Lead Opinion
This matter involves four actions which, for purposes of this appeal, have been con
In Wegan plaintiff-appellant Dennis Wegan (Wegan) sustained serious personal injuries on September 8, 1974, as a result of a traffic accident involving his motorcycle and an automobile driven by Ronald Smith (Smith). On October 27, 1976, Wegan served a summons and complaint on Smith and the Village of Lexington, d.b.a. Village of Lexington Liquor Bar (Lexington Bar), alleging, inter alia, that the Lexington Bar served Smith intoxicating liquor in violation of the Dram Shop Act.
On May 29, 1980, Wegan asserted a dram shop claim against Circle Pines. After answering Wegan’s claim, Circle Pines moved for judgment on the pleadings because Wegan failed to give proper notice of his claim and did not bring the action within the three-year statute of limitations. On October 17,1980, the Anoka County District Court ordered that Circle Pines’ motion for judgment on the pleadings be granted. Wegan appeals to this court from the October 17, 1980, order.
In Rounsville, plaintiff James Rounsville was injured along with his wife, Bonnie, Franklin Rounsville and his wife, Louise, and Winnie Stanhope when, on January 11, 1978, the automobile in which they were riding was struck by a vehicle driven by defendant Dennis Fredrickson (Fredrick-son). On March 9, 1978, appellants’ attorneys notified Leons, Inc., d/b/a Leon’s Supper Club (Leons), of potential claims against it for illegally furnishing alcoholic beverages to Fredrickson. Leons’ insurance carrier acknowledged receipt of the notification letter on April 10, 1978. Thus, there is no
After answering the complaint, Leons brought a summary judgment motion, contending that appellants failed to assert their dram shop claims within the one-year statute of limitations. The Hennepin County District Court granted Leons’ motion in an order dated July 18, 1979. On August 16, 1979, appellants requested the district court to reconsider that order. Appellants appeal from a June 16, 1980, order denying their motion to reconsider and vacate the earlier order.
In Wolfe the plaintiff-appellant Leslie Wolfe (Wolfe) sustained personal injuries on September 30, 1978 when she and four other pedestrians were struck by an automobile driven by Timothy Gillaspie (Gillas-pie). On March 11, 1980, Wolfe served a summons and complaint on Gillaspie and Chinook, Inc. (Chinook) alleging inter alia that Chinook served Gillaspie intoxicating liquor in violation of the Dram Shop Act. In accordance with Minn.Stat. § 340.951 Wolfe served a written notice of claim upon Chinook within 120 days of the claimed violation, but failed to commence her lawsuit within the one-year statute of limitations. After interposing its answer, Chinook brought a summary judgment motion based upon Wolfe’s failure to prosecute her action within the one-year statute of limitations. In an order dated April 21, 1980, the Hennepin County District Court granted Chinook’s motion. Wolfe appeals to this court from the April 21, 1980, order.
In Ecker the plaintiff-appellant Brian Ecker (Ecker) sustained severe injuries on October 5, 1974, when he was struck by an automobile driven by George Radie.
In September 1977,
Ecker’s claims against Arcade were settled. Mohawk, the remaining defendant, brought a motion for summary judgment on Count I of plaintiff’s complaint, asserting that it had not received timely written or actual notice of plaintiff’s dram shop claim as required by Minn.Stat. § 340.-951(3), and on Count II, alleging that there were no facts indicating that Morseth consumed 3.2 beer. In denying the summary judgment motion, the district court indicated in its order that an examination of the documents revealed that no written notice was given to Mohawk of Ecker’s dram shop claim. The court stated, however, that the issue of whether actual notice was received by Mohawk was one of fact requiring a trial on the merits.
Two issues are raised in the various appeals. First, whether any of the plaintiffs are estopped from challenging the constitutionality of the commencement-of-suit or notice-of-claim provisions contained in Minn.Stat. § 340.951. Second, whether the commencement-of-suit and notice-of-claim provisions contained in Minn.Stat. § 340.951 violate the equal protection clause of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
1. The first issue results from the district court’s holding in Ecker that “since plaintiff here invoked the provisions of Minn.Stat. § 340.951 and claimed that defendant Mohawk had actual notice of his injury, he cannot, in the next breath, claim it is unconstitutional.” In support of its conclusion that Ecker was estopped from challenging the constitutionality of the notice-of-claim provision, the district court relied upon the tax cases of Byard v. Commissioner of Taxation,
Whatever continued validity the doctrine of estoppel has in the area of tax benefits, neither Ecker nor any of the other plaintiffs should be estopped from attacking the notice-of-claim or commencement-of-suit provisions. To rule otherwise would be inconsistent with our recent holdings permitting plaintiffs to challenge the constitutionality of various statutes while seeking benefits under the same laws. See, e. g., Haugen v. Town of Waltham,
2. Any examination of the constitutionality of the commencement-of-suit and notice-of-claim requirements must begin with our decision in Trail v. Christian,
Because the cause of action in Trail is grounded in common-law negligence, the six-year tort statute of limitations contained in Minn.Stat. § 541.05 (1980) is applicable. Additionally, no notice of claim is required as a condition precedent to suit. Because of this court’s holding in Trail, appellants argue that the law protects different classes of claimants unequally and that the following classifications exist:
*278 (1) Vendors of 3.2 beer liable in negligence have a six-year statute of limitations and no notice-of-claim requirement;
(2) Minnesota vendors of intoxicating liquor whose liability is purely statutory are protected by a one-year statute of limitations and a 120-day notice-of-claim requirement.
Appellants further argue that these classifications result in such unequal treatment that their right to equal protection under the law is violated.
Respondents contend that even if such classifications exist, they do not result from legislative action and, therefore, do not constitute an equal protection violation. Respondents argue that any alleged disparity in treatment exists due to the Trail decision. We do not find respondents’ reasoning persuasive. An examination of the history of the Minnesota Dram Shop Act clearly indicates that only because of legislative action is there a distinction between “nonintoxicating” 3.2 beer and “intoxicating” liquor.
Prior to 1911 there was only one chapter in the laws of Minnesota that regulated intoxicating liquor. See Minn.Rev.Laws, eh. 16 (1905). In 1911, the Minnesota Legislature enacted the statutory predecessor to Minn.Stat. § 340.95 (1980), commonly referred to as the Dram Shop Act. Act of Apr. 18, 1911, ch. 175, 1911 Minn.Laws 221. At that time the statute did not define intoxicating liquor by a percentage of either volume or weight. The 1911 Dram Shop Act provided no definition of intoxicating liquor. Therefore, one must rely on the definition of intoxicating liquor contained in Minn.Rev.Laws, ch. 16, § 1564 (1905), which remained in effect on the date that the Dram Shop Act was enacted. That law stated: “The terms ‘intoxicating liquor’ and ‘liquor,’ wherever used in this chapter, shall include distilled, fermented, spirituous, vinous and malt liquor.” Id. (emphasis added). Malt liquor obviously includes 3.2 beer. Indeed, early decisions from this court indicate that all types of beer are intoxicating.
In 1919 Minnesota’s law relating to prohibition was enacted. Act of Apr. 25, 1919, ch. 455, 1919 Minn.Laws 537. This law contained its own definition of what constituted intoxicating liquor.
Wherever used in this Act the terms “intoxicating liquor” and “liquor” shall include and mean ethyl alcohol and any distilled, fermented, spirituous, vinous, or malt liquor or liquid of any kind potable as a beverage, whenever any of said liquors or liquid contain one-half of one percent or more of alcohol by volume.
Id. § 1, 1919 Minn.Laws at 537. Under this definition 3.2 beer would certainly be an intoxicating beverage.
The liquor laws of Minnesota were not substantially amended until 1933 and 1934, when the State Beer Acts and Liquor Control Act were respectively passed. The State Beer Acts, Act of Mar. 27, 1933, ch. 115, 1933 Minn.Laws 119, and Act of Mar. 27,1933, ch. 116, 1933 Minn.Laws 120, regulated the manufacture, sale and license to sell of any beverage containing more than 3.2 percent alcohol by weight. Chapter 115 of the 1933 State Beer Act specifically defined “intoxicating malt liquor” as containing in excess of 3.2 percent of alcohol by weight. Act of Mar. 27, 1933, ch. 115, 1933 Minn.Laws 119, 120. The Liquor Control Act regulated the manufacture, sale, and licensing of intoxicating liquor. Act of Jan. 6, 1934, ch. 46, 1934 Minn.Laws Ex.Sess. 50.
The State Beer Acts were enacted on March 27, 1933, when prohibition was still in effect. The Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution, which repealed prohibition, did not take effect until nine months later.
Resolution of the constitutional issue raised in this ease is governed by well-established principles of constitutional construction. “There is, of course, a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the statute * * *.” Guilliams v. Commissioner of Revenue,
In applying these well-established principles it is necessary first to determine the appropriate standard of constitutional review. Our recent decision in Kossak v. Stalling,
Because a rational basis test is applicable, the three-factor test most recently enunciated in Guilliams v. Commissioner of Revenue must be satisfied. In Guilliams we stated that:
This court has listed three factors in measuring a statutory classification against the equal protection requirement:
(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the classification from those excluded must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial, thereby providing a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the classification must be genuine or relevant to the purpose of the law; that is, there must be an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed remedy; (3) the purpose of the statute must be one that the state can legitimately attempt to achieve.
Guilliams’ third factor is satisfied. The justifications for the commencement-of-suit and notice-of-claim provisions may be summarized as follows:
1. To provide dramshops with an early opportunity to investigate claims;
2. to facilitate negotiation and settlement without litigation;
3. to correct any defects revealed by the occurrence before more people suffer injury;
4. to protect against stale and fraudulent claims.
Certainly, these are legitimate purposes. The statute is fatally defective, however, because it cannot satisfy Guilliams’ first and second factors. The classifications (sale of 3.2 beer versus sale of intoxicating liquor) are not genuine or relevant to the purpose of the law. Moreover, the distinctions which separate those included within the classification from those excluded are manifestly arbitrary and fanciful. Because prohibition was repealed almost half a century ago, the legislative distinctions between 3.2 beer and intoxicating liquor are based, at best, upon historical anachronisms. There is no rational basis for distinguishing between persons injured by those intoxicated from drinking 3.2 beer and those intoxicated as a result of consuming stronger liquor. An injured person cares little whether the driver who causes his injuries became intoxicated as a result of consuming 3.2 beer or stronger liquor. Indeed, a lay person unable to obtain just compensation because of the peculiarities of Minnesota’s Dram Shop Law could justifiably conclude that he was the victim of artificial legal word games.
Moreover, the continued reference to 3.2 beer as “non-intoxicating” results in a number of anomalies and absurdities that become apparent in the context of a lawsuit alleging both 3.2 negligence and Minn.Stat. § 340.95 liability.
The classifications at issue in the cases at bar rest on a legal foundation less sound than those in Kossak and Pacific Indemnity. For all of the above reasons, we hold that the commencement-of-suit and notice-of-claim provisions at issue violate the equal protection clause of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand each of the orders appealed from for trial on the merits.
Notes
. On September 8, 1974, the statute of limitations on dram shop claims was three years. On that date Minn.Stat. § 340.951(3)(1974) read in relevant part: “Any cause of action for injury heretofore caused by an intoxicated person as a result of an illegal sale, barter or gift of liquor and not barred by the existing statute of limitations may be brought within three years after the cause of action accrued * * Id. In 1977 the legislature amended Minn.Stat. § 340.951(3) by shortening the statute of limitations to one year. See Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 390, § 2, 1977 Minn. Laws 888, 888 (current version at Minn.Stat. § 340.951 (1980)).
Although plaintiffs’ causes of action in Weg-an and Ecker are controlled by the three-year statute of limitations, the claims in Wolfe and Rounsville are dependent on the constitutionality of the one-year statute of limitations.
. On December 17, 1979, the Anoka County District Court issued an order permitting the Lexington Bar to serve a third-party complaint on Circle Pines. Even though no notice of claim was ever filed with Circle Pines, nor any action commenced within three years, the third-party claim was proper because of this court’s recent holding in Hammerschmidt v. Moore,
.The Radie vehicle was insured by State Farm Insurance Company. As a result of an investigation of the incident, it was learned that Radie had been drinking at Gallagher’s White Elephant Club.
Ecker settled his claim against State Farm for $10,000, the policy limits on the Radie vehicle. Ecker’s claim against Gallagher’s White Elephant Club was settled for $30,000 through the use of a Pierringer release.
. Both Ecker and Morseth were struck by the Radie vehicle while fighting on the street. Ecker claims that Morseth refused to release him although Ecker warned him of the approaching car.
. On October 5, 1974, the statute of limitations on dram shop actions was three years. Ecker’s cause of action was, therefore, brought within the applicable statute of limitations. Only the validity of the notice-of-claim provision is at issue in Ecker’s case.
. Ecker’s action was bifurcated for trial. Only the dram shop claim was dismissed; the common law cause of action against Mohawk for the negligent sale of 3.2 beer to Morseth has not yet been tried.
. Appellants contend that these classifications contravene the equal protection guarantees contained in U.S.Const. amend. XIV, and Minn. Const, art. 1, § 2.
. For example, in State v. Dick,
. In United States v. Chambers,
. Because the City of Duluth received actual notice of the accident, this court did not find it necessary to address the constitutionality of the notice-of-claim provision. See
. The irrationality of the legislative classifications is well illustrated by the facts in Ecker. In that case the same establishment allegedly served a patron responsible for Ecker’s injury 3.2“non-intoxicating” beer and “intoxicating liquor.” Although the district court dismissed Ecker’s dram shop claim, it left pending Ecker’s 3.2negligence action against the same bar.
In the common-law negligence action, Ecker will attempt to submit into evidence exactly the same proof that he would have submitted in an action based on Minn.Stat. § 340.95. The dram shop defendant, no doubt, will object to any evidence that the alleged intoxicated person consumed intoxicating liquor because that cause of action was dismissed. The resulting confusion regarding what testimony pertains to 3.2beer versus intoxicating liquor in itself raises perplexing constitutional issues. See generally Price v. Amdahl,
. Contribution problems occur because only strong liquor vendors are protected by the cap on damages contained in Minn.Stat. § 340.95. To remedy this problem, we suggest that the
. Respondents seek to distinguish Kossak because that case involved a common-law negligence action, while the instant cases involve a statutory cause of action. Such a distinction is more semantic than real. The same constitutional principles apply regardless of whether a cause of action is based on negligence or statutory strict liability.
Moreover, respondents overstate the difference between the two causes of action. Under either cause of action a plaintiff must prove that the vendor knew or should have known that the patron was “obviously intoxicated.” In a dram shop action this burden of proof is mandated by Minn.Stat. § 340.14(la) (1980). In an action against a 3.2 vendor this burden of proof is simply an application of general common-law negligence precepts.
. Although we hold that the classifications violate the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, we also conclude that even if the classifications passed constitutional muster under the federal constitution, they would still be defective under our state constitution.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially).
I agree with the majority that the notice of claim and statute of limitations provisions of the Civil Damages Act, Minn.Stat. § 340.95-.951 (1980), are violative of equal protection. However, I would go further and hold that the entire Act is constitutionally infirm because the Legislature’s failure to impose liability under the Act upon 3.2 beer vendors is without a rational basis. The reasoning of the majority opinion clearly supports this proposed result although the majority concludes that only a portion of the Act is invalid.
We have never directly confronted an equal protection challenge to the Civil Damages Act. We are now faced with that issue and I believe we should address it squarely.
The majority examines the history of the Civil Damages Act in detail and concludes that 3.2 beer was defined as “non-intoxicating” by the 1933 Minnesota Legislature so that vendors could sell 3.2 beer without violating prohibition. Notwithstanding the validity of the majority opinion’s historical analysis, I respectfully believe that this discussion does not help us resolve the issue at bar.
The crux of the problem before us is that the statute on its face creates a classification between two types of liquor vendors; vendors of “intoxicating liquor” and vendors of 3.2 beer. “Intoxicating liquor” vendors are subject to liability under the Act while 3.2 beer vendors who engage in the
The majority correctly sets forth the appropriate standard of review but does not go far enough in applying it. Legislative classifications must apply uniformly to all similarly situated persons and the distinctions which separate those who are included within a classification and those who are not must be natural and reasonable. Schwartz v. Talmo,
The majority forcefully asserts that “the classifications at issue * * * rest on a legal foundation less sound than those in Kossak and Pacific Indemnity," where disparate statutes of limitations favoring certain persons were declared violative of equal protection. In my opinion, the majority reads these cases too narrowly, overlooking the underlying rationale for striking the statutes there at issue. The statutes in Kossak and Pacific Indemnity were declared unconstitutional because the legislative classifications were without a rational basis.
I submit that if the legislative classifications created between liquor vendors and their respective victims have no rational basis, the Civil Damages Act as a whole is repugnant to the equal protection clause.
Respondents argue that the disparity in treatment accorded the two types of liquor vendors exists by virtue of our decision in Trail v. Christian,
The availability of a common law action in situations in which the Civil Damages Act is inapplicable does, however, accentuate the need to strike the Act in its entirety. Both the majority and the dissent note a number of “anomalies and absurdities” inherent in continued recognition of two separate causes of action against liquor vendors who should, in my opinion, be subject to the same liability. Of these, the cap on damages of $250,000 in dramshop actions while damages are not so limited in Trail actions is the most blatant. Confusing problems are also evident with regard to the defenses available to a negligent 3.2 beer vendor and those which may be asserted by a dramshop vendor.
I agree with the dissent that the solution lies in an amendment to the Civil Damages Act to include 3.2 beer in the Act’s definition of intoxicating liquor. However, I disagree that this court should sit in silence and await legislative action to remedy the problems inherent in that Act for a number of reasons. First, as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall noted in Marbury v. Madison,
Third, I do not find relevant Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621,
No similar inequity exists in the instant cases to justify a prospective or tentative invalidation of the Civil Damages Act. Liquor vendors are not, by virtue of the proposed result, deprived of a substantive defense upon which they previously relied. This is not a case in which there has been a longstanding rule of immunity from suit; both types of liquor vendors are now liable to innocent third persons and commonly procure appropriate insurance.
Fourth, by prospectively declaring the unconstitutionality of the Civil Damages Act, the dissent ignores the policy of providing incentives for challenging unconstitutional laws and outmoded legal doctrines. Courts and commentators have long recognized that public policy should encourage litigants to challenge unconstitutional law and obsolete legal rules. See e. g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
Finally, the dissent in effect would have this court issue advisory opinions. This court has long had a policy of refusing to provide legal opinions in advisory form.
Although I recognize that the Legislature “may implement [its] program step by step * * * adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and referring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations,” Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
Where the Civil Damages Act was applicable, we have consistently declined to find a common law action against a liquor vendor because of legislative pre-emption in the area. Blamey v. Brown,
. In 1977, the Legislature amended the Civil Damages Act to provide that our comparative fault statute, Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1980), was applicable in dramshop actions unless the action is brought by a dependent of an intoxicated person. Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 390, § 2, 1977 Minn. Laws 888 (current version at Minn. Stat. § 340.95 (1980)).
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
The majority says the legislature is responsible for the inequality of treatment between victims of 3.2 beer sales and victims of sales of more potent intoxicating liquor. This is because the legislature excluded 3.2 beer from the definition of intoxicating liquor in the Civil Damages Act.
Undeniably, a person can get just as intoxicated on 3.2 beer as on more potent liquor. The majority opinion traces the history of how 3.2 beer came to be regulated differently, but this does not fully explain why the legislature still did not choose to include 3.2 vendors in the Civil Damages Act after 1933. Since the Civil Damages Act was considered to be in derogation of the common law, which afforded no remedy against any liquor vendor, and since the Act was deemed to be penal in nature, the legislature may have felt it would limit the penalty to vendors of more potent intoxicating liquor, where it felt the potential for abuse was greater. This would be consistent with the rationale then prevalent that dramshop liability “is only a means of punishment for having violated the law and is not based on a wrong done to the plaintiffs.” Beck v. Groe,
The common law, however, is not static. In recent years, this court, in construing the Civil Damages Act, has focused more on the wrong done to the injured, innocent third party, i. e., on the remedial aspects of the Act rather than its penal side. For example, in Ross v. Ross,
Not until 1973, with Trail v. Christian,
Since 1973 we have had an anomalous situation, as illustrated by this case. A Trail cause of action expires after 6 years; a dramshop action after 1 year. The majority here opts for 6 years and declares the shorter limitation period unconstitutional. A Trail cause of action has no notice of claim as a condition precedent to suit; a
I think the solution is for the legislature to amend the Civil Damages Act to include 3.2 beer in the Act’s definition of intoxicating liquor. The amendment in 1977 to make dramshop actions subject to the comparative fault statute is indicative of the legislature’s awareness of the nonpenal aspects of the Act.
I would prefer we not disturb the Act until the legislature has had an opportunity to enact its own corrective measures. This seems preferable to piecemeal judicial legislation. The difficulty in attacking the problem piecemeal is illustrated here by the striking down of the 120-day notice provision. It would seem the legislature had reasonable grounds for the notice requirement. Unlike other tort actions, a dram-shop action has some unique features. The accident in which the third party is injured frequently occurs off the vendor’s premises, at a distant time and place, so that the vendor may be unaware of the potential claim against him or her and consequently unaware of the need to make a prompt investigation.
There is authority for the solution proposed here. In Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621,
We are dealing here, of course, with constitutional infirmities which should be corrected promptly. It is not clear, however, that the legislature was fully aware of the constitutional implications of Trail; at least those implications were not alluded to in that decision. Moreover, the legislature “may implement [its] program step by step * * * adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and referring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations.” Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring).
I agree with the opinion of Justice Am-dahl.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring).
I agree with the opinion of Justice Am-dahl.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I agree with the opinion of Justice Simo-nett.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Simonett.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Simonett.