Gilliam v. BaezGilliam v. Baez
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Kenneth M. Karas
Appearances:
Quddoos Gilliam
Otisville, NY
Pro Se Plaintiff
Eric T. Schneiderman, Esq.
Christina Okereke, Esq.
Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York
New York, NY
Counsel for Defendants
KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:
Pro se Plaintiff Quddoos Gilliam (“Plaintiff“), currently incarcerated at Otisville Correctional Facility (“Otisville“), brings this Action under
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following allegations are taken from Plaintiff‘s Complaint and are treated as true for the purposes of resolving the instant Motion.
On June 27, 2013, Plaintiff—a “[p]racticing member[] of the [Nation of Islam (‘NOI‘)] religion,” (Compl. ¶ 7)—“‘signed out’ to attend NOI class at 6:15 PM on the Pass List inside his Housing Unit (‘H.U.‘),” (id. ¶ 8). At the time, “Plaintiff was serving 30 days Loss of Recreation (‘L.O.R.‘) as part of a disciplinary sanction impose[d] by the Otisville Correctional Facility Administration.” (Id.) When Plaintiff arrived at the location of the NOI class, he was informed that he “[could not] attend NOI class” and instructed to return to his H.U. (Id. ¶ 10.) Upon returning to his H.U., Plaintiff was told by Defendant Fatiuk that Defendant Baez had ordered Plaintiff back to his H.U. because of Plaintiff‘s L.O.R. status. (Id. ¶ 12.) The next day, Plaintiff approached Defendant Baez in the messhall and Defendant Baez confirmed that he had ordered Plaintiff to return to his H.U. and that “the policy of [Otisville] [was] that if an inmate is on L.O.R. status[,] the inmate cannot attend [r]eligious [c]lasses.” (Id. ¶ 15 (internal quotation
The following day, Plaintiff went to the Inmate Liaison Committee (“I.L.C.“) and filed a report that inmates on L.O.R. status were being denied the opportunity to participate in religious classes and that Plaintiff would like the issue to be raised at the next I.L.C. agenda meeting. (Id. ¶ 17.) On June 30, 2013, Plaintiff “request[ed] to see Deacon Bormann[,] the facility coordinating chaplain.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff was told that “in order to speak with Deacon Bormann [Plaintiff] ha[d] to submit a formal request via ‘interview slip‘” or could approach Deacon Bormann when Plaintiff saw him on the facility compound. (Id.)
On July 4, 2013, Plaintiff again attempted to attend NOI class, but was stopped by Defendant Fatiuk, (id. ¶ 19), and told that Plaintiff “[could not] leave [the] unit and attend religious class,” (id. ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff then decided to file a grievance with the Inmate Grievance Resolution Committee (“IGRC“). (Id. ¶ 21.)2 Approximately three weeks after filing his grievance, Plaintiff received a decision that “[t]he issue ha[d] been resolved,” that the facility had “outlined . . . what can be attended when an inmate is on [L.O.R.] status,” and that Plaintiff‘s “[r]equest [wa]s outside the purview of the IGRC.” (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff was instructed that he could appeal the decision to the facility Superintendent, (id.), and promptly did so, (id. ¶ 23). In response to Plaintiff‘s appeal, he received a letter from the Superintendent stating that despite the fact that “[t]here [was] no
Plaintiff appealed the grievance to the Central Office Review Committee (“CORC“) “in order to r[a]ise awareness of the unlawful conduct by the staff at Otisville . . . because sometime[s] a lot of constitutional violation[s] . . . occur at [Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (‘DOCCS‘)] facilities” and “the CORC [is] not aware of these violations.” (Id. ¶ 24.)
As a result of Defendants’ alleged violations, Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment, compensatory damages in the amount of $60,000, punitive damages “in an amount to be proved at tr[ia]l,” and disbursement, costs, and interest. (Id. at unnumbered 14 ¶¶ 1–5.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on August 21, 2015. (Dkt. No. 2.) On December 1, 2015, Plaintiff‘s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP“) was granted by then-Chief Judge Loretta A. Preska of the Southern District of New York. (Dkt. No. 4.)3 On December 15, 2015, the Court issued an Order of Service stating that “the Complaint [did] not provide sufficient information to permit the New York State Attorney General, which is the attorney for and agent of the New York State [DOCCS], to identify Correctional Officer John Doe #1 and Correctional Officer John Doe #2” and that “the Complaint lack[ed] any allegations addressing the conduct of any unnamed correctional officers.” (Order of Service 2 (Dkt. No. 6).) Plaintiff was directed to “file an amended complaint within 45 days which [would] replace, not supplement, the original
On June 16, 2016, Defendants filed the instant Motion To Dismiss and accompanying memorandum of law. (Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss the Compl. (“Defs.’ Mem.“) (Dkt. No. 22).) On September 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’ Motion. (Resp. to Defs.’ Movement [sic] Defense and Movement [sic] For Summ. J. (“Pl.‘s Resp.“) (Dkt. No. 26).)4 On September 30, 2016, Defendants filed a reply. (See Reply Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss the Compl. (“Defs.’ Reply“) (Dkt. No. 29).)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
1. Rule 12(b)(1)
“A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action only when it has authority to adjudicate the cause pressed in the complaint.” Bryant v. Steele, 25 F. Supp. 3d 233, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry and a claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff‘d, 561 U.S. 247 (2010). While a district court resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) “must take all uncontroverted facts in the
2. Rule 12(b)(6)
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff‘s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed,
“[W]hen ruling on a defendant‘s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (“In addressing the sufficiency of a complaint we accept as true all factual allegations . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Aegis Ins. Servs., Inc. v. 7 World Trade Co., 737 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2013) (“In reviewing a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we . . . accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true . . . .” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, “[f]or the purpose of resolving [a] motion to dismiss, the Court . . . draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Daniel v. T & M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie‘s Int‘l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Additionally, “[i]n ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, . . . a court may consider the complaint[,] . . . any written instrument attached to the complaint as an exhibit[,] or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference,” as well as “matters of which judicial notice may be taken, and documents either in [the] plaintiffs’ possession or of which [the] plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing
Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must “construe[] [his complaint] liberally and interpret[] [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Analysis
1. First Amendment
a. Failure to State a Claim
Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff‘s Complaint on the basis that it fails to state a First Amendment claim. Defendants argue that “[P]laintiff fails to show any more than a de minimis burden, much less a substantial burden, on the free exercise of his religious beliefs.” (Defs.’ Mem. 8 (italics omitted).)
“Prisoners have long been understood to retain some measure of the constitutional protection afforded by the First Amendment‘s Free Exercise Clause,” Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003), which includes the right to participate in religious services, see
“To be entitled to protection under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, a prisoner must make a threshold showing that the disputed conduct substantially burdened his sincerely held religious beliefs.” Washington v. Chaboty, No. 09-CV-9199, 2015 WL 1439348, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274–45 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The prisoner must show at the threshold that the disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs.“); Shapiro v. Cmty. First Servs., Inc., No. 11-CV-4061, 2014 WL 1276479, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014) (“At the motion to dismiss stage, a complaint must assert sufficient allegations necessary to establish that [the] plaintiff‘s claim is based upon a sincerely held religious belief.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).5 In determining whether a belief is “sincere”
Defendants do not contest the sincerity of Plaintiff‘s religious beliefs. The Court, therefore, will assume for the purpose of resolving the instant Motion that Plaintiff‘s religious beliefs are sincerely held. Accordingly, the Court addresses whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged that his ability to exercise his religious beliefs was substantially burdened.
Plaintiff asserts that on two occasions, Defendants “den[ied] [him] the opportunity to participate in NOI class.” (Compl. ¶ 25.) In the Second Circuit, courts have held that preclusion from attending two religious services is not, without more, a “substantial burden” on a plaintiff‘s
Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that the specific services were “‘central or important’ to his faith.” Rossi, 2015 WL 769551, at *8 (quoting Ford, 352 F.3d at 593). Indeed, Plaintiff notes that “[t]he NOI [c]lass is the best opportunity for [him] to learn the basic doctrines of the NOI faith,” (Compl. ¶ 26), but that “[t]here are several options for Plaintiff to learn about his religion,” albeit “limited” options, (id. ¶ 30). See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987) (noting a factor “relevant in determining the reasonableness of a prison restriction . . . is whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates“); Holland, 758 F.3d at 222–23 (same); Henry v. Schriro, No. 10-CV-7573, 2011 WL 3370394, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2011) (finding “the availability of alternative means of exercising the right to free exercise of religion” weighed in favor of granting the defendant‘s motion to dismiss);
b. Qualified Immunity
Defendants further contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff‘s claims for monetary damages under the First Amendment. (See Defs.’ Mem. 10–13.) “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Qualified immunity “‘gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’ by ‘protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.‘” City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)). Because qualified immunity is “an affirmative defense [that] . . . reflects an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability[,] . . . it is appropriate to decide the issue of qualified immunity, when raised, at an early stage of the litigation, such as when deciding a pre-answer motion to dismiss.” Betts v. Shearman, No. 12-CV-3195, 2013 WL 311124, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013) (italics and internal quotation marks omitted), aff‘d, 751 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2014).
In determining whether a right is clearly established, “th[e] inquiry turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted). “In the
Here, as noted above, at the time Plaintiff was denied the ability to attend two NOI classes, it was far from clearly established that precluding an inmate from attending two religious classes violated the First Amendment. Indeed, courts in the Second Circuit have explicitly held otherwise. See Jean-Laurent, 2015 WL 1015383, at *6 (“Courts within the Second Circuit have consistently held that missing two religious services does not pose a substantial burden on an inmate‘s religion.“); Blalock, 2014 WL 5324326, at *7 (same); Shapiro, 2014 WL 1276479, at *11 (same); see also Smith, 2010 WL 1330019, at *9 (“[T]he cancellation of two services did not violate [the] [p]laintiff‘s free exercise rights and such First Amendment claim should be dismissed.“); Williams v. Weaver, No. 03-CV-912, 2006 WL 2794417, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006) (noting that inability to attend two religious services was not a substantial burden on the plaintiff‘s right to practice his religion). This is enough to safely conclude, at the absolute minimum, “a reasonable [prison official] would not have understood from the existing law that his conduct was unlawful.” Schubert, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 702 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Plaintiff‘s claims for monetary damages pursuant to violations of the First Amendment are dismissed.
c. Immunity Under the Eleventh Amendment
As to the declaratory relief Plaintiff seeks, (see Compl. at unnumbered 14, ¶ 1), Defendants assert that such relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as Plaintiff‘s “alleged
As both Plaintiff and Defendants note, following the submission of Plaintiff‘s grievance, Otisville “clarified . . . what constitutes [L.O.R.]” and distributed a new list and revised Facility Operations Manual (“FOM“) No. 223 to all housing units. (See Compl. Ex. B at unnumbered 23.) On the revised FOM No. 223, “Chaplain and Religious Services/Classes” is listed as an activity inmates can attend while on L.O.R. (See Decl. of Christina Okereke (“Okereke Decl.“) Ex. A at 2 (Dkt. No. 23).) Therefore, without potential for future violations, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits declaratory relief and Plaintiff‘s claim for such relief is dismissed.
2. RLUIPA
As with Plaintiff‘s free exercise claim under the First Amendment, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff‘s allegations pursuant to RLUIPA for failure to state a claim. (See Defs.’ Mem. 15.) RLUIPA “protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government‘s permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005). RLUIPA “provides a more stringent standard than does the First Amendment, barring the government from imposing a substantial burden on a prisoner‘s free exercise unless the challenged conduct or regulation furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.” Holland, 758 F.3d at 224 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 2006) (“RLUIPA protects inmates by
“RLUIPA does not authorize claims for monetary damages against state officers in either their official or individual capacities.” Holland, 758 F.3d at 224 (citing Washington v. Gonyea, 731 F.3d 143, 145–46 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)); see also Keitt v. Hawk, No. 13-CV-850, 2015 WL 1246058, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2015) (same). Instead, a plaintiff may only seek injunctive relief. See Holland, 758 F.3d at 224; see also Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 734 F. Supp. 2d 409, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“It is readily apparent that injunctive relief constitutes appropriate relief under RLUIPA.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). However, here Plaintiff‘s does not seek injunctive relief. (See Compl. 14 ¶¶ 1–5.)6 Accordingly, Plaintiff‘s claims under RLUIPA are dismissed.
3. Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Defendants further contend that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment. (Defs.’ Mem. 16–17.) “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that all persons similarly situated be treated in the same manner.” Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 260 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks
Plaintiff claims that by prohibiting Plaintiff from “attend[ing] NOI class,” Defendants affected “the manner in which and how Plaintiff can practice his religion” and that Defendants had “discriminatory intent” in doing so. (Compl. ¶ 47.) Plaintiff asserts—and Defendants do not dispute—that at the time of the alleged incident, inmates were still “mandated” to attend “academic school, v[o]cational, R-SAT (substance abuse), ART (Aggression Recessive Training), OHM (Mental Health) [p]rograms” while on L.O.R. status, (id. ¶ 45), but were prohibited from attending religious classes, (id.).
Here, the deficiency in Plaintiff‘s equal protection claim is that it “does not allege that [Plaintiff] was treated differently from any identified individuals, let alone individuals who he
4. State Law Claims
In addition to Plaintiff‘s federal claims, Plaintiff also asserts violations of the New York State Constitution and State Correctional Law § 610. (Compl. ¶¶ 55–64.) Where a district court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” it “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over any remaining claims. See
The Court finds that nothing distinguishes this Action from “the usual case.” Plaintiff‘s federal claims are all dismissed prior to trial, see Dellutri v. Village of Elmsford, 895 F. Supp. 2d 555, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where “th[e] case remains in its initial stages, and the [p]arties have not yet proceeded to discovery“); Middleton v. United States, No. 10-CV-6057, 2012 WL 394559, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2012) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because no federal claims survived a motion to dismiss), and none of the factors that the Supreme Court enunciated in Cohill—“judicial economy, convenience, fairness, [or] comity“—militate against such dismissal, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7. Thus, Plaintiff‘s state claims are dismissed without prejudice.
III. Conclusion
For the above reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss. However, in light of Plaintiff‘s pro se status, and because this is the first adjudication of his claims on the merits, Plaintiff‘s claims are dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff wishes to file an Amended Complaint alleging additional facts and otherwise addressing the deficiencies identified above,
The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the pending Motion. (Dkt. No. 21.)
SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 2, 2017
White Plains, New York
KENNETH M. KARAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE