THE PEOPLE, Plаintiff and Respondent, v. RANSOM HUNTLEY GRIFFIN, Defendant and Appellant.
A159104
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE
Filed 11/30/20
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Lake County Super. Ct. Nos. CR952884, CR953175-B, CR953305-A)
We agree with respondent on that issue, following the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 (Stamps) and a recent Fifth District decision, People v. Hernandez (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 942 (Hernandez). However, we part with Hernandez in one respect and conclude it would be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to impose a longer sentence than the original agreement if a new plea agreement is entered on remand.
BACKGROUND3
In December 2018, the Lake County District Attorney filed a felony complaint in case number CR952884 charging Appellant with possession of methamphetamine for sale (
In February 2019, the Lake County District Attorney filed a felony complaint in case number CR953175-B charging Appellant with entry with intent to commit larceny (
Also in February 2019, the Lake County District Attorney filed a felony complaint in case number CR953305-A charging Appellant with felony transportation of methamphetamine with intent to sell (
In September 2019, Appellant entered into a plea agreement for all three cases. In case numbers CR952884 and CR953305-A, Appellant pled no contest to possession of a controlled substance for sale (
In October 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a prison term of eight years, four months pursuant to the plea agreement.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Under the version of the statute in effect when Appellant was sentenced,
Because neither of the prior prison term enhancements alleged below were based on a sexually violent offense, we agree the one-year enhancement imposed under
The first disputed issue on appeal is whether the
Matthews’ reasoning is no longer sustainable in light of the decision on a related issue in Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th 685, subsequently followed by the Fifth District in People v. Barton (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1145 (Barton) (regarding an enactment analogous to Senate Bill 136) and Hernandez, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 942 (regarding Senate Bill 136 itself). In Stamps, the defendant’s plea agreement specified a nine-year prison sentence that included a five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement. (Stamps, at pp. 692–693.) While the defendant’s “appeal was pending, a new law went into effect permitting the trial court to strike a serious felony enhancement in furtherance of justice [citation], which it was not previously authorized to do.” (Id. at. p. 692.) The change in the law resulted from Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1393). (Stamps, at p. 700.) The Supreme Court held the matter should be remanded to give the defendant an opportunity to request that the trial court exercise its newly granted discretion to strike under
Stamps reasoned, “Even when applicable,
In Stamps, the defendant argued there was sufficient indication of legislative intent because, in enacting Senate Bill 1393, the Legislature sought ” ‘to reduce prison overcrowding, save money, and achieve a more just, individualized sentencing scheme.’ ” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 702.) The Supreme Court concluded that was insufficient because “the legislative history does not demonstrate any intent to overturn existing law regarding a court’s lack of authority to unilaterally modify a plea agreement. Indeed, none of the legislative history materials mention plea agreements at all. . . . Thus, the Legislature gave a court the same discretion to strike a serious felony enhancement that it retains to strike any other sentence enhancing provision. Its action did not operate to change well-settled law that a court lacks discretion to modify a plea agreement unless the parties agree to the mоdification.” (Ibid.)
Stamps distinguished Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984. In Harris, the defendant had pleaded guilty to felony grand theft with a prior in exchange for a stipulated prison sentence of six years. (Harris, at pp. 987–989.) As Stamps explained, “After passage of Proposition 47, which ‘reduced certain nonviolent crimes . . . from felonies to misdemeanors’ [citation], [the defendant] petitioned to have his theft conviction resentenced as a misdemeanor. [Citation.] The People argued the reduction violated the plea agreement and sought to withdraw from the bargain.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 702, quoting Harris, at p. 988.) Noting that the enactment “specifically applied to a person ‘serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea,’ Harris concluded that ‘[b]y expressly mentioning convictions by plea, Proposition 47 contemplated relief to all eligible defendants.’ ” (Stamps, at p. 703, quoting Harris, at p. 991.) Stamps observed that, unlike the enactment in Harris, “Senate Bill 1393 is silent regarding pleas and provides no еxpress mechanism for relief,” which “undercuts any suggestion that the Legislature intended to create special rules for plea cases involving serious felony enhancements.” (Stamps, at p. 704.)
