Mateo v. DawnMateo v. Dawn
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Kenneth M. Karas
KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:
Plaintiff Cesar Mateo (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed the instant Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”) against Defendants Dawn Mason, Cheryl Morris, and Jean King (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause by failing to properly process his lawfully obtained marriage license and by
I. Background
A. Factual Allegations
The following facts are based on the allegations in the SAC, which are taken as true for purposes of the Motion.
On June 16, 2012, Plaintiff, while incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, and his then-fiancé attended a marriage ceremony organized by Defendant Dawn Mason (“Mason”). (See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 13.) Plaintiff and his fiancé presented a marriage license and obtained the signatures of all necessary parties. (See id. ¶¶ 10, 13.) While the other inmates participating in the ceremony had obtained their marriage licenses from the Ossining Town Clerk (where Sing Sing Correctional Facility is located), Plaintiff and his fiancé obtained their marriage license from the New York City Marriage Bureau. (See id. ¶¶ 10, 11.) At the end of the marriage ceremony, Mason collected the completed marriage licenses to be sent to the town clerk so that marriage certificates could be issued. (See id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff and his fiancé informed Mason that their marriage license would need to be sent to the New York City Marriage Bureau, and their marriage license contained instructions on the back to the same
In October 2012, Plaintiff was transferred to Woodbourne Correctional Facility. (See id. ¶ 25.) In January 2013, he applied to participate in the FRP, which would allow him to consummate his marriage and visit with his relatives, and indicated on the FRP application that he was married. (See id. ¶ 25; see also id. at unnumbered 20.) Plaintiff’s application was denied in May 2013 on the grounds that he had not completed a substance abuse program. (See id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff filed an appeal of the denial of his FRP application, alleging that his peers were admitted to the FRP while they were on the waiting list for the substance abuse program, but before they completed or were enrolled in the program. (See id. ¶ 31; see also id. ¶ 29.) In
On March 14, 2014, Plaintiff obtained a copy of his marriage certificate from the New York City Marriage Bureau. (See id. ¶ 37; see also id. at unnumbered 21.) He included this certificate in his new application to the FRP, submitted on March 18, 2014. (See id. ¶¶ 36–37; see also id. at unnumbered 27.) Defendant Jean King (“King”) responded to Plaintiff’s application shortly thereafter, saying that Morris had already determined that Plaintiff’s marriage license was invalid and that King was “in no way able to supersede that determination.” (See id. ¶¶ 38–39; see also id. at unnumbered at 23.) Plaintiff alleges that this conduct violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause because King allowed similarly situated couples with valid marriage certificates to participate in the FRP. (See id. ¶ 41.)
B. Procedural History
In his original complaint (the “Original Complaint”), filed on April 11, 2014, Plaintiff brought claims against Mason, Morris, and King, as well as Mary Ann Robert (the Ossining Town Clerk) and Jeff McKoy (the Deputy Commissioner of Program Services), alleging due process and equal protection violations arising from the same conduct identified in the SAC. (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 2).) Then-Chief Judge Loretta A. Preska issued an Order to Amend on
On June 9, 2014, Plaintiff filed his amended complaint, naming only King as a defendant and alleging that King violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause in denying his second FRP application. (See Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 7).) Plaintiff also stated his belief that the difference in treatment arose from his history of filing lawsuits against officers of the correctional institutions where he has been housed. (See id. ¶ 23.) Following execution of service on December 9, 2014, (see Marshal’s Process Receipt & Return of Service Executed (Dkt. No. 17)), Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (see Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (Dkt. No. 19)). The injunction was denied as moot after King’s counsel indicated that Plaintiff’s marriage had been recognized by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”). (See Dkt. No. 28; see also Decl. of Robert F. Cunningham in Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. (Dkt. No. 26).) Following a conference with the Court, Plaintiff filed the SAC on May 14, 2015. (See Dkt. No. 35.) Defendants thereafter moved under
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
1. Effect of the Order to Amend
Defendants contend that in the Order to Amend, Judge Preska dismissed all claims against Mason and Morris, and granted Plaintiff leave to amend the Original Complaint only with respect to his allegations under the Equal Protection Clause related to the denial of his second FRP application. (See Defs.’ Mem. 6–7.) Defendants argue that, accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Mason and Morris, which were removed in the First Amended Complaint but revived in the SAC, should be dismissed. (See id.)
