COLIE L. LONG, APPELLANT, v. UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
No. 22-CO-0342
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
Decided April 11, 2024
(Argued January 30, 2024)
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.
(Hon. Lynn Leibovitz, Trial Judge)
Matthew B. Kaplan for appellant.
Zoé Friedland, with whom Samia Fam and Alice Wang were on the brief for Public Defender Service, amicus curiae.
Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, and EASTERLY and SHANKER, Associate Judges.
SHANKER, Associate Judge: In the early morning hours of March 19, 1996, appellant Colie L. Long shot and killed fourteen-year-old Ronald Williamson. After nearly two decades of subsequent litigation regarding his convictions and sentence, the trial court ultimately sentenced Mr. Long to life in prison. See Long v. United States, 163 A.3d 777, 779 (D.C. 2017).
In November 2021, Mr. Long requested that the trial court reduce his sentence under the Incarceration Reduction Amendment Act (IRAA),
This appeal requires us to decide, among other issues, whether parolees are ineligible for relief under the IRAA due to their release from prison. We conclude that a parolee‘s release from prison does not automatically render them ineligible for a sentence reduction under the IRAA. We further conclude that the trial court committed legal error in denying Mr. Long‘s IRAA motion. We therefore vacate the order and remand to the trial court for reconsideration in light of this opinion.
I. Background
In 1996, Mr. Long, then eighteen years old, shot and killed fourteen-year-old Ronald Williamson. See Long v. United States, 83 A.3d 369, 372 (D.C. 2013). A jury convicted Mr. Long of first-degree premeditated murder while armed, among other crimes. Id. at 373. Mr. Long was initially sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This court, however, twice vacated Mr. Long‘s sentence, and he was ultimately sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. Long v. United States, 163 A.3d 777, 779, 781, 790 (D.C. 2017). Mr. Long became parole-eligible on October 12, 2021.
On November 3, 2021, Mr. Long filed a Motion to Reduce Sentence Under the [IRAA] in which he asked the trial court to reduce his sentence so that he may immediately be released from confinement. The IRAA provides that the Superior Court shall reduce a term of imprisonment imposed upon a defendant for an offense committed before the defendant‘s 25th birthday if the defendant has served at least 15 years in prison and the court finds, after considering the factors set forth in subsection (c) of the statute, that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any person or the community and that the interests of justice warrant a sentence modification.
As discussed in more detail below in Part II.D.1., the trial court held a hearing on the motion, at which Mr. Long presented testimony from five witnesses, including himself.
During the pendency of the trial court‘s consideration of his motion, Mr. Long separately sought parole from the United States Parole Commission. The Parole Commission granted his request and scheduled his release for July 29, 2022. On April 19, 2022, the trial court received the
II. Analysis
On appeal, Mr. Long asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his IRAA motion. Before reaching that argument, however, we must address the government‘s three preliminary arguments that speak to whether we can afford Mr. Long the relief he seeks. In particular, thе government asserts that: (1) Mr. Long‘s appeal is moot; (2) to the extent that Mr. Long seeks justiciable relief, he failed to preserve that relief by requesting it in Superior Court; and (3) the IRAA does not extend relief to parolees. We consider each issue in turn.
A. Mootness
Although this court is not constitutionally bound by the cases or controversies limitation of Article III of the United States Constitution, we generally adhere to it for prudential reasons. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Hormel Foods Corp., 258 A.3d 174, 181 (D.C. 2021). Moot cases do not satisfy the cases or controversies limitation of Article III, Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 160-61 (2016), and this court does not normally decide [such] cases, Cropp v. Williams, 841 A.2d 328, 330 (D.C. 2004) (per curiam). The case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (internal quotation omitted). This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id. (internal quotation omitted). An appeal is moot when it is impossible or unnecessary for the court to grant relief. Classic CAB v. D.C. Dep‘t of For-Hire Vehicles, 244 A.3d 703, 705 (D.C. 2021). The burden of demonstrating that a case is moot falls heavily upon the party asserting mootness. Jackson v. George, 146 A.3d 405, 416 (D.C. 2016) (internal quotation and brackets omitted).
The government asserts three separate mootness arguments, the latter two of which do not properly implicate mootness. We address them seriatim.
1. Whether Mr. Long‘s rеlease on parole rendered his appeal moot
The government first contends that Mr. Long‘s release from prison mooted his appeal. In particular, the government argues that [t]he relief [Mr.] Long seeks on appeal—vacatur of the trial court‘s order and remand with instructions that [Mr.] Long be resentenced—is both impossible and unnecessary due to his release on parole.
If Mr. Long only sought release from prison, the government would be indisputably correct that his appeal is now moot. Such relief would be impossible for this court to grant because it has already occurred.
But because Mr. Long seeks a sentence reduction, his appeal presents an actual injury traceable to his sentence, Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7, that is redressable by this court. Despite his release from prison, Mr. Long continues to suffer at least two redressable injuries. First, the conditions of release imposed by the parole process constitute an injury under Article III. [P]arolees are on the continuum of state-imposed punishments. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) (internal quotation omitted). Although parolees are released from immediate physical imprisonment, [parole] imposes conditions which significantly confine and restrain [a parolee‘s] freedom. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). Parоle is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972); In re Dortch, 860 A.2d 346, 362 (D.C. 2004) (Parole is a continuation of an offender‘s sentence; it is a state of conditioned liberty; a prison without walls.) (internal quotations omitted). We therefore agree with Mr. Long that he still faces significant restrictions on his liberty imposed by parole, which constitute a cognizable Article III injury. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7 (restrictions on liberty imposed by the terms of parole constitute[ ] a concrete injury).
Second, Mr. Long‘s sentence remains operative despite his release on parole and itself constitutes an independent injury. In the District, a parolee continues to serve his or her sentence despite a conditional release from prison. Parolees remain in the legal custody and under the control of the Attorney General of the United States or his or her authorized representative until . . . [t]he expiration of the maximum term or terms specified in his or her sentence or the sentence is otherwise terminated,
Both of these injuries are redressable by this court as any other challenge to a convict‘s sentence or parole conditions would be. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7 (An incarcerated convict‘s (or a parolee‘s) challenge to the validity of his conviction always satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction.). It is not impossible, Classic CAB, 244 A.3d at 705, for this court to render effective relief. We could, for example, reduce Mr. Long‘s sentence to time served, completing his sentence and lifting his parole conditions. Nor is it unnecessary, id., for this court to relieve Mr. Long of the above injuries: Mr. Long has a continued interest in a reduced sentence. Because Mr. Long‘s appeal presents concrete injuries capable of redress by this court,
2. Whether Mr. Long‘s appeal is moot because the IRAA does not extend relief to parolees
The government also argues that Mr. Long‘s appeal is moot because the plain language of the IRAA does not extend relief to parolees. In particular, the government argues that because the trial court lacks authority to resentence former prisoners under the IRAA, Mr. Long‘s appeal is moot.
The government miscasts its statutory-interpretation argument as a mootness problem. Irrespective of what the IRAA authorizes, an argument questioning the legal availability of a certain kind of relief, couched as a claim of mootness, confuses mootness with the merits. Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 174 (2013).3 [W]hether the class of litigants of which [Mr. Long] is a member may use the courts to enforce the right at issue does not speak to the justiciability of the dispute. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (noting that the court of appeals confuse[d] the question of whether petitioner had standing with the question of whether she had asserted a proper сause of action); see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 500 (1969) (argument that a claim was brought in the wrong court confuses mootness with whether [the plaintiff] has established a right to recover).
The absence of a valid cause of action does not typically implicate a court‘s power to adjudicate the case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 92 (1998). Courts have jurisdiction to decide a case even if one interpretation of a statute leaves the complaining party without relief. Id.; see also Laufer v. Acheson Hotels, LLC, 50 F.4th 259, 278 (1st Cir. 2022) (That a plaintiff‘s ultimate recovery may be uncertain or even unlikely is of no moment to the mootness inquiry. Instead, we assume the claim‘s legal validity to determine whether it is nonetheless moot.) (internal quotations, alteration, and citation omitted), vacated on other grounds, Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U.S. 1 (2023).
If the government‘s statutory interpretation argument is correct, then Mr. Long has no right to relief under the IRAA. But that does not mean his claim is moot.
3. Whether Mr. Long‘s appeal is moot because he failed to request justiciable relief in Superior Court
Finally, the government argues that Mr. Long‘s appeal is moot because he secured the only relief he actually sought: immediate release from incarceration. It points to language in Mr. Long‘s IRAA motion asking the court to reduce his sentence so that he may immediately be releаsed from confinement. Accordingly, the government argues, it is unnecessary to consider Mr. Long‘s appeal. Implicit in this argument is that mootness is tied to the relief Mr. Long sought in Superior Court.
Contrary to the government‘s framing, whether Mr. Long articulated his current request for relief before the trial court raises an issue of preservation, see infra Part II.B., not one of mootness. Mootness is not indexed to the particular claims raised before the trial court but
Mr. Long now clearly asks this court to remand for the trial court to grant his IRAA motion so that he may obtain a sentence reduction. That claim for relief—whether or not actually raised in the Superior Court and thus preserved on appeal—presents a live and justiciable controversy for the reasons set forth above.
B. Preservation
Assertions of mootness aside, the government contends that Mr. Long never actually sought a sentence reduction in Superior Court and that his IRAA motion was in faсt limited to seeking an immediate release from prison. In the government‘s view, Mr. Long and the Public Defender Service (PDS) only now seek to recast [Mr. Long‘s] argument as a challenge to parole supervision and his release conditions. It asserts that Mr. Long only requested a sentence reduction so that he might be immediately release[d] from prison.
We disagree. The relief contemplated by the IRAA is the reduc[tion of] a term of imprisonment . . . .
