*1 capacity NORDLINGER HAHN, in his as TAX ASSESSOR FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY, et al. No. 90-1912. Argued February 25, 1992 18, 1992 June Decided *2 Blackmun, J., opinion delivered the Court, Rehnquist, which J.,C. and White, O’Connor, Scaua, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined, Thomas, J., joined which as to Part Thomas, II-A. J., filed an opinion concurring part concurring in the judgment, post, p. 18. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 28.
Carlyle W. Hall, Jr., argued cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Rex E. Lee argued the cause respondents. With him brief were G. Carter Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, De- *3 Witt W. Clinton, David L. Muir, and Albert Ramseyer* delivered the
Justice Blackmun the opinion of Court. In 1978, California voters staged what has been described as a tax property revolt1 by approving statewide ballot *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Building In- dustry Association California, Southern Inc., et al. by Brent N. Rush- forth, Ennis, Jr., Bruce J. Anthony Epstein; C. and and for William K. Rentz, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of by California Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, and Milam, Robert D. Deputy Attorney General; for Wilson, Pete Governor of California, et al. by Bogart; L. Michael for the California Taxpayers’ by Association Robert Joe Hull Douglas Kindrick; and L. for the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Asso- ciation et by al. Ronald Zumbrun, A John H. Findley, Anthony Caso, T. and Grimm; A Trevor People’s Advocate, Inc., by Jayna et al. P. Kapinski; and for the Washington Legal by Foundation et al. Daniel J. Popeo Scully. John C. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Senate the State of California by Jeremiah F. Hallisey; for the American Planning Association et al. by William W.Abbott Hanson; Marilee for the California Assessors’ by Association Douglas J. Maloney and Allen Haim; A for the Interna- tional Association Assessing Gossett; James F. Officers and for the League of Women Voters of California Steven C.McCracken and Rob- ert E. Palmer. 1See N. Times, Y. 8, 1978, June p. 23, 1; col. Washington Post, June 1978, p. H1. Proposi- adoption The 13. Proposition known
initiative im- to Constitution California amend to served tion taxed is property real at which rate on limits pose strict in- assessments property real which rate on consider we litigation, In year. year to from creased challenge Four- Clause Equal Protection under property real which in manner to the Amendment teenth Constitution. California under assessed now I A rising real rapidly years of many followed years 1967-1968 fiscal From California. taxes an av- on increased taxes these from revenues 1971-1972, to Commis- the Senate Report of year. See per erage 11.5% the California Revenue Equity and Property Tax on sion re- Report). (Senate (1991) Commission Senate State sponse, several enacted Legislature 1972. rates cap tax including a measures, relief tax market estate real State’s boom 23-24. Id., existing price of median however, and persevered, aAs $62,430 in 1973 $31,530 doubled home sharply in- because rise continued levies result, homeowners Some at 23. Id., values. creasing assessment *4 well period, during triple double bills tax their saw Id., pay. ability to income their any growth outpacing Con- 13—Genesis Proposition Oakland, also See 25. at 1979). (Supp. June 387, 392 J. Tax Nat. sequences, 32 politi major emerged as had relief tax property By relief time, month’s one California. issue cal qualify to signatures million 1.2 over collected advocates Proposition Alli & Lefcoe See ballot. the June for Val Amador The 13: Proposition Aspects Legal son, day, election On 173, 174 L. Rev. Cal. 53 S. ley Case, carried 64.8% vote a favorable received State, Secretary of counties. State’s 55 of Supplement, Statement of Vote and Primary Election, June p. 6, 1978, 39. California had thus novel constitutional property amendment that led to a tax cut approximately year. billion in the $7 first Senate Report Commission 28. A California enjoyed homeowner with a $50,000home an im- mediate per year reduction of property about $750 taxes. at Id., by Proposition
As enacted 13,Article XIIIA of the Califor- caps nia Constitution property real taxes proper- at 1% a ty’s 1(a). § “full cash value.” “Full cash value” is defined as the assessed year valuation of the 1975-1976 tax or, appraised “thereafter, the value of pur- real when newly chased, change constructed, or a ownership has oc- §2(a). curred after the 1975assessment.” The assessment “may year year reflect from inflationary rate not to percent given 2(b). exceed any year.” § Article XIIIA also exemptions contains several from this provision. reassessment exemption One leg- authorizes the islature to allow age homeowners over the of 55 who sell principal their carry residences to previous base-year assessments replacement with them to equal residences of §2(a). or lesser value. A exemption second applies principal (and transfers of up residence to million $1 property) other real parents §2(h). between and children. In short, Article XIIIA combines a ceiling prop- 1% on the erty tax rate cap with a 2% on annual increases in assessed
valuations. The assessment subject limitation, however, is exception to the that new change construction aor of owner- ship triggers a up reassessment appraised current value. Thus, the provisions assessment of Article essentially XIIIA embody “acquisition system value” of taxation rather than commonplace the more “current value” prop- taxation. Real erty is assessed values related to the value of the acquired time it is taxpayer rather than to the *5 value it has in the current real estate market. dra- created has system acquisition-value this time, Over owning similar persons paid taxes in disparities
matic in- have in California values Property property. of pieces in increases cap on 2% allowed of excess in far flated newly constructed not that property for assessments Re- pay Commission Senate See changed hands. not has that owners property longer term result, aAs port 31-32. values, property reflecting historic taxes property lower reflecting taxes property higher pay owners newer while Proposition reason, For values. recent more system stranger” —the “welcome aas by some labeled been in “welcome” community is established to newcomer percentage larger a contribute will he anticipation who neighbor settled his than government locál for support dif- terms, dollar in Indeed, home. comparable owns 44% By 1989, staggering. burdens in ferences since homes owned who homeowners only 25% shouldered in13 enactment paid taxes property residential billion $4 than more values If 33. Id., at statewide. by homeowners cap, inflationary 2% annual more rise to continue grow. continue will disparity B Stephanie petitioner complaint, amended According her Bald- house purchased November Nordlinger in $170,000. County for Angeles Los neighborhood Hills win years just two home bought prior owners App. 5. peti- purchase, her Before 6. Id., $121,500. before Angeles Los apartment rented ain lived had tioner Tr. 5; Id., California. any real owned had Arg. Oral Los notice received petitioner early in- here, respondent ais Assessor, who County Tax Angeles upward reassessed been had home her forming her App. 7. ownership. change in account $170,100
7 in a tax that the reassessment resulted property learned She $1,701, 36% to for the 1988-1989 fiscal $453.60, up increase Ibid. year. she about five later discovered was paying
