STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. ROY STEVEN JORGENSON, Appellant.
No. 87448-4
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
NOV 21 2013
GONZALEZ, J.
En Banc
GONZALEZ,
Jorgenson claims that
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The State charged Jorgenson with assault in the first degree for shooting another man. On June 6, 2008, a Cowlitz County Superior Court judge found probable cause to believe Jorgenson had committed the crime. See
At a pretrial hearing on August 5, 2008, the prosecutor requested a specific release condition barring possession of firearms, but the judge declined to impose the condition. At another pretrial hearing on October 14, 2008, while Jorgenson was present, the prosecutor advised the court that
On November 25, 2008, police officers responded to a 911 call reporting a gunshot and found Jorgenson standing outside his car. Jorgenson admitted he had a rifle and a handgun in the car, and the officers could see the rifle in plain view. The officers knew of Jorgenson‘s pending trial for first degree assault and arrested him for second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. On a later search pursuant to a warrant, officers found a 9mm Tokarev handgun and an Olympic Arms AR-15 rifle inside Jorgenson‘s car.
Jorgenson was charged with two counts of second degree unlawful possession of a firearm under
Jorgenson appealed his convictions, arguing that
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. State v. Sieyes, 168 Wn.2d 276, 281, 225 P.3d 995 (2010) (citing State v. Chavez, 163 Wn.2d 262, 267, 180 P.3d 1250 (2008)). This court will presume a legislative enactment constitutional and, if possible, construe an enactment so as to render it constitutional. City of Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wn.2d 583, 589-90, 919 P.2d 1218 (1996).
It is unclear to us from the briefing whether Jorgenson contends
III. ANALYSIS
Jorgenson argues that
1. Washington Constitution
Where feasible, we resolve constitutional questions first under our own state constitution before turning to federal law. O‘Day v. King County, 109 Wn.2d 796, 801-02, 749 P.2d 142 (1988) (citing State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 373-74, 679 P.2d 353 (1984)). “Besides our responsibility to interpret Washington‘s Constitution, we must furnish a rational basis ‘for counsel to predict the future course of state decisional law.‘” Id. at 802 (quoting State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 60, 720 P.2d 808 (1986)).
Article
Textual language and differences between parallel provisions
We examine the first two Gunwall factors together because they are closely related. These factors indicate that the firearm rights guaranteed by the Washington Constitution are distinct from those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
Like the United States Constitution, the Washington Constitution vests firearm rights in the “individual citizen.”
Constitutional and common law history
Another factor supporting a different reading of the Washington Constitution is our common law history. Our constitution is patterned primarily on other state constitutions, which themselves draw from prerevolutionary common law. See State v. Earls, 116 Wn.2d 364, 391, 805 P.2d 211 (1991) (Utter, J., dissenting) (“Washington‘s Declaration of Rights in article 1 of the constitution had its sources primarily in other states’ constitutions, rather than the federal charter.” (citing Robert J. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491, 497 (1984); THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889, at 512 n.40 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed., 1962) (article I, section 24 borrows from the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, article I, section 27 of the Oregon Constitution, and W. Lair Hill‘s proposed article I, section 28))).
In turn, many early state constitutions couch firearm rights in terms of self defense or defense of the state. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 585 & n.8 (citing constitutional provisions from nine states guaranteeing the right to “‘bear arms in defense of themselves and the state‘” or “‘bear arms in defense of himself and the state‘“). The plain text of these rights is different from the plain text of the federal right to bear arms. Therefore, like the first and second Gunwall factors, the third Gunwall factor points toward a separate interpretation.
Preexisting state law
Preexisting state law does not demonstrate how the state right compares to its
Structural differences
In Gunwall, we found the structural differences between the state and federal constitutions required us to read article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution more broadly than its federal equivalent. We observed that where the United States Constitution is a grant of enumerated powers, the Washington Constitution is a limitation on the otherwise plenary power of the state. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 66-67. The same reasoning applies here. Because the state has the plenary power to act unless expressly forbidden by the state constitution or federal law, we give a broad reading to the “explicit affirmation of fundamental rights in our state constitution.” Id. at 62.
Particular state interest and concern
The final Gunwall factor directs us to consider whether the subject matter is local in character or a matter of national policy. Id. Firearm ownership varies radically between localities, as does the incidence of firearm violence. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3128-29, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Furthermore, federalism and comity place the state courts in the role of the “primary protectors of the rights of criminal defendants.” Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 391, 106 S. Ct. 689, 88 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1986). Therefore, this factor also instructs us to look to the state right separately from the federal right.
The Gunwall analysis, aside from the inconclusive fourth factor, suggests we should interpret the state right separately and independently of its federal counterpart. We analyze article I, section 24 below.
We have long held that the firearm rights guaranteed by the Washington Constitution are subject to reasonable regulation pursuant to the State‘s police power. State v. Krantz, 24 Wn.2d 350, 353, 164 P.2d 453 (1945); see also Montana, 129 Wn.2d at 593; Morris, 118 Wn.2d at 144; State v. Rupe, 101 Wn.2d 664, 707 n.9, 683 P.2d 571 (1984). Heller and McDonald left this police power largely intact. Heller explicitly recognized “presumptively lawful” firearm regulations, such as those banning felons and the mentally ill from possessing guns. 554 U.S. at 626-27 & n.26. And while Heller rejected the use of a “freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach” to determine the scope of Second Amendment rights, id. at 634, we read the Washington Constitution‘s provisions independently of the Second Amendment pursuant to Gunwall.
Under this court‘s precedent, a constitutionally reasonable regulation is one that is “reasonably necessary to protect public safety or welfare, and substantially related to legitimate ends sought.” Montana, 129 Wn.2d at 594 (citing State v. Spencer, 75 Wn. App. 118, 121, 876 P.2d 939 (1994); Second Amendment Found., 35 Wn. App. at 586-87). We “balanc[e] the public benefit from the regulation against the degree to which it frustrates the purpose of the constitutional provision.” Id. The Court of Appeals applied this test to the statute at bar in State v. Spiers, 119 Wn. App. 85, 79 P.3d 30 (2003).
The Spiers
Following Montana, we look first to public benefit, then to whether the regulation frustrates the purpose of article I, section 24. The State has an interest in preventing crime by persons awaiting trial. Although we do not find relevant legislative history specifically regarding the ban on defendants charged with serious offenses, we can safely presume that this provision pertains to the legislature‘s goal of “‘reducing the unlawful use of and access to firearms‘” as a means of addressing “‘increasing violence in our society.‘” Matthew R. Kite, State v. Radan: Upsetting the Balance of Public Safety and the Right To Bear Arms, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 201, 206 (2002) (quoting violence reduction programs act, LAWS OF 1994, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 7, § 101).4 Thus, we turn to the question of whether proscribing possession or control of a firearm by a defendant unduly frustrates the purposes of article I, section 24.
We conclude that
2. Second Amendment
We next consider whether
The Second Amendment vests the right to bear arms in the individual. Heller, 554 U.S. at 602. In Heller, the Court struck down under the Second Amendment a District of Columbia law that totally banned handgun possession in the home and required any lawful firearm in the home to be disassembled or secured with a trigger lock. Id. at 628, 635. But the rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment are neither absolute nor unconditional. The Court identified “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” as examples of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” controlling ownership of firearms. Id. at 626-27 & n.26.
The level of scrutiny (if any) applicable to firearm restrictions challenged under the Second Amendment is not settled. In light of Heller, we declined to analyze a different subsection of
prohibiting possession of a firearm by a person subject to a domestic protection order); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (reviewing under intermediate scrutiny a former federal regulation that prohibited carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle within national park areas). But see United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-32 (D. Utah 2009) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute banning persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing firearms); Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to determine what type of heighted scrutiny applies to laws that substantially burden Second Amendment rights); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting rational basis as the appropriate standard but otherwise avoiding “the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire“).
We find intermediate scrutiny is appropriate to evaluate
person only while on bond or personal recognizance. Although Washington‘s firearm ban is broader than
A law survives intermediate scrutiny if it is substantially related to an important government purpose. Sieyes, 168 Wn.2d at 295 n.18 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1996)). The State has an important interest in restricting
justified as applied here. See Laurent, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 105 (“The fact that Laurent was charged with the instant crime because he apparently committed a crime of violence while under indictment undermines any claim he might have that § 922(n) is not substantially related to preventing him from engaging in further violence.“).
We are mindful, however, of the significant burden this statute places on persons charged with a serious offense. Unlike the federal statutes prohibiting possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers and banning loaded weapons in national park areas,
2010) (per curiam) (same);8 see also
IV. CONCLUSION
We find that the limited, temporary ban on possession of firearms while released on bail pending proceedings for a serious offense did not violate Jorgenson‘s right to bear arms under either the state or federal constitution. We affirm.
No. 87448-4
WIGGINS, J. (dissenting)—Washington state law categorically prohibits persons accused—but not yet convicted—of
Because I find that
DISCUSSION
We must recognize what the statute at issue does.
Though the right to bear arms is not absolute, regulation that infringes on an individual liberty must be implemented in a fair manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). This required fundamental fairness analysis, omitted by the majority, is the hallmark of our procedural due process review. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987).
I. The categorical prohibition on the possession of firearms for indictees violates procedural due process
The due process clause provides that no state shall deprive any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”2
The Supreme Court has applied a procedural due process analysis to deprivation of a defendant‘s liberty pretrial. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739. In Salerno, the Court considered the constitutionality of the provisions of the “Adam Walsh Amendments to the Bail Reform
Salerno‘s due process analysis of pretrial detention applies equally to the pretrial prohibition on the possession of firearms. Federal courts have applied the Salerno standard in assessing the federal Adam Walsh Amendments,3 various provisions of which have been held facially unconstitutional by numerous federal district courts. See United States v. Karper, 847 F. Supp. 2d 350 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971 (E.D. Mo. 2009); United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591 (W.O. Tex. 2008).4 Like the Washington statute, the Adam Walsh Amendments identify a subset of serious crimes5 and require that all persons indicted for those crimes are prohibited from exercising certain liberties, including possession of a firearm, without an individual determination of risk.
In assessing whether a right to due process exists, we examine whether the person has been deprived of a liberty interest, and we examine the process by which that liberty was denied. In re Pers. Restraint of McCarthy, 161 Wn.2d 234, 240-41, 164 P.3d 1283 (2007) (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 162 L. Ed. 2d 174 (2005)). We initially consider whether the individual is being deprived of an interest that arises from “‘the Constitution,’ from ‘guarantees implicit in the word “liberty“’ or ‘from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.‘” Id. (quoting Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221). Once we have determined that an individual has been deprived of a liberty interest, our test for the degree of due process required in a particular case follows the federal standard in balancing three factors: the private interest to be protected, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest by the government‘s procedures, and the government‘s
Applying this analysis, it is clear that
A.
The right to possess firearms falls within the scope of the right guaranteed by
B. The statute deprives the defendant of fundamental rights
Jorgenson‘s fundamental right to bear arms is not unlimited. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (noting with approval long standing prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill). However, Salerno makes clear that the regulation of pretrial arrestees’ liberties requires an individualized determination of risk to ensure that individuals are not erroneously deprived of their fundamental rights. See United States v. Laurent, 861 F. Supp. 2d 71, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751); United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Williams, 616 F. 3d 685, 692-93 (7th Cir. 2010); Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 602-03. “Absent any individualized determination, there is simply no way of knowing whether the deprivation of liberty is warranted or wholly erroneous.” Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 975.
The mandatory restrictions of
The federal statutory scheme explicitly details what must occur to sufficiently limit the risk of the erroneous deprivation of fundamental rights. Beyond merely making an arrest and the finding of probable cause, the government must “convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750; see also
C. The State‘s general interest in public safety, without an individualized determination of risk, does not outweigh Jorgenson‘s interest in his fundamental right to bear arms
The State‘s regulatory interest in community safety outweighs an individual‘s private liberty interest under special, limited circumstances. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749. Individuals may be detained if they pose a risk of flight or if the State presents evidence that they pose a danger to witnesses. Id. In determining the validity of the government interest, courts balance the nature of the interest and the burdens that an additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
A judicial determination of probable cause that the defendant committed the charged crime is insufficient in itself to justify deprivation of a fundamental right. Id. at 750 (statute only valid with probable cause and with individualized determination of dangerousness); Scott, 450 F.3d 863 at 874 (“arrest alone [does] not establish defendant‘s dangerousness; it merely trigger[s] the ability to hold a hearing during which such a determination might be made“). In order to subordinate an individual‘s fundamental liberty interest to the needs of society, a judicial officer must find by clear and convincing proof that an arrestee, already indicted or held to answer for a serious crime, presents a demonstrable danger to the community. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750. Probable cause alone does not elevate the State‘s general interest in preventing crime to the point that would warrant denying Jorgenson his fundamental rights. Compare majority at 20, with Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.
The government‘s interest in ensuring the safety of the community would not be substantially burdened by requiring an independent judicial determination of the danger caused by the defendant and the efficacy of the proposed condition. This requirement is consistent with both federal practices of detention and with restrictions on the right to bear arms in the federal system; due process requires that an arrestee‘s liberty be restricted only after a determination that there is no other less drastic means that can reasonably assure his or her presence at trial or the safety of the community. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750; see also
The majority identifies only two other states that prohibit pretrial releasees from possessing firearms. Majority at 17 n. 7. Nearly every state is able to ensure the safety of the community by restricting the possession of firearms to those who have been convicted of a serious offense or felony or by requiring an individualized determination of dangerousness performed by the trial court following the initial indictment. See, e.g.,
In addition, no court has upheld a ban like ours after the decision of the Supreme Court in Heller, 554 U.S. 570. Not a single case cited by the majority supports a categorical ban on the possession of firearms by individuals pending trial in the absence of an individualized determination of dangerousness. Instead, the majority‘s cases either uphold restrictions on possession after conviction of a
Finally, the majority points to a statute that forbids persons dishonorably discharged from the military from possessing firearms.
The majority relies most heavily on Laurent, a case that explicitly limits its holding to the receipt, shipping, or transportation of firearms. 861 F. Supp. 2d at 107-08 (noting that the statute at issue “does not categorically prohibit an individual under indictment from retaining weapons already in his possession“). The majority‘s reliance on these decisions is misplaced in that the majority fails to recognize that these decisions do not approve of pretrial restriction of the possession of firearms without an opportunity to be heard and a judicial determination that the restriction is necessary.
It is entirely appropriate to prohibit some individuals accused of a serious crime from possessing firearms. However, the categorical denial of due process when stripping individuals of their fundamental rights can never be valid. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 744; Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
CONCLUSION
The legislature may reasonably regulate the right to bear arms, consistent with the precedents of this court and of the United States Supreme Court. However, any such regulation must comport with due process.
I cannot limit this analysis to an as-applied challenge to
I respectfully dissent.
Wiggins, J.
C. Johnson, J.
Chambers, J.P.T.
J.M. JOHNSON, J. (concurring in the dissent)—I agree with the analysis of Justice Wiggins’ dissent. I write separately, however, to emphasize my continued opposition to the majority‘s adoption of “intermediate scrutiny” as the standard of review for laws that limit the fundamental right to bear arms expressly protected by both the United States and Washington Constitutions. This is most dramatically obvious when considering Washington‘s unqualified right to bear arms in
Before the
In today‘s decision, the majority decides that the fundamental right to bear arms does not require strict scrutiny protection. Instead of ensuring that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest, the majority gives “deference to the legislature‘s finding that certain crimes justify limited restriction of firearms ....” Majority at 13.2
The majority ultimately finds
The majority does not persuade me. Recognizing strict scrutiny still allows an analysis in which (unlike most free speech cases) the right to bear arms will not inevitably overwhelm other compelling interests.
As I noted, of most courts in Sieyes, despite the clarity of our federal and state constitutions, the right to bear arms “has seldom been viewed as deserving the same protection as other fundamental rights found in either the Bill of Rights or our state constitution.” 168 Wn.2d at 306 (J.M. Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting in part). “No good reason exists to continue this legacy of disregard and disproportionate review. In fact, doing so furthers the risk that courts—or the legislature—will do injustice to other fundamental constitutional rights ... by failing to adequately scrutinize laws that limit those rights.” Id. Just because the fundamental right in question is a right that is not politically favored, there is no reason to afford it a lesser level of protection; indeed, such constitutional rights need more protection.
It is possible that
Washington‘s constitutional founders adopted protection for “[t]he right of the individual citizen to bear arms.”
J.M. Johnson, J.
