citations.] Commentators have estimated that in most jurisdictions, between 80 and 90 percent оf criminal cases are disposed of by guilty pleas [citation], which, in the majority of cases, are the product of plea bargains.” (In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 933; accord, Lafler v. Cooper (2012) 566 U.S. 156, 170, citing Missouri v. Frye (2012) 566 U.S. 134, 143-144 [“[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.“]; In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 654, fn. 5 [vast majority of criminal cases resolved by plea]; People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 604-605.)
Assembly Bill 1950 “reflects [the Legislature‘s] categorical determination that a shorter term of probation is sufficient for the purpose of rehabilitation.” (Quinn, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 885.) Given that the majority of all criminal cases are resolved by plea, applying Assembly Bill 1950 only in a minority subset of cases would frustrate the Legislature‘s intent to advance specific social and financial public policy goals through the reduction of probation terms, and it would do so in most cases. (See Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 992.) These financial and social goals were the driver for the legislation rather than a benefit merely incidental to a separate primary purpose. Applying Assembly Bill 1950 to all cases not yet final on review except for those specifically excluded by the Legislature effectuates legislative intent. (Scarano, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 1019 (dis. opn. of Raye, P.J.).) A contrary interpretation that excludes applicаtion in cases in which probation was a term of the plea bargain plainly and directly thwarts legislative intent. (See Butler, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 225 [allowing prosecutor “to withdraw from the plea agreement ... would frustrate legislative intent“]; accord, Stewart, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1078-1079 [same], review granted.)
2. Stamps Remedy
The People raise no dispute as to the foregoing, but contend that the remedy in Stamps nevertheless applies where probation was a negotiated term of the parties’ plea bargain. We recognize there is a split of authority on the application of Stamps to ameliorative legislation in general,13 and in the context of Assembly Bill 1950, one
In Stamps, as discussed, the California Supreme Court concluded that Senate Bill 1393 applied retroactively under Estrada (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 699), and because plea bargains are not insulated from changes in the law the Legislature or electorate intended to apply (id. at p. 707, citing Ellis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 946;
Stamps addressed an additional concern not presented here, however. Senate Bill 1393 did not directly modify a term of the parties’ plea bargain, unlike Assembly Bill 1950. Rather, it merely afforded the defendant the opportunity to ask the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion under
Therefore, Stamps considered whether “the Legislature intended to overturn longstanding law that a court cannot unilaterally modify an agreed-upon term by striking portions of it under
The remedy in Stamps served to reconcile the defendant‘s entitlement to request the trial court exercise its newly expanded sentencing discretion under Senate Bill 1393 with the trial court‘s lack of authority to modify a term of the parties’ plea bargain. In order to give effect to the former within the confines of established law governing the latter, the court concluded the defendant was entitled to request relief under Senate Bill 1393. This afforded the defendant all that he was entitled to under the law: the opportunity to avail himself of the ameliorative change under Senate Bill 1393. If the trial court concluded it was not in the interest of justice to strike the enhancement, that would end the matter. If the trial court was inclined to grant relief in a given case, it would necessitate modification of the plea agreement and whether viewed as a withdrawal by the court of its prior approval or an opportunity afforded to the prosecutor to either accept the new terms or withdraw from the plea agreement, having the enhancement stricken while also maintaining the remainder of the bargain was in excess of the bounty to which the defendant was entitled under Senate Bill 1393. Reduction in the maximum probation term under Assembly Bill 1950, which was effected by the Legislature directly and does not rely upon the trial court‘s exercise of its sentencing discretion, is distinguishable. (Scarano, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 1019 (dis. opn. of Raye, P.J.) [“The power at issue is not the unilateral power of a court to modify a plea agreement but the power of a court to determine that the agreement has been superseded by the Legislature‘s intent as expressed in a particular legislative enactment.“]; Stewart, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1078-1079 [discussing unilateral modification by trial court versus “direct and conclusive effect on the legality of existing sentences“], review granted.)
Finally, we consider Collins, as the California Supreme Court has not departed from the decision and Harris affirmed it remains good law. (Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 993.) Stamps did not discuss Collins at length and did not look to Collins for remedy, but we believe the explanation lies in the distinction between the types of relief afforded by the legislation at issue—mere entitlement to request the trial court exercise newly acquired sentencing discretion, which did not directly affect any term of the plea bargain (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 707), compared with decriminalization of conduct, which directly affected a term of the plea bargain and undermined the bargain entirely (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 213-215).
We already concluded that the People‘s position they should be afforded the opportunity to withdraw from the plea bargain is contrary to the plain language of Assembly Bill 1950 and would frustrate legislative intent, and we explained why Stamps is distinguishable as to remedy. The result urged by the People is also inconsistent with the principles articulated in Collins in several respects.
First, the People‘s suggested remedy—withdrawal and return to the status quo—speaks only to their interests without taking into consideration defendant‘s interests, in disregard of the concept of reciprocity in plea bargaining. This is a situation where the Legislature afforded defendant the relief at issue; he did not elect to repudiate his plea bargain. (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216; cf. Stamps, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 707-708.) Second, the People‘s suggested remedy places defendant in the untenable position of potentially being both deprived of the benefit of the change in the law to which he is entitled and deprived of the benefit of his bargain. Collins proscribes such a result; as previously stated, a defendant exercising his right to appeal based on an ameliorative change in the law “should not be penalized ... by being rendered vulnerable to punishment more severe than under his plea bargain.” (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 216-217; accord, People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 360 & fn. 2 (Hanson);
Collins approved a remedy designed to restore the People‘s benefit of the bargain. However, in that case, as discussed, the Legislature decriminalized the conduct underlying the single count to which the defendant pled guilty, and the court recognized that “[w]hen a defendant gains total relief from his vulnerability to sentence, the state is substantially deprived of the benefits for which it agreed to enter the bargain.” (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 215, italics added.) Under those specific circumstances, affording
As a practical matter, given defendant‘s entitlement to the reduction of his probation term and the limitation in Collins precluding any punishment greater than that under the terms of the plea bargain, the options for restructuring a plea bargain in the context of a probation case would appear limited.16 Notwithstanding practical difficulties, the reduction in defendant‘s term of probation differs materially from the decriminalization of the defendant‘s conduct in Collins and does not necessitate the restorative remedy approved there.
Assembly Bill 1950 merely reduces the probationary period to which defendant is subject under the terms of his plea bargain, in accordance with the Legislature‘s determination that probationary periods beyond 18 to 24 months do not serve the rehabilitative goal of probation and divert resources that are best focused on the first 12 to 24 months of probation. Assembly Bill 1950 does not substantially deprive the state of the benefit of its bargain by either decriminalizing the conduct to which defendant pled or affording him total relief from criminal consequences through the elimination of probation. Collins is distinguishable on this point, therefore. A contrary conclusion would thwart Legislative intent, as discussed, and would contravene
The questions raised by these issues simply do not lend themselves to easy answers. We anticipate further clarification from the California Supreme Court in light of the cases currently pending review, cited herein. Given the interpretative difficulties courts have faced, the divergence of opinion on these matters, and the sheer volume of nonfinal criminal cases in this state, the majority of which involve plea bargains, the benefit of greater specificity from the Legislature, or the electorate, cannot be overstated.
4. Defendant Entitled to Modification on Review
In sum, we conclude that defendant is entitled under Assembly Bill 1950 to modification of his probation term to no more than one year. We need not remand a matter when it would be an idle act wasteful of judicial resources (People v. Ledbetter (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 896, 904), and because the maximum probationary period has expired, we shall modify defendant‘s probation term on review (
In accordance with Assembly Bill 1950, defendant‘s three-year probation term is reduced to one year, and the trial court is directed to amend its records to reflect this modification. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
LEVY, Acting P. J.
PEÑA, J.
Notes
“No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a revocation of probation following an admission of violation, except where both of the following are met:
“(a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings.
“(b) The trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court.”