In the Order to Amend, Judge Preska dismissed Plaintiff’s claim under the Due Process Clause regarding the failure of Mason and the Ossining Town Clerk to forward his marriage license to the New York City Marriage Bureau. (See Order to Amend 4–5.) Plaintiff had not alleged, and thus Judge Preska did not address, a claim against Mason under the Equal Protection Clause. In the SAC, by contrast, Plaintiff alleges that Mason “treated [him] differently from [his] peer inmates who obtained their marriage certificate[s] because Mason return[ed] their marriage license[s] to the[] issuing agency.” (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 24.) And Plaintiff makes clear in the SAC that the basis for his claims is the Equal Protection Clause. (See id. ¶ 5.) Therefore, Defendants are incorrect in contending that the claim against Mason under the Equal Protection Clause has been dismissed.
Less clear is whether Plaintiff was permitted to amend his complaint to include an equal protection claim against Mason given the limited scope of the Order to Amend. However, because the Court concludes below that Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Mason under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court declines to consider whether Plaintiff’s inclusion of the claim in the SAC was impermissible.
Even assuming Plaintiff was permitted to amend his complaint with regard to his equal protection claim against Morris, Judge Preska’s finding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim is the law of the case and informs the outcome here. See Fermin v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 2d 590, 600 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[W]hen a court has ruled on an issue, that decision should generally be adhered to by that court in subsequent stages in the same case unless cogent and compelling reasons militate otherwise.” (quoting Johnson v. Holder, 564 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 2009))); Am. Hotel Int’l Grp., Inc. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 611 F. Supp. 2d 373, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Under the law of the case doctrine, ‘a decision on an issue of law made at one stage of a case becomes binding precedent to be followed in subsequent stages of the same litigation.’” (quoting In re PCH Assocs., 949 F.2d 585, 592 (2d Cir. 1991))), aff’d, 374 F. App’x 71 (2d Cir. 2010). Although Plaintiff has added more detail to his complaint, he has not alleged additional facts that would persuade this Court to veer from Judge Preska’s determination that Plaintiff has failed to
However, Judge Preska’s holding was limited only to the first FRP application. She gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint related to the second FRP application. (See Order to Amend 7.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against King relating to the second FRP application are properly before the Court and will be addressed below.
2. Equal Protection Claims
Defendants next contend that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See Defs.’ Mem. 8–10.) The SAC purports to make claims under the Equal Protection Clause, and the Court will construe Plaintiff’s pleadings accordingly.
The Equal Protection Clause requires the government to treat all similarly situated persons alike. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). While the Equal Protection Clause is typically invoked to bring lawsuits claiming discrimination based on membership in a protected class, where a plaintiff does not allege membership in a protected class, he may still prevail on a “class-of-one” theory of equal protection. See Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). A class-of-one claim arises when a plaintiff claims that he was “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
In order to succeed on such a claim, the plaintiff must establish that:
(i) no rational person could regard the circumstances of the plaintiff to differ from those of a comparator to a degree that would justify the differential treatment on
the basis of a legitimate government policy; and (ii) the similarity in circumstances and difference in treatment are sufficient to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted on the basis of a mistake.
Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Neilson, 409 F.3d at 104). Class-of-one plaintiffs must show “an extremely high degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to whom they compare themselves.” Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Because of the particular posture of a ‘class of one’ claim, the comparator’s circumstances must be ‘prima facie identical.’” Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. Village of Wesley Hills, 815 F. Supp. 2d 679, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Neilson, 409 F.3d at 105). The comparison to similarly situated individuals should “provide an inference that the plaintiff was intentionally singled out for reasons that so lack any reasonable nexus with a legitimate government policy that an improper purpose—whether personal or otherwise—is all but certain.” Neilson, 409 F.3d at 105. “It is well established that this pleading standard is demanding.” Hampshire Recreation, LLC v. Village of Mamaroneck, No. 14-CV-7228, 2016 WL 1181727, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a class-of-one claim with respect to Mason because he has not alleged that any other inmates who obtained marriage licenses from New York City were treated differently. Plaintiff alleges, in fact, that all of his peer inmates obtained their marriage licenses from the Ossining Town Clerk, (see Second Am. Compl. ¶ 11), and that Mason mailed all of the marriage licenses to the Ossining Town Clerk, (see id. ¶ 16). Plaintiff attempts to identify a broader class of comparators, alleging that Mason returned the marriage licenses of his peer inmates “to the[] issuing agency where they purchased them,” but failed to do so for Plaintiff. (See id. ¶ 17.) But plaintiffs seeking to make a class-of-one claim must show “an
Nor has Plaintiff stated a class-of-one equal protection claim against King. As Defendants note, (Defs.’ Mem. 9–10), there is an initial question of whether class-of-one equal protection claims alleging differential treatment resulting from discretionary state action are viable after Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (2008), and Analytical Diagnostic, 626 F.3d 135. In Engquist, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]here are some forms of state action . . . which by their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments.” 553 U.S. at 603. “In such cases the rule that people should be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions is not violated when one person is treated differently from others, because treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court went on to say that this principle applied “clearly in the employment context,” and therefore held that “the class-of-one theory of equal protection . . . is simply a poor fit in the public employment context.” Id. at 604–05. The Court concluded that “the class-of-one theory of equal protection has no application in the public employment context.” Id. at 607.
Shortly after Engquist was decided, some courts in the Second Circuit interpreted Engquist to hold that class-of-one equal protection claims were precluded for any government actions that were discretionary, regardless of whether the issue involved public employment. See, e.g., Catcove Corp. v. Heaney, 685 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[P]ost Engquist, a plaintiff who proceeds on a class of one claim must allege that the differential treatment resulted from non-discretionary state action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 658 F. Supp. 2d 461, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that Engquist
The Second Circuit went on to hold that the plaintiff, a private clinical testing laboratory that alleged that the New York Department of Health maliciously subjected the plaintiff to an “intense and unwarranted degree of regulatory scrutiny” during inspections prior to revoking the plaintiff’s operating permit, was not barred from bringing a class-of-one equal protection claim. Id. at 137–38, 142–43. The court reasoned that the New York Department of Health “[did] not possess unfettered discretion” in revoking or suspending existing operating permits, and that the