Petitioner taxes than some of her who neighbors times more in owned since 1975 within the same residential homes de- comparable a For one block house of identi- example, away, velopment. lot was petitioner’s cal size on a slightly larger subject (based to a tax on an assessed levy only general $358.20 which reflected the home’s value in 1975 $35,820, valuation Id., factor). inflation 9-10.2 year up-to-2% per plus her taxes over the total According petitioner, property while $19,000, first 10 in her home will years approach any who a home in 1975 stands to bought neighbor comparable Brief for Petitioner 3. The tax $4,100. general pay just a dollars levied her modest home few short against that owner of a million Malibu beach- paid by pre-1976 $2.1 front home. App. remedies, administrative exhausting
After petitioner in Los County suit Su brought against respondents Angeles She tax refund and a declaration sought Court. perior tax unconstitutional.3 In her amended com her was proffered suggesting the trial additional Petitioner court evidence in in disparities greater residential tax burdens were other Los County example, Angeles neighborhoods. For a small two-bedroom house $27,000 previously Santa assessed at and that sold Monica was was levy $4,650, a $465,000 subject would be to a tax bill 17 times year by paid previous App. $270 more than the before owner. proffered dispari 76-77. Petitioner also evidence that similar suggesting respect apartment buildings ties obtained with commercial in Id., 68-69,82-85. income-producing properties. dustrial grants taxpayer statute cause of action to a “where the alleged illegal unconstitutional or or assessment collection occurs as the change regulations statutory direct result of a administrative or con- prior stitutional law that became effective not than 12 months to the more taxpayer.” date action is initiated Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. (West 1987). § Although Proposition years 13 was enacted before complaint, petitioner change she filed her contended that the relevant arbitrary- created XIIIA alleged: “Article plaint, she burdens property disparate real assigns system which prop similarly situated comparable generally owners taxed, property real of the use regard to the without erties actual government, places on the burden prop capability financial or the value *7 at Id., Respondents demurred. 12. at Id., erty owner.” de sustained Superior Court order, By minute 14. amend. to leave complaint without dismissed murrer App. D2. for Cert. Pet. to Nordlinger v. Appeal affirmed. Court The (1990). It Rptr. 684 Cal. 1259, 275 App. 3d Lynch, 225 Cal. already re had of California Supreme Court noted disparities taxation in challenge jected a constitutional Valley Joint Amador See XIIIA. resulting Article from 22 Equalization, Bd. State Dist. High School Union Characterizing Article 1281 2d 583 P. 3d Cal. Appeal Court system, the value” “acquisition anas XIIIA was it because review, protection equal survived it found prevented First, bases: rational two least at supported unfore unduly reflecting inflated property taxes owners it allowed second, values, and, current seen certainty. 225 liability substantial future estimate (citing Ama 691-692 Rptr., at Cal. 1273, 275 App. at 3d, Cal. 1293). at 2d, 583 P. at 3d, dor, Cal. more this Court’s Appeal also concluded County v.Co. Pittsburgh Coal Allegheny decision recent (1989), war- not did U. S. 336 Cty., 488 Webster Comm’n of Pittsburgh Allegheny issue At result. a different rant county assessor Virginia a West practice was pur- its basis property on recently purchased assessing County v. Co. Pittsburgh Coal decision this Court's was law before 9 months (1989), decided Cty., Webster Comm’n of did courts the California Because complaint. amended her filed petitioner §4808, not dowe timely under action was petitioner's whether discuss not so. do price, making only
chase minor while modifications in the recently assessments of that had not been sold. recently Properties that had been sold were reassessed and properties taxed at values between and 35 times that of Id., that had not been at sold. 341. This Court determined unequal practice that the assessment violated the Pro- tection Clause. distinguished Appeal Allegheny Pittsburgh
The Court of grounds opted on the “California for an assessment acquisition method based on each individual owner’s cost,” “[i]n Virginia while, marked contrast, the West Constitution requires property to be taxed at a uniform rate statewide according (emphasis estimated current market value” original). App. Rptr., 3d, 1277-1278, Cal. 275 Cal. Appeal “Allegheny Thus, the Court of found: does prohibit adopting acquisition the states from value *8 merely prohibits assessment That method. decision ar- bitrary enforcement a current value assessment method” omitted). (emphasis Rptr., Id., at 1265, Cal. at 686. Appeal rejected petitioner’s argument The Court of also right that effect Article XIIIA on the constitutional to heightened equal protection travel warranted review. The right infringed, court determined that the to travel was not because Article XIIIA “bases each owner’s assess acquisition irrespective ment on value, of the owner’s status length as a California resident or the owner’s of residence in Rptr., Any Id., state.” at 1281, 275Cal. at 697. benefit longtime California residents was deemed “incidental” to acquisition-value approach. Finally, Appeal the Court of unchanged by exemptions found its conclusionwas in Ar ticle XIIIA. Ibid. Supreme
The
App.
Court California denied review.
granted
Pet. for Cert. Bl. We
certiorari.
II Amend Fourteenth Clause Protection any person “deny to shall § no State 1, commands ment, Of laws.” protection equal jurisdiction the within between fashion in some differentiate laws course, most does Clause Equal Protection persons. The classes deci- governmental keeps simply It classifications. forbid in all differently who persons treating sionmakers Vir Co. v. Royster Guano F. S. respects alike. relevant ginia, (1920). 412, 415 253 S. presumed “legislatures are general rule, aAs that, despite the fact power constitutional within acted inequality.” McGowan in some result laws practice, their Accordingly, (1961). 425-426 420, Maryland, S.U. v. war- a classification that, unless are clear eases Court’s jeopardizes it because heightened review form some rants basis categorizes on the right or a fundamental exercise Equal Protection characteristic, inherently suspect of an rationally further classification requires Clause v. Cleburne g., Cleburne See, e. legitimate state interest. (1985); Or- New 439-441 432, U. S. Living Center, Inc., 473 (1976). 297, 303 U. S. Dukes, 427 leans A qual- XIIIA suggests Article petitioner outset, the At infringes upon the scrutiny because heightened ifies Williams, g., Zobel v. See, e. right to travel. constitutional Maricopa Hospital v. (1982);Memorial 60, n. U. S. peti- particular, 254-256 County, S.U. *9 for trans- reassessment to exemptions alleges tioner between transfers for age and of 55 over the owners fers right travel, because run afoul parents children residency. California directly basis classify on they has petitioner herself allege that complaint does But the settling traveling fromor impeded from been home, purchasing her prior to noted, been as has because, 11 Angeles. apartment petitioner in Los This lived in an standing principles impose “general pro prudential Court’s raising person’s legal litigant’s rights.” another on hibition (1984). Wright, 737, U. 751 See also Moose Allen v. 468 (1972). Lodge Irvis, 163, 166 407 S. Petitioner No. 107 v. any preventing who wish not identified obstacle others asserting on their or in California from claims to travel settle any special relationship has she shown with behalf, own nor might rights assert, that we those whose she seeks to such Drysdale, Caplin prudential & overlook this limitation. (1989). n. 3 States, 617, 623, United U. S. Chartered v. may petitioner Accordingly, not assert the constitutional heightened right as to travel a basis review.
B appropriate is the differ standard review whether ration in treatment between newer older owners ence ally general, legitimate state furthers interest. long plau is satisfied is a Protection Clause so there policy classification, sible reason for the see United States Fritz, 166, 174, Bd. v. Railroad Retirement U. S. (1980), ap legislative facts which the classification rationally may parently based have been considered governmental decisionmaker, see Minnesota v. true (1981), Creamery Co., 456, 464 Clover 449 U. S. Leaf goal relationship of attenu the classification to is not so arbitrary irrational, the distinction see ated as render Living Center, Inc., at S., Cleburne v. Cleburne 473 U. especially deferential in the This standard is context clas by complex structuring “[I]n sifications made tax laws. in leeway large schemes ternal taxation ‘the States have making drawing judg classifications and lines which ” systems produce ment reasonable taxation.’ Williams (1985), quoting Vermont, 472 U. S. Lehnhausen v. Co., Lake Shore Auto Parts 410 U. S. See Regan Representation also Wash., v. Taxation *10 especially broad (1983) (“Legislatures have S.U. in tax distinctions and creating classifications in latitude statutes”). does XIIIA Article owners, older and newer between As or the rate tax respect either to discriminate older and Newer adjustment in assessments. rate annual long run and short in both benefit alike owners a 2% ceiling more no rate 1% tax of a protections old year. owners per New value assessment increase factor respect one to differently with treated owners initially assessed. property is on which basis —the her— has denied complaint State true Petitioner’s value assessment same benefit owner—the newa enjoy. neighbors
her owners— —older rational two ascertaining least difficulty in no haveWe jus- policy that of difference considerations or reasonable neighbors’ lower her benefits petitioner denying tify legitimate interest State First, the assessments. stability. continuity, and preservation, neighborhood local Realty Co., Ambler Village Euclid v. to structure can legitimately decide therefore The State ownership of rapid discourage turnover system to dis- inhibit to example, order businesses, homes gentrifi- forces families income of lower placement by newer “mom-and-pop”businesses established, or of eation pro- pay owners By permitting older operations. chain prop- comparable owners than new in taxes less gressively rationally fur- scheme assessment erty, XIIIA the Article interest. thers a new conclude can legitimately the State Second, not have property does acquiring his time of at the owner higher against protection warranting interest reliance same deny may a new State existing owner. an as does taxes in” right “lock purchase the point of owner existing owner by an enjoyed isas value assessed same comparable rationally existing owner property, because *11 expectations his thought may have vested to be deserving antic- protection than the more that or home point purchase. the expectations new owner at of a ipator scope of future the about full information has owner A new property, if thinks he liability acquiring the before tax demanding, not to he can decide is too burden future the existing By contrast, the purchase at all. complete the purchase, not have does already his saddled with owner, pro- buy become deciding if taxes home his option not might obligations, he high. hibitively his tax To meet away from the his income to divert home or his to sell forced short, clothing, necessities. and other purchase food, lost, may to have owned is worse it decide that the State owned all. have than never acknowledged that classifica- previously has Court
This expectation reliance legitimate protect serving to tions “The protection the laws.4 deny equal not do interests legiti- only a is not interests protection reliance reasonable exceedingly provides objective: governmental mate U. Mathews, 465 S. v. Heckler justification_” persuasive omitted). (internal ex- (1984) quotation For marks 746 728, 487 S. Schools, Public ample, v. Dickinson in Kadrmas prohibition user (1988), a that determined Court “reorganized” districts, but not school service fees for bus not Clause, Court has Equal Protection of the context Outside the expecta protecting reliance and legitimacy of recognize the hesitated Illinois, (1978) g., Rakas v. e. U. S. See, tional interests. upon . depends . . whether ("[PJrotection Fourth Amendment legitimate ex has protection of the Amendment who claims person Transportation Central Penn place”); in the privacy invaded pectation (1978) (whether City, regulation of 104, 124 York Co. v. New 438 U. to which part on “the extent depends “taking” constitutes expecta investment-backed with distinct interfered regulation Sindermann, (state-law (1972) “prop tions”); Perry 408 U. S. that process denotes “interests due purpose of federal erty” interest (internal quotation understandings”) existing rules are secured omitted). marks violate not districts, does “nonreorganized” school con legislature could “the Clause, because
Equal Protection policy serve would such ceivably believed expectations fulfilling the reasonable purpose of legitimate arrangements busing free residing in districts of those Similarly, in plans.” Id., at 465. by reorganization imposed Fritz, Bd. v. Retirement Railroad States United ben retirement “windfall” of dual a denial determined vio others, did not workers, but railroad to some efits “Congress could Clause, because Equal Protection late actually acquired had persons who properly conclude em still while *12 benefits statutory to windfall entitlement equitable claim greater industry had a ployed the railroad in who class appellee’s members than the benefits to those they became employment when longer railroad in no were Finally, in 178. atS.,U. eligible benefits.” dual for (1976), deter the Court 427 U. S. Dukes, v. Orleans New oper banning certain street-vendor an ordinance that mined in been had existing who vendors grandfathering ations, but the years, not violate eight did operation for more reasonably “city could the because Equal Clause Protection likely built to have less were businesses newer that decide operation.” continued interests in up reliance substantial at 305.5 Id., be cannot distin- XIIIA argues Article that
Petitioner to violate practice found tax assessment guished the from Pittsburgh. Like Allegheny in Clause Equal Protection Pittsburgh Allegheny in practice issue at XIIIA, Article properties of taxation disparities in dramatic resulted differ- factual critical and an comparable But obvious value. the State’s rationally furthers XIIIA Article that conclude we Because property owners’ protection stability neighborhood interests serves permissibly it consider whether not' interests, need we reliance real taxes it whether including parties, discussed interests other taxes pay or whether ability to taxpayers’ according property tax revenues. stability of local way promote toas in such a real Pittsburgh Allegheny the ab- is ease and between ence poli- Pittsburgh that any indication sence could acquisition-value scheme underlying taxation cies County purpose Webster for the conceivably been the have first In the unequal scheme. assessment tax assessor’s argued scheme County assessment that “its place, Webster assessing properties purpose rationally its related is added). (emphasis S., at 343.6 488 U. value” true current at provide Virginia laws “Constitution Moreover, the West by petitioners be shall held kind all according throughout the State uniform rate taxed at a sug- “no found value,” market its estimated sys- adopted may a different gestion” “the State 345. specified Id., at practice statute.” tem does not demand Protection Clause sure, To legislature or review that purposes of rational-basis any actually time governing articulate decisionmaker supporting classification. United purpose or rationale Fritz, S., 449 U. v.Bd. Retirement Railroad States Chi Election Comm’rs Board See also McDonald (1969) may purpose (legitimate state cago, 802, 809 394 S.U. legislative administrative even when be ascertained silent). re review does history Nevertheless, this Court’s *13 reasonably “may conceivably may purpose quire that govern policy” purpose relevant of the been the have Ohio, Inc. Bow- v. Allied Stores mental decisionmaker. of 6 were used County outdated assessments argued that Webster adjust taxation, upward periodic because with current-value consistent not feasible to reassess individu and it was for inflation ments were made obliquely county year. Although the property every ally piece each of accounting, Brief of historical cost advantages in footnote to the referred County Pittsburgh Coal Comm’n Co. v. Allegheny Respondent for of 87-1303, 30, this was not an 1988, p. 23, n. assertion Cty., O. T. No. Webster if taxation. Even supporting acquisition-value policies general of the asserted, would the assertion policies had been acquisition-value county’s princi inconsistency with the its given inherent been nonsensical promote current-value taxation. trying that it was fact pal argument 16 Schweiker v. (1959). also See
ers, 358 528-529 U. S. scheme must (1981) (classifieatory Wilson, 221, 235 S. U. 450 govern a reasonable identifiable advanc[e] “rationally Pittsburgh Allegheny added)). (emphasis objective” mental any plausible precluded the facts where rare case was practice assessment unequal for reason that the inference of acquisition-value the benefits achieve was precisely enacted was XIIIA Article contrast, By scheme.7 Alle system. anof acquisition-value benefits achieve Pittsburgh here.8 gheny controlling is not Article of the unfairness that contends petitioner Finally, reassessment from exemptions by made worse XIIIA 55 and aged persons new owners: classes two special who children residences, and exchange principal who older, Court previously This their parents. from acquire a general exemptions that narrow to hold declined in- scheme the overall render necessarily taxation scheme 7 (1959),the Court Bowers, 622 U. S. Ohio, v. Inc. Stores In Allied Corp. v. Wheeling Steel its decision grounds on similar distinguished statutory scheme (1949), invalidated state which Glander, S.U. 562 by owned receivable accounts notes and certain from taxation exempting owned receivable accounts notes and but not the State residents deter Wheeling Steel Court in After S., at 529. 358 U. nonresidents. legitimate, not purpose was stated statutory scheme’s mined “[h]aving themselves because considered to be need purposes did not other to con no room left statutes the Ohio purpose, declared specifically S., U. their existence.” any purpose for other ceive of suggest do distinguishable, we Pittsburgh Allegheny finding when any less Clause Protection Equal protections case, mandate, in this by legislative is drawn classification Sunday Lake Pittsburgh. See Allegheny action, inas administrative do we Nor Wakefield, Township Co.v. Iron administrators, as constrains Clause Protection suggest uniformity requiring law violating state Pittsburgh, from Browning, 310 Nashville, R. Co. & St. L. C. See property. taxation of County Light Co. v. & (1940);Puget Sound Power 362, 368-370 U. S. *14 Hughes, 321 (1924). generally Snowden See 22, 27-28 King, 264 U. S. 1, 8-11 S.U. g., Regan with v. Taxation discriminatory. See, e.
vidiously (denial of at 550-551 S., Wash, 461 U. Representation of an organizations, with but lobbying nonprofit exemption to protec equal groups, not violate does exception for veterans’ the “latitude review, tion). purposes of rational-basis For partial granting notably . . . the wide is discretion Royster policy.” F. grounds upon exemptions total Virginia, S., at Co.v. Guano rationally legiti- further here exemptions at issue The two reasonably could people of California purposes. The
mate general not be should persons in that older have concluded more moving suitable to a residence discouraged from people Similarly, the family size or income. changing the in- that reasonably have concluded could of California stability continuity and neighborhood family and terests exemption transfers for warrant and are furthered dem- has Petitioner parents children. and between these either lie for bases rational no that onstrated exemptions. Ill appeal that Article argue some with amici and Petitioner ownership of home dream” “American frustrates XIIIA They families. poorer younger many and for de- that startup businesses places argue XIIIA Article disadvantage a severe ownership pend argue They businesses. competing established of new construction dampens demand XIIIA Article argue XIIIA they that Article buildings. And housing and public expense educa- tax revenues local constricts vital services. tion in the made clear has however, again,
Time presumes that, the “Constitution context rational-basis improvident de- antipathy, even infer reason to some absent process democratic eventually be rectified will cisions no generally unwarranted judicial intervention and that political may unwisely branch think we how matter *15 18 93, 97 Bradley, omitted). 440 U. S. (footnote v. Vance
acted” appears to experiment grand Certainly, California’s segment entrenched powerful, and broad, ain benefits vest ordinary surmised, Appeal Court society, as the and, prompt reconsid unlikely may processes democratic 1282, n. App. at 3d, Cal. 225 repeal. See eration well- many and wise Yet 11. Rptr., 698, n. at Cal. malady. Article same from suffer laws intentioned peti decline arbitrary, must we and palpably is not XIIIA people of California. will upset request tioner’s Appeal is affirmed. judgment of the Court The is so ordered.
It in concurring part Thomas, concurring Justice the judgment. County Comm’n Pittsburgh v.Co. Coal Allegheny down (1989), struck this Court Cty., U. 488 S. Webster Virginia, County, West Webster used method
assessment way the California precisely same operated agree the Court today. with I challenged being scheme Proposition agree But I also constitutional. Jus- 13 is be distin- Pittsburgh cannot Allegheny tice Stevens Pittsburgh Allegheny me To 31-32. post, guished. See infringement on judicial “needlessly intrusive represents Dukes, Orleans powers,” New legislative the State’s separately curiam), (1976) I write (per S. refusing to con- risk, much benefit, no see I because directly. front
I county assessment Pittsburgh involved Proposi- respects indistinguishable in relevant scheme prop- real taxes explains, California As the tion “assessed means which value,” erty “full cash 1% method) and after (under previous of 1975 value” as pur- when of real “appraised value 1975-1976 change has occurred value newly constructed, or a chased, may be in- value The assessed assessment." after the each rate of 2% at a maximum inflation, but creased 1(a), 2(a); §§ ante, XIIIA, Const., Art. year. See California way system much the same worked at 5. *16 as- Virginia. County, tax assessor The West in Webster “appraised the value,” set “assessed property signed an real by appraised then collected taxes value, of the value” half by rate. relevant tax the value multiplying assessed the recently, set the assessor sold property had been that For purchase. price of recent at the most appraised value recently, increased she property sold that had not been For again in 1981 by 1976, in then price 10%,first appraised 1983. in “dramatic differences resulted methods The assessor’s recently transferred . .. between in valuation 341; surrounding S., at 488 U. comparable land.” otherwise Equal Wash. Protection, Geo. Taxation and Glennon, cf. Proposi- (1990)(discussing of the effects 261,269-270 L. Rev. Clothing: Equality 13); A Comment Cohen, tion State Law County Pittsburgh Company Commis- Allegheny v. Coal (1990); & n. 29 Hellerstein 91, and Rev. sion, 38 L. UCLA Far-Reaching Supreme Have Decisions Peters, Recent Implications, Several 70 Taxation J. 308-310 County sued companies Webster that owned coal alleging Vir- county of both the West violations assessor, Supreme The ginia Constitutions. States United and the Virginia upheld the assessment Appeals of West Court of against companies, reversed. this Court but re- Pittsburgh that with Court asserted constrains Protection spect Clause taxation, to adjust- general Although “[t]he use of States as follows. reappraisal for an individual ment substitute as transitional requires command,” Clause no constitutional violates enough adjustments [be] short “general over a accurate proportion equalize be- period the differences time property holders.” a class assessments tween sea is the requirement “[T]he constitutional at 343. S.,U. equality tax treatment rough aof attainment sonable Ibid, (citing Allied property owners.” similarly situated (1959)). 522, 526-527 Bowers, U. Ohio, Inc. Stores of laws the Constitution stated, the Court Moreover, held the kind property of that all Virginia “provide West throughout the uniform rate at a taxed shall petitioners “[t]here value,” and market according estimated State adopted a may have State suggestion . . . [was] no specified statute.” practice from system in different practice seems assessor’s] [the “Indeed, S., at Virginia by West published guide contrary to that assess in the 'assessors local aid Commission Tax (‘We ibid. also Ibid.; see property.” real ment au practice which Virginia statute any West advised *17 own fashion of the State counties individual thorizes stat state independently of policies assessment substantive the Webster “whether decide ute”). refused The Court foot a different stand would method County assessment applied, instead generally State, law of ing were if it be.” appears to policy it enforcement the aberrational of “ [I]ntentional Finally, declared: Court 344, n. Id., at taxable of other officials state systematic undervaluation constitutional contravenes class the same property in ” Id., property.’ of his upon value full right taxed one Township v.Co. Sunday Iron Lake (quoting 345 citing (1918), Sioux 352-353 S. U. Wakefield, (1923); Cum County, S. 441 U. Bridge Dakota City v.Co. Assessments Tax Revision Board v.Co. Coal berland (1931)). con County, S. U. in Greene proper companies’ coal for the the assessments cluded that Equal Protection requisites of these failed had ties Clause.