It is of no consequence that Mr. Long sought a sentence reduction so that he may immediately be released from confinement. The quoted language does not alter the core of Mr. Long‘s request for a reduced sentence. Rather, it functioned only to alert the trial court to how much time Mr. Long wanted shaved off his sentence if the court were to grant his motion. More fundamentally, the government confuses Mr. Long‘s motivation for the requested relief with the requested relief itself.
C. Whether the IRAA Extends Relief to Parolees
The government contends that the IRAA does not extend relief to paroled former prisoners. Before addressing that question, however, we must first decide whether the government‘s argument is properly before us.
1. Whether this argument is properly before us
Generally, this court will address only those arguments raised in, and addressed by, the trial court. John C. Flood of MD, Inc. v. Brighthaupt, 122 A.3d 937, 944 (D.C. 2015) (noting the well-established appellate principle that we do not decide issues on appeal that were neither raised nor decided in the trial court (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is fundamental that arguments not raised in the trial court are not usually considered
PDS asserts that the issue whether the IRAA extends relief to parolees is not properly presented on appeal. After addressing the government‘s statutory argument at length in its briefing here, it argued that, because Mr. Long was ‘presently incarcerated’ and not yet released on parole at the time his IRAA motiоn was decided, this case does not present any occasion for this Court to decide whether parolees are eligible for IRAA relief.
We agree with PDS that the issue whether parolees are eligible for relief under the IRAA was neither presented in nor decided by the trial court. Neither Mr. Long nor the government raised the issue—and for good reason; the Parole Commission granted Mr. Long‘s request for parole just two days before the trial court issued its order denying his IRAA motion, and Mr. Long was not actually released until approximately three months after the order on review. The trial court therefore had no occasion to consider directly the effect of Mr. Long‘s parole on his eligibility for a reduced sentence under the IRAA. Nor can we say that the trial court implicitly relied on Mr. Long‘s then-impending release on parole in denying his motion. Although the trial court mentioned that the strictures of parole would be necessary to ensure [Mr. Long‘s] transition [from prison] in a way that minimizes the risks that the court identified in its order, it did not consider Mr. Long‘s parole status in any portion of its IRAA analysis. Only after it determined that Mr. Long was ineligible for relief under the enumerated factors did the trial court mention that Mr. Long had been granted parole. In fact, it concluded thаt Mr. Long failed to meet his burden under the IRAA [n]otwithstanding the decision of the Parole Commission.
That this issue was not raised in or decided by the trial court, however, does not foreclose us from addressing it. The principle that, [n]ormally, a claim that was not raised or passed on in the trial court will be spurned on appeal is one of discretion, not jurisdiction. Tilley v. United States, 238 A.3d 961, 969 (D.C. 2020) (internal quotation omitted). In fact, [w]e have repeatedly affirmed our discretion, in the interests of justice, to consider an argument that is raised for the first time on appeal if the issue is purely one of law, [ ] the factual record is complete, and a remand for further factual development would serve no purpose. In re Ta.L., 149 A.3d 1060, 1073 (D.C. 2016) (en banc). We reserve this discretion for exceptional situations. District of Columbia v. Helen Dwight Reid Educ. Found., 766 A.2d 28, 33 n.3 (D.C. 2001) (internal quotation omitted).
We conclude that this is one of the exceptional situations justifying the exercise of our discretion to reach an issue that the trial court did not address. See id. First, the parties’ failure to raise the issue in Superior Court is entirely excusable. As noted above, Mr. Long was not released on parole until approximately three months after the trial court denied his motion. The Parole Commission did not grant Mr. Long‘s parole request until two days before the court issued the order on review. Second, the parties—including both institutional litigants with an interest in our interpretation of the IRAA—have briefed the issue at length. Third, this case fits squarely within the mold of cases in which we have traditionally exercised our discretion to address issues not decided by the trial court: it presents a purely legal issue, contains a complete record, and would not otherwise benefit from further factual development. See Helen Dwight Reid Educ. Found, 766 A.2d at 33 n.3 (noting that the factual component of [a] mixed question
2. Whether the IRAA extends relief to parolees
We review questions of statutory construction de novo. Price v. Bd. of Ethics and Gov‘t Accountability, 284 A.3d 1019, 1023 (D.C. 2022). Statutory interpretation is a holistic endeavor, and, at a minimum, must account for the statute‘s full text [and] language as well as punctuation, structure, and subject matter. Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 559 (D.C. 2011) (internal quotation omitted). Generally speaking, if the plain meaning of statutory language is clear and unambiguous and will not produce an absurd result, [this court] will look no further. Id. (internal quotation omitted). [I]n examining the statutory language, it is axiomatic that the words of the statute should be construed according to their ordinary sense and with the meaning commonly attributed to them. Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C. 1983) (en banc) (internal quotation and brackets omitted). We may refer to a statute‘s grammar and use of a verb tense in discerning its meaning. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992). If, in the process of discerning [statutory] meaning, we happen to consult grammar . . . we do so because the rules that govern language often inform how ordinary people understand the rules that govern them. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 169 (2021).
Before reviewing the IRAA‘s text, we consider the relationship between parole and the IRAA. Contrary to the government‘s framing, the IRAA is not simply parole by another name. The two mechanisms are motivatеd by different policy considerations, operate under different procedures, and achieve different objectives. Underlying the IRAA is a body of scientific evidence demonstrat[ing] that the frontal lobes of the brain, which control executive functions like planning, working memory, and impulse control . . . [,] may not be fully developed until the mid-twenties. Comprehensive Youth Justice Amendment Act of 2016, Report on Bill No. 21-0683 before the Committee on the Judiciary, Council of the District of Columbia, at 3 (Oct. 5, 2016); see also Bishop v. United States, 310 A.3d 629, 635, 645-46 (D.C. 2024) (detailing the D.C.
Perhaps the most important distinction between parole and the IRAA, however, is that the two mechanisms offer fundamentally different kinds of relief. The former authorizes a prisoner‘s conditional release from incarceration pending completion of his or her sentence,
The government therefore over-reads some of our language in Williams. To be sure, we noted similarities between parole and the IRAA. See id. at 847-48 (the IRAA‘s standard [for a reduced sentence], in conjunction with the requirement that the defendant must have served at least [fifteen] years of his prison term, is essentially equivalent to the standard for granting parole). Indeed, the central holding of Williams is that the IRAA, like parole, provides [defendants] with the requisite ‘meaningful opportunity’ to obtain release from prison as required by the Supreme Court‘s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence regarding juvenile sentences of life without parole. Id. at 841.
But the “essential[ ] equival[ency]” of parole and the IRAA identified in Williams was limited largely to a constitutional equivalency, not a practical one. See id. at 849 (“The sentence appellant is serving is now equivalent, for Eighth Amendment purposes, to a life sentence with parole eligibility—a sentence the Eighth Amendment permits.“) (emphasis added); id. (“The IRAA‘s provision of this opportunity for release does all the Supreme Court has said is necessary in its juvenile [life-without-parole] cases for such sentences to pass muster under the Eighth Amendment . . . .“). In fact, Williams expressly recognized many important distinctions between parole and the IRAA. For example, “[t]he IRAA judicial hearing is superior to a parole hearing in [certain] respects, for one reason because the IRAA explicitly requires judges to give individualized consideration to the factors specific to juveniles that counsel against sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 853 (internal quotations omitted). “In addition, the formal judicial hearing envisioned by the IRAA provides defendants significant procedural guarantees, in contrast to the “minimal” procedures that the Constitution requires in parole proceedings. These include a fuller opportunity to present relevant evidence . . . with the assistance of counsel, and a written, structured decision by the judge that is subject to more stringent constitutional and statutory requirements and is more fully reviewable on appeal.” Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011)). Therefore, although related for constitutional purposes, parole and the IRAA are otherwise distinct.
With this context in mind, we turn to the text of the statute. The IRAA provides, in relevant part, that courts “shall reduce a term of imprisonment imposed upon a defendant for an offense committed before the defendant‘s 25th birthday if: (1) The defendant was sentenced [or committed] pursuant to [certain statutes] . . . and has served at least 15 years in prison; and (2) The court finds . . . that the defendant is nоt a danger to the safety of any person or the community and that the interests of justice warrant a sentence modification.”
- The defendant‘s age at the time of the offense;
- The history and characteristics of the defendant;
- Whether the defendant has substantially complied with the rules of the institution to which the defendant has been confined, and whether the defendant has completed any educational, vocational, or other program, where available;
- Any report or recommendation received from the United States Attorney;
- Whether the defendant has demonstrated maturity, rehabilitation, and a fitness to reenter society sufficient to justify a sentence reduction;
- Any statement, provided orally or in writing, provided pursuant to
§ 23-1904 or18 U.S.C. § 3771 by a victim of the offense for which the defendant is imprisoned, or by a family member of the victim if the victim is deceased; - Any reports of physical, mental, or psychiatric examinations of the defendant conducted by licensed health care professionals;
- The defendant‘s family and community circumstances at the time of the offense, including any history of abuse, trauma, or involvement in the child welfare system;
- The extent of the defendant‘s role in the offense and whether and to what extent another person was involved in the offense;
- The diminished culpability of juveniles and persons under age 25, as compared
to that of older adults, and the hallmark features of youth, including immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences, which counsel against sentencing them to lengthy terms in prison, despite the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime, and the defendant‘s personal circumstances that support an aging out of crime; and - Any other information the court deems relevant to its decision.
Although not neatly divided by the text of the statute, we read subsections (a) and (a)(1) as setting forth the IRAA‘s eligibility criteria. A movant is eligible for a sentence reduction under IRAA relief if he or she (1) committed the relevant offense before the age of twenty-five, (2) “was sentenced pursuant to
The government argues that parolees, as a class, are ineligible for IRAA relief because the phrase “has served at least 15 years in prison” requires the movant to be physically incarcerated for the whole of his or her IRAA proceedings. We disagree. The IRAA does not limit relief only to those who are physically incarcerated. We hold instead that if a movant has served the requisite 15 years in prison, their subsequent release on parole does not necessarily render the movant ineligible for IRAA relief.6
As noted above, the IRAA sets forth an exhaustive set of eligibility criteria in subsections (a) and (a)(1). We find it significant that nowhere among those criteria is a requirement that the movant be presently incarcerated. Given the statute‘s otherwise express conditions of eligibility for relief, such an omission “should be understood as [an] exclusion[ ].” McCray v. McGee, 504 A.2d 1128, 1130 (D.C. 1986) (noting the “basic rule of statutory construction” that “when a legislature makes express mention of one thing, the exclusion of others is implied, because there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions“) (internal quotations omitted). “[A]s in any field of statutory interpretation, it is our duty to respect not only what [the legislature] wrote but, as importantly, what it didn‘t write.” Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1900 (2019).
It is true that certain omissions may simply reflect a legislature‘s “inadvertent failure to focus on [ ] less typical” circumstances, such as the one presented here. J.P. v. District of Columbia, 189 A.3d 212, 219 (D.C. 2018). But the lack of any express requirement that a movant be physically incarcerated does not appear to be a mere oversight. Rather, the Council specifically removed language limiting IRAA relief to movants who had “not yet become eligible . . . for release on parole from the sentence imposed.” Compare
Although the ”expression unius maxim . . . must be applied with a considerable measure of caution,” Council of D.C. v. Clay, 683 A.2d 1385, 1390 (D.C. 1996), we cannot discern any plausible explanation for the Council‘s removal of this language, except that it intended to sever the link between parole and eligibility for relief under the IRAA. It is highly unlikely that the Council intended to allow individuals to apply for relief under both the parole system and the IRAA simultaneously but implicitly render granting the diffеrent forms of relief mutually exclusive. This is especially so when, as noted above, the two mechanisms offer fundamentally different forms of relief and a parolee would benefit from a sentence reduction as much as a prisoner. We do not doubt that relief under the IRAA is primarily directed toward prisoners. But the lack of any express limitation of IRAA relief to current prisoners is significant.
The government counters that the present-perfect verb tense of the phrase “has served” as used in subsection (a)(2) signifies the Council‘s intent that only current prisoners are eligible for IRAA relief. In particular, the government contends that when a statute denotes a “relatively definite” time period, “the ‘action’ (imprisonment) must ‘continue to the present‘; otherwise, ‘the present perfect would not be the right tense.‘” Gov. Br. at 15 (alterations omitted) (quoting Bryan A. Garner, Garner‘s Modern English Usage, at 897 (4th ed. 2016)). In such a case, the government argues, the simple-past tense is appropriate. See id. (“It is ‘error[ ]’ . . . ‘to use the present-perfect form when the time is definite but the action doesn‘t touch the present.‘“) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Garner, supra, at 897). Therefore, “[s]ince [Mr.] Long is no longer imprisoned, describing the length of his past imprisonment calls for use of the simple past tense[.]” Id. Because the Cоuncil did not use the simple-past tense, so the argument goes, it meant that imprisonment must continue into the present. The government‘s argument would render parolees as a class ineligible for relief under the IRAA.
We find the Council‘s use of the present-perfect phrase “has served” ambiguous or, at most, of little value in discerning whether parolees are eligible for relief under the IRAA. The present-perfect tense can appropriately refer to either (1) an action “completed at some indefinite time in the past,” e.g., ”I have played more than 1,000 rounds of golf,” or (2) an action that “continues to the present,” e.g., ”I have played cards nonstop since 3:00 yesterday.” Garner, supra, at 896; see also Chicago Manual of Style § 5.126, at 237 (16th ed. 2010) (“The present perfect tense . . . denotes an act, state, or condition that is now completed or continues up to the present.“).
Due to the dual nature of the present-perfect tense, courts have repeatedly found the statutory use of the present-perfect tense ambiguous or to refer to both actions that continue into the present and actions that were completed at some point in the past. See, e.g., Solar Energy Indus. Ass‘n v. United States, 86 F.4th 885, 900 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“Like the trade court, we hold that the distinction between ‘has
Indeed, the case on which the government primarily relies, Padilla-Romero v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), undermines, rather than supports, its grammatical argument. In Padilla-Romero, the Ninth Circuit interpreted an immigration statute authorizing cancellation of removal for a noncitizen who “has been . . . lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years.” Id. at 1013 (emphasis added) (quoting
In its second textual argument, the government points to the language of several mandatory factors enumerated in
We acknowledge that some of the merits factors may imply that a movant
Additionally, we believe that trial courts will have little difficulty in applying the merits factors to parolees. Despite a parolee‘s release from prison, the court can still assess whether the parolee “substantially complied” with the rules of the prison in which he or she was committed under factor (c)(3).
Nor is subsection (g) contrary to our reading of the statute. That subsection instructs courts to ”endeavor to prioritize consideration of the applications of defendants who have been incarcerated the longest.”
We therefore hold that the IRAA does not require a movant to be incarcerated during the pendency of their motion so long as the movant has, at some point, served at least fifteen years in prison for the relevant sentence. Stated differently, the IRAA does not render otherwise eligible parolees ineligible for relief simply by virtue of their conditional release. Because the government does not contest that Mr. Long otherwise satisfies all other eligibility requirements, we turn to the merits of his motion.
D. The Merits
1. Additional background
a. The IRAA Hearing
At the hearing on his motion, the government introduced as evidence Mr. Long‘s disciplinary history. Between 2002 and 2019, Mr. Long accrued a total of thirteen disciplinary infractions, two of which resulted in criminal charges. During his time in Bureau of Prisons custody between 2002 and 2014, Mr. Long incurred ten disciplinary infractions. Two of these infractions were 100-level infractions for disposing of an item during a search and possession of a hazardous tool in the form of a cellphone charging cable.7 Mr. Long‘s
After returning to the D.C. Jail from Bureau of Prisons custody in 2018, Mr. Long incurred three infractions. Two of these infractions resulted in criminal charges. In October 2018, Mr. Long was in his cell speaking to a person on a cellphone through earphones; Mr. Long was shielding himself from view of his cell door with a sheet. Correctional officers entered his cell. Surprised (he said) by the officers’ entry and mistakenly believing them to be other prisoners posing a threat, Mr. Long punched one of correctional officers. Mr. Long testified that his impulsive response was due to exposure to trauma as a young person. In addition to receiving two disciplinary infractions for this incident, Mr. Long was criminally charged with one count of possessing contraband in the form of a cellphone and one count of assaulting a law enforcement officer. Mr. Long was separately disciplined for possession of a cellphone in 2019.
At the hearing, Mr. Long presented five witnesses, including himself. In his testimony, Mr. Long admitted for the first time that he shot and killed Mr. Williamson. Mr. Long, forty-four years old at the time of the hearing, came from a dysfunctional two-parent household. Throughout his childhood, Mr. Long suffered “neglect and physical abuse” from his father who “beat him persistently.” At fourteen, Mr. Long began running away from home. Mr. Long started helping his uncle sell drugs. After his uncle was arrested and incarcerated, Mr. Long turned to selling drugs himself.
Dr. Lucy Guarnera testified as an expert in the administration of violence risk assessments. She administered two separate risk assessments to Mr. Long. In the first, Dr. Guarnera found that five of ten historical risk factors applied to Mr. Long, but that he did not manifest any of the five “clinical risk factors.” In the second assessment, Dr. Guarnera concluded that Mr. Long exhibited nine “protective factors” out of sixteen, which was “significantly higher” and more positive than other violent offenders. As to Mr. Long‘s disciplinary history, Dr. Guarnera concluded that Mr. Long‘s five cellphone infractions did not constitute “antisocial behavior” but acknowledged that Mr. Long showed a propensity toward rule-breaking, which meant that Mr. Long might “be likely to break technical conditions of probation.” Overall, Dr. Guarnera found that Mr. Long presented “a low risk of violence.”
Lieutenant Temesghen Andemichael, a correctional officer and Commander of the D.C. Department of Corrections’ Young Men Emerging (YME) unit, selected Mr. Long as a mentor in the program “based on his observations of [Mr. Long‘s] interactions with оther inmates and his leadership skills.” Lieutenant Andemichael described Mr. Long as a “stand out guy” and stated that Mr. Long would be “an asset to the community when released.”
Eric Weaver, a former inmate and program analyst in the YME unit, testified that phone abuse often arises out of “situation[s] where sometimes you got to think about, do you want to just not make outside contact, or do you run the risk of putting yourself in a bad situation because of the phone or racing up getting up first thing in the morning trying to be the first one to get to the phone.” Mr. Weaver had founded a nonprofit organization and testified that, if the opportunity presented, he would employ Mr. Long in a part-time position.
b. The Trial Court Order
The trial court issued its written order on April 21, 2022. It found that Mr. Long was serving a term of thirty years to life and committed the underlying offense when he was eighteen years old. At the time of the order, Mr. Long had served twenty-six years of his sentence.
As to the first
Under the second factor—the history and characteristics of the defendant—the court noted that the underlying crime was Mr. Long‘s first criminal offense. Additionally, Mr. Long experienced violence during his youth, was physically and emotionally abused by his father, and participated in the drug trade as a juvenile. He obtained a GED from the Maryland Military Youth Corps.
The third factor requires the trial court to consider whether the movant “has substantially complied with the rules of the institution to which [the movant] has been confined, and whether the [the movant] has completed any educational, vocational, or other program, where available.”
On the other hand, the trial court found that Mr. Long‘s disciplinary record was “substantial.” The court did not credit Mr. Long‘s explanatiоn as to why he assaulted the correctional officer. It also noted that Mr. Long‘s repeated disciplinary infractions due to phone abuse “constituted calculated rule breaking to suit his own purposes, with an understanding of the consequences, and of the wrongfulness of the conduct.” Overall, the court concluded that “without a more sustained period of compliance,” Mr. Long had “failed to demonstrate substantial compliance with institutional rules, notwithstanding the fact that [he] has not been disciplined since the 2019 infraction.”
Under the fourth factor, which requires trial courts to consider “[a]ny report or recommendation received from the United States Attorney,” the court noted the government‘s opposition to Mr. Long‘s motion.
On the fifth factor—concerning whether the movant has demonstrated maturity, rehabilitation, and fitness to reenter society—the trial court acknowledged Mr. Long‘s “sophisticated programming and educational enrichment” but was “concerned by [Mr. Long‘s] steady record of disciplinary infractions, which continued after participation in college courses early in his imprisonment, and other high-level programming.” Mr. Long‘s “witnesses confirmed their strong support for” reducing his sentence. However, the trial court discounted some of their conclusions. For example, it was difficult for the trial court to “reconcile” Mr. Long‘s role as a YME mentor with “the example set by [Mr. Long‘s] recent violations of the rules of the institution.” Finally, Mr. Long‘s “record of repeated disciplinary infractions, even after
Mr. Williamson‘s family did not provide a statement for the court to review under factor six.
The seventh factor instructs courts to consider examinations of the movant by medical professionals. According to Dr. Guarnera, Mr. Long‘s “past violent behavior, past antisocial behavior, association with negative peers, and violent attitudes were highly rooted in his adolescent and young adult contexts, contexts which no longer exist for him and seem highly unlikely to be recreated if he were released.” Similarly, Shannon Keyes Woodward, a mitigation specialist who authored Mr. Long‘s Mitigation Report, concluded that Mr. Long “is a ‘better educated, more mature, and goal driven man’ than when he entered prison 26 years ago.”
Under factor eight, courts must consider “[t]he defendant‘s family and community circumstances at the time of the offense, inсluding any history of abuse, trauma, or involvement in the child welfare system.”
As to factor nine, the trial court noted that Mr. Long “was the primary actor in the shooting death of [Mr.] Williamson, although the offense arose from a dispute that involved one or more additional individuals.”
Finally, under factor ten, the trial court stated that it had “considered” “the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to that of adults, and the hallmark features of youth, including immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences, which counsel against sentencing them to lengthy terms in prison, despite the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime[.]”8
The trial court made no express findings as to Mr. Long‘s dangerousness “to the safety of any person or the community” or whether the “interests of justice warrant a sentence modification.”
We review the denial of an IRAA motion for abuse of discretion. Bishop, 310 A.3d at 641. Under this standard, we owe “broad deference to [the] ruling by the trial court.” Walden v. United States, 366 A.2d 1075, 1076-77 (D.C. 1976). In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we “must determine whether the decision maker failed to consider a relevant factor, whether [the decision maker] relied upon an improper factor, and whether the reasons given reasonably support the conclusion.” Crater v. Oliver, 201 A.3d 582, 584 (D.C. 2019) (internal quotation omitted). “A court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Vining v. District of Columbia, 198 A.3d 738, 754 (D.C. 2018) (internal quotation omitted).
Mr. Long argues that the trial court abused its discretion in two wаys: (1) it committed legal errors and (2) it improperly weighed certain pieces of evidence.
3. Discussion
a. Legal Error
With respect to asserted legal errors, Mr. Long argues that (1) the trial court made no express findings as to whether he posed a “danger to the safety of any person or the community” or whether “the interests of justice warrant a sentence modification” as required by the statute,
We agree with Mr. Long that the trial court committed legal error. In particular, the trial court made no express findings on either of the determinative inquiries under the IRAA. As noted above, the trial court must reduce a term of imprisonment if the movant “is not a danger to the safety of any person or the community and the interests of justice warrant a sentence modification.”
The trial court‘s explanation does not specify whether it denied Mr. Long‘s motion because it found Mr. Long dangerous or because the interests of justice weigh against a reduced sentence. Although its concluding passage makes certain findings, we are unable to discern whether the court concluded that Mr. Long had not “met his burden” with respect to dangerousness, the interests of justice, or both. Without the trial court‘s express view on either of these inquiries (and the reasons supporting its view), we cannot determine whether its rationale for denying the motion is sufficient. See Bishop, 310 A.3d at 637 (“[T]o ensure this court‘s ability to adequately review its decision, the trial court must make clear in [its] written opinion how the statutory factors informed its determinations regarding dangerousness and the interests of justice.“). A trial court‘s failure to explain such a nonobvious exercise of discretion generally requires a remand, particularly when it prevents adequate appellate review of the basis of its holding.9 See Sherman v. Quinn, 668 F.3d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Ordinarily, when a district judge fails to
explain a nonobvious exercise of his [or her] discretion, the proper remedy is to remand the case fоr him [or her] to do so.” (internal quotation omitted)). “[A]lthough we accord the trial court substantial ‘latitude’ in its exercise of discretion, this latitude comes with conditions: that the ‘court . . . take no shortcuts,’ that it ‘exercise its discretion with reference to all the necessary criteria,’ and that it explain its reasoning in sufficient detail to permit appellate review.” Cruz v. United States, 165 A.3d 290, 294 (D.C. 2017) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 635 (D.C. 1979)). In addition, the lack of any indication whether the trial court relied on dangerousness, the interests of justice, or both, prevents this court from conducting a meaningful harmlessness analysis if it were to determine that the bases for one ground or the other were erroneous.
As to Mr. Long‘s second claim of legal error—that the trial court misinterpreted and misapplied factor eight—we conclude that the trial court erred. The eighth factor requires the trial court to consider “[t]he defendant‘s family and community circumstances at the time of the offense, including any history of abuse, trauma, or involvement in the child welfare system.”
The government acknowledges this error but argues that Mr. Long suffered no prejudice by the trial court‘s mere “transposition error” because the court took into account his family and community circumstances at the time of the offense elsewhere in its order. Indeed, under factor two, the trial court discussed Mr. Long‘s history of family abuse and trauma and the influence that “the gun and drug epidemic in the 1980s and 1990s” had “on his childhood and resulting behavior,” including by selling drugs on behalf of his uncle. Moreover, although factor eight does not call for consideration of the defendant‘s family and community circumstances at the time of the IRAA motion, we see no reason that such circumstances would not be relevant for (unfavorable or favorable) consideration under factor eleven. In any event, in light of our other finding of legal error and remand on that basis, we need not determine whether Mr. Long was prejudiced by the trial court‘s error with respect to factor eight.
b. Improper Weighing
Mr. Long also asserts that the trial court gave “improper weight” to certain pieces of evidence. First, he contends that the court placed “far more emphasis on the 2018 and 2019” disciplinary incidents than was warranted. Second, Mr. Long argues that the trial court overly relied on his “lack of support from his family.” Finally, Mr. Long asserts that the
We disagree with Mr. Long that the trial court improperly weighed certain aspects of the case. Generally, on review for abuse of discretion, an argument that the trial court “should have given more weight to factors favorable to [the appellee] . . . is not a basis for reversal.” Sharps v. United States, 246 A.3d 1141, 1159 n.90 (D.C. 2021). “[S]o long as the evidence provides sufficient support for the trial court‘s order, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the judge who heard the evidence.” Blackson v. United States, 897 A.2d 187, 194 (D.C. 2006) (internal quotation and brackets omitted); Fridman v. Orbis Bus. Intel. Ltd., 229 A.3d 494, 513 (D.C. 2020) (“Discretion signifies choice.“) (internal quotations omitted). Although it is difficult to discern how the court ultimately weighed each factor without any findings under
First, regarding the trial court‘s assessment of the 2019 infraction, Mr. Long argues that it “was the only infraction involving a prison employee during [Mr.] Long‘s entire decades-long incarceration” and that he had adequately explained the event. While the former may be true, Mr. Long also correctly recognizes that “[p]unching a guard is certainly not inconsequential.” The trial court was within its discretion to decline to credit Mr. Long‘s explanation of the event. See Bolanos v. United States, 938 A.2d 672, 685 (D.C. 2007) (“It is the role of the trial court to assess the credibility of witnesses . . . .“). True, Mr. Long‘s most recent violent disciplinary offense aside from the 2019 infraction occurred in 2007, nearly two decades ago. The trial court, however, wished to see “a more sustained period of compliance” after the 2019 incident. In our view, the trial court did not exceed its discretion in this respect.
Second, Mr. Long asserts that “the trial court‘s heavy emphasis on [his] supposed lack of support from family is entirely inappropriate” because “[m]any defendants serving lengthy prison sentences come from dysfunctional families that, for reasons beyond [their] control . . . cannot be expected to support them.” We agree that the IRAA is “not mean[t] to exclude” individuals who do not maintain familial ties, especially when they come from circumstances where those ties may have contributed to the underlying crime. Indeed, courts should credit movants who extricate themselves from the violent or unstable circumstances of their youth. Here, however, the trial court noted Mr. Long‘s familial circumstances (outside of its discussion in factor eight) only in the context of his ability to provide “for stable housing after one year.” On remand, the trial court may well give Mr. Long credit for removing himself from the circumstances that contributed to the underlying offense. Nevertheless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in discounting Mr. Long‘s reentry plan based on what it ultimately concluded was a deficiency in his plans for housing.10
Finally, Mr. Long argues that the trial court placed undue weight on his cellphone infractions. We do not agree. Again, we afford a trial court considerable deference in weighing evidence. Mr. Long does not contest that he sustained many disciplinary
III. Conclusion
We conclude that a remand is necessary for the trial court to reconsider its order in light of the foregoing discussion. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court‘s order and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.