In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: R.D.L. and J.W., Parents.
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Cory A. Carlson, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.
Bruce Jones, Lariss Jude, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Shirley Reider, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for Guardian Ad Litem.
S Y L L A B U S
- Because the right to parent is a fundamental right, statutes that infringe on this fundamental right are subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection provisions of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
- Assuming, without deciding, that within a strict scrutiny analysis a claimant must show at the threshold that he or she is “similarly situated” to challenge a statute on equal protection grounds, parents facing a subsequent petition to terminate their parental rights, whether those rights were terminated voluntarily or involuntarily, are similarly situated.
- The rebuttable statutory presumption of parental unfitness found in
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2012) , is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, and therefore does not violate the equal protection provisions of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
The question presented in this case is whether
On September 15, 2011, respondent Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department filed a Petition for Children in Need of Protection or Services (“CHIPS“) on behalf of four children of parents J.W. (father) and appellant R.D.L. (mother). The petition alleged, among other things, that the mother was engaging in prostitution out of a Brooklyn Center hotel in the children‘s presence, that the father had physically abused the mother in front of their children, and that the mother used illegal drugs in front of the children. The juvenile court found that the children were in need of protection and services and issued an order placing them in foster care.
Eight months later, on May 3, 2012, the County filed a petition to terminate the parents’ rights to the four children, alleging that the parents failed to comply with the case plans designed to reunite them with their children. See
A few weeks after the County filed its petition to terminate the parents’ rights to the four children, the mother gave birth to a fifth child, who is the subject of this action. On July 27, 2012, less than a week before trial began on the County‘s petition to terminate parental rights to the four older children, the County made an offer to the mother concerning her fifth child. The County proposed to agree “on the record” that if the mother would seek to voluntarily terminate her rights to the four older children, the County would not use
After a two-day trial, the juvenile court terminated the parents’ rights to the four older children.1
Two days after the juvenile court‘s decision, the County filed a CHIPS petition on behalf of the fifth child, the newborn. After the County located and placed the baby into
protective care, the County filed a petition to terminate the parents’ rights to the newborn, alleging that four of the statutory grounds for termination existed, including, as relevant here, that the mother was “palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship.”
At a subsequent hearing, the father offered some, “albeit scant,” evidence in an effort to overcome the presumption. The mother offered no evidence to rebut the presumption. Instead, she argued that the statutory presumption,
The juvenile court rejected the mother‘s constitutional challenge and found that the father failed to overcome the presumption. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that both parents failed to overcome the presumption of unfitness and that it was in the child‘s best interests to terminate their parental rights. The court of appeals
affirmed. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., No. A13-1820, 2014 WL 1272408, at *3 (Minn. App. Mar. 31, 2014).
I.
The question presented in this case is whether the statutory presumption in
843 N.W.2d 233, 239 (Minn. 2014). Whether a statute violates the Constitution is a question that we review de novo.5 Gretsch v. Vantium Capital, Inc., 846 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Minn. 2014).
A.
The court of appeals determined that the mother could not make a successful equal protection claim because “parents who voluntarily terminate their parental rights are not situated similarly to those who have their rights terminated involuntarily.” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., No. A13-1820, 2014 WL 1272408, at *2 (Minn. App. Mar. 31, 2014) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court found that the two sets of parents are not similarly situated because a parent who has had parental rights involuntarily terminated has been ” ‘adjudicated as failing to adequately provide for the child‘s health and safety,’ ” while a parent who has voluntarily terminated rights ” ‘has not been so adjudicated.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Child of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 589 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2003)). The mother argues that the court of appeals erred because “[i]t is simply not correct to say that any articulable difference
between the two groups renders them ‘not similarly situated’ for equal
We have required that a party establish that he or she is similarly situated to persons who have been treated differently in order to support an equal protection claim. See, e.g., State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Minn. 2011). We have explained that “the Equal Protection Clause does not require the state to treat things that are different in fact or opinion as though they were the same in law.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to determine whether two groups are similarly situated, we focus on whether the groups are alike in all relevant respects. Id. at 522.
As discussed below, we subject the statutory presumption in
In this case, the parties do not squarely present the question of whether the “similarly situated” threshold test should be applied when the statute at issue is subject to strict scrutiny review. Instead, the parties appear to assume that the mother must be similarly situated to the parents to whom she seeks to compare herself for purposes of the equal protection question, regardless of the level of scrutiny applied. We therefore have no occasion in this case to determine, as a matter of law, whether the “similarly situated” threshold is applied in strict scrutiny cases.
Nevertheless, if we assume, without deciding, that the “similarly situated” threshold applies, we disagree with the court of appeals’ analysis and conclude that parents who have lost parental rights previously, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, are similarly situated for the purposes of the equal protection claim before us.
Despite these differences, we conclude that the two groups of parents before us are similarly situated, at least with respect to the purposes of
B.
Concluding that the two sets of parents are similarly situated, we next consider what level of scrutiny the statute,
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental nature of parental rights. In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court noted that the “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.” 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). We have similarly held that a parent‘s right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her children is a protected fundamental right. SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn. 2007).6 Because the right to parent is a fundamental one, we will subject the statute at issue,
C.
Once a statute is subject to strict scrutiny, it is “not entitled to the usual presumption of validity.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973). Rather, the County must carry a “heavy burden of justification,” id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), to show that the classification is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Greene, 755 N.W.2d at 725 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“[S]trict scrutiny of the classification . . . is essential . . . .“).
In the due process context, we have held that the government has a compelling interest in its role as parens patriae in promoting relationships among those in recognized family units in order to protect the general welfare of children. SooHoo, 731 N.W.2d at 822. The government also has a compelling interest in “identifying and protecting abused children,” R.S. v. State, 459 N.W.2d 680, 689 (Minn. 1990), and in “safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being” of children, Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The mother does not dispute that the government has a compelling interest in protecting children. But she argues that the government interest served by the presumption at issue here is not generally to protect children, but rather to “conserve litigation resources and spare the County the time and expense of an actual trial,” and she contends that such an interest is not compelling. We disagree. Proceedings involving endangered children are not expedited so that the government is able to conserve government resources. These proceedings are expedited because a quick resolution is essential for the best interests of children who are in need of protection. See In re Welfare of J.R., 655 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2003) (“Each delay in the termination of a parent‘s rights equates to a delay in a child‘s opportunity to have a permanent home . . . .“); see also Chief Justice Kathleen Blatz, The State of the Judiciary 2001, 58 Bench & B. of Minn. 27, 30 (Aug. 2001) (noting that children in the child protection system are not just battling the experience of abuse and neglect, but the experience “of being caught up in the cogs of a bureaucracy for years upon years, longing for a family who will love them and hating how long it takes to find one“). In fact, that resources are saved through operation of the statutory presumption in
The statutory presumption directly serves the compelling government interest of protecting children because it facilitates the more expeditious resolution of cases involving children in need of protection. The principle that child protection cases are to receive priority and be resolved quickly is a thoroughly engrained policy that both the legislative and executive branches endorse and support. See
But, the mother argues, the statutory presumption cannot survive strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to serve the government‘s compelling interest in protecting children. To survive strict scrutiny, a statute can be neither overinclusive nor underinclusive; rather, it must be “precisely tailored to serve the compelling state interest.” See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The Supreme Court has repeatedly sought to “dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’ ” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (citation omitted). And the Court has held that narrow tailoring “does not require exhaustion of every conceivable . . . alternative,” nor does it require a “dramatic sacrifice” of the compelling interest at stake. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339-40 (2003), superseded by constitutional amendment as recognized in Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
The mother argues that the statutory presumption in
To be sure, the presumption of unfitness in
A natural parent is presumed to be suitable “to be entrusted with the care of his child” and it is “in the best interest of a child to be in the custody of his natural parent.” In re Welfare of Clausen, 289 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. 1980). When, however, the government has, in an initial proceeding, overcome that presumption of fitness through clear and convincing evidence that a parent cannot be entrusted to care for his or her children, see
We recognize that the statutory presumption, standing alone, may not meet the heavy burden of narrow tailoring. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that “[p]rocedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination,” and has said that in family law matters, presumptions that foreclose individual determinations on determinative issues can “needlessly risk[] running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972). But the presumption we are faced with today does not forsake an individual determination. To the contrary, several factors establish that even when the presumption in
First, termination of parental rights is always discretionary with the juvenile court. Language throughout the juvenile
Second, the presumption is easily rebuttable. The court of appeals has held that when the presumption of unfitness applies, a parent rebuts the presumption by introducing evidence that would ” ‘justify a finding of fact’ that [the parent] is not palpably unfit,” and whether the evidence satisfies the burden of production is determined on a case-by-case basis. In re Welfare of Child of J.W., 807 N.W.2d at 445-46 (quoting
Third, we have made clear that an involuntary termination of parental rights is proper only when at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and the termination is in the child‘s best interest. In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 54-55 (Minn. 2004). Here, while the juvenile court relied on the presumption of parental unfitness in its order terminating the mother‘s rights to her fifth child, the court also separately found “[c]lear and convincing evidence” that it was “in the best interests of the child that any and all parental rights be terminated.” This separate statutory requirement for a best-interests consideration,
Together, these procedural protections ensure that the
Based on our analysis, we conclude that
Affirmed.
D I S S E N T
PAGE, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I do so because I conclude that the presumption of palpable unfitness in
R.D.L. faced a termination of parental rights hearing with respect to her four oldest children because she was engaging in illegal activity in their presence and failed to comply with her case plan. In re Welfare of Children of R.D.L., Nos. 27-JV-11-8351, 27-JV-12-4240, Order at 2 (Henn. Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed Aug. 28, 2012). Before the hearing, R.D.L. gave birth to another child. Hennepin County proposed that it would not use the termination proceeding relating to the four oldest children as a basis for terminating R.D.L.‘s parental rights to her newborn child if R.D.L. agreed to voluntarily terminate her parental rights to her four oldest children. R.D.L. rejected the County‘s proposal and, after the hearing, had her parental rights to the four oldest children involuntarily terminated. Subsequently, the County filed a petition to terminate R.D.L.‘s parental rights to the newborn. At trial, the County, relying on
subd. 1(b)(4), which does not apply to demonstrably unfit parents who voluntarily terminated their parental rights, is not narrowly tailored because the statute is underinclusive. R.D.L. also contends that this classification does not serve a compelling government interest.
I.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, “No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
concurring) (” ‘[S]trict scrutiny’ . . . is strict in theory, but fatal in fact.“). To survive strict scrutiny, the statute “must be ‘narrowly tailored and reasonably necessary to further a compelling governmental interest.’ ” Greene, 755 N.W.2d at 725 (quoting Hennepin Cnty. v. Perry, 561 N.W.2d 889, 897 n.7 (Minn. 1997)). Strict scrutiny in the context of fundamental rights focuses on whether the classification itself serves a compelling government interest, not whether the statute as a whole serves such an interest. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
II.
Here, the classification is between parents who have in the past voluntarily terminated their parental rights and parents who have previously had their parental rights involuntarily terminated. Under
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
R.D.L. argues that the classification in
I conclude that the classification in
child can lead to either a voluntary or an involuntary termination . . . .“). Second, it is not uncommon that parents voluntarily relinquish their rights to a child for reasons that would support an involuntary termination. See, e.g., In re Welfare of D.D.G., 558 N.W.2d 481, 486 (Minn. 1997) (concluding that good cause existed for voluntary termination because of the parents’ abusive relationship and drug use); In re Welfare of Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 92, 95 (Minn. App. 2008) (holding that good cause was present because the parents had not completed their case plans and were chemically dependent); In re Welfare of Child of R.A.S., No. A07-297, 2007 WL 2367554, at *2 (Minn. App. Aug. 16, 2007) (concluding that abandonment constitutes good cause).
Perhaps the best example of the lack of distinction between the two classifications as it relates to the asserted government interest in creating the two classes is R.D.L. herself. Had R.D.L. agreed to Hennepin County‘s proposal and voluntarily waived her parental rights to her four older children, the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness would not have applied to her newborn child. But having rejected the offer, the presumption applied. In both cases, however, the facts with respect to R.D.L.‘s ability to parent her newborn are exactly the same. Thus, I can see no compelling reason or government interest in treating the two classifications of parents differently. Indeed, it would appear that the only reason for treating the two classes of parents differently is to put pressure on parents to voluntarily terminate their parental rights rather than asserting their right to a hearing and putting the government to its proof. Put another way, R.D.L. could have fit into either classification without any impact on her parental fitness or circumstances. This illustrates that the principal distinction between parents who
voluntarily terminated their parental rights and parents, like R.D.L. here, whose rights are involuntarily terminated, is that parents in the latter group simply refuse to voluntarily terminate their rights. Because the distinction between the two classes of parents is marginal at best, the presumption of palpable unfitness in
III.
Even if a statute is underinclusive, ” ‘perfection is by no means required.’ ” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979) (quoting Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 385 (1960)). The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld an underinclusive or overinclusive statute if the statute otherwise meets the appropriate level of scrutiny. See id. (“We accept such imperfection because it is in turn rationally related to the secondary objective of legislative convenience.“). As indicated above, the applicable level of scrutiny here is strict scrutiny, which requires that the classification be narrowly tailored and reasonably necessary to meet a compelling governmental interest. Greene v. Comm‘r of Dep‘t of Human Servs., 755 N.W.2d 713, 725 (Minn. 2008).
According to the court, the compelling government interest served by the statutory presumption at issue is “protecting children” by “facilitat[ing] more expeditious resolution of cases involving children in need of protection.” While the protection of children is a compelling government interest, the court ignores the well-recognized principle that the classification itself, not the statute, must serve a compelling government interest. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Thus,
the County must articulate a compelling government interest that is furthered by applying
who voluntarily terminated their rights to other children, there is no compelling government interest that is furthered by applying
Moreover, despite the articulated goal of expediting the removal of children in need of protection, the classification simply does not accomplish that goal. Here, R.D.L. faced two separate termination proceedings, one relating to her four oldest children in which the presumption was not applicable and one relating to her newborn child in which the presumption was applicable.
With respect to R.D.L.‘s four oldest children, the County filed a child in need of
is fair to say that neither the statutory presumption nor the classification did anything to expedite the termination of R.D.L.‘s parental rights to her newborn child. Thus, it is clear that the classification as applied to the presumption is not reasonably necessary to meet a compelling government interest.
Finally, I note that the court holds that to rebut the presumption “the parent needs to produce only enough evidence to support a finding that the parent is ‘suitable to be entrusted with the care’ of the children.” The court characterizes this standard as “a much lower bar than the ‘clear and convincing’ standard” the County must meet. If a parent is easily able to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness, parents will often succeed in meeting this burden; therefore, the presumption will frequently be of little utility to the County. If the presumption often has little utility, then there is no compelling government interest.
IV.
While the court is correct that strict scrutiny applies to the classification at issue and that parents whose parental rights are involuntarily terminated are similarly situated to parents who voluntarily terminate their parental rights, the court‘s conclusion that the classification survives strict scrutiny is erroneous.