Stamps concluded the appropriate remedy was to remand to provide the defendant an opportunity to ask the trial court to exercise its newly
In People v. Barton (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1145 (Barton), the Fifth District followed Stamps in a statutory context similar to that involved in the present case. The issue in Barton was application of Senate Bill No. 180 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 180) to a non-final judgment. (Barton, at p. 1149Health and Safety Code section 11370.2 “by eliminating its three-year enhancements for most drug-related prior convictions.” (Barton, at p. 1149Barton argued “the proper remedy is to vacate the enhancements and leave the remainder of her plea agreement intact.” (Ibid.)
In light of Stamps, Barton reasoned that “the scope of the trial court’s authority on remand depends on the legislative intent behind Senate Bill 180.” (Barton, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 1157.) The court of appeal concluded the legislative history did not show “the Legislature intended for Senate Bill 180 to override the strictures of . . .
Finally, in Hernandez, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 942, the Fifth District followed Stamps as to Senate Bill 136, the enactment at issue in
There is one significant difference between Senate Bill 1393, at issue in Stamps, and Senate Bill 136. Senate Bill 1393 gave trial courts discretion to strike an enhancement, while Senate Bill 136 categorically removed authorization to impose the
The second disputed issue on appeal is whether on remand the trial court may impose a longer sentence than that provided in the original plea agreement, if the parties enter into a new agreement. We conclude it may not.6
At the outset, we observe such a result plainly would be inconsistent with the legislative intеnt underlying Senate Bill 136. The purpose of the enactment was to decrease the length of sentences imposed on repeat felons by substantially narrowing the scope of application of the prior prison term enhancement. An increased sentence due to retroactive application of the enactment would be directly contrary to the result the Legislature intended. The risk of an increased sentence would also discourage defendants from exercising their right to challenge unauthorized
The California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208 (Collins), supports a conclusion that the trial court may not on remand approve a new plea agreement imposing a longer sentence than that in the original plea agreement. In Collins, the defendant pleaded guilty to oral copulation in violation of former section 288a, in exchange for dismissal of numerous remaining charges. (Collins, at p. 211Collins, at p. 211Id. at p. 212.) However, the court rejected the defendant’s suggestion that he could “gain
Nevertheless, and as relevant to the present appeal, Collins emphasized the defendant was “also entitled to the benefit of his bargain.” (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216Collins, at p. 216Id. at pp. 216–217.) That disposition “permits the defendant to realize the benefits he derived from the plea bargaining agreement, while the People also receive approximately that for which they bargained.” (Id. at p. 217.) As support for its result, Collins invoked cases from the double jeopardy context. (Id. at p. 216.) The court explained the “concern there was specifically to preclude vindictiveness and more generally to avoid penalizing a defendant for pursuing a successful appeal.” (Ibid.) Similarly, the defendant in Collins “should not be penalized for properly invoking [precedent] to overturn his erroneous conviction and sentence by being rendered vulnerable to punishment more severe than under his plea bargain.” (Id. at p. 217; see also People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 366 [following Collins and emphasizing “the chilling effect on the right to appeal generated by the risk of a more severe punishment“].)
The same reasoning applies here. Appellant, like the defendant in Collins, did not repudiate his plea; “he attacks only the judgment, and does so on the basis of external events . . . that have rendered the judgment insupportable.” (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216Id. at p. 215.) But it would be contrary to legislative intent and deprive Appellant of the benefit of his bargain were the trial court on remand to impose a longer sentence following Appellant’s entry of a guilty plea pursuant to a new agreement. ” ‘The process of plea bargaining . . . contemplates an agreement negotiated by the People and the defendant and approved by the court.’ ” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 705.) ” ‘In exercising their discretion to approve or reject proposed plea bargains, trial courts are charged with the protection and promotion of the public’s interest in vigorous prosecution of the accused, imposition of appropriate punishment, and protection of victims of crimes. [Citation.] For that reason, a trial court’s approval of a proposed plea bargain must represent an informed decision in furtherance of the
Respondent urges this court to follow Hernandez, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 947, which rejected the idea of extending the reasoning of Collins to a Senate Bill 136 remand. Hernandez stated, “we acknowledge the holding in Collins that allowed the prosecution to refile the previously dismissed charges as long as the defendant was not resentenced to a greater term than provided in the original plea agreement. Stamps did not extend Collins to permit such a resolution, and instead held the People could completely withdraw frоm the plea agreement if the prior serious felony enhancement was dismissed.” (Hernandez, at p. 959Stamps never addressed the language in Collins capping the sentence that could be imposed on remand, and Stamps never addressed whether the trial court could properly impose a longer sentence on remand. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 703–704Collins than Stamps: Any new plea agreement on remand in Stamps would have been the result of the defendant’s decision to seek relief under Senate Bill 1393. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 708Collins and the present case, the legislative enactments were “external events” that simply rendered the plea agreements unenforceable. (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216Collins, that distinction supports different remand instructions here than in Stamps.7
Because “we must fashion a remedy that restores to the state the benefits for which it bargained without depriving defendant of the bargain to which he remains entitled” (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 215–216), we reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to strike the
The judgment is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SIMONS, Acting P.J.
I concur.
NEEDHAM, J.
(A159104)
Reardon, J., Concurring.
I agree fully with the conclusion in Part I of the majority opinion that, on remand, the trial court must strike the one-year enhancement and, thereafter, may not otherwise enforce the remainder of the original plea agreement, absent the consent of the parties. Under the authority of our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208 (Collins), I concur with the opinion’s further conclusion in Part II that, on remand, the trial court may not accept a new plea agreement with a sentence longer than that contemplated by the original plea agreement.
This area of the law admits of several different permutations. Among them, as noted in the majority opinion, is whether the change in law which undermines the original plea agreement is one that, as here, renders the agreement unenforceable because a provision of law has been repealed or no longer applies to the matter, or is a change that renders the agreement newly subject to judicial discretion, as in People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 (Stamps). In the former circumstance, the plea agreement is nullified by operation of law; in the latter, by judicial determination. As explained in the majority opinion, per the reasoning in Stamps (id. at p. 707), the parties are no longer bound by the agreement in either instance.
The majority opinion goes on to conclude that the original plea agreement continues to operate as a cap on punishment, even if the parties otherwise agree. I believe this result is compelled by language in Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pages 216–217. I also agree with my colleagues that an implied overruling of Collins did not occur in Stamps. (See maj. opn. ante, at p. 14, fn. 7.) The court in Stamps cited Collins approvingly on a related point (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 703–704), and had the opportunity to overrule Collins on this one and did not. (Cf. People v. Hernandez (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 942, 949.) However, I believe the court’s analysis in Stamps indicates a willingness to reconsider Collins on this point. I write here to encourage that reconsideration.
The majority opinion confines its analysis to those situations wherein, upon remand, the parties enter into a new plea agreement. (See maj. opn. ante, at
I see no reason to prevent the parties on remand from reaching a new agreement that contemplates a punishment in excess of the original agreement.2 Any new agreement would, of course, be subject to the trial court’s approval. ” ‘Judicial approval is an essential condition precedent to the effectiveness of the “bargain” worked out by the defense and prosecution.’ [Citations.] [¶] The statutory scheme contemplates that a court may initially indicate its approval of an agreement at the time of the plea but that ‘it may, at the time set for the hearing on the application for probation or pronouncement of judgment, withdraw its approval in the light of further consideration of the matter . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘The code expressly reserves to the court the power to disapprove the plea agreement’ up until sentencing. [Citation.] ‘In exercising their discretion to approve or reject proposed plea bargains, trial courts are charged with the protection and promotion of the public’s interest in vigorous prosecution of the accused, imрosition of appropriate punishment, and protection of victims of crimes. [Citation.] For that reason, a trial court’s approval of a proposed plea bargain must represent an informed decision in furtherance of the interests of society.’ ” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 705–706.) I would expect the trial court to exercise its discretion appropriately in approving or rejecting the new agreement, but I would not limit that discretion or the ability of the parties to freely contract by imposing a cap. (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 930 [“[A] ‘negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract.’ “].)
The parties to a plea bargain must consider all possibilities, from complete acquittal with no punishment to conviction on all charges and imposition of
Take as an example a defendant charged, prior to the passage of Senate Bill No. 136, with one count of residential burglary (
Take a second example in which a defendant pleads guilty to one of many counts, the plea is invalidated, and the matter remanded. Suppose further that no new agrеement is reached and the matter goes to trial. If the defendant is convicted of more offenses at trial than incorporated in the plea bargain, any cap would act to hamstring the trial court’s appropriate exercise of sentencing discretion. Certainly, a court approving a plea bargain weighs different interests and different information when approving that bargain than does a court at sentencing following trial.
In addition, a cap on any posttrial sentence would inordinately skew the plea bargaining process in favor of the defendant. Returning to my first
Here, for instance, defendant was charged in three different dockets with a variety of offenses. Should he choose not to enter into a new agreement, the People would face the prospect of trying all three cases, yet being limited to a potential punishment no greater than that contemplated by the original plea agreement. Certainly, any concession by the People reflected by the original plea term, in the name of efficiency, the interests of victims, convenience of witnesses, guaranteed result, finality, etc., would be lost if the cases had to be tried. And, the greater potential punishment that the People forwent by entering into the plea bargain would also be lost by the imposition of a cap. For this reason, in addition to the inappropriate limitation on a sentencing court’s discretion after trial, the imposition of a sentencing cap on any trial after remand is not advisable.
The majority opinion relies, in part, on the laudable principle that our ruling should not dissuade individuals from seeking appellate redress. (See maj. opn. ante, at p. 11.) But, at the time a defendant is deciding whether to appeal in these situations, he does not know if he will be able to reach a new plea agreement with the People, and neither he nor the court can force one. That is to say, he may have to go to trial, where no cap would apply. Thus, there seems to be no way to avoid the potential of dissuading him from appealing.
The court in Stamps held: “Defendant should be allowed to make an informed decision whether to seek relief on remand.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 708.) Of course, there, the original plea bargain was not unlawful on its face. Rather, on remand, a defendant would be inviting the trial court’s exercise of discretion as to whether or not to strike the serious felony prior conviction. I see no meaningful distinction where, as here, the
It is important to note that this balancing by the defendant of the risks and benefits of аppellate review pertains only in cases of a plea bargain. When a defendant is convicted following trial or after entering an open plea to all the charges, no plea bargain is involved. On remand for resentencing, the sentencing court simply “reconsider[s] its sentence in light of its newly conferred authority.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 700.) The sentencing court is appropriately limited by its original sentence should the matter be remanded for resentencing following the alteration of the legal landscape. (People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281.) In the former case, the People have had their opportunity to prove all the charges; in the latter, the defendant has admitted all the charges. The parties’ bargaining positions have not been altered. Rather, the sentencing court having originally exercised its discretion to impose a certain sentence is simply limited by that sentence on remand. A defendant convicted under either of those scenarios would not be dissuaded from pursuing his appellate rights for fear of receiving a greater sentence.
As a general proposition, the court has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments. (People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 497.) Yet, the Legislature did not go so far as to apply the remedy of Senate Bill No. 136 to final judgments, which it could have done. (See Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), granting retroactive relief when liability for murder under the theories of felony murder and natural and probable consequence was altered.) Is the interest, therefore, so great that we would require alteration of a nonfinal judgment that a defendant understandably did not request?
The majority opinion also explains that a cap on post-remand plea bargains would be consistent with the lеgislative intent underlying Senate Bill No. 136, namely to decrease prison sentences imposed on repeat felons. (See maj. opn. ante, at p. 11.) However, the Supreme Court’s discussion in Stamps explains the persuasive limits of that intent in light of the wording of the statute at issue there (similar to the one before us), particularly when compared to the more sweeping language of Proposition 47, analyzed in Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984 and referenced in the majority opinion. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 702–705 [“[T]his bill . . . says nothing about the proper remedy should we conclude a law retroactively applies.“].) The Stamps court concluded that the legislative intent to reduce sentences did not extend so far as to lock the People into a diminished plea bargain.
This brings us to what is, in my view, the persuasive reason for the holding in Part II of the majority opinion: Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d 208. In that case, the defendant was charged with various felonies, including several forcible sexual assaults. Pursuant to a plea bargain, he рled guilty to one count of nonforcible oral copulation, which at that time was unlawful even between consenting adults. He was committed for treatment as a mentally disordered offender. By the time he was later returned to court for further proceedings, consensual oral copulation had been legalized. Overruling his objection, the court sentenced Collins to prison for an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years. (Id. at pp. 211–212.)
The Collins court did four things. First and unremarkably, it applied its earlier ruling in People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, holding that the change in law legalizing the conduct for which Collins had been convicted applied retroactively, thus nullifying Collins’s conviction. (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 212–213.) Secondly, it determined that “the proper remedy is to reverse the judgment with directions to dismiss the count involved herein,” rather than uphold the conviction and indicate ” ‘no penalty,’ ” as suggested by Collins. (Id. at p. 214.) Thirdly, it provided guidance to the trial court on remand by finding that the counts that were dismissed at the time of the plea could be reinstated. Because the defendant in Rossi had been convicted at trial of only nonforcible oral copulation, the question of other, dismissed counts had not been presented in that case. “Critical to plea bargaining is the concept of reciprocal benefits. When either the prosecution or the defendant is deprived of benefits for which it has bargained, corresponding relief will lie from concessions made. . . . [¶] The question to be decided, then, is whether the prosecution has been deprived of the benefit of its bargain by the relief granted herein. We conclude that it has and hence the dismissed counts may be restored.” (Collins, at pp. 214–215Stamps relied upon Collins on this third point. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 703–704.)
But, Collins went one step further by limiting the defendant’s potential sentence on remand “to not more than three years in state prison, the term of punishment set by the Community Release Board pursuant to the determinate sentencing act.” (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216).3 In so
doing, the
Any concern that the People would be acting vindictively, I believe, is adequately addressed through the trial court’s traditional powers of supervision and approval of plea bargаins. As I have explained above, the potential chilling of a defendant’s appellate remedies is a weighty factor where the defendant has been sentenced following trial—the cases relied upon by the court in Collins. (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 216–217.) I find it less weighty and, indeed, unavoidable in the quite complicated context of plea bargaining.
As mentioned, the Stamps court relied upon Collins as to the third point: the restoration of the dismissed counts. Curiously, the court did not rely upon Collins on the fourth and final point—the post-remand cap—or even take that issue up, in so many words. Instead, the court discussed at length and with approval People v. Ellis (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 925, as to whether remand for resentencing would be futile in that case. As Stamps explained: “In light of these potential consequences to the plea agreement, we emphasize that it is ultimately defendant’s choice whether he wishes to seek relief under Senate Bill 1393. As Ellis reasоned: ‘Given that defendants in criminal cases presumably obtained some benefit from the plea agreement, we anticipate that there will be defendants who determine that, notwithstanding their entitlement to seek relief based on the change in the law, their interests are better served by preserving the status quo. That determination, however, lies in each instance with the defendant.’ [Citation.] While it is true that defendant has consistently argued on appeal that Senate Bill 1393 should retroactively apply to him, his argument has always been coupled with his claim that the proper remedy should be to simply allow the trial court to reduce his sentence by five years while otherwise maintaining the remainder of the plea agreement. Now that we have rejected his proposed remedy, defendant’s calculus in seeking relief under Senate Bill 1393 may have changed. Defendant should be allowed to make an informed decision whether to seek relief on remand.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
The discussion in Stamps suggests a willingness by our Supreme Court to revisit Collins. I hope my thoughts may encourage that. Nonetheless, I agree that Collins remains our Supreme Court’s clearest pronouncement on this point and that we arе compelled to follow it. Thus, I join in the majority opinion’s conclusion in Part II as well.
Reardon, J.*
A159104
* Judge of the Superior Court of Alameda County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Superior Court of Lake County, Nos. CR952884, CR953175-B, CR953305-A, Hon. Arthur H. Mann, Judge.
Nathan Siedman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin and Bruce M. Slavin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.