Since Analytical Diagnostic, courts in the Second Circuit have attempted to delineate between those claims prohibited by Engquist (and Analytical Diagnostic) and those claims left unaffected. Compare Johnson v. Pallito, No. 12-CV-138, 2014 WL 2000369, at *3 (D. Vt. Apr. 21, 2014) (“Given that [the plaintiff’s] employment in a correctional facility is analogous to the public employment at issue in Engquist, the holding of that case controls here and bars [the plaintiff’s] class-of-one equal protection claim against [the defendant].”), adopted by 2014 WL 1922728 (D. Vt. May 14, 2014), and Barnes v. Abdullah, No. 11-CV-8168, 2013 WL 3816586, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2013) (dismissing a class-of-one claim where “the conduct of [the defendants] in deciding which inmates may participate in [drug rehabilitation programs] is more akin to the state acting as a proprietor or employer than as a regulator”), with Aliberti, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 163 (“[The] plaintiffs’ claim is not barred by Engquist because [the] plaintiffs were not government employees and the [defendant] was exercising its regulatory power.”), and Lexjac, LLC v. Incorporated Village of Muttontown, No. 07-CV-4614, 2011 WL 1059122, at *7 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2011) (“Here, too, the [d]efendant did not manage its internal relations so much as it exercised its regulatory, plat-approving power. Thus, to the extent that the Analytical Diagnostic . . . court extended Eng[q]uist outside of the employment context, that ruling does not apply here.”). In Barnes, the court held that a prisoner could not bring a class-of-one claim
While the reasoning in Barnes is persuasive, the context here yields a different result. In contrast to Barnes, whatever discretion prison officials may have exercised in denying Plaintiff’s first application to the FRP, King made clear in her denial of Plaintiff’s application that she was not exercising her discretion, but, in fact, was “in no way able to supersede [Mason’s] determination.” (Second Am. Compl. at unnumbered 23.) Thus, King did not enjoy “considerable discretion,” but instead was constrained by the procedures of which Plaintiff now complains. And even if admission to the FRP is “theoretically discretionary,” “as a practical matter,” admission in this circumstance was not a matter of discretion. Analytical Diagnostic, 626 F.3d at 141 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because King did not “possess unfettered discretion,” id. at 142, Engquist does not bar Plaintiff’s class-of-one equal protection claim against King related to her denial of Plaintiff’s second application to the FRP.4
However, Plaintiff has again failed to identify similarly situated comparators sufficient to plead a class-of-one claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiff has not identified any
3. Retaliation Claim
In his opposition papers, Plaintiff suggests that the motivation for Defendants’ alleged misconduct is Plaintiff’s “history of filing complaints in court against their fellow employees.” (Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 10.) Although this allegation of retaliation was raised in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, (see Am. Compl. ¶ 23), Plaintiff removed it in the SAC, (see generally Second Am. Compl.). As Defendants point out, “a party is not entitled to amend its complaint through statements made in motion papers.” Shetiwy v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 980 F. Supp. 2d 461, 477 n.88 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also LaFlamme v. Societe Air Fr., 702 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he court declines to consider those documents submitted by [the] plaintiffs to support allegations first raised in their motion papers and found nowhere in the [c]omplaint.”). Application of that rule is particularly apt here, where Plaintiff removed the allegation from an earlier amended complaint. And while Plaintiff is permitted to amend his complaint once as a matter of right, see
Even were the Court to entertain, however, Plaintiff’s scattered allusions to a retaliatory motive on the part of Defendants, nothing in the SAC or in Plaintiff’s opposition papers suffices to state a claim for retaliatory action in violation of the First Amendment. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim must allege “(1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action.” Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts are instructed to “approach prisoner retaliation claims with skepticism and particular care, because virtually any adverse action taken against a prisoner by a prison official . . . can be characterized as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act.” Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, First Amendment retaliation claims brought by prisoners must “be ‘supported by specific and detailed factual allegations,’ not stated ‘in wholly conclusory terms.’” Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)).
Plaintiff’s filing of lawsuits against prison officials is indisputably a protected First Amendment activity. See Espinal, 558 F.3d at 128–29; see also Tirado v. Shutt, No. 13-CV-2848, 2015 WL 4476027, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2015) (“Inmates are . . . protected when they file lawsuits against prison officials.”); Baskerville v. Blot, 224 F. Supp. 2d 723, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same). In determining whether an adverse action has been taken against Plaintiff, the Court conducts an objective inquiry, asking whether the alleged conduct “would deter a similarly
Plaintiff’s history of filing lawsuits against prison officials is well documented. See, e.g., Mateo v. Bristow, No. 12-CV-5052, 2015 WL 925933 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2015); Mateo v. Gundrum, No. 10-CV-1103, 2013 WL 5464722 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013); Mateo v. O’Connor, No. 10-CV-8426, 2012 WL 1075830 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2012); Mateo v. Fischer, 682 F. Supp. 2d 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). But none of the Defendants here was named as a defendant in any of those cases, and “[a]s a general matter, it is difficult to establish one defendant’s retaliation for complaints against []other defendant[s].” Hare v. Hayden, No. 09-CV-3135, 2011 WL 1453789, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2011); see also Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 274 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing retaliation claim where “the only individual defendants named in the . . . [c]omplaint were Goord, McDermott, and Dirie, none of whom was alleged to have participated in th[e] [retaliatory] event”); Henson v. Gagnon, No. 13-CV-590, 2015 WL 9809874, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015) (“The record is devoid of evidence . . . that supports [the] [p]laintiff’s conclusory assertion that [the defendant] planted evidence and issued the [m]isbehavior [r]eport based upon evidence in retaliation for grievances [the] [p]laintiff had filed against other corrections officers.”), adopted by 2016 WL 204494 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2016). Plaintiff’s claim is similarly handicapped by its failure to allege or otherwise suggest that Defendants even knew of the complaints filed against other correction officers. See Wesley v. Kalos, No. 97-CV-1598, 1997 WL 767557, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1997) (“To establish a claim of retaliatory transfer
Because this is Plaintiff’s third attempt to plead a cause of action against Defendants, the Court dismisses the SAC with prejudice.
A complaint should be dismissed without prejudice if the pleading, “‘liberally read,’ suggests that the plaintiff has a claim that [s]he has inadequately or inartfully pleaded and that [s]he should therefore be given a chance to reframe.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (alterations and citation omitted) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). If a complaint, however, has substantive problems and “[a] better pleading will not cure [them],” “[s]uch a futile request to replead should be denied.” Id. (citing Hunt v. All. N. Am. Gov’t Income Tr., 159 F.3d 723, 728 (2d Cir. 1998)). Even pro se plaintiffs are not entitled to file an amended complaint if the complaint “contains substantive problems such that an amended pleading would be futile.” Lastra v. Barnes & Noble Bookstore, No. 11-CV-2173, 2012 WL 12876, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2012), aff’d, 523 F. App’x 32 (2d Cir. 2013). Courts are especially wary of giving plaintiffs multiple “bites at the apple” where a plaintiff has already been granted leave to amend. See Anthony v. Brockway, No. 15-CV-451, 2015 WL 5773402, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) ([The] [p]laintiff has already been given one opportunity to amend his complaint . . . , and there is nothing in his second amended complaint suggesting that [he] could do better given another opportunity.”); Al-Qadaffi v. Servs. for the Underserved (SUS), No. 13-CV-8193, 2015 WL 585801, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2015) (denying leave to amend where “[the plaintiff] has already had one chance to amend his [c]omplaint, and there is still no indication that a valid claim might be stated if given a second chance”), aff’d, 632 F. App’x 31 (2d Cir. 2016); Bui v. Indus. Enters. of Am., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 364, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing an amended complaint with prejudice where the
Here, Plaintiff is on his third complaint. The Original Complaint was dismissed on all grounds by Judge Preska, with leave to amend in a limited respect. (See Order to Amend.) Plaintiff did so, (see Am. Compl.), but after reviewing the grounds for Defendants’ proposed Motion To Dismiss, (see Letter from Kruti Dharia, Esq., to Court (Feb. 26, 2015) (Dkt. No. 29)), Plaintiff opted to file a third complaint, attempting to cure the deficiencies identified by Defendants, (see Second Am. Compl.). At no point in these pleadings has Plaintiff successfully stated a claim for relief. And Plaintiff’s failure to do so is not a consequence of inartful pleading or lack of legal acumen; rather, Plaintiff’s claims lack substance in the law. Indeed, the SAC is detailed in its factual allegations, and provides documentary support for many of Plaintiff’s allegations. There is little question that Plaintiff has presented the Court with all of the facts pertinent to his claims, yet even construing Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, Plaintiff has failed again to state a claim. Accordingly, the dismissal of the SAC is with prejudice.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is granted with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to terminate the pending Motion (Dkt. No. 61) and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 28, 2016
White Plains, New York
KENNETH M. KARAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE