People v. RuizPeople v. Ruiz
Pursuant to judicially authorized wiretapping, law enforcement officers heard defendant Feliz Corral Ruiz II, who is a member of a Norteño street gang, conspiring to shoot and kill members of another gang in retaliation for the shooting of a Norteño gang member. On July 28, 2012, several Norteño gang members shot at an apartment complex where members of the other gang were known to gather, hitting one person in the chest and another in the leg. In connection with these events, the People filed an information charging defendant with, among other crimes, conspiracy to transport a controlled substance in violation of
On appeal, defendant argued that these fees were “unauthorized” — and should therefore be stricken — because: (1) he was convicted, not of a drug offense specified in the statutes establishing the fees, but of conspiracy to commit one of the specified offenses; and (2) the fees are not “punishment” for purposes of the conspiracy sentencing statute —
Instead, the parties, like the Court of Appeal, focus on the sanctions provision of the conspiracy statute, which states in relevant part that persons convicted of conspiring to commit a felony “shall be punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of that felony.” (
In evaluating these opposing positions, our “fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose. [Citation.]” (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) “Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.” (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1040; see also
Insofar as the People appear to assert that it is irrelevant whether the fees constitute punishment, their argument runs afoul of these rules of statutory construction. As noted above, subdivision (a) of
Instead, as noted above, the People rely on our decision in Athar, but that decision does not support their argument. There, we held that sentence enhancements prescribed for a money laundering conviction apply to offenders convicted of conspiring to commit money laundering. (Athar, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 398.) As the People observe, toward the end of the opinion, we stated that
In light of the preceding, the question here is whether the fees at issue are part of “the punishment” “provided for” the underlying target felony — transporting a controlled substance in violation of
Regarding the term‘s ordinary meaning, we have observed that “[c]ommonly understood definitions of punishment are intuitive: there is little dispute that additional jail time or extra fines are punishment. [Citation.] However, punishment has historically included a variety of methods limited only by human imagination . . . .” (People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 84.) Dictionaries have typically defined the term broadly to include any ” ‘pain, suffering, loss, confinement or other penalty inflicted on a person for a crime or offense, by the authority to which the offender is subject.’ ” (Gunning v. People (1899) 86 Ill.App. 174, 178.) Similarly, “[a]s a legal term of art, ‘punishment’ has always meant a ‘fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by the authority of the law and the judgment and sentence of a court, for some crime or offense committed by him.’ ” (Helling v. McKinney (1993) 509 U.S. 25, 38 (dis. opn. of Thomas, J), quoting Black‘s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 1234.)
“[T]he traditional aims of punishment” are “retribution or deterrence.” (People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 759.) However, a sanction does not constitute punishment merely because it has some ”deterrent or retributive effect.”
“[T]he method” courts use to determine “what constitutes punishment varies depending upon the context in which the question arises. But two factors appear important in each case: whether the Legislature intended the provision to constitute punishment and, if not, whether the provision is so punitive in nature or effect that it must be found to constitute punishment despite the Legislature‘s contrary intent.” (People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 795 (plur. opn. of George, C.J.).) The first factor is generally considered determinative where a court concludes that the Legislature did, in fact, intend the particular sanction to constitute punishment. As we recently explained in the context of applying the constitutional right to a jury trial, “[a]t the outset, . . . the inquiry is whether the state legislative authority, in adopting a law allowing a court to impose [a sanction], intended [it] as punishment, or instead meant to adopt a nonpunitive regulatory scheme. [¶] . . . ‘[I]f the intention . . . was to impose punishment, that
Consistent with these principles, defendant focuses in his briefs on the Legislature‘s intent in passing sections 11372.5 and 11372.7. He argues that the Legislature‘s “clearly discernible . . . intent” is that the fees in question “are not ‘punishment.’ ” In support of his position, he emphasizes that both statutes use the term “fee” to describe their respective charges rather than the term “fine,” “penalty,” or “punishment.” (
Moreover, defendant‘s argument ignores the principle that, in determining a statute‘s purpose, we consider its language, not in isolation, but in the context of its “entire substance” and all of “its various parts.” (Alford v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) After setting forth the “criminal laboratory analysis fee” in the first sentence of
To the extent the statutory language leaves any uncertainty about the Legislature‘s intent, “the legislative record [further] evinces [an] intent to punish.” (Nixon, supra, 433 U.S. at p. 478). The Legislature enacted
The legislative history of the 1980 statute confirms this conclusion. The Legislative Counsel‘s Digest described the subject of Senate Bill No. 1535 as “Controlled substance offenses: penalty assessments,” and then explained: “This bill would require every person who is convicted of prescribed controlled substance offenses to pay an additional $50 as part of any fine imposed; the total fine would be increased to include the increment. The bill would authorize $50 fines to be imposed for such purpose with respect to offenses for which fines are
Indeed, nothing in the legislative history of the 1983 amendment supports the view that the change in language defendant cites reflects a legislative intent to change the increment from a fine or penalty to an administrative fee. As introduced, the bill that amended the statute — Assembly Bill No. 2044 — proposed: (1) adding new crimes to the list of specified offenses; (2) changing the phrase “shall, as part of any fine imposed, pay an increment in the amount of fifty dollars ($50) for each separate offense” to “shall pay a criminal laboratory analysis fee in the amount of fifty dollars ($50) for each separate offense whether or not a fine is imposed“; and (3) deleting the rest of
The Assembly quickly responded by essentially adopting the latter suggestion, i.e., “return[ing] to current law,” which “mak[es] the fee part of a fine.” (Assem. Crim. Law and Pub. Safety Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2044 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 11, 1983, p. 2.) Although retaining the new designation of the increment as “a criminal laboratory analysis fee,” the Assembly deleted the proposed phrase “whether or not a fine is imposed” and revived those parts of the 1980 statute that the earlier version would have deleted, by reinserting (with minor revisions (see fn. 4, supra)) the language requiring courts to “increase the total fine necessary to include this increment” and, as to specified offenses “for which a fine is not authorized by other provisions of law,” permitting courts to “impose” the “increment” as “a fine . . . in addition to any other penalty authorized by law.” (Assem. Bill No. 2044 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 2, 1983, § 1.)
Several analyses of this revised form of the bill explained that (1) existing law requires those convicted of specified controlled substance offenses to “pay an additional $50 as part of any fine imposed,” and (2) the proposed amendment “[s]pecifies that the $50 fine is a criminal laboratory analysis fee.” (Assem. Crim. Law & Pub. Safety Com., 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2044 (1983–
Subsequent legislative developments are fully consistent with these conclusions. In 1985, the Legislature added new crimes to the statute‘s list of specified offenses. (Stats. 1985, ch. 1098, § 5.) In describing this amendment, the Legislative Counsel‘s Digest explained: “Existing law requires every person who is convicted of specified controlled substance offenses to pay an additional $50 fine imposed as a criminal laboratory analysis fee . . . . [¶] This bill would include additional specified offenses . . . within these provisions.” (Legis. Counsel‘s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2401 (1985–1986 Reg. Sess.) 4 Stats. 1985, Summary Dig., p. 380, italics added.) Consistent with this description, the Legislative Analyst explained that the 1985 amendment would “[m]ake[] persons
At this point, the legislative history of
Several analyses of the bill that proposed
Subsequent legislative developments also support this conclusion. As enacted, subdivision (c) of
In 1993, the Legislature, through passage of Assembly Bill No. 855, increased the maximum amount of
Defendant largely ignores these clear indicators of legislative intent. Instead, he relies on the Court of Appeal‘s assertion in People v. Vega (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 183, 195 (Vega), that “the main purpose” of
Initially, neither the language of the statutes nor their legislative history persuades us to adopt defendant‘s view of the Legislature‘s “main purpose” in establishing these charges. As already explained, both statutes refer to the charges as “fine[s]” and provide that, in some cases, the fine “shall be in addition to any other penalty prescribed by law.” (
In any event, even accepting defendant‘s assertion, we reject his argument that the criminal laboratory analysis and drug program fees are not “punishment” for purposes of
Supporting this conclusion is our decision in People v. Talibdeen (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1151 (Talibdeen), on which the People rely. There, the trial court imposed a criminal laboratory analysis fee under
As defendant observes, several courts of appeal have stated that Talibdeen is not dispositive of whether
By contrast, our decision in People v. Alford, supra, 42 Cal.4th 749, on which defendant relies, provides little support for his view. There, we held that the court security fee
As this discussion makes clear, there are significant differences between the indicia of legislative intent we cited in People v. Alford regarding the court security fee and the indicia of legislative intent regarding the charges at issue in this case. Whereas the Legislature referred to the court security charge as a fee, as we have explained, both the statutes and the legislative history refer to the criminal laboratory analysis and drug program fees as fines, penalties, and punishments. Whereas the Legislature did not require a criminal conviction for imposition of the court security fee, and imposed that fee even in the civil context, it provided for7
As noted earlier, a finding that the Legislature intended a particular sanction to constitute punishment ” ‘ends the inquiry.’ ” (Mosley, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1063.) Because, for reasons explained above, it is clear the Legislature intended the fees at issue here to be punishment, it is “unnecessary to pursue any additional inquiry into their underlying character.” (People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 361 [finding, for purposes of applying the double jeopardy clause, that Legislature intended restitution fines to be “punishment“].)8
Shortly before oral argument, defendant filed a request to submit supplemental briefing on two additional issues: (1) whether the criminal laboratory analysis fee and the drug program fee are subject to penalty assessments (see fn. 5, ante); and (2) whether a firearm sentence enhancement he received under
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal and remand to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
ASHMANN-GERST, J.*
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* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.