Monroe v. GerbingMonroe v. Gerbing
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Kenneth M. Karas
Dwinel Monroe
New York, NY
Pro se Plaintiff
Colleen K. Faherty, Esq.
New York State Office of the Attorney General
New York, NY
Counsel for Defendants Anthony Annucci, Kathleen Gerbing, Carl Koenigsmann, Peter Early, Stephen Roberts, Karen Bellamy, Alicia Smith-Roberts, Peter Wolff, Razia Ferdous, Hafiz Mahmood, Rhonda Murray, Catherine Jacobsen, Brandon Smith, Marie Hammond, Francis Steinbach, Doreen Smith, Karen Cole, Jon Miller, Tracy Johnson McBride, Lori Mardon, Tracy Miles, Anthony Black, Thomas Mauro, Danielle Glebocki, Kathy Apple, Sergeant William Brandt, Captain Douglas, Dr. Maryann Genovese, Dr. Herbert Goulding, Sid Johnston, Marlyn Kopp, Aaron Lewis, and Patricia Susen
KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:
Dwinel Monroe (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), pursuant to
A. Factual Background
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s SAC and are taken as true for the purpose of resolving the instant Motions.
1. Events at Otisville Correctional Facility
Plaintiff is a 54-year old individual who has been imprisoned for at least the last five and a half years. (See SAC ¶ 21.) Plaintiff purports to be disabled, (see id. ¶ 22), as he suffers from heart disease, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (“COPD”), “back problems,” and “other issues which are well [d]ocumented in his medical chart, (id. ¶ 30). Plaintiff also suffers from “many other sickness [sic] and illness [sic] that limit his abilities to walk, run, stand, bend and lift.” (Id. ¶ 31.) As a result of these ailments, Plaintiff walks with a cane. (See id. ¶ 30.)
On or about June 6, 2015, Plaintiff was transferred from Riverview Correctional Facility to Otisville Correctional Facility (“Otisville”). (See SAC ¶ 33.) Upon his arrival at Otisville, Plaintiff was escorted to the “draft processing room,” where Angelo Rosado, Jr. (“Rosado”) took Plaintiff’s cane while his handcuffs were removed. (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff requested his cane back once his handcuffs were off, but was told by Rosado that, due to security concerns, Otisville did not allow canes until approved by a nurse and doctor. (See id. ¶ 36.)2 On either the same day or shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was called to the medical unit to meet with Wolff, a nurse at Otisville, as well as other medical staff, who took Plaintiff’s vital signs and blood pressure, and then gave Plaintiff insulin for his diabetes. (See id. ¶ 41.) While speaking with Wolff, Plaintiff asked about his cane and informed Wolff that he was experiencing back pain. (See id. ¶ 42.) Wolff
At an unspecified time, Plaintiff attended the facility orientation at Otisville, where the facility executive team—Gerbing, Early, and Smith-Roberts—informed new inmates of the rules and policies at the facility. (See id. ¶¶ 53–54.) During this orientation, Plaintiff spoke with Gerbing, Early, and Smith-Roberts individually regarding his request for a cane, but none of these individuals addressed his request. (See id. ¶¶ 55–58.) Plaintiff also made a written request to Smith-Roberts for a “reasonable accommodation” for his back pain, but again received no response. (Id. ¶ 62.)
On June 18, 2015, Plaintiff made a request unrelated to his cane and back pain. Plaintiff, a professed Muslim, sought to participate in a fast during the month of Ramadan. (See id. ¶ 63.) Plaintiff met with Murray, the Nurse Administrator, and informed her that he intended to fast during Ramadan, which would require changing the time he took his medication and insulin to a time after sundown. (See id. ¶ 64.) Murray said a doctor would need to approve this request and thereafter located Dr. Goulding. (See id. ¶¶ 65–66.) Plaintiff reiterated his request to Dr. Goulding, who approved the schedule change. (See id. ¶¶ 67–68.) Yet, on June 24, 2015, roughly a week into Ramadan, Plaintiff was informed by Wolff that he would no longer be
On July 6, 2015, Plaintiff met with Dr. Ferdous and explained this situation. (See id. ¶ 85.) Dr. Ferdous reinstituted the approval initially granted by Dr. Goulding and allowed Plaintiff to receive his medication after sundown. (See id. ¶ 86.) However, two days later, Wolff again informed Plaintiff that he would not be allowed to move the timing of his medication for Ramadan. (See id. ¶ 87.) Plaintiff then wrote to Dr. Goulding, who responded by rescinding both his prior order and the order of Dr. Ferdous that allowed him to receive his medication after sundown. (See id. ¶ 88.) Plaintiff was informed that he could either receive his medication at the regular time or he could refuse his medication entirely. (See id.)
