Lora WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
No. 15-2570
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: May 19, 2016 Filed: August 2, 2016
831 F.3d 968
As there is no rule of procedure that specifically addresses the timing of submissions to establish standing in agency review proceedings, we will consider the supplemental declaration in this case. We give notice, however, that “a petitioner whose standing is not self-evident should establish its standing ... at the first appropriate point in the review proceeding.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Post-argument submissions are not an appropriate point in the proceedings to present new evidence to address standing. Future litigants should not expect the court to allow this procedure without a showing of good cause. Id. at 900-01.
Having examined the supplemental submission, we conclude that the Association has not established that any of the five entities named in the declaration has suffered an injury-in-fact. The declaration does not state how many accidents, if any, are on each carrier‘s record. A carrier receives a Crash Indicator ranking only if it has had a minimum of two accidents in the preceding twenty-four months and at least one accident in the previous twelve months. If the carriers had no recent accidents, and thus did not receive a Crash Indicator ranking, then the guidance could not affect any ranking of the five carriers by benefitting other carriers in one of the safety-event groups. With no evidence of recent accidents for these five carriers, petitioners cannot meet their burden to show that the guidance caused a concrete injury to any of the carriers.2
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For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that petitioners have failed to establish Article III standing to challenge the disputed agency guidance. The petition for review is therefore dismissed.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant was Mark Murray Nolan, of Bloomington, MN. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellant brief; Mark Murray Nolan, of Bloomington, MN.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was David Walfred Asp, of Minneapolis, MN. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellee brief; Susan E. Ellingstad, of Minneapolis, MN., David Walfred Asp, of Minneapolis, MN.
Before RILEY, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
RILEY, Chief Judge.
Lora Walker, a senior planning analyst for Hennepin County, Minnesota, was insured under a group long-term disability policy the county obtained from Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company (Hartford).1 In April 2009, Walker filed a
I. BACKGROUND
For years, the county permitted Walker to work from home full-time. In 2008, Walker‘s new supervisor advised Walker she would have to work at a county office two days a week. Walker, for the first time in January 2008, informed the county she had diabetes and asked that she be allowed to work from home so she could test her blood and take insulin as needed. Walker complained the county office lacked sufficient privacy and a safe, sanitary, and effective place to take insulin.
When the county refused to accommodate Walker and let her work full-time from home, as her doctor recommended, Walker ended her employment. Although she worked part-time through December 2008, Walker‘s last full day of work was June 17, 2008. On April 8, 2009, Walker filed a claim for disability benefits under the Hartford policy. Hartford denied the claim initially and on appeal, concluding Walker failed to show she could not perform her essential job duties.4
In May 2014, Walker sued Hartford for breach of contract in Minnesota state court. Hartford removed the case to federal court and later moved for summary judgment, arguing Walker‘s suit (1) was untimely under the policy‘s limitation period, and (2) even if timely, failed on the merits. Walker cross-moved for partial summary judgment on several grounds. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge for disposition.
After conducting a hearing, the magistrate judge recommended the district court grant summary judgment to Hartford because Walker‘s suit was untimely under the policy. The magistrate judge also recommended denying Walker‘s cross-motion as moot. In a summary order, the district court denied Walker‘s objections and adopted the report and recommendation in full. Walker appeals3, challenging the district court‘s interpretation of Minnesota law which governs the policy.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Choice of Law and Standards of Review
The parties agree Minnesota substantive law applies to this diversity case. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The Supreme Court of Minnesota has not addressed the issues raised in this appeal, so “[w]e must predict how [it] would rule, and we follow decisions of the intermediate state court when they are the best evidence of Minnesota law.” Friedberg v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 691 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 2012). We review de novo the district court‘s interpretation of Minnesota law and its summary judgment rulings. See Bannister v. Bemis Co., 556 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 2009). We also review de novo Walker‘s constitutional claims. See United States v. Meirick, 674 F.3d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is required “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
B. Plain Meaning
Hartford‘s group policy required Walker to initiate any legal action against Hartford within “three years after the time written Proof of Loss is required to be furnished according to the terms of the Policy.” The policy required Walker to send proof of loss “within 90 days after the start of the period for which [Hartford] owe[d] payment.” Based on the policy terms and the undisputed facts in the record, the district court correctly determined Walker “could not take legal action against Hartford after December 15, 2011.” Because Walker did not file suit until May 2014, the district court concluded Walker‘s suit was time-barred.
Walker does not dispute the district court‘s calculations under the policy or argue that her suit was timely under the policy‘s limitation period. Rather, Walker argues the policy‘s limitation period does not apply at all. According to Walker, “[t]he District Court should be reversed because Chapter 62A, when read in its entirety, is intended to provide the protections of
Walker‘s arguments turn on issues of statutory interpretation. Under Minnesota law, “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”
Walker contends the district court should have determined her suit was timely under the “standard provisions” of
Required provisions. Except as provided in subdivision 4 each [accident and
health insurance] policy delivered or issued for delivery to any person in this state shall contain the provisions specified in this subdivision in the words in which the same appear in this section. The insurer may, at its option, substitute for one or more of such provisions corresponding provisions of different wording approved by the commissioner which are in each instance not less favorable in any respect to the insured or the beneficiary.
With respect to proof of loss, which triggers the limitation period, subsection (7) requires a provision that states, in relevant part,
Written proof of loss must be furnished to the insurer at its said office in case of claim for loss for which this policy provides any periodic payment contingent upon continuing loss within 90 days after the termination of the period for which the insurer is liable.
In Walker‘s view, “[t]he critical language difference between the policy and the statute is that the policy requires proof of loss 90 days from the start of a disability, while the statute requires proof of loss 90 days from the termination of a disability.” Walker concedes her suit is untimely under the policy, but maintains it is timely under what she argues is the controlling statute.
The key question, then, is whether the limitation period in the Hartford group policy must give way to the “standard provisions” of
Section 62A.01, subdiv. 2 generally requires certificates of insurance issued to Minnesota residents to “provide coverage for all benefits required to be covered in group policies in Minnesota.” Walker says this section “requires parity between individual and group policies.” Section 62A.05(a) states, “No policy provision which is not subject to section 62A.04 shall make a policy, or any portion thereof, less favorable in any respect to the insured or the beneficiary than the provisions thereof which are subject to sections 62A.01 to 62A.09 hereof.” Walker asserts the proof-of-loss provision in the policy is less favorable than
As the district court recognized, the fatal flaw in Walker‘s patchwork statutory analysis is that it ignores the plain meaning of
Undeterred by the unambiguous statutory language in
We also reject Walker‘s assertion that we already determined the “mandatory” provisions of
C. Equal Protection
Walker argues “that if
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a state from denying “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
“The purpose of the[se] equal protection clause[s] ... is to secure every person within the State‘s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination.” Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918). Equal protection “does not guarantee that all persons must be dealt with in an identical manner,” Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 500 (8th Cir. 2010), and “‘does not forbid [all statutory] classifications,’ ” In re Welfare of M.L.M., 813 N.W.2d 26, 37 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). Rather, “[i]t simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant aspects alike.” Id. (quoting Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10).
Where, as here, an equal-protection challenge does not involve a protected class or a fundamental constitutional right, “we review the challenge under a rational basis standard under both the state and federal constitutions.” Scott v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass‘n, Inc., 615 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Minn. 2000). Under federal rational-basis review, “we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); accord Scott, 615 N.W.2d at 74. Walker‘s constitutional claim fails “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” FCC v. Beach Commc‘ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). We afford the challenged classification in
In addition to applying federal rational-basis review, the Minnesota Supreme Court has, at times, also applied a stricter formulation of the rational-basis test under the Minnesota constitution. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 683 N.W.2d 294, 298-99 (Minn. 2004). Minnesota‘s alternative rational-basis test has three requirements:
“(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the classification from those excluded must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial, thereby providing a natural and reasonable basis to
justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the classification must be genuine or relevant to the purpose of the law; that is there must be an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed remedy; and (3) the purpose of the statute must be one that the state can legitimately attempt to achieve.”
In re Guardianship of Durand, 859 N.W.2d at 784 (quoting Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888). “The key distinction between the federal and Minnesota tests is that under the Minnesota test [the Supreme Court of Minnesota] ha[s] been unwilling to hypothesize a rational basis to justify a classification,” requiring instead ” ‘a reasonable connection between the actual, and not just the theoretical, effect of the challenged classification and the statutory goals.’ ” Garcia, 683 N.W.2d at 299 (quoting Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889).
When evaluating an equal-protection challenge under Minnesota law, “[w]e presume statutes to be constitutional and exercise our power to declare a statute unconstitutional with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.” Gluba ex rel. Gluba v. Bitzan & Ohren Masonry, 735 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2007). We will not declare a statute “unconstitutional unless the party challenging it demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates some constitutional provision.” Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 279 (Minn. 1981).
After careful review of the limited record on this issue, we conclude Walker fails to overcome the presumptions of validity in favor of
Hartford responds that Walker has failed to show individual policyholders and group policyholders are similarly situated in all relevant respects. In support, Hartford relies in part on Lundberg ex rel. Lundberg v. Jeep Corp., 582 N.W.2d 268, 272 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), in which the Minnesota Court of Appeals decided “[t]he separate and distinct sources of funds for [a Minnesota] medical assistance program and private health insurance prevent[ed] a determination that individuals who receive [medical assistance] [we]re similarly situated to individuals covered by private health insurance.” According to Hartford, Walker ignores significant differences between individual and group policies, including the typical group employer‘s greater sophistication and expertise in dealing with insurance matters and its “stronger bargaining power to negotiate additional or modified terms.”
Building on those differences in applying the Minnesota rational-basis test, Hartford maintains “individual and group policies” have long been “operationally different in terms of marketing, purchase, negotiation, payment and claims filing,” which results in a real and substantial distinction rather than an arbitrary and capricious one. As for purpose, Hartford, noting the absence
Hartford proposes the legislature reasonably decided the differences in expertise and bargaining power made “it unnecessary to extend all of the mandates for individual policies to group policies,” the rationale being that insureds under group policies do not need the same statutory protection as individuals buying insurance themselves and may benefit in other ways from fewer mandatory requirements, particularly for group policies that cross state lines. Hartford suggests the greater flexibility and freedom to negotiate could reduce costs and encourage “employers to make these insurance benefits available to employees, improving the welfare of Minnesota citizens.” Finding those purposes unquestionably legitimate, Hartford contends
In response, Walker summarily asserts individual and group policyholders are similarly situated and baldly opines “[t]here is no rational basis to distinguish between the 2 classes of insureds.” Walker faults Hartford for (1) failing “to show a difference between the insureds under group policies and insureds under individual policies“; (2) assuming “all employers are big corporations” that “don‘t need protections against insurance companies” when
Even if we assume individual and group policyholders are similarly situated for the purposes of equal protection, we agree with Hartford that Walker has not met her heavy burden of proving
What‘s more, the basis for a reasonable distinction need not apply in every circumstance to be valid. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (“[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional.“); Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 333 N.W.2d 744, 751-52 (Minn. 1983). “Rational-basis review ... does not require a perfect or exact fit between the means used and the ends sought.” United States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 951, 963 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 85 (1988) (“[A] state statute need not be ... perfectly calibrated in order to pass muster under the rational-basis test.“)); accord Mack, 333 N.W.2d at 751 (explaining “[a] statute is not unconstitutional merely because it does not” apply in every circumstance so long as “the statute bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate public purpose“). The possibility that the purchaser of a group policy may not always have superior bargaining power to an individual does not render the distinction between individual and group policies in
III. CONCLUSION
Because
RILEY, Chief Judge.