Case Information
*1 13 ‐ 619 ‐ cv
John
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
________ A UGUST T ERM , 2013 A RGUED : S EPTEMBER D ECIDED : M AY No. ‐ ‐
J OHN B ETTS ,
Plaintiff Appellant, M ARTHA A NNE S HEARMAN , C ITY OF N EW Y ORK , P OLICE O FFICER P ABLO R ODRIGUEZ ,
Defendants Appellees, P OLICE O FFICER J ANE D OE , Defendant.
________ Before: W INTER W ALKER W ESLEY , Circuit Judges
________
Plaintiff filed this suit seeking damages U.S.C. § arising from based allegedly accusations made complaining victim. United States ‐ ‐ Martha Anne District Court for Southern District of New York (J. Paul Oetken, District Judge ) granted defendants’ motions dismiss complaint.
We hold, first, because arguable existed Betts, his claims for arrest, imprisonment, abuse of process, malicious prosecution were properly dismissed. Second, we hold Betts’s for denial of right fair trial properly dismissed because failed meet required pleading standards. Finally, we hold claims defendant complainant properly dismissed she did act color of law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM judgment court.
M ICHAEL H. J OSEPH , Law Office Michael H. Joeseph, P.L.L.C., White Plains, NY, for Plaintiff Appellant
M ICHAEL J. P ASTOR (Kristen M. Helmers, on brief ), for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel City New York, New York, NY, Defendants Appellees City New York Police Officer Pablo
C HARLES E. D ORKEY III, McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP, York, NY (Rebecca Tingey, ‐ ‐ Martha Anne brief ), for Defendant Appellee Martha Anne
________
J OHN M. W ALKER J R ., Circuit Judge :
In this appeal we consider whether United States District Court for Southern District York (J. Paul Oetken, District Judge ) erred granting defendants’ motions dismiss complaint this U.S.C. § action which plaintiff seeks damages arising from his arrest based allegedly false accusations made complaining victim.
We hold, first, because arguable existed Betts, his claims for arrest, imprisonment, abuse process, malicious prosecution were properly dismissed. Second, we hold Betts’s denial right fair trial properly dismissed failed meet required pleading standards. Finally, we hold claims defendant complainant properly Betts dismissed she did not act under the color of law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM judgment of district court.
BACKGROUND
Because this appeal arises from court’s dismissal pleadings pursuant Rule 12(b)(6), we accept true following allegations set forth complaint. See Doe City York
On January approximately 11:30 p.m., while Shearman influence alcohol and other controlled substances, she became verbally combative towards her then husband Betts. To avoid her, Betts locked himself spare bedroom. Shearman tried force her way threatened if did let her in, she would call police. then called falsely accused assaulting her.
At approximately 1:00 a.m., Police responded call. In their presence, accused assault, harassment, slamming her arm ground, Betts Shearman, causing her substantial pain. The officers forcibly entered the spare bedroom where Betts was sleeping and arrested him.
Betts alleges officers then assisted in making accusation and coached her in fabricating version events justify arrest. Betts also alleges there reasons for officers doubt Shearman’s credibility: obviously intoxicated, high, and appeared strung out; she made accusations against Betts in past; and there lack physical evidence support an assault charge. charged under New York law with assault third degree, harassment second degree and resisting
arrest. Eventually state court dismissed these charges prejudice.
In April filed complaint against Officers Rodriguez Doe, City York. brought claims violations U.S.C. § law *6 13 ‐ 619 ‐ cv v.
violations for false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse process, prima facie tort, intentional infliction emotional distress. His claimed constitutional violations against alleged she “state actor” for purposes § 1983. also brought claim Monell Department Social Services U.S. 658, ‐ (1978), City York for allegedly having “custom, policy, practice” permitted violations.
On January 24, 2013, district court granted defendants’ motions dismiss. No. ‐ ‐ 3195(JPO), WL (S.D.N.Y. Jan. The district court held entitled qualified immunity on Betts’s claims for arrest, imprisonment, malicious prosecution “arguable cause” Betts. Id at *9 *12. The also dismissed excessive force basis failed meet required pleading standards alleging nothing more than shoulder somehow injured during arrest. Id. *10 ‐ district court dismissed abuse process claim failing plead “nefarious aim” behind prosecution, id . at *12, fair trial claim basis allegations were implausible, id. at *13. The district court dismissed Betts’s § claims against because she state actor pleadings were insufficient establish conspired with officers or participated willfully joint activity with them. Id. at *13 And finally, district court dismissed Betts’s claim against City York Betts’s allegations acted accordance with City custom, policy, or practice conclusory. Id . *16.
The district court dismissed all federal claims prejudice except Betts’s excessive force Officer Rodriguez, which dismissed without prejudice. Id declined exercise supplemental jurisdiction over law claims. Id 619 ‐ Betts v.