After Ramadan, Plaintiff filed requests for “reasonable accommodations” regarding his cane and back pain with Annucci and Koenigsmann, who is the “Chief Doctor of the Department of Corrections,” as well as Smith-Roberts, Early, Gerbing, Dr. Goulding, and Glebocki. (See id. ¶¶ 90–91.) Plaintiff was not granted access to a cane, and was ultimately transferred from Otisville to Wallkill Correctional Facility (“Wallkill”) on September 15, 2015. (See id. ¶ 92.)
2. Events at Wallkill Correctional Facility
Plaintiff arrived at Wallkill on September 15, 2015, where he discovered he had been assigned to a room on the third floor. (See id. ¶ 102.) Plaintiff informed the officer on duty at the “P.C. Room” that he could not walk up to the third floor due to his back pain, as well as other medical conditions, including general difficulty breathing. (Id.) The officer informed Plaintiff
The next day, Susen informed Plaintiff that she and Dr. Genovese were worried about Plaintiff carrying “nitro” around the facility and would prefer if he left it in the clinic. (Id. ¶ 109.) Plaintiff explained that it was “self carry” and needed to have it on his person in the event of an emergency. (Id.) Susen said she would have to speak to Dr. Genevose about this, though she knew that Dr. Genovese did not want him to carry the nitro around the facility. (See id. ¶ 110.) Susen went to speak to Dr. Genovese, and upon her return informed Plaintiff that she could not locate Plaintiff’s medical chart. (See id. ¶ 111.) Dr. Genovese thereafter performed a medical evaluation of Plaintiff and ordered certain medical tests related to his age and stated health conditions. (See id. ¶ 112.) Plaintiff asked Dr. Genovese about the use of a cane, as well as “other issues dealing with [his] health” and his medication. (See id.) Dr. Genovese informed Plaintiff that he would have to wait until a new medical chart was created, or his old chart was located, so his medical needs could be evaluated. (See id.)
Plaintiff immediately filed a request for a “reasonable accommodation” with Deputy Superintendent of Programs Kopp, Deputy Superintendent of Administration Johnston, and Superintendent Jacobsen, seeking the return of his cane and an elevator pass. (Id. ¶ 113.) Kopp
Plaintiff did not receive his cane or an elevator pass prior to his transfer from Wallkill to Greene Correctional Facility (“Greene”) on October 1, 2015. (See id. ¶ 118.)
3. Events at Greene Correctional Facility
Upon his arrival at Greene on October 1, 2015, Plaintiff was brought to the draft room to pick up his property. (See id. ¶ 128.) Plaintiff realized that one of his bags was open, (see id.), and when he returned to his room he noticed that “22 pouches w[ere] missing,” (id.). Plaintiff believed that one of the individuals in the draft room stole his property, so he attempted to file a grievance. (See id. ¶¶ 129–30.) He was informed by Black, the grievance supervisor at Greene, and Apple, the facility steward, that he could not file a grievance related to lost property and may only “file a claim.” (Id. ¶ 130.) Plaintiff timely filed this claim, but was not allowed to file a grievance “on due process.” (Id.) Ultimately, Plaintiff’s claim regarding his lost property was denied. (See id.) Plaintiff later filed grievances about the theft of his property and lost mail at Greene, specifically against Lewis, Brandt, and Douglas, who Plaintiff claims stole his mail. (See id. ¶ 147.)
Plaintiff next filed a grievance requesting access to his cane, but upon being informed that Greene was not a “medical facility” by Deputy Superintendent for Administration Steinbach, Plaintiff proceeded to file a claim for a transfer from Greene. (See id. ¶ 135.) Through this grievance process, Plaintiff determined that his medical level had been increased a level between his time at Otisville and Greene. (See id. ¶ 136.)
On his first Friday at Greene, Plaintiff asked to speak with the Muslim chaplain, Imam Gaber, about attending “Juma Services.” (Id. ¶ 137.) However, attending would require Plaintiff
In the meantime, Plaintiff received a cane at Greene from Dr. Miller. (See id. ¶ 153.) However, Plaintiff continued to experience pain in his back and was given new medication that “became addictive” and caused “allergic reactions” when mixed with his existing medication. (Id.)
As a result of the conduct taking place at Otisville, Wallkill, and Green, Plaintiff seeks damages for his mental and physical anguish, as well as declaratory relief, to remedy the alleged violation of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
On April 14, 2016, Plaintiff brought suit against Gerbing, Annucci, Koenigsmann, Early, Roberts, Bellamy, Smith-Roberts, Wolff, Dr. Ferdous, Mahmood, Murray, Jacobsen, B. Smith, Hammond, Steinbach, D. Smith, Cole, Dr. Miller, McBride, Mardon, Miles, Black, Mauro, and Glebocki, as well as numerous John Doe defendants. (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 2). That same day, Plaintiff requested to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (See Request to Proceed IFP (Dkt. No. 1).) The Court granted Plaintiff’s request for IFP status on May 2, 2016. (Order Granting IFP Application (Dkt. No. 4).)
On September 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, (See Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 42)), but was instructed by the Court to file a Second Amended Complaint to address certain deficiencies in his pleadings, (See Order (Dkt. No. 44).) Plaintiff thereafter filed his Second Amended Complaint on October 26, 2016, where he added claims against Rosado, Kusisto, Kopp, Johnston, Susen, Dr. Genovese, Apple, Lewis, Brandt, Douglas, and Dr. Goulding. (See SAC.) Plaintiff’s IFP status entitled him to service upon the newly named defendants in the SAC, which was delayed through no fault of his own and commenced by way of an Order of Service issued by the Court on March 27, 2017. (Order of Service 2–3 (Dkt. No. 56).) Plaintiff also filed an Application To Request Appointment of Counsel on March 24, 2017, (see Dkt. No. 59), which the Court denied without prejudice on October 4, 2017, (see Order (Dkt. No. 90)).
While the process of serving those newly added individuals was ongoing, Defendants Gerbing, Annucci, Koenigsmann, Early, Roberts, Bellamy, Smith-Roberts, Wolff, Dr. Ferdous, Mahmood, Murray, Jacobsen, B. Smith, Hammond, Steinbach, D. Smith, Cole, Dr. Miller, McBride, Mardon, Miles, Black, Mauro, and Glebocki moved to dismiss the SAC. (See Initial Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss the SAC (“First Motion”) (Dkt. No. 53).) On August 3, 2017, after
Plaintiff did not respond to either of the Motions. The Court will therefore consider the Motions fully briefed, but independently consider the merits of the Motions. See Goldberg v. Danaher, 599 F.3d 181, 183 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that district courts should consider the merits of a motion to dismiss rather than automatically grant the motion if a plaintiff fails to respond).
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked
“[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and “draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,” Daniel v. T&M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Additionally, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F. Supp. 3d 306, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same).
Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must “construe[] [his] [complaint] liberally and interpret[] [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Caidor v. Onondaga Cty., 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[P]ro se litigants generally are required to inform themselves regarding procedural rules and to comply with them.” (italics and internal quotation marks omitted)).
B. Analysis
1. Eighth Amendment
Plaintiff’s SAC alleges that Defendants were “deliberate[ly] indifferent” in that the “medical treatment [was] below standard and close to gross negligence.” (SAC ¶ 25.) “The Eighth Amendment forbids ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A convicted prisoner’s claim of deliberate indifference to his medical needs by those overseeing his care is analyzed under the Eighth Amendment because it is an allegation that “conditions of confinement [are] a form of punishment” and thus is a “violation of [the] Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017). Here, too, the inquiry proceeds by two steps, “[f]irst, the plaintiff must establish that he suffered a sufficiently serious constitutional deprivation. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted with deliberate
“The first requirement is objective: the alleged deprivation of adequate medical care must be sufficiently serious.” Spavone, 719 F.3d at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted). Analyzing this objective requirement involves two inquiries: “[t]he first inquiry is whether the prisoner was actually deprived of adequate medical care,” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006), and the second “asks whether the inadequacy in medical care is sufficiently serious. This inquiry requires the [C]ourt to examine how the offending conduct is inadequate and what harm, if any, the inadequacy has caused or will likely cause the prisoner,” id. at 280. To meet the objective requirement, “the inmate must show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health.” Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013). “There is no settled, precise metric to guide a court in its estimation of the seriousness of a prisoner’s medical condition.” Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has presented the following non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when evaluating an inmate’s medical condition: “(1) whether a reasonable doctor or patient would perceive the medical need in question as ‘important and worthy of comment or treatment,’ (2) whether the medical condition significantly affects daily activities, and (3) ‘the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Id. (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)).
“The second requirement is subjective: the charged officials must be subjectively reckless in their denial of medical care.” Spavone, 719 F.3d at 138. Under the second prong, the defendant must “appreciate the risk to which a prisoner was subjected,” and had a “subjective awareness of the harmfulness associated with those conditions to be liable for meting out that
Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from back pain and heart disease, which required use of a cane at Otisville, Wallkill, and Greene, as well as use of nitro to treat his heart disease. (See SAC ¶¶ 30–32.) He also claims to suffer from diabetes and requires insulin to be given on a daily basis, (see id. ¶ 41.) Plaintiff further alleges that, at Greene, Dr. Miller provided him with new medication that “became addictive” and caused “allergic reactions” when mixed with his existing medication, so he had to “get off” the new medicine. (Id. ¶ 153.) These allegations are insufficient to state a deliberate indifference claim against any Defendant. Assuming here that Plaintiff’s allegations of chronic back pain, heart problems, and other maladies constituted sufficiently serious medical conditions, Plaintiff’s medical needs were not ignored. Upon his arrival at Otisville, though Plaintiff’s cane was taken from him, he was able to meet with Dr.
Plaintiff’s claims under the Eight Amendment amount to nothing more than a dispute with the medical staff at Otisville, Wallkill, and Greene over the treatment he has received. Yet, such disagreement regarding the particularities of his treatment is insufficient to state a claim. See Chance, 143 F.3d at 703 (“It is well-established that mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim.”); Nelson v. Deming, 140 F. Supp. 3d 248, 262 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (dismissing deliberate indifference claim because the “[p]laintiff’s
Regarding the subjective prong, Plaintiff offers conclusory allegations that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, but has not alleged sufficient facts to support this allegation. In fact, Plaintiff’s SAC makes clear that Defendants at each of the three facilities attempted to provide Plaintiff with care that Defendants believed was sufficient to address Plaintiff’s medical needs. See Flemming v. Smith, No. 11-CV-804, 2014 WL 3698004, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) (“Conclusory allegations that medical staff defendants were aware of a [prisoner’s] medical needs and failed to provide adequate care are generally insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate medical care.”); Gumbs v. Dynan, No. 11-CV-857, 2012 WL 3705009, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2012) (“[C]onclusory allegations that [the] defendants were aware of [the] plaintiff’s medical needs and chronic pain but failed to respond
2. First Amendment
a. Retaliation
Plaintiff cursorily alleges that he was transferred from Otisville to Wallkill to Greene due to his filing of grievances and his frequent requests for reasonable accommodations. (See SAC ¶¶ 92, 124.) A plaintiff asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim must allege “(1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action.” Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts are instructed to “approach prisoner retaliation claims with skepticism and particular care, because virtually any adverse action taken against a prisoner by a prison official . . . can be characterized as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act.” Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, First Amendment retaliation claims brought by prisoners must “be ‘supported by specific and detailed factual allegations,’ not stated ‘in wholly conclusory terms.’” Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015)
Plaintiff’s filing of grievances is protected conduct and therefore meets the first prong of the inquiry. See Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1996) (“This court has held that retaliation against a prisoner for pursuing a grievance violates the right to petition government for the redress of grievances guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and is actionable under § 1983.”); Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[I]ntentional obstruction of a prisoner’s right to seek redress of grievances is precisely the sort of oppression that [§] 1983 is intended to remedy.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). However, assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff’s transfer is an “adverse action” that meets the second prong, he has not alleged sufficient facts showing “a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action.” Espinal, 558 F.3d at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A plaintiff cannot sustain a claim of retaliation without proving that the defendant knew of the protected conduct—in this case, the grievances filed—or participated in the alleged retaliatory act. See Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 274 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing retaliation claim where “the only individual defendants named in the . . . [c]omplaint were [supervisors], none of whom was alleged to have participated in th[e] [retaliatory] event”); Tirado v. Shutt, No. 13-CV-2848, 2015 WL 774982, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2015) (“Absent evidence that any defendant knew about his . . . grievance, [the plaintiff] has failed to provide any basis to believe that they retaliated against him for a grievance in which they were not named.”), adopted in relevant part by 2015 WL 4476027 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 22, 2015); Wesley v. Kalos, No. 97-CV-1598, 1997 WL 767557, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1997) (“To establish a claim of retaliatory transfer
The Court construes Plaintiff‘s SAC as asserting a claim under the First Amendment due to the decision of Dr. Goulding, Wolff, Murray, and Mahmood to require delivery of Plaintiff‘s medication during the fasting hours of Ramadan. (See SAC ¶ 70–74, 87–88, 174.) “Prisoners have long been understood to retain some measure of the constitutional protection afforded by the First Amendment‘s Free Exercise Clause,” Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003), which includes the right to participate in religious services, see Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 993 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1993). A prisoner‘s First Amendment rights, however, are “[b]alanced against . . . the interests of prison officials charged with complex duties arising from administration of the penal system.” Ford, 352 F.3d at 588 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Weathers v. Rock, No. 12-CV-1301, 2014 WL 4810309, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2014) (explaining that the right of inmates to freely exercise a chosen religion “is not limitless, and may be subject to restrictions relating to legitimate penological concerns“). Accordingly, a prisoner‘s free exercise claims are “judged under a reasonableness test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights.” Ford, 352 F.3d at 588 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“To be entitled to protection under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, a prisoner must make a threshold showing that the disputed conduct substantially burdened his sincerely held religious beliefs.” Washington v. Chaboty, No. 09-CV-9199, 2015 WL 1439348, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 2015) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274–75 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The prisoner must show at the threshold that the disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs.“); Shapiro v. Cmty. First Servs., Inc., No. 11-CV-4061, 2014 WL 1276479, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014) (“At the motion to dismiss stage, a complaint must assert sufficient allegations necessary to establish that [the] plaintiff‘s claim is based upon a sincerely held religious belief.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).4 In determining whether a belief is “sincere,” “an individual . . . need only demonstrate that the beliefs professed are sincerely held and in the individual‘s own scheme of things, religious.” Ford, 352 F.3d at 588 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[a] substantial burden on religious exercise exists where the state puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Rossi v. Fishcer, No. 13-CV-3167, 2015 WL 769551, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Second Circuit has further specified that “[t]he relevant question in determining whether [the plaintiff‘s] religious beliefs were substantially burdened is whether participation in the [religious activity], in particular, is considered central or important to [the plaintiff‘s religious] practice.” Ford, 352 F.3d at 593–94. “Once [a] plaintiff establishes this burden, ‘[t]he defendants then bear the relatively limited burden of identifying the legitimate penological interests that justify the impinging conduct.‘” Smith v. Perlman, No. 11-CV-20, 2012 WL 929848, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012) (quoting Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 308). The burden then shifts to the inmate “to show that these articulated concerns were irrational.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 275 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court turns, then, to whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged that his ability to exercise his religious beliefs was substantially burdened. The Second Circuit has long held “that prison authorities must accommodate the right of prisoners to receive diets consistent with their religious scruples.” Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1975); see also McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that to “deny prison inmates the provision of food that satisfies the dictates of their faith . . . unconstitutionally burden[s] their free exercise rights“); Ford, 352 F.3d at 597 (“We . . . have clearly established that a prisoner has a right to a diet consistent with his or her religious scruples . . . . “); accord Crichlow v. Fischer, No. 12-CV-7774, 2015 WL 678725, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015) (“Generally, an inmate is entitled to a reasonable accommodation of his religious beliefs, including religious dietary beliefs.“).
Plaintiff alleges that he is Muslim and that taking his medication, including his insulin, prior to sundown violated his religious beliefs, as he was required to fast during the month of Ramadan. (See SAC ¶¶ 71, 73, 80–82.) “[A] substantial burden exists where the state ‘put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.‘” Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp‘t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)); see also Holland, 758 F.3d at 221 (noting that “a Muslim inmate‘s free exercise rights would be substantially burdened if prison officials denied his request for a meal to celebrate the [end of Ramadan] feast“). Here, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that his sincerely held religious beliefs were substantially burdened, as he
Because Plaintiff has crossed the substantial burden threshold, Defendants now must meet “the relatively limited burden of identifying the legitimate penological interests that justify the impinging conduct.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 275. To make this determination, a court must consider:
whether the challenged regulation or official action has a valid, rational connection to a legitimate governmental objective; whether prisoners have alternative means of exercising the burdened right; the impact on guards, inmates, and prison resources of accommodating the right; and the existence of alternative means of facilitating exercise of the right that have only a de minimis adverse effect on valid penological interests.
Holland, 758 F.3d at 222–23 (quoting Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 274). Additionally, the rule requiring a legitimate penological interest is equally applicable to individual actions of prison personnel as it is to generally-applied policies or regulations. See Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 274 n.4 (“An individualized decision to deny a prisoner the ability to engage in religious exercise is analyzed in the same way as a prison regulation denying such exercise.“).
Nor can Defendants establish that no alternative means existed to facilitate Plaintiff‘s right. Plaintiff alleges that he was given his medication after his fast for five days without incident or illness, which belies Defendants’ assertion that concern for Plaintiff‘s health and well-being drove this decision. (See SAC ¶¶ 69–70.) Defendants do not argue that there was a change in Plaintiff‘s condition that would prompt Defendants to rescind their permission for Ramadan-compliant medication; in fact, Plaintiff alleged Dr. Ferdous reinstated his preferred
Thus, at this stage, Defendants have failed to identify a legitimate penological interest that would satisfy the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Washington v. Chaboty, No. 09-CV-9199, 2011 WL 102714, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2011) (“The Second Circuit has cautioned that evaluation of penological interests is a fact-intensive inquiry that is not ordinarily amenable to resolution on a motion to dismiss.” (citing Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 2004))), rev‘d in part on other grounds sub nom Washington v. Gonyea, 538 F. App‘x 23 (2d Cir. 2013). Therefore, this claim survives the Motions To Dismiss.
c. Qualified Immunity
Dr. Goulding, Wolff, Murray, and Mahmood next contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity in the event Plaintiff‘s First Amendment claims survive. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Qualified immunity “‘gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’ by ‘protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.‘” City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)). Because qualified immunity is “an affirmative defense [that] . . . reflects an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability[,] . . . it is appropriate to decide the issue of qualified immunity, when raised, at an early stage of the litigation, such as when deciding a pre-answer motion to dismiss.” Betts v. Shearman, No. 12-CV-3195, 2013 WL 311124, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013) (italics, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted), aff‘d, 751 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2014).
In determining whether a right is clearly established, the “inquiry turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted). “In the Second Circuit, ‘a right is clearly established if (1) the law is defined with reasonable clarity, (2) the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit has recognized the right, and (3) a reasonable defendant would have understood from the existing law that his conduct was unlawful.‘” Schubert v. City of Rye, 775 F. Supp. 2d 689, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir. 2004)).
A Muslim inmate‘s right to participate in Ramadan fasting was clearly established at the time of the incident. See Ford, 352 F.3d at 597 (holding that it a Muslim inmate‘s “right to a diet consistent with his or her religious scruples” is clearly established); Bass v. Coughlin, 976 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (“At least as early as 1975, it was established that prison officials must provide a prisoner a diet that is consistent with his religious scruples.“). Defendants are correct that the Second Circuit has never specifically recognized that facility personnel are required to change an inmate‘s medication schedule to accommodate their Ramadan fast, (see First Motion 14; Second Motion 9), “but courts need not have ruled in favor of a prisoner under precisely the same factual circumstance in order for the right to be clearly
3. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff contends that his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by Defendants Apple, Brandt, Douglas, and Lewis based on the alleged theft of his property at Greene. (See SAC ¶ 188.) ”
Pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
As an initial matter, “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of . . . the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); see also Acevedo v. Fischer, No. 12–CV–6866, 2014 WL 5015470, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014) (same).5 In fact, “the state‘s action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses
Moreover, Plaintiff‘s claim that Defendants Mauro, Black, and Bellamy have violated his right to due process by failing to timely respond to his grievances also fails to state a claim. “[I]t is well-established that inmates do not have a protected liberty interest in the processing of their prison grievances.” Crichlow v. Fischer, No. 15-CV-6252, 2017 WL 920753, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2017); see also Corley v. City of New York, No. 14-CV-3202, 2017 WL 4357662, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017) (“[The p]laintiff did not have a liberty interest to access the [prison]
4. Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act
Plaintiff also asserts a claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. (See SAC ¶ 12.) The SAC alleges that various Defendants at Otisville, Wallkill, and Greene, failed to provide reasonable accommodations with regard to Plaintiff‘s “heart disease . . . high pertention [sic] . . . COPD, back problems . . . spine injury[,] and other issues which are well documented in [h]is medical chart.” (Id. ¶ 30.) As alleged, the Court construes these claims as being against Smith-Roberts, Roberts, Early, Gerbing, Dr. Koenigsmann, Annucci, Glebocki, Kopp, Jacobsen, Johnston, Dr. Goulding, Black, Hammond, Steinbach, Smith, and Mauro.
Title II of the ADA provides, in pertinent part, that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
First, “[i]nsofar as [Plaintiff] is suing the individual [D]efendants in their individual capacities, neither Title II of the ADA nor
“Whether individuals can be sued for damages under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act in their official capacities, however, is unsettled in th[e] [Second Circuit].” Jones v. Ng, No. 14-CV-1350, 2015 WL 998467, at *10 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2015) (emphasis added). Numerous courts in the Second Circuit have held that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act do not provide for liability against individual defendants in their official capacities. See, e.g., Keitt v. N.Y. State Dep‘t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 11-CV-855, 2015 WL 2383687, at *21 (W.D.N.Y. May 19, 2015) (“Courts have held that ... individuals [cannot] be named as defendants in ADA or Rehabilitation Act suits in their official or representative capacities.“); Myers v. N.Y. Dep‘t of Motor Vehicles, No. 06-CV-4583, 2013 WL 3990770, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2013) (“[N]umerous district courts in this [C]ircuit have persuasively held that there is no individual liability under Title I or Title II of the ADA, regardless of whether the claim is brought in an individual or official capacity.“); Maus v. Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 688 F. Supp. 2d 282, 302 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[I]ndividuals cannot be named as defendants in ADA or Rehabilitation Act suits in their official or representative capacities.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Carrasquillo v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 2d 428, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Individuals cannot be named as defendants in ADA suits in either their official or representative capacities.“). Yet, other courts have reached the opposite conclusion, see, e.g., Keitt, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 456-57 (explaining that official capacity suits under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act can proceed in the absence of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Cole v. Goord, No. 05-CV-2902, 2009 WL 2601369, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009) (finding that individuals can be sued for damages in their official capacities under the ADA because “the suit addresses the office—a ‘public entity‘—not the officer personally“), in light of the Second Circuit‘s decision in Henrietta D., which held that an individual sued for injunctive relief in his or her official capacity is effectively a “public entity” subject to liability under the ADA because the government is the real party in interest in an official capacity suit, see id. at 288.
Yet, even under this latter school of thought, any official capacity claims against Defendants would fail. The Second Circuit has held that an ADA claim for damages against a state (or state agency or official) is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment only “if the plaintiff
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motions To Dismiss are denied as to Plaintiff‘s Free Exercise claims regarding the scheduling of his medication as against Dr. Goulding, Wolff, Murphy, and Mahmood, but are granted as to all other claims and Defendants.
In light of Plaintiff‘s pro se status, and because this is the first adjudication of Plaintiff‘s claims on the merits, the faulty claims are dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff wishes to file an Amended Complaint alleging additional facts and otherwise addressing the deficiencies identified above, Plaintiff must do so within 30 days of the date of this Opinion & Order. The failure to do so may result in the dismissal of Plaintiff‘s claims with prejudice. An amended complaint will replace, and not supplement, the original complaint. If Plaintiff files no Amended Complaint, the Court will assume Plaintiff intends only to proceed with the Free Exercise claims regarding the delivery of his medication during Ramadan.
The Court will hold a status conference on February 1, 2018 at 2:00 PM. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the pending Motions, (see Dkt. Nos. 53, 86), and mail a copy of this Opinion & Order to Plaintiff at the address listed on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 27, 2017
White Plains, New York
KENNETH M. KARAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE