SWARTHOUT, WARDEN v. COOKE
No. 10-333
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided January 24, 2011*
562 U.S. 216
*Tоgether with Cate, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation v. Clay (see this Court‘s Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same court.
I
California‘s parole statute provides that the Board of Prison Terms “shall set a release date unless it determines
A
Respondent Damon Cooke was convicted of attempted first-degree murder in 1991, and a Cаlifornia court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of seven years to life in prison with the possibility of parole. In November 2002, the board determined that Cooke was not yet suitable for parole, basing its deсision on the “especially cruel and callous manner” of his commitment offense, App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a; his failure to participate fully in rehabilitative programs; his failure to develop marketable skills; аnd three incidents of misconduct while in prison. The board admitted that Cooke had received a favorable psychological report, but it dismissed the report as not credible because it included severаl inconsistent and erroneous statements.
Cooke filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in State Superior Court. The court denied his petition. “The record indicates,” it said, “that there was some evidеnce, including but certainly not limited to the life offense, to support the board‘s denial.” Id., at 42a. Cooke subsequently filed a habeas petition with the California Court of Appeal and a petition for direct review by the California Supreme Court. Both were denied.
B
Respondent Elijah Clay was convicted of first-degree murder in 1978, and a California court sentenced him to imprisonment for seven years to life with the possibility of parole. In 2003, the board found Clay suitable for parole, but the Governor exercised his authority to review the case and found Clay unsuitable for parole. See
Clay filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in State Superior Court. That court denied Clay‘s petition, as did the California Court of Appeal. The California Supreme Court denied review.
Clay subsequently filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the District Court granted. The District
II
In granting habeas relief based on its conclusion that the state courts had misapplied California‘s “some evidence” rule, the Ninth Circuit must have assumed either that federal habeas relief is available for an error of state law, or that correct application of the State‘s “some evidence” standard is required by the federal Due Process Clause. Neither assumption is correct.
As to the first: The habeas statute “unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue a writ of habeаs corpus to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.‘” Wilson v. Corcoran, ante, at 5 (per curiam) (quoting
As for the Due Process Clause, standard analysis under that provision proceeds in two steps: We first ask whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U. S. 454, 460 (1989). Here, the Ninth Circuit held that California law creates a liberty interest in parole, see 606 F. 3d, at 1213. While we have no need to review that holding here, it is a
Whatever liberty interest exists is, of course, a state interest created by California law. There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence, and the States are under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners. Id., at 7. When, however, a State creates a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause rеquires fair procedures for its vindication—and federal courts will review the application of those constitutionally required procedures. In the context of parole, we have held that the procedures required are minimal. In Greenholtz, we found that a prisoner subject to a parole statute similar to California‘s received adequate process when he was allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied. Id., at 16. “The Constitution,” we held, “does not require more.” Ibid. Cooke and Clay received at least this amount of process: They were allowed to speak at their parole hearings and tо contest the evidence against them, were afforded access to their records in advance, and were notified as to the reasons why parole was denied. 606 F. 3d, at 1208-1212; App. to Pet. for Cert. 69a-80a;
That should have been the beginning and the еnd of the federal habeas courts’ inquiry into whether Cooke and Clay received due process. Instead, however, the Court of Appeals reviewed the state courts’ decisions on the merits and concluded that they had unreasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence. See 606 F. 3d, at 1213-1216; 384 Fed. Appx., at 545-546. Other Ninth Circuit cases have done the same. See, e. g., Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F. 3d 606, 611 (2010) (per curiam). No opinion of ours supports converting California‘s “some evidence” rule into a substantive
It will not do to pronounce California‘s “some evidence” rule to be “a compоnent” of the liberty interest, 606 F. 3d, at 1213. Such reasoning would subject to federal-court merits review the application of all state-prescribed procedures in cases involving liberty or property interests, including (of course) those in criminal prosecutions. That has never* been the law. To the contrary, we have long recognized that
The Ninth Circuit‘s questionable finding that there was no evidence in the record supporting the parole denials is irrelevant unless there is a federal right at stake, as
The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondents’ motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgments below are
Reversed.
JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring.
In Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U. S. 445, 455 (1985), this Court held that, to comply with duе process, revocation of a prisoner‘s good time credits must be supported by “some evidence.” If California law entitled prisoners to parole upon satisfaction of specified criteria, then Hill would be closely in point. See In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 657-658, 59 P. 3d 174, 205 (2002). The Ninth Circuit, however, has determined that for California‘s parole system, as for Nebraska‘s, Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U. S. 1 (1979), is the controlling precedent. Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F. 3d 546, 559-561 (2010) (en banc). Given that determination, I agree that today‘s summary disposition is in order.