HHHH today, accurately s “this Court states the Court As Pittsburgh Allegheny that, clear unless aside—“are cases”— heightened review form warrants some a classification right jeopardizes [the] fundamental of a exercise because inherently suspect charac- categorizes basis of on the requires that the Equal Protection Clause teristic, legitimate rationally state interest.” further classification Burlington Ford, 504 R. Co.v. Northern 10; see also Ante, (1992); Auto Parts v. Lake Shore Lehnhausen system, 356, 359 The California Co., 410 U. S. suspect or funda- either classes does not involve most, like properly rights, reviews and the Court California’s mental Today’s however, review, a rational basis. classification for Pittsburgh. Allegheny from the review differs suscepti- Pittsburgh analysis in The Court’s interpretations. The first is I to at least three ble, think, reading by petitioner. case, her one Under offered “similarly the same “class” properties situated” or within are they Equal purposes when Protection Clause for the types neighborhoods, roughly the same are located roughly roughly example, size, and are the same According petitioner, ways. unspecified other, same in County plan violated the Pro- the Webster assessor’s a “season- had failed to achieve because she tection Clause equality rough of all in tax treatment” of a able attainment County, properties objectively comparable in Webster acreage about presumably same those with about the *18 Proposi- contends that the amount of coal. Petitioner same points out, In she 13 from similar flaws. tion suffers stately 7,800-square-foot, long-time seven- owner of a “the Beverly (among huge Hills the mansion on a lot bedroom neighbor- expensive of the most most luxurious homes one County) paid Angeles less . . . hoods in Los tiny 980-square-foot annually than the homeowner of a new neighbor- extremely modest Venice on a small lot in home (Petitioner’s id., at also 5; see Petitioner Brief for hood.” Baldwin unpretentious her on assessment property tax “1988 pre-1976 of a identical is almost home tract Hills residential Malibu beach-front fabulous aof owner property is worth though her million, even $2.1 worth only has not his”). not Because as much as l/12th gross dispar- intentional, and systematic, repair this tried petitioner positive law, into has enacted ity but taxation, Clause. Protection the violates argues, misunder- my on a basic view, argument rests, This pro- there Pittsburgh. Court Allegheny standing of (assumed par- because assumption of law on ceeded by the it) classification, initial not did contest ties (as- assumption fact and the constitutional, State, was proper- stipulated) that so parties had because sumed But classification. the State’s comparable under were ties (noting that 271-272 Rev., L. Wash. Glennon, Geo. cf. not). did others coal properties contained some property hold- a “class referring treatment to the tax atS.,U. property owners,” 488 “similarly situated ers,” or constitutionality review purport to not did 343,the by the value, drawn classification, market of the initial within subclassification opposed further State, as In- assessor. by acquisition value, drawn class, initial proper- Pittsburgh that whether assumed stead, law, depended on state similarly situated persons ties such criteria neutral argues, some petitioner not, as value. proxies market for as that serve location size or only rational be theory, value would market Under that Equal Protection classifying property. But the basis We of taxation. single method prescribe does Clause g., theory, e. Ohio see, petitioner’s rejected consistently (1930); Gap v. R. Co. Bell’s Conway, 281 U. S. Co. Oil properly (1890), the Court Pennsylvania, 134 U. today. rejects it *19 Pittsburgh, prevent the
Allegheny does not State then, classifying properties basis of their on the from supported long acquisition, the classification so as value at agree both is, by I Court a rational basis. by given 11-14, Court, ante, this see for the reasons given by Supreme of California for reasons High Valley Bd. Dist. v. State Union School Amador Joint Equalization, But P. 2d 1281 3d Cal. County by assessor, employed the Webster the classification indistinguishable all those rational for California’s, was argument answering petitioner’s reasons as well. respondents Pittsburgh a sec- Allegheny offer here, controls gives explanation for that case. ond Justice Stevens though post, explanation, he 31-32, see much the same Allegheny Proposition after end that in the concludes Pittsburgh, is unconstitutional. respondents, Equal
According Protection Clause properties permits sim- which to determine State itself (classifying ilarly of California did here situated, as the State value) by properties acquisition and as the of West State Pittsburgh (classifying properties Virginia Allegheny did in value). respondents so, does market But once State requires suggest, after Alle- Protection Clause Pittsburgh properties gheny be ac- in the same class intentionally seasonably equal and not be treatment corded provides systematically undervalued. properties the same state- for the assessment roughly regularly value; and at full determined class County, with the in Webster where contrasts tax scheme value) dividing (by market into a same class value), (by acquisition regularly under- subclass the assessor similarly according This, valued situated. County respondents, made the Webster scheme unconstitu- distinguishes Proposition tional, and reading Pittsburgh my Respondents’ is, petitioner’s; misplaced starters, as view, test, *20 in cited the cases of In one pedigree. a dubious with comes against an upheld Stores, we Pittsburgh, Allied Allegheny cor- exempted some challenge that statute a protection equal Not on others. imposed taxes ad valorem porations from the Constitution that hint even not Stores Allied does rough equality aof attainment seasonable “require[s]... owners,” 488 similarly situated tax treatment in very different a to stress pains there took 343, we S., at U. proposition: laying of in very discretion wide States
“The exercise in the taxes_Of States, course, the their requirements of subject to taxing power, are Amend- Fourteenth of the Clause Protection equality, rule imposes iron no clause But ment. appro- variety flexibility and prohibiting the taxation. state schemes priate reasonable distinctions to close resort required to not is ... State uniformity refer- precise, scientific to maintain or value,” Stores, 358 Allied or composition, use ence to S., 526-527. U. Pittsburgh, Sun- Allegheny in cited cases other
Two equal rejected Bridge, City also Sioux day Iron Lake Loan &Sav. Fed. challenges, Charleston also see protection (1945), which the ease Alderson, 324 U. S. Assn. first undervaluation systematic, and intentional, words U. S. Co., R. Nashville & v. Louisville appeared, Coulter came test explain where (1905), did why. or to strike of Coulter applied rule we true It is Alle- cited Coal, also system in Cumberland tax down reflects however, Coal, Pittsburgh. Cumberland gheny reading of respondents’ problems with serious most these understand respondents Pittsburgh. As violates scheme categorical: A rule eases, their two sea- provides “the unless Equal Protection Clause rough equality tax treatment” of a sonable attainment ” “ systematic undervaluation’ in ‘intentional if it results similarly S., properties state law. situated inequality regardless whether the would be so This (as may undervaluation, which result Webster or the County) properties within a classifications of from further supported But not since the rational basis. class, is jurisprudence protection coming equal has this of modern judgments representa- supplanted of state the rational “rough equality,” “undervalua- own notions of tives with its Coal, fails even to which tion,” or “fairness.” Cumberland *21 review, conflicts with our current case mention rational-basis Pittsburgh my Allegheny mean to not, view, law. did sometimes second- return us to the era when this Court rejecting today respondents’ guessed state tax officials. Pittsburgh, reading Allegheny Court, the as I understand agrees. it, Allegheny brings explanation the
This me to third for by Pittsburgh, today the one offered Court Court. purports equal protec- proceeds standard in what to be our my though reapplies old, an and to mind framework, tion it gloss con- to rational-basis The Court discredited, review. “Equal not for that the Protection Clause does demand cedes gov- legislature purposes or review a of rational-basis any pur- actually erning at time the decisionmaker articulate supporting pose Ante, at 15 or rationale its classification.” (citing Fritz, Bd. v. 449 United States Railroad Retirement (1980)). principle applies, the Court 166, 179 This U. S. acknowledges, not to an but to initial classification “Nevertheless, all further classifications within a class. may conceivably require purpose review does that a Court’s reasonably ‘may purpose policy’ have been the of the governmental says, ante, relevant decisionmaker,” 528-529), (quoting supra, Stores, Allied and “Alle- Pittsburgh gheny pre- the facts was the rare case where any plausible un- cluded inference that the reason for the of an benefits to achieve practice was equal assessment Rather ante, at scheme,” acquisition-value county applied,” generally State, aof obeying “law pol- enforcement “aberrational administered had assessor According to ante, at 15. 4. See 344, n. S., at icy.” 488 U. Pittsburgh problem therefore, Court, ra- though otherwise County scheme, Webster that the was contrary law. state was because irrational was tional, scheme acquisition-value underlying the bases Any rational they “unreasonable”) were (or because “implausible” were of West State laws of Constitution and, made so Virginia. is in respondents’, petitioner’s like explanation, That vio- did assessor if the Even law. case settled tension question, (and open to did she Virginia law West late Co., Coal Against Oneida Assessments 1975 Tax In re see (1987)),she would 560, 2dE. Va.W. A violation Clause. Equal Protection violated not violation constitute itself does law state clear Snowden made We Constitution. Federal Hughes, candidate (1944), where instance, for 1U. S. canvass- local theof members complained that office state nominee certify name his ing had refused board *22 Be- violating statute. Illinois Secretary State, thus the say, the defendants alleged, not plaintiff had cause grounds, but racial against on him to discriminate had meant statute, we a comply with they failed to merely had thereby vio- had defendants argument that rejected the Clause. Equal Protection lated law state right conferred every of a “[N]ot denial laws, of the equal protection a denial 'involves may person right one to though denial even official [W]here .. another.. operate it on to confer statutory clas- conformity purports action of the performance mistaken erroneous sification, an statute, is not duty, although violation statutory equal protection without more a denial of the Id., at laws.” Browning, Nashville, also St. L.
See
C. &
R. Co.v.
310 S.U.
(1940).
today promises
The Court
not
Snowden,
to have overruled
ante,
see
at
but its
I
disclaimer,
think,
n.
is in vain.
suggests,
if,
For
Court
what made the assessor’s
supposed
method unreasonable was her
violation of state
interpretation
Allegheny Pittsburgh
law, the Court’s
re
proposition
casts in this case the
that we had earlier re
jected. See Glennon,
Rev.,
58 Geo. Wash. L.
at 268-269;
Ely,
Spin
Cohen,
Rev.,
93-94;
38 UCLA L.
Another
(1990).
Pittsburgh, 38
L.
107, 108-109
UCLA Rev.
repudiating
Snowden, moreover, the Court threatens set
principles
tled
of the Fourteenth Amendment but of
the Eleventh. We have held that the Eleventh Amendment
ordering
bars federal courts from
state actors to conform
to the dictates of state law. Pennhurst State School and
Hospital
today,
Halderman,
I understand distinguish that the Alle- gheny Pittsburgh, doing but in so, think, I the Court has left equal protection jurisprudence disarray. our analy- appropriate straightforward. sis to this case is Unless a suspect classification involves rights, classes or fundamental judicial scrutiny under the Protection Clause demands *23 only a challenged conceivable rational basis for the state dis- supra; tinction. Freight- See Fritz, Kassel v. Consolidated (1981) 13n. and 702-706, 662, S.U. Corp. Del., ways be one not need basis dissenting). This J., (Rehnquist, articu need fact, States itself; in by the State identified Proposi ibid. See actions. for all any reasons late same for so, standard —but believe, satisfies 13,1 tion County. See employed in Webster scheme did reasons, 7, Curiae Amici as et al. Legal Foundation Pacific for Brief et al. of Counties Association National for 9-10, Brief Alle 31-32, Respondent Brief 9-13, and Curiae Amici Webster County Comm’n Pittsburgh Co. Coal gheny 11-14. ante, 87-1310; 87-1303, 1988, Nos. County, T.O. today’s deci survived have appears to Pittsburgh legacy. though, about wonder, I sion. [*] [*] [*] II-A join Part and the Court judgment of in the concur I opinion. of its dissenting. Stevens,
Justice property owners decades, California past During two pop- State’s theAs extraordinary prosperity. enjoyed estate. real itsof value has mushroomed, so has ulation value assessed total alone, Between increased property taxation subject real in California invested who put, those Simply tenfold.1 capitalists fortunate most among the 1970’s estate world. investors successful these provided 13 has se- created doing so, and, windfall a tremendous L. Rev. Wash. Geo. Protection, 68 1Glennon, Taxation rose Hawaii in] values [property period, the same “For 49n. New 350%; and approximately D. C. Washington, 450%; approximately Commerce, Ibid, Dept. of 2. U. (citing 125%.” approximately York 12); 2 (Table (1987) 86-111 Values Property Census, Taxable Bureau Values Property Census, Taxable Commerce, Bureau Dept, of S.U. 2)). (Table (1977) Ratios Price Assessment/Sales *24 inequities property vere in California’s tax scheme.2 These (hereinafter property Squires) guaranteed owners are that, long they property improve so as retain their do it, and any given year. their taxes will not increase more than 2% in As a Squires, direct result of pur- this windfall for the later pay chasers must far property more than fair their share of taxes. specific disparity prompted petitioner to chal-
lenge constitutionality Proposition 13 is the fact that property her large annual tax bill is almost five times as neighbors comparable her who own homes: While her. neighbors’ averaged petitioner 1989taxes less than $400, was App. disparity $1,700. taxed 18-20. This is not unusual Proposition under pay Indeed, 13. some homeowners neighbors comparable times as much in taxes as their property. id., dispari- See at 76-77. For land, vacant may great App. ties be as as 500 to 1. Pet. for Cert. A7. Proposition Moreover, as 13 controls the taxation of commer- property property, regime cial as well as residential greatly enterprises Squires, favors the commercial placing disadvantage. new businesses at substantial Proposition Squires,
As a result of 13, the who own 44% owner-occupied paid only residences, 25% of the total Report taxes collected from homeowners of Senate Property Equity on Commission Tax and Revenue (Commission (1991) Report). State Senate 33 disparities §2 aggravated by These Proposition exempts reappraisal which from owner’s home up to million of prop- $1 other real when that erty is to a transferred child of exemption the owner. This repeatedly can indefinitely, be invoked allowing passed generation windfall to gen- eration. As the Property California Senate Commission on Equity Tax and Revenue observed:
2Proposition 13 was codified as Article XIIIA of the California Constitu tion; for sake, however, convenience I colloquial refer to it its name. buys new family young One clear. inequity is
“The Another value. market full assessed home based pays taxes home, but family inherits young though both even acquisition date parents’ consti- does Not *25 value. identical of are homes treatment equal tax policy of offend provision tutional to favor appears situations, it in similar taxpayers for homeowner-parents with children of housing needs theWith non-homeowner-parents. with children over tax gift and inheritance state’s repeal of Commission negligible." exemption is for rationale Report 9-10. rationale my mind, the To generous. too was commission The nonexis- is it “negligible,” merely is not disparity such
for
char-
a medieval
privilege
establishes
lawa
Such
tent.
equal resources
and
equal needs
families
Two
acter:
heritage.
different
their
solely because
differently
treated
situ-
similarly
treatment
disparate
such
opinion,
my
Although the
unreasonable.
arbitrary and
is
taxpayers
ated
ante, at
see
inequities,
gross
these
recognizes
today
Court
inequities con-
those
for
justification
analysis of
its2,n.
accrue
benefits
a restatement
largely of
sists
those
benefits
law That
owners.
long-time
severe
justification
adequate
cannot
benefits
Proposition
created
those
as
inequalities such
I
chal-
protection
equal
we review
by which
The standard
properly
established
well
is
regimes
lenges
state
specific
no
is concerned
taxation
“Where
deferential.
imperiled,
is
protection,
equal
apart
right,
federal
draw-
making classifications
leeway in
large
States
sys-
reasonable
produce
judgment
which
ing lines
Parts
Auto
Shore
Lake
v.
Lehnhausen
taxation.”
tems
today
(1973). Thus,
356, 359
U. S.
Co., 410
difference
“whether
this case
issue
notes, the
treatment between newer and
rationally
older owners
fur
legitimate
thers a
state interest.” Ante, at 11.3
But deference is not abdication and “rational-basis scru
tiny”
scrutiny.
is still
Thus
have,
we
on several recent occa
sions, invalidated tax schemes under such a
of re
standard
g., Allegheny
view. See, e.
Pittsburgh
County
Coal Co. v.
Cty.,
Comm’n
(1989);
Webster
Hooper
S.U. 336
v. Ber
County
nalillo
Assessor,
(1985);
472 S. 612,
Williams
v.
(1985);
Vermont,
Just ago, three Terms unanimously this Court invalidated County, Webster Virginia’s West assessment scheme under scrutiny. rational-basis County employed Webster a de system: county assessment facto assessed recently purchased property on the purchase basis *26 price but made adjustments occasional (averaging 3-4% year) per to the properties. assessments of other as Just in “[t]his this approach case, systematically produced dramatic differences in valuation recently between . . . transferred property comparable and otherwise surrounding land.” Alle- gheny Pittsburgh, 488 atS.,U. “‘[ijntentional systematic undervaluation,’” id., at
345, constitutionally found Allegheny infirm in Pittsburgh been by codified in Proposition 13. That the Allegheny discrimination in Pittsburgh was and the defacto discrimination jure in this case de makes little difference. purpose “The equal protection clause of the Four- teenth Amendment is every person to secure within the 3As notes, ante, the Court 10, petitioner contends that Proposition 13 infringes on the constitutional right that, travel and accordingly, a searching more standard of review appropriate. is There is no need to address that issue because gross disparities by created Proposition 13 pass do not even the most deferential standard of Hooper review. Cf. v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 612, 472 U. S. (1985); Williams, Zobel 55, (1982). S. 60-61 arbitrary discrim- against intentional jurisdiction
State's statute express terms of occasioned whether ination, agents” duly constituted through improper execution by its S. 247 U. Wakefield, Township v.Co. Sunday Iron Lake in- anything, added). If (emphasis (1918) 352-353 350, constitutionally more is13 Proposition created equality policy statewide aof product is it because problematic mal- assessor's individual of an result rather administration. distinguished because Pittsburgh be Allegheny can Nor re- assessment a market-value established Virginia law West constitutionally in- was County’s scheme Webster gime. be- but law, state departure awas it because valid “ undervaluation... ‘systematic relative involved it cause defined (as was class class’” same [of] (em- atS.,U. Pittsburgh, 488 law). Allegheny by state established added). decisions Our phasis arbitrary by the much as offended Clause Protection Equal ease) by the (as classes delineation (as class same within properties arbitrary treatment Ken- v.Co. Brown-Forman See Pittsburgh). Allegheny v.Co. Coal (1910); Cumberland 563, 573 U. S. tucky, 217 County, Greene Assessments Tax Revision Board holding unanimous our if Thus, 28-30 284 U. convinced remain I sound—and Pittsburgh was like inexorably that follows was—it violates scheme, County’s assessment Webster dis- statewide my opinion, Indeed, in Clause. Protection *27 aberration a local invidious more far is crimination disparity. a tax creates prop- classify power to broad course, States, nei- is “classification if taxing schemes erty reasonable some upon arbitrary, rests nor capricious ther of the denial nois there policy, or difference consideration Ken- v.Co. Brown-Forman law.” of the protection equal Pitts- stated weAs S., at tucky, 217 U. burgh, may property “State divide different kinds of into assign classes and long each class different tax burden so as those divisions and burdens áre reasonable.” S., 488 U. at 344. upheld
Consistent with
long
standard,
the Court has
taxpayer’s ability
pay,
g.,
classes based on the
see, e.
Jersey,
Fox v. Standard Oil Co. New
87,
U. S.
(1935);
(tangible
intangible)
the nature
property,
or
of the
g.,
Supervisors
e.
see,
Klein
Board
Tax
of Jefferson
County,
(1930);
282 U.
property,
S.
23-24
the use of the
g.,
City,
(1900);
see, e. Clark v. Kansas
HH contemporary equal protection Under doctrine, test of arbitrary whether a classification is the differ- “whether ence in [earlier treatment between purchasers] and later ra- tionally legitimate furthers a state Ante, interest.” at 11.
34 impor- more are standard in this adverbs adjectives and
The verbs. and nouns the than tant interests encompass the must interest state legitimate A community the and disadvantaged class the of members of the members the interests direct the aswell large, as independent goal purpose It must class. favored “ may we ‘that one and legislation effect direct the legisla- impartial an motivated to have reasonably presume S.U. ” Inc., Living Center, v. Cleburne Cleburne ture/ (quoting concurring) J., (1985) (Stevens, 4n. 452, S.U. Fritz, v. Bd. Retirement Railroad States United judgment)). concurring in (1980) (Stevens, J., 166, 180-181 itself outside justification find must classification That becoming an from classifications such review judicial saves reasoning. tautological exercise challenge protection equal deflect cannot “A State all statutory classification the light of observing .that similarly situated. are class burdened within those differences; pre-existing reflect must classification supported ones new create cannot Clause Equal Protection ‘The bootstraps. own nondiseriminatory law state aof more requires Rinaldi it establishes/ class within application v. Ver (1966).” Williams U. S. Yeager, 384 S., mont, 472 inde- is discriminatory classification goal If classification] [of choice “each itself, policy
pendent
acceptable,
count
goal will
goal, each
import
own
will
will
choice-goal relation
‘rational’
a requirement
Legisla-
Ely,
choice.”
making
very
by satisfied
Law,
in Constitutional
Motivation
Administrative
tive
1205, L. J.
Yale
when
interest
state
rationally
furthers
classification
A
disparate treatment
between
fit
some
there
of tax
review
in the
above,
noted
As
purpose.
legislative
*29
generous
statutes we have allowed such
approx
fit to be
and
recognizing
imate,
may
“rational distinctions
be made
substantially
less than mathematical exactitude.” New
(1976).
Orleans Dukes,
The
analysis
Proposition
Court’s
pays
little
attention to
aspects
either of these
controlling
stand-
ard of review. The first
state interest
identified
Court is California’s
neighborhood
“interest in local
preser-
continuity,
stability.”
vation,
and
(citing
Ante,
Vil-
lage
Realty
(1926)).
Euclid v. Ambler
Co.,
I Proposition sweeps too broadly operates indiscriminately too “rationally fur- ther” neighborhood the State’s interest preservation. No early doubt purchasers there are living some on fixed or lim- ited incomes who pay higher could not afford to taxes 4“Herod, ordering the death all male children particular born on a day because one of day them would some bring downfall, about his em ployed such a[n overinclusive] t]he did treat wartime classification^ ment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry imposed] [which burdens upon a large class of individuals because some of them were believed to be disloyal.” Tussman & tenBroek, Laws, Protection of the Calif L. Rev. special enacted homes. their maintain
still can- concerns Those plight.5 to their respond legislation A13. for justification adequate provide all for windfall tax across-the-board statewide, means “rational” amore no descendants owners exemp- tax a blanket subgroup small for protecting rational abe would Smith named taxpayers all tion who Smith named taxpayer a particular protect means bill. her paying difficulty demonstrated resi- County, Angeles Los populated densely within Even *30 value market of half less comprises property dential that said be cannot It 45. App. roll. tax the property neighborhood in preserving interest state legitimate owners for benefits tax furthered” “rationally is character nonresidential other and vacant, industrial, commercial, conclude to of absurd short is just It properties.6 small relatively in protecting interest state legitimate addressed Report, Commission in the out pointed As has established State The legislation. specific with problem specific programs: two up to refunds Provides Assistance. Tax Property Citizens “Senior age over homeowners income lowto taxes property percent ninety-six 62. citizens senior Allows Postponement. Tax Property Citizens “Senior taxes part all postpone to $20,000 under incomes Report Commission occurs.” change ownership an until homes argua not even 13 does Proposition upholding rationale Court’s Proposition recognizes, That, property. vacant apply bly imped creates law ownership means changes of discourages how matter no property such development transfer to the iment plain equally is It might be. improvement socially desirable prop commercial own who Squires by the enjoyed advantage competitive providing interest state rational is no There unjustified. wholly erty is discourage oth that tends privilege special awith entrepreneurs those free econ aIn property. income-producing transfers desirable erwise arbitrarily encouraged, should competitors entry newof omy, treatment. by unfavorable hampered economically
number of vulnerable “rationally families is fur- thered” a tax windfall for 9,787,887 all property owners7 in California.
The Court’s conclusion is only unsound not because of the lack of numerical fit posited between the state interest and Proposition inequities 13’s but also because of the log lack of ical fit between ends and Although means. may. the State have a valid interest in preserving some neighborhoods,8 13 not “inhibit[s the] displacement” of set tled families, also inhibits the unimproved transfer of land, buildings, abandoned and substandard contrary uses. Thus, suggestion, the Court’s Proposition 13 not zoning like system. zoning system A by recognizing functions different uses of treating those different differently. uses See Realty Euclid v.Ambler Co., S.,U. 388-390. Proposition13 treats all property giving alike, all owners tax breaks, discouraging improvement transfer or of all developed dilapidated, and the neighborly —the and the nuisance. although agree short, I with the “neighbor- Court that *31 preservation”
hood legitimate is a state interest, I cannot agree that a tax persons windfall for all purchased who prop- erty rationally before 1978 furthers that my interest. To Proposition mind, 13 is too blunt a accomplish tool to such a 7Brief for California Assessors’ Amicus Curiae Association 8The ambiguous character of this interest is by illustrated options the by faced a couple married that owns a three- or four-bedroom home that suited their family needs while their children lived at home. After the children have out, moved increased taxes and maintenance expenses Proposition would —absent 13—tend to motivate the sale of the home to a younger family needing size, home of that or perhaps the rental of room or generate two to the income necessary to pay taxes. Proposition 13, however, subsidizes the wasteful retention unused housing capacity, making the sale of the home unwise and the rental the space extra unnecessary. Propo- by created inequalities severe The goal.
specialized an interest.9 by such justified be 13 cannot sition is the Court the identified interest state second The I find Here purchasers. earlier the interests” “reliance pro- Although the follow. reasoning difficult Court’s gov- legitimate is a interests reliance of reasonable tection S.U. 465 Mathews, v. Heckler see purpose, ernmental A interests. such implicate does (1984), case this 746 justifiably individual an when created is' interest reliance legal condition existing an that assumption under acts implicated often most are interests reliance thus persist; will acts then benefit some provides government when Dukes, Orleans g., New See, e. benefit. eliminate purchased who those case, (1976). S.U. as- no received enacted 18 was Proposition before property a limited only increase would assessments that surances property many purchased contrary, to the indeed, rate; assessments) ap- would (and values property that hope there- said, cannot It quickly. substantially and preciate have somehow property purchasers the earlier fore, increases. limited interest reliance post-Proposition is means Court Perhaps what pre-Proposition interests reliance less purchasers created inequities contend Respondents taxa owners protecting interest State's by the justified on relied Supreme appreciation. unrealized tion High School Union Valley Joint Amador See interest. state a similar P. 2d 208, 236-238, 3d 22 Cal. Equalization, Bd. v. State Dist. reason Court’s closely related argument This 1309-1311 State claim respondents preservation”; “neighborhood concerning ing real “skyrocketing in which the situation preventing interest ability to taxpayers’ some beyond taxes driv[e] ... prices estate above, whatever demonstrated 19. As Respondents Brief pay.” *32 tax blanket pay,” “ability price acquisition between connection descendants) is (and their purchasers early for all windfall interest posited State’s further” “rationally overinclusive too simply taxpayers. vulnerable protecting 39 may tax reasons that State purchasers. The Court differently purchasers because later earlier and thought rationally may existing to have owner “an are home that expectations, in his vested anticipatory ex- deserving protection than the more purchase. point A at the pectations owner of a new scope of future about has full information new owner property, acquiring if he liability before tax demanding, can he is too future tax burden thinks the n By complete purchase all. contrast, not decide purchase, already existing his saddled with owner, buy deciding option home not to his not have does high.” prohibitively Ante, 12-13.10 if become taxes pre- Proposition A simply the effects This restates expectations” in reduced Proposition owner has “vested expecta- gave Proposition such her because taxes expectations purchaser because no such tions; a later expectations. provide But Proposition her such does not any arbitrary protection an exist- can be said of the same taxpayers. that establishes that ing Consider a law class twice the would be taxed at numbers homes with even street certainly true It is street numbers. with odd rate of homes not decide to “un- could homeowners that the even-numbered considering buying purchase” and that those their homes came with an extra would know that it home even-numbered arbitrary certainly justify but that would burden, disparate numbers. imposition based on house tax burdens provides a benefit for ease. So purchasers. purchasers imposes a burden on later earlier they getting say purchasers What know To that the later question: it reasonable critical Is not answer the into does already sad “existing sympathetic ownerfs] reference to The Court’s early fact that property should these with their not obscure dled” already property increase value more purchasers have seen their tenfold.
40 pur- late than early purchasers less to tax constitutional properties taxation of time at the when chasers answer. does Court question the
comparable? This saying that to be seems Court essence, the Distilled Proposition 13 because under benefit purchasers can earlier If, how- Proposition 13. under purchasers benefit earlier preserv- interest disparity, State’s the a law creates ever, jus- interest” “legitimate state be disparity cannot ing that disparate a statute’s above, inequity. noted As tifying that the from purpose by distinct justified must treatment disagree with Thus, I by statute. that very created effects Proposition by wrought inequities severe the that Court the in- “reliance the calls by justified what can be 13 scheme.11 that from benefit those who terests” similarly situated treat irrational my opinion, In they joined the date differently the basis on persons thought today, would I Until property owners. class v. Wil Zobel controversial. from proposition far program of Alaska’s (1982), ruled we 457 U. liams, recipient’s basis on the distributing dividends cash n Equal Protection violated residency the State years of wrote: The Court Clause. dividend cash of a amount make states can
“If the preclude what would residence, length of depend on on sliding based scale university a on tuition varying pub- limiting finite access even years residence —or Supreme the California analysis of drawing on Respondents, justi also 13 are Proposition by inequities created Court, that the contend more to make taxpayer “permitting State’s interest by the fied Valley, liability." Amador of future predictions accurate careful same suffers analysis This 2d, P. 3d, 239, 583 Cal. Proposition agree I analysis. “reliance” infirmity Court’s as the how question, relevant liability; the of tax predictability greater permits cre purchasers later earlier and inequities between ever, is whether the benefit something other justified can be ated they can. not believe I do early purchasers. eligibility civil service loans, for for student facilities, lie by length of domicile? jobs, government contracts or for length impose taxes based states Could different *34 open reasoning door could to Alaska’s residence? rights, apportionment benefits, serv- of other state residency. permit length according It would to ices expanding numbers into citizens to divide the states clearly permanent result would be classes. Such (footnotes added) (emphasis impermissible.” Id., at 64 omitted). equal protection
Similarly, invalidated permanent providing policy grounds New Mexico’s been state resi- exemption who had veterans Vietnam May recent arrivals. but not to more before dents County Assessor, Hooper 472 U. S. Bernalillo rejected it had a expressly claim that State’s The Court special providing rewards to veterans legitimate interest and concluded that before 1976 lived in the who State “Nei- prece- Clause, nor this Court’s Protection ther prefer veter- permit established resident dents, State apportionment of an retroactive newcomers in the ans over . Id., at 623. benefit.” economic provision the selective demonstrate, these decisions
As membership timing ain class of one’s based on benefits (whether the class be the class of residents that class owners) “legitimate rarely state interest.” equal right Similarly neighbors to share situated obviously government. It would of local benefits provide more or fire or one with better unconstitutional just plainly police protection unconsti- it is other; than the require pay five times as much tutional to one my government for the services. taxes as the other same by Proposition inequalities opinion, 13 are created the severe arbitrary rationally farther a and unreasonable and do not legitimate state interest.
Accordingly, respectfully I dissent.