ROCKY MOUNTAIN GUN OWNERS, а Colorado nonprofit corporation; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR GUN RIGHTS, INC., a Virginia nonprofit corporation; and JOHN A. STERNBERG v. JARED S. POLIS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Colorado
No. 18SC817
Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
June 29, 2020
2020 CO 66
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 17CA1502. Judgment Affirmed en banc.
Opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court are available to the public and can be accessed through the Judicial Branch‘s homepage at http://www.courts.state.co.us. Opinions are also posted on the Colorado Bar Association‘s homepage at http://www.cobar.org.
ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
June 29, 2020
2020 CO 66
No. 18SC817, Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis — Right to Keep and Bear Arms —
The supreme court reviews whether legislation prohibiting the sale, transfer, or possession of a “large-capacity magazine” violates the right to keep and bear arms protected under
Attorneys for Petitioners:
Arrington Law Office
Barry K. Arrington
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Eric R. Olson, Solicitor General
Stephanie Lindquist Scoville, First Assistant Attorney General
Kathleen L. Spalding, Senior Assistant Attorney General
Grant T. Sullivan, Assistant Solicitor General
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence:
Hogan Lovells US LLP
Lisa J. Fried
Nathaniel H. Nesbitt
Mark D. Gibson
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae City and County of Denver:
Kristin M. Bronson, City Attorney
Kristen J. Crawford, Assistant City Attorney
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae City of Boulder:
Thomas A. Carr, City Attorney
Everytown Law
William J. Taylor, Jr.
Denver, Colorado
Attorney for Amici Curiae Colorado Law Enforcement Firearms Instructors Association; Sheriffs Shannon Byerly, Todd Combs, Allen Cooper, Garth Crowther, Bill Elder, Thomas Elliott, KC Hume, Matt Lewis, Dave Martin, Anthony Mazzola, Don McDonald, Tom McGraw, Jason Mikesell, Shawn Mobley, Tim Norton, Brett Powell, Steve Reams, Richard Reigenborn, Danny Sanchez, Brent Schroetlin, Casey Sheridan, Aaron Shiplett, Jeff Shrader, Justin Smith, Tony Spurlock, John Stivers, Rick Valdez, James Van Beek, Lou Vallario, Garrett Wiggins, Don Wilson, and Sam Zordel; and the Independence Institute:
David B. Kopel
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Municipal League:
David W. Broadwell
Laurel Witt
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado State Shooting Association:
Hale Westfall, LLP
Richard A. Westfall
Denver, Colorado
Attorney for Amicus Curiae Firearms Policy Coalition, Firearms Policy Foundation, Second Amendment Foundation, and Millennial Policy Center:
Joseph Greenlee
Sacramento, California
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence:
Morrison & Foerster LLP
Nicole K. Serfoss
Sarah E. Barr
Denver, Colorado
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 In recent decades, Colorado has been the setting of two of the nation‘s most notorious mass shootings: Columbine High School in 1999 and the Aurora movie theater in 2012. In both attacks, the shooters used large-capacity ammunition magazines. Collectively, the shooters killed over twо dozen people and wounded scores more.
¶2 In response to these shootings, the Colorado General Assembly passed House Bill 13-1224 (“HB 1224“), which limits the capacity of magazines acquired after July 1, 2013. Relevant here, HB 1224 generally prohibits the sale, transfer, or possession of any “large-capacity magazine,” defined to include “[a] fixed or detachable magazine, box, drum, feed strip, or similar device capable of accepting, or that is designed to be readily converted to accept, more than fifteen rounds of ammunition.”
¶3 Rocky Mountain Gun Owners (a Colorado nonprofit organization), the National Association for Gun Rights (a Virginia nonprofit organization), and John A. Sternberg (collectively, “Plaintiffs“) challenge this law as an infringement on the right to bear arms — not under the
¶4 We disagree. We conclude that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the definition of “large-capacity magazine” is inconsistent with the provision‘s plain text because it ignores the narrowing language, ”designed to be readily converted to accept[] more than fifteen rounds of ammunition.”
