THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARL LEE HOULE, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
A159055
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Filed 5/18/21
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR724212-1)
After the judgment was entered, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (SB 136) amended
The People agree the amended version of
We hold that remand is appropriate in order for the trial court to strike the
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 26, 2019, an information was filed charging defendant with one count of unlawfully carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (
On July 23, 2019, defendant pleaded no contest to the charged offense and admitted the prior strike and prior prison term allegations. In exchange, defendant received a stipulated six-year prison term in this case, the reduction of a felony to a misdemeanor charge for intimidation of a witness in a second case (
As mentioned, effective January 1, 2020,
DISCUSSION
The parties agree that newly amended
The parties disagree, however, on the appropriate remedy. Defendant, in his opening brief, asked this court to strike his two one-year enhancements and leave the remainder of his plea bargain intact—actions not requiring remand to the trial court. In his reply brief, defendant took a new position, asking this court to remand to the trial court with instructions to strike the enhancements and to permit (1) defendant to agree to the original six-year term, (2) the trial court to reject the plea bargain, and (3) the prosecutor to agree to a new term or to withdraw from the plea bargain and reinstate all charges in all three of his cases while limiting his exposure in the three cases to no more than six years. Then, in a letter to the court dated January 13, 2021, defendant returned to his initial position, asking this court to strike the enhancements
The People, in turn, contend the proper remedy is to remand the matter to the trial court to strike the two one-year enhancements and to exercise its sentencing discretion “to achieve a sentence as near as possible to the six year stipulated term,” citing People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 681. The People reason that defendant “already received the benefit of the bargain—namely, avoiding trial, the reduction of the felony intimidation of a witness charge to a misdemeanor in another case, and the outright dismissal of a third case“—and “nothing in amended
During the briefing of this appeal, the California Supreme Court issued a new decision (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th 685) that, we conclude, forecloses defendant‘s initial argument that the enhancements should be stricken but the remainder of the plea bargain left intact. In Stamps, the defendant received a stipulated nine-year sentence under a plea bargain that included a five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement. (Id. at pp. 692-693.) Before the judgment was final, Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1393) was enacted, affording the trial court new discretion to strike a serious felony enhancement in furtherance of justice. (Stamps, at pp. 692-693, 700.) The court held that the matter should be remanded to permit the defendant to ask the trial court to exercise its newly granted discretion to strike the enhancement, but made clear the trial court did not have discretion on remand to strike the enhancement but to otherwise maintain the plea bargain: “If defendant stood convicted of a crime with an enhancing prior as a result of trial or an open plea of guilty as charged, his case could be remanded for the court to reconsider its sentence in light of its newly conferred authority to strike the enhancement. This case is procedurally different because both parties entered a plea agreement for a specific prison term.” (Stamps, 9 Cal.5th at p. 700.) ”
The Stamps court then reviewed the legislative history of SB 1393 and concluded that, while the Legislature gave the court the same discretion to strike a serious felony enhancement that it retains to strike any other sentence enhancing provision when enacting that bill, the Legislature did not change the well-settled law that “a court lacks discretion to modify a plea agreement unless the parties agree to the modification.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 702.) Accordingly, the Stamps court held that if on remand “the court indicates an inclination to exercise its discretion . . . , the prosecution may . . . agree to modify the bargain to reflect the downward departure in the sentence such exercise would entail. Barring such a modification agreement, ‘the prosecutor is entitled to the same remedy as the defendant—withdrawal of assent to the plea agreement . . . .‘” (Id. at p. 707.)
Several appellate courts, including those in the First District, have applied the holding of Stamps to cases such as ours addressing the scope of the trial court‘s authority on remand when striking an enhancement under newly amended
Collins concerned a defendant who pleaded guilty to a sex crime, oral copulation, that was decriminalized as to “consenting, nonprisoner adults” prior to his sentencing. In exchange for his plea, numerous other charges against the defendant were dismissed. (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 211.) In holding that the defendant‘s sentence as to the former sex crime was no longer authorized and had to be stricken, the California Supreme Court recognized that if the rest of the parties’ plea bargain remained intact, the prosecution would lose the benefit of its bargain. To avoid this result, the court held that on remand the prosecution could “revive one or more of the dismissed counts . . . .” (Id. at pp. 215, 216.) However, if the prosecution chose to revive one or more counts, the court further held that the trial court could not impose a greater sentence on the defendant than he received under the original plea bargain lest the defendant lose the benefit of his bargain. (Id. at pp. 216-217.) The court explained: “This is not a case in which the defendant has repudiated the bargain by attacking his guilty plea; he attacks only the judgment, and does so on the basis of external events—the repeal and reenactment of section 288a—that have rendered the judgment insupportable.” (Collins, at p. 216, fn. omitted.) As such, the defendant “should not be penalized for properly invoking [precedent] to overturn his erroneous conviction and sentence by being rendered vulnerable to punishment more severe than under his plea bargain.” (Id. at p. 217.)
The Griffin court followed Collins in fashioning a remedy based on the change of law under SB 136. (Griffin, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098, rev.gr.) Our colleagues reasoned: “Appellant, like the defendant in Collins, did not repudiate his plea; ‘he attacks only the judgment, and does so on the basis of external events . . . that have rendered the judgment insupportable.’ (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216.) Rejection of Appellant‘s request to leave the remainder of the plea bargain intact ensures
As Griffin notes, in Hernandez, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 942, our Fifth District colleagues declined to follow Collins to the extent it permitted the prosecution to refile the previously dismissed charges as long as the defendant was not resentenced to a greater term than he or she originally received. Hernandez reasoned that ”Stamps did not extend Collins to permit such a resolution, and instead held the People could completely withdraw from the plea agreement if the prior serious felony enhancement was dismissed.” (Hernandez, supra, at p. 959, rev.gr.) Griffin correctly pointed out, however, that (1) Stamps never addressed whether the trial court could impose a longer sentence on remand, much less overrule the language in Collins capping the sentence that could be imposed (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 703-704); and (2) unlike the legislative enactment at issue in Stamps (SB 1393), here and in Collins the relevant changes in law were “external events” that rendered the defendants’ plea agreements unenforceable by operation of law without regard to whether the defendants sought relief from the trial court. (Griffin, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1099, rev.gr.) We agree with Griffin that after Stamps, the holding in Collins capping the length of the sentence based on the sentence imposed under the original plea bargain remains binding precedent that applies in this case. (See Griffin, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1105-1106 (conc. opn. of Reardon, J.), rev.gr.)
Accordingly, for the reasons stated we herein adopt the approach of our Griffin colleagues.5 Neither party has successfully distinguished Collins on
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Jackson, J.
WE CONCUR:
Fujisaki, Acting P. J.
Wiseman, J.*
A159055/People v. Carl Lee Houle, Jr.
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
A159055/People v. Carl Lee Houle, Jr.
Trial Court: Superior Court of the County of Sonoma
Trial Judge: Peter Ottenweller, J.
Counsel: Maria T. Rogers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorneys General, Roni Dina Pomerantz and Victoria Ratnikova, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.