DISCUSSION does appeal dismissal of his excessive force
claim, claim City of York, or his claims against Officer Doe. Rather, urges this court reverse dismissal other claims. We hold district neither erred in granting defendants’ motions dismiss nor abused its discretion in denying leave replead.
I. Dismissal Claims
We review court’s dismissal complaint Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo and, doing so, we “view pleadings light most favorable to, draw all reasonable inference favor of, non moving party.” , F.3d (internal quotation marks omitted).
A. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution
Probable complete defense arrest, Singer Fulton Cnty. Sheriff 1995), imprisonment, Zanghi Vill. Old Brookville *9 13 619 ‐ v.
F.2d 42, (2d Cir. And continuing probable cause is a complete defense to a claim malicious prosecution. Kinzer Jackson F.3d (2d Cir. 2003) (stating probable cause is defense malicious prosecution if it is later nullified by information establishing defendant’s innocence). “Probable cause exists when one has knowledge of, or reasonably trustworthy information as to, facts circumstances are sufficient warrant person reasonable caution belief an offense has been or being committed person be arrested.” Williams Town Greenburgh 2008) (internal quotation marks alterations omitted).
More specifically, exists if law enforcement officer “received [] information from some person, normally putative victim or eyewitness, unless circumstances raise doubt person’s veracity. reliability or veracity informant basis informant’s knowledge are two v. important factors.” Panetta Crowley F.3d (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks citations omitted).
Even absence probable cause, officer entitled qualified immunity where “(1) [her] conduct does violate clearly established statutory or rights which reasonable person would have known, or (2) it was ‘objectively reasonable’ [her] believe [her] actions were lawful time challenged act.” Jenkins City York 2007) (internal quotation marks citations omitted). Plaintiff’s arrest, imprisonment, malicious prosecution claims therefore turn whether defendant officers’ probable cause determination objectively reasonable—that is, whether there “arguable” probable cause arrest. Id For following reasons, we agree arresting arguable entitled qualified immunity. Betts
As Betts alleged complaint, Shearman called and reported Betts had, among other things, assaulted her. Betts also alleged once officers arrived apartment, again accused Betts assault and harassment, although it unclear from complaint whether made this allegation before or after allegedly being “coached” officers lie.
In any event, and responded domestic disturbance based on Shearman’s report over phone she had been assaulted found Betts locked bedroom. alleged, now argues, officers had reason doubt Shearman’s credibility because she visibly intoxicated made accusations past, because there lack physical evidence support an assault charge.
Shearman’s past accusations, however, do undermine finding arguable nowhere alleged knew prior accusations 619 v. night was arrested. See Panetta , F.3d at “When determining whether probable cause exists courts must consider those facts available to officer at time of immediately before it . .” Id . (quoting Caldarola Calabrese F.3d (2d Cir. Likewise, lack physical evidence an assault Shearman’s body not fatal to finding arguable when Shearman reported she had been assaulted. See Krause Bennett 1989) (A officer’s purpose “is apprehend those suspected wrongdoing, finally determine guilt through weighing evidence.”).
Additionally, alleges “obviously intoxicated high, she appeared be strung out,” but fails allege any facts regarding how would have known this time made accusations Betts. Even assuming aware Sherman intoxicated, absent other indicia raising concerns reliability, officers were not unreasonable surmising that an offense had been committed by Betts. And allegations coached by officers into making allegations are, discussed below, implausible.
In sum, arresting arguable probable cause to they were entitled to believe Shearman’s accusation assault absent credible reasons to. Given facts available to officers, it “objectively reasonable officer[s] to believe existed.” Golino City Haven
B. Right to Fair Trial argues erred dismissing his fair trial basis allegations insufficient support it. “When officer creates information likely influence jury’s decision forwards information prosecutors, violates accused’s right fair trial, harm occasioned such an unconscionable action *14 13 619 v. Shearman,
redressable an action for damages 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. , 124 130
We agree with court complaint failed plausibly plead this claim required Bell Atlantic Corp. Twombly , U.S. (2007) and Ashcroft Iqbal , U.S. 662 (2009). Factual allegations must “state relief plausible its face,” which requires pleading facts “permit infer more than mere possibility misconduct.” Iqbal U.S. at (quoting Twombly U.S. at 570), alleges Doe, upon arriving apartment shared “assisted
making allegation . coached her fabricating contrived version events justify baseless arrest.” Betts, however, also alleges initially phoned police made same “false” accusations that, among other things, assaulted her. original accusation without possibility any complicity sufficient sustain *15 13 619 ‐ Betts
arrest, thereby undermining claim that it was police whose false accusation denied Betts a fair trial. Moreover, it is plausible that, without more, complaining witness who originally conceived accusations on her own accord also required “coaching” in making substantially same accusations again. Betts’s claim that his right fair trial violated was thus properly dismissed by district court.
C. State Action by Shearman
Betts alleges his complaint, now argues appeal, that Shearman engaged joint action with violate civil rights such that Shearman acted color law. [1] Specifically, argues Shearman became actor “knowingly making allegations jointly acting with *16 13 619 v. defendants fabricate a contrived version facts . for purpose having [Betts] baselessly arrested.” We disagree.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, torts are only actionable against state actors or private parties acting “under color of” state law. Ciambriello , 292 F.3d at We have said private entity must “allege facts demonstrating private entity acted concert with state actor commit an unconstitutional act.” Spear v. Town West Hartford , 954 F.2d 63, 68 Cir. “Put differently, private actor acts color law when private actor ‘is willful participant joint activity with State or its agents.’” Ciambriello , F.3d (quoting Adickes S.H. Kress & Co. , U.S. (1970)).
A private actor can only be “a willful participant joint activity State or its agents” if two share some common goal violate plaintiff’s rights. See, e.g. Cunningham Southlake Center Mental Health, Inc. (7th 1991) (“A charge joint action amounts alleging some agreement between private and public actors violate plaintiff’s rights. A requirement joint action charge therefore both public and private actors share common, unconstitutional goal.” (internal citations omitted)); Ginsberg Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc.
In Ginsberg plaintiff Ginsberg, upon returning truck rented from defendant Healey Leasing, got into verbal altercation manager at Healey Leasing over whether, Ginsberg insisted, two agreed Ginsberg’s automobile insurer would pay rental fee. Id . After Ginsberg left, Healey Leasing manager called police and reported payment dispute and altercation. Id police arrived threatened Ginsburg larceny or breach peace if he did pay rental fee Healey Leasing. Id Ginsberg paid fee later sued Healey Leasing under Section alleging deprived property without due process Healey Leasing, acting color law, complicit deprivation. Id.
On appeal, we affirmed district court’s grant summary judgment to Healey Leasing. We held that Healey Leasing’s requesting police assistance providing information led to police action did not make Healey Leasing a joint participant state action. Id “Where . . . a officer exercises independent judgment how respond to a private party’s legitimate request assistance, private party is not ‘jointly engaged’ officer’s conduct so render it state actor Section 1983.” Id In Ginsberg state action could not be inferred because, absent “evidence [the officer] undertook resolve dispute pursuant any agreement or plan Healey,” id ., it could be shown Healey officer shared common goal violating Ginsberg’s rights. operation this principle illustrated by two district
court decisions found state action complicity by private party. In Bang Utopia Restaurant held action restaurant owner adequately pleaded when, absent probable cause, the arrested the plaintiffs after speaking the restaurant owner for twenty minutes. F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The Bang court stated “it would be reasonable infer during conversation, [the restaurant owner] urged officers arrest both plaintiffs, without cause, in furtherance what became shared goal depriving plaintiffs federally guaranteed rights.” Id . The court pointed out, however, officers arrested plaintiffs immediately upon arriving scene based on information illegality given over phone, “it would be difficult infer joint action . . it would appear shared unlawful goal [the restaurant owner].” Id
Similarly, White Moylan found plaintiff properly pleaded action two private security guards who substituted plaintiff’s bag unpurchased store merchandise for goods already purchased, resulting plaintiff’s shoplifting. F. Supp. 2d (D. Conn. plaintiff alleged that the security guards and arresting officer reviewed surveillance footage, discovered that the plaintiff’s merchandise was not, in fact, stolen, and worked in tandem to “fabricate[] a reason arrest [plaintiff] shoplifting.” Id . at 267. Plaintiff’s complaint thus alleged police officer did more than simply plaintiff based information from security guards. Id . By jointly working fabricate evidence crime, private actors and police officer shared common goal violating plaintiff’s rights.
Here, alleges Officers “assisted Sherman making false allegation . coached her fabricating contrived version events justify baseless arrest.” As explained above Section I.B, however, allegation coached into making accusations plausible given first called reported she assaulted prior her interaction officers. v.
Betts’s claim against a state actor boils down to fact arrested upon accusation assault made him private citizen to police. This insufficient to plausible arresting shared common goal violating rights. district court properly granted defendant Shearman’s motion to dismiss.
II. Leave to Replead
We review district court’s denial leave replead for abuse discretion. Williams Citigroup Inc. F.3d (2d Cir. 2011). Here, did abuse its discretion any amendment complaint claims discussed herein would be futile. See Lucente Int’l Bus. Machines Corp.
No changes complaint would undermine existence arguable Betts. Additionally, has identified no facts that, if alleged, would bolster allegations coached make accusations. Likewise, has identified no facts would sufficiently allege should be treated actor purposes U.S.C. §
CONCLUSION
For foregoing reasons, court’s order AFFIRMED.
[1] also alleged conspired violate his rights. A Section conspiracy distinct from one joint action. See Ciambriello County Nassau We conclude correctly held failed sufficiently plead conspiracy, both pleading conclusory, because, described above Section I.B, allegations coached implausible. See WL *14.