¶5 We emphasize that the
I. Facts and Procedural History
A. HB 1224
¶6 In 2013, the Governor signed HB 1224 into law. As relevant here, that legislation added two provisions to the criminal code regulating large-capacity magazines (“LCMs“). Section
B. Plaintiffs’ Complaint
¶7 Plaintiffs challenged HB 1224 under
The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons.
According to Plaintiffs, a removable base pаd “allows the user to clear ammunition jams, clean the inside of the magazine, and perform maintenance on the internal mechanics of the magazine.” But importantly for purposes of their constitutional challenge, Plaintiffs alleged that a removable base pad also “inherently creates the possibility” for a magazine to be extended through commercially available or readily fabricated parts, such that nearly every magazine can be “readily converted to accept[] more than fifteen rounds of ammunition” in violation of section
C. Initial Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint
¶8 The trial court granted the Governor‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim, relying on this court‘s decision in Robertson v. City & County of Denver. Robertson addressed a challenge to a Denver ordinance that banned the manufacture, sale, or possession of assault weapons. 874 P.2d at 326. The district court in that case concluded that the right to bear arms under
¶9 This court reversed and instead applied a “reasonable exercise” test to Denver‘s assault weapon ban. Id. Specifically, we held that “the state may regulate the exercise of [the
¶10 Here, applying the reasonable exercise test from Robertson, the trial court held that, even accepting the facts alleged in their complaint as true, Plaintiffs failed to state a claim that HB 1224 was not а reasonable exercise of the state‘s police power. The trial court rejected Plaintiffs’ reading of the statutory definition of an LCM, reasoning that “a magazine that is designed to be readily converted is not the same as one with a design that is subject to being readily converted.” The court explained that “[t]he fact that extensions may be bought or built which take advantage of the removable floor plate to extend the magazine capacity does not alter [the] purpose for which the floor plate was designed.” That purpose, even according to the complaint, was to allow users to clear ammunition jams and perform maintenance and cleaning. The trial court thus concluded that Plaintiffs’ central allegation rested on a misreading of the plain language of HB 1224.
D. RMGO I
¶11 The court of appeals reversed the trial court‘s order dismissing the complaint. Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Hickenlooper, 2016 COA 45M, 371 P.3d 768 (“RMGO I“). In a 2-1 ruling, the division rejected Plaintiffs’ chief argument on appeal: that the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), effectively overruled Robertson by establishing that the right to bear arms under the
¶12 The division also disagreed with Plaintiffs’ premise that, by adopting the reasonable exercise test, Robertson implicitly held the right to bear arms under
(Colo. App. 2002), and explained its view that Trinen‘s reading of Robertson was “based on the misperception that Robertson‘s ‘reasonable exercise of the police power’ test was ‘essentially’ the same as the ‘rational basis test.‘” RMGO I, ¶ 18 n.3, 371 P.3d at 772 n.3 (quoting Trinen, 53 P.3d at 757-58). The division agreed instead with the analysis in Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, LLC v. Regents of the University of Colorado, 280 P.3d 18 (Colo. App. 2010), see RMGO I, ¶ 18 n.3, 371 P.3d at 772 n.3, which concluded that the reasonable exercise test is distinguishable from rational basis review and that Robertson expressly declined to address whether the
¶13 Having concluded that Robertson provided the applicable framework, the division determined that because the reasonable exercise test presents a mixed question of law and fact, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ claim without a factual inquiry into the reasonableness of the limits set by HB 1224. RMGO I, ¶¶ 23-31, 371 P.3d at 774-75. It therefore reversed the trial court‘s judgment and remanded the case to give Plaintiffs an opportunity to test their allegations “through the crucible of factfinding.” Id. at ¶¶ 29, 48, 371 P.3d at 775, 778.
E. Bench Trial
¶14 A week-long bench trial followed. The court heard testimony from both sides’ experts in constitutional history; Plaintiffs’ experts in statistical analysis and the design and operation of firearms and their components; and the Governor‘s experts in public health and violence prevention, security policy and mass shootings, and economics and econometric analysis. It also heard testimony from former law enforcement officers and witnesses to mass shootings.
¶15 In a detailed written order, the court concluded that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to prove HB 1224 unconstitutional under Robertson. First, the court made findings concerning the relationship between LCMs and the prevalence and lethality of mass shootings. These included that the number and fatality rate of mass shootings in the country had surged in the preceding decade; that use of LCMs in mass shootings dramatically increases the number of victims shot, results in victims being struck by more bullets, and increases the fatality rate of struck victims; and that LCMs have been used in the most horrific mass shootings in recent history, including Columbine High School in 1999 and the Aurora movie theater in 2012.
¶16 Next, based on testimony from a security policy expert and a witness who tackled a gunman during a shooting in Arizona, the trial court found that one of the most importаnt dynamics in ending a mass shooting and reducing casualties is the pause created by the shooter‘s need to stop and reload or replace a magazine. Such pauses give victims an opportunity to take life-saving measures like hiding, running, or attacking the shooter. Ultimately, the court found that the greater the capacity of the magazines used, the greater the number of people hurt. By contrast, the lower the capacity of the magazines used, the sooner opportunities are created to allow people to take potential life-saving measures.
¶17 On the other side of the equation, the court found that the ability to fire more than fifteen rounds without replacing a magazine is not required for purposes of legitimate self-defense. It observed that persons defending themselves, their homes, or their property do not seek to kill as many people as they can; instead, they need only to cause an intruder or assailant to flee. Indeed, the court noted that the testimony of law enforcement officers with decades of experience in urban and rural jurisdictiоns identified no examples of individuals firing more than two to three shots in self-defense.
¶18 Looking to the legislative history of HB 1224, the trial court concluded there was “no question” that its specific purpose was “to reduce the number of people who are killed or shot in mass shootings,” as opposed to reducing overall gun violence or gun deaths. It therefore rejected as irrelevant Plaintiffs’ evidence regarding the ineffectiveness of LCM prohibitions in reducing general murder rates, gun homicide rates, or gun crime rates. Ultimately, the court concluded that HB 1224 sought to address a “specific and valid governmental concern regarding the health, safety, and welfare” of Coloradans, namely, reducing “the number of victims in mass shootings by limiting the number
¶19 The evidence presented at trial further persuaded the court that the fifteen-round limit was not only based on a “valid, reasonable, safety concern,” but is reasonable and “does not impose on the constitutionally protected right to keep and bear arms for self-defense or defense of home or property.” The court noted that in fact, during the legislative process, the General Assembly raised the limit from ten rounds (as initially proposed) to fifteen rounds as a compromise “to increase the capacity of firearms used for defensive purposes.”
¶20 In concluding that HB 1224 was a reasonable exercise of the state‘s police power, the trial court again rejected Plaintiffs’ position that the statutory language, “designed to be readily converted,” encompasses the 90% of detachable magazines manufactured with a removable base pad. It acknowledged that Plaintiffs’ expert had demonstrated the ease with which various magazines with removable base pads can be converted to accept more ammunition in a matter of seconds using simple tools. But the court doubted the credibility of the expert‘s suggestion that the removable base pads were designed with the intent to increase magazine capacity. Instead, the weight of evidence indicated that the purpose of removable base pads is to “facilitate cleaning, maintenance, and repair.” The court concluded that “while the nature of removable base pads make[s] it possible to increase the capacity of a magazine, they were not specifically designed to be so modified.” (Emphases added.)
¶21 Finally, considering expert testimony from both sides regarding Colorado constitutional history, the court ruled there was no historical basis to conclude that the framers of
¶22 The court rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that restrictions on the right to bear arms under
F. RMGO II
¶23 Plaintiffs appealed again. This time, the court of аppeals unanimously affirmed the trial court‘s judgment. Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Hickenlooper, 2018 COA 149 (“RMGO II“). First, the division rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that HB 1224 must be subject to a heightened standard of review. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18 (explaining that the division was neither at liberty to depart from this court‘s precedent in Robertson nor inclined to depart from the law of the case set forth in RMGO I).6
¶25 Next, the division concluded that ample record evidence supported the trial court‘s findings that the LCM prohibition is reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation:
Because the incidence of mass shootings with LCMs is on the rise; the only mass shootings in Colorado over the last fifty years involved LCMs (and resulted in deaths of twenty-five people); and smaller magazines create more pauses in firing, which allow potential victims to take life-saving measures, we conclude that the statutes are reasonably related to the legitimate governmental purposе of reducing deaths from mass shootings.
Id. at ¶ 25. In response to Plaintiffs’ contention that LCM restrictions have not been shown to reduce overall gun violence or deaths from use of guns, the court of appeals explained that “[l]egislation need not solve all gun problems to be constitutional.” Id. at ¶ 26 (citing Parrish v. Lamm, 758 P.2d 1356, 1371 (Colo. 1988)).
¶26 The division also rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred in construing the “designed to be readily converted” provision not to include all magazines with removable base pads. Id. at ¶¶ 27-33. The division reasoned that the dictionary defines “designed” to mean “done, performed, or made with purpose and intent.” Id. at ¶ 31 (quoting Designed, Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 612 (2002)). And it found record support for the trial court‘s conclusion that magazines with removable base pads were not designed with the intent to be converted to LCMs. Id. at ¶ 30. Thus, the division concluded that under the statute‘s plain language, the General Assembly did not intend to regulate all magazines with removable floor plates. Id. at ¶ 32. The division added that even if the statutory language were ambiguous, the legislative history of the bill and the doctrine of constitutional doubt would resolve any question against Plaintiffs’ interpretation. Id. at ¶ 33.
¶27 The division further agreed with the trial court that limiting magazines to fifteen rounds “burden[s] only a person‘s opportunity to use an LCM, not a person‘s right to bear arms in self-defense.” Id. at ¶ 35. It highlighted the parties’ stipulation to the mass availability of magazines that hold fifteen or fewer rounds and of guns compatible with such magazines, id.; the trial court‘s finding, supported by the record, that people almost never fire weapons in self-defense using more than two or three bullets, id. at ¶ 34; and Plaintiffs’ failure to present any evidence at trial that “any person in Colorado has ever fired even close to fifteen rounds in self-defense,” id. at ¶ 36.
¶28 In sum, the court of appeals concluded that HB 1224 was a reasonable exercise of police power and that its definition of LCMs neither forbids the use of magazines simply because they have detachable base pads nor unreasonably burdens the right to self-defense. Id. at ¶ 37.
¶29 We granted Plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari to determine whether HB 1224 runs afoul of
II. Standard of Review
¶30 In reviewing a lower court‘s judgment on the constitutionality of a statute, we review conclusions of law de novo but defer to findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. See Town of Dillon v. Yacht Club Condos. Home Owners Ass‘n, 2014 CO 37, ¶ 22, 325 P.3d 1032, 1038 (considering constitutionality of municipal ordinance). Stаtutes are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers, through which “the judiciary respects the roles of the legislature and the executive in the enactment of laws.” City of Greenwood Vill. v. Petitioners for the Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 440 (Colo. 2000). Because “declaring a statute unconstitutional is one of the gravest duties impressed upon the courts,” People v. Graves, 2016 CO 15, ¶ 9, 368 P.3d 317, 322 (quoting City of Greenwood Vill., 3 P.3d at 440), this presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only if it is shown that the enactment is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, Colo. Union of Taxpayers Found. v. City of Aspen, 2018 CO 36, ¶ 13, 418 P.3d 506, 511; Mosgrove v. Town of Fed. Heights, 543 P.2d 715, 717 (Colo. 1975).
III. Analysis
¶31 To begin, because Plaintiffs challenge HB 1224 solely under
reaffirm the reasonable exercise test articulated in Robertson for reviewing challenges brought under
A. Heller and McDonald Do Not Bind This Court with Respect to the Meaning of Article II, Section 13.
¶32 In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller that the
¶33 Plaintiffs argue that
¶34 We agree with Plaintiffs’ starting premise that
¶35 To be sure, the
¶36 Of course, that our test under
¶37 We acknowledge that in some contexts, we have borrowed from federal analysis of the
¶38 We have also tended to follow federal jurisprudence where, based on our independent analysis, we find the U.S. Supreme Court‘s reasoning to be sound, see, e.g., Nicholls, ¶ 32, 396 P.3d at 681-82 (following new development in federal Confrontation Clause jurisprudence because “the Supreme Court‘s reasoning . . . is sound“), and where no party has argued that the Colorado provision calls for a distinct analysis, see, e.g., Garner v. People, 2019 CO 19, ¶ 67 n.8, 436 P.3d 1107, 1120 n.8 (“We do not separately analyze our state constitutional due process guarantee because [defendant] has not argued that it should be interpreted any more broadly than its federal counterpart.“), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 448 (2019).
¶39 None of these considerations is present here. First, as masters of their complaint, Plaintiffs did not bring dual constitutional claims but instead elected to chаllenge HB 1224 solely under the
¶40 Second,
The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons.
¶41 Of particular relevance here,
¶42 Reflecting the significant textual differences between the two provisions, our precedent construing
¶43 In People v. Nakamura, 62 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1936), we construed
¶45 The point is that we have consistently determined the scope of our provision based on an independent analysis of the
¶46 Third, we note that neither Heller nor McDonald mandated a particular test even for Second Amendment challenges under the
¶47 Finally, this is clearly not a case where the parties have agreed that the relevant state constitutional provision should be treated as equivalent to its federal counterpart. Instead, the daylight between the two constitutional guarantees has been a core disagreement in this litigаtion.
¶48 For all these reasons, we reject Plaintiffs’ contention that Heller and McDonald bind this court with respect to the meaning of the right to bear arms under
B. Robertson and the Reasonable Exercise Test
1. Robertson Did Not Decide the Status of the Article II, Section 13 Right.
¶49 Like the present case, Robertson involved a constitutional challenge brought solely under
¶50 Reviewing our case law construing the provision, we observed that we had “never found it necessary to decide the status accorded [the article II, section 13 right].” Id. at 328. Instead, we had “consistently concluded that the state may regulate the exercise of that right under its inherent police power so long as the exercise of that power is reasonable.” Id. We therefore held conclusively in Robertson that it was unnecessary to reach whether the right is fundamental:
when confronted with a challenge to the validity of a statute or ordinance regulating the exercise of the right to bear arms guaranteed under
article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution , a reviewing court need not determine the status of thаt right. Rather, the question in each case is whether the law at issue constitutes a reasonable exercise of the state‘s police power.
Id. at 329. Indeed, we remarked that the trial court‘s error in reaching the question of the status to be accorded the article II, section 13 right was “contrary to the entire body of precedent of this court.” Id. at 330-31.
¶51 Given these clear pronouncements, we now expressly disapprove of the Trinen division‘s conclusion that in Robertson we “implicitly found that the right to bear arms is not a fundamental right.” Trinen, 53 P.3d at 757. Rather, we effectively rejected the importation of federal tiers of scrutiny into our article II, section 13 jurisprudence. As the division in RMGO I correctly understood, we reasoned that whether the right under
¶52 Because we agree with the RMGO I division that the Trinen division misperceived our decision in Robertson as having “essentially” applied the “rational basis test” to the Denver ordinance, RMGO I, ¶ 18 n.3, 371 P.3d at 772 n.3 (quoting Trinen, 53 P.3d at 757), we take this opportunity to clarify the distinction between the reasonable exercise test and rational basis review.
2. The Reasonable Exercise Test Is Distinct from Rational Basis Reviеw.
¶53 In Town of Dillon, we explained that the police power “is an inherent attribute of sovereignty with which the state is endowed for the protection and general welfare of its citizens.” ¶ 25, 325 P.3d at 1038 (quoting In re Interrogatories of the Governor on Chapter 118, Sess. Laws 1935, 52 P.2d 663, 667 (Colo. 1935)). We held that the police power, though broad, is “limited by due process,” id. at ¶ 26, 325 P.3d at 1039, such that legislation or regulation based on the exercise of the state‘s police power must “bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest,” id. at ¶ 27, 325 P.3d at 1039. Under the approach we took there, which we described as essentially rational basis review, “it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged [legislation] actually motivated the legislature.” FCC v. Beach Commc‘ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (outlining rational basis review in equal protection context).12 In other words, the rational basis test ensures rational government enactments.
¶54 But the due process limitation we discussed in Town of Dillon is independent from the separate and distinct constraint located in
¶55 True, the reasonable exercise test demands that government enactments implicating the
¶56 Reflecting that function, the
¶57 These features of the reasonable exercise test are apparent from our earliest application of
¶58 Importantly, we found it “equally clear” that the act had the effect of “wholly disarming aliens for all purposes.” Id. We held that the state “cannot disarm any class of persons or deprive them of the right guaranteed under
¶59 Our later cases just as clearly demonstrate the independent bite of the reasonable exercise test. In Blue, we held that a statute prohibiting individuals with prior felony convictions from possessing weapons was a constitutional exercise of the police power under
¶61 In sum, under
C. HB 1224 Does Not Run Afoul of Article II, Section 13.
¶62 Having clarified the appropriate standard for reviewing Plaintiffs’ argument that HB 1224 is unconstitutional under
1. HB 1224 Constitutes a Reasonable Exercise of Police Power.
¶63 We credit the trial court‘s finding that the purpose of HB 1224 was to “reduce the number of people who are killed or shot in mass shootings.” The court‘s finding is amply supported by the record and we affirm both lower courts’ conclusions that this discrete purpose of the legislation lies well within the state‘s police power. Indeed, it can hardly be argued that seeking to reduce the lethality of mass shootings and to contain their rippling, traumatic effects does not relate to the public health, safety, or welfare. And beyond their contention about the definition of LCMs, which we examine and reject below, Plaintiffs make no argument that HB 1224 instead had an illegitimate purpose of nullifying the
¶64 We further agree with the court of appeals that the prohibition on LCMs is reasonably related to that legitimate — and increasingly critical — state interest. Evidence at trial established that the use of LCMs in mass shootings increases the number of victims shot and the fatality rate of struck victims. It also established that LCMs were used in some of the most horrific shootings in recent memory. These statistics have been deeply felt in Colorado, where LCMs played a lethal role in the Columbine and Aurora massacres. Finally, the record supports the trial court‘s finding that the pause created by the need to reload or replace a mаgazine creates an opportunity for potential victims to take life-saving measures. In short, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated the reasonableness of the General Assembly‘s choice to set a limit on the number of rounds that can be fired before a shooter needs to reload.
2. HB 1224 Does Not Work a Nullity of the Right to Bear Arms in Self-Defense.
¶65 The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claim that HB 1224 violates the state constitutional
¶66 We review issues of statutory construction de novo. People v. Opana, 2017 CO 56, ¶ 34, 395 P.3d 757, 764. In construing a statute, our primary purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature‘s intent. Id. As such, where the plain meaning of a statute is clear, we need not look to other interpretive tools. Goodman v. Heritage Builders, Inc., 2017 CO 13, ¶ 7, 390 P.3d 398, 401. We read statutory language in context, giving words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning and avoiding constructions that would render any word or phrase superfluous. People v. Iannicelli, 2019 CO 80, ¶¶ 19-20, 449 P.3d 387, 391.
¶67 Because our analysis must begin with the text itself, we set forth the disputed language of HB 1224 again in full:
(2)(a) “Large-capacity magazine” means:
(I) A fixed or detachable magazine, box, drum, feed strip, or similar device capable of accepting, or that is designed to be readily converted to accept, more than fifteen rounds of ammunition.
¶68 First, if the legislature had intended the definition of an LCM to include any magazine with a design that made it “capable of being readily converted,” it could have used that language. Indeed, reading subsection (2)(a)(I) as a whole, the legislature used “capable of” just words earlier.
¶69 A word or рhrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text, while a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012). That the legislature used the phrase “capable of accepting,” but immediately thereafter chose the much narrower “designed to be readily converted to accept” evinces a deliberate variation in meaning. Put differently, it is clear that “designed to be” must mean something other than merely “capable of.”
¶70 This inference is buttressed by the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “designed.” As the division below observed, the dictionary defines “designed” to mean “done, performed, or made with purpose and intent.” RMGO II, ¶ 31 (quoting Designed, Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 612 (2002)); see also Designed, adj., Oxford English Dictionary Online (last updated June 2020) (defining “designed” to mean “[p]lanned, intended“). In short, a magazine “designed” to be readily converted to accept more than fifteen rounds requires an intent or purpose that a magazine merely “capable” of being so converted does not. Plaintiffs’ construction, however, еffectively equates these terms, and thus strips the phrase “designed to be” of its common meaning.
¶71 Notably, given the structure of the provision, the legislature would have achieved the meaning Plaintiffs suggest had it entirely omitted the words “designed to be” from the definition. So written, subsection (2)(a)(I) would include any “magazine . . . capable of accepting or [being] readily converted to accept” more than fifteen rounds.
¶72 We decline to “presume that the legislature used language idly and with no intent that meaning should be given to its language.” Goodman, ¶ 7, 390 P.3d at 401 (quoting People v. J.J.H., 17 P.3d 159, 162 (Colo. 2001)). Instead, “we must interpret a statute to give effect to all its parts.” Colo. Comp. Ins. Auth. v. Jorgensen, 992 P.2d 1156, 1163 (Colo. 2000). Because Plaintiffs’ construction would render meaningless the limiting words “designed to be,” we reject it.
¶73 The legislative history of the provision buttresses our conclusion that the legislature deliberately included the words “designed to be.” Notably, the bill lacked that language as originally introduced. H.B. 1224, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 1 (Colo. 2013) (as introduced in House). Subsection (2)(a)(I) initially defined an LCM to include any “magazine . . . capable of accepting, or that can be readily converted to accept” more than the specified number of rounds.
¶74 Finally, “courts should construe ambiguous statutes to avoid the need even to address serious questions about their constitutionality.” United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2332 n.6 (2019). Even if we were to conclude that the language “designed to be” were susceptible of multiple reasonable interpretations, under the doctrine of constitutional doubt, we would decline to read into the statute the constitutional problem that Plaintiffs’ construction invites. In sum, we conclude that HB 1224‘s plain language, its legislative history, and the doctrine of constitutional doubt all weigh against Plaintiffs’ interpretation.
¶75 Plaintiffs counter that reading “designed” to connote purpose or intent improperly grafts an element of specific intent onto the crime of selling, transferring, or possessing LCMs after July 1, 2013.14 We disagree. Although we conclude that “designed to be readily converted to accept” means more than “capable of being readily converted to accept,” we do not construe the phrase to impose a subjective, specific intent requirement. Instead, because “designed” does not refer to any particular subject whose mens rea is a necessary element of the crime (e.g., a parts manufacturer, a seller, a person in possession), we read it to convey only an objective reference. Cf. Opana, ¶ 13, 395 P.3d at 760 (“When the term ‘intended’ is used in the passive voice or as a unit modifier, without reference to a particular subject . . ., it is just as naturally understood to convey an objective reference, as in ‘normally intended’ or ‘reasonably intended.‘“). In the context of subsection (2)(a)(I), we conclude that a magazine “designed to be readily converted to accept” more than fifteen rounds is one that would be objectively understood as purposely created or intended for the purpose of being converted to accept more than fifteen rounds. Because the evidence Plaintiffs put forth at trial did not prove that all magazines with removable base pads meet this definition under any conceivable set of facts, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ removable base pad theory did not carry their considerable burden to prove the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶76 Instead, the overwhelming evidence demonstrated that limiting magazine capacity to fifteen rounds does not significantly interfere with the core of Coloradans’
¶77 Moreover, HB 1224 is similar to the ordinance we upheld in Robertson in that it leaves available “ample weapons” for self-defense. Robertson, 874 P.2d at 333. Indeed, the parties here stipulated that “thousands of models and variants of firearms with detachable box magazines remain available for lawful purchase and use for home defense in Colorado,” and that virtually “every gun that was available before July 1, 2013, is compatible with magazines holding 15 or fewer rounds.” And HB 1224 contains a “grandfather clause” that allows a person to maintain continuous possession of LCMs if they were owned on the law‘s effective date.
IV. Conclusion
¶79 We hold that HB 1224 is a reasonable exercise of the police power that has neither the purpose nor effect of nullifying the right to bear arms in self-defense encompassed by
Notes
- Whether this court should address and resolve the conflict between Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, LLC v. Regents of the University of Colorado, 280 P.3d 18 (Colo. App. 2010), and Trinen v. City & County of Denver, 53 P.3d 754 (Colo. App. 2002), surrounding the meaning of the “reasonableness” standard of review established in Robertson v. City & County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1994).
- Whether the court of appeals erred in applying the Robertson reasonableness standard after the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
- Whether the court of appeals’ interpretation of HB 1224 was contrary to the plain meaning and purpose of the statute.
- Whether HB 1224 violates the right to bear arms as set forth in
article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution .