CAMPBELL-EWALD CO. v. GOMEZ
No. 14-857
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
January 20, 2016
577 U. S. ____ (2016)
Argued October 14, 2015
OCTOBER TERM, 2015
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CAMPBELL-EWALD CO. v. GOMEZ
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-857. Argued October 14, 2015-Decided January 20, 2016
The United States Navy contracted with petitioner Campbell-Ewald Company (Campbell) to develop a multimedia recruiting campaign that included the sending of text messages to young adults, but only if those individuals had “opted in” to receipt of marketing solicitations on topics that included Navy service. Campbell‘s subcontractor Mindmatics LLC generated a list of cellular phone numbers for consenting 18- to 24-year-old users and then transmitted the Navy‘s message to over 100,000 recipients, including respondent Jose Gomez, who alleges that he did not consent to receive text messages and, at age 40, was not in the Navy‘s targeted age group. Gomez filed a nationwide class action, alleging that Campbell violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA),
Before the deadline for Gomez to file a motion for class certification, Campbell proposed to settle Gomez‘s individual claim and filed an offer of judgment pursuant to
Held:
1. An unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff‘s case, so the District Court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate Gomez‘s complaint.
Gomez‘s complaint was not effaced by Campbell‘s unaccepted offer to satisfy his individual claim. Under basic principles of contract law, Campbell‘s settlement bid and
2. Campbell‘s status as a federal contractor does not entitle it to immunity from suit for its violation of the TCPA. Unlike the United States and its agencies, federal contractors do not enjoy absolute immunity. A federal contractor who simply performs as directed by the Government may be shielded from liability for injuries caused by its conduct. See Yearsley, 309 U. S., at 20-21. But no “derivative immunity” exists when the contractor has “exceeded [its] authority” or its authority “was not validly conferred.” Id., at 21. The summary judgment record includes evidence that the Navy authorized Campbell to send text messages only to individuals who had “opted in” to receive solicitations, as required by the TCPA. When a contractor violates both federal law and the Government‘s explicit instructions, as alleged here, no immunity shields the contractor from suit. Pp. 12-14.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA and ALITO, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 14-857
CAMPBELL-EWALD COMPANY, PETITIONER v. JOSE GOMEZ
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[January 20, 2016]
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
Is an unaccepted offer to satisfy the named plaintiff‘s individual claim sufficient to render a case moot when the complaint seeks relief on behalf of the plaintiff and a class of persons similarly situated? This question, on which Courts of Appeals have divided, was reserved in Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U. S. 66, ____, n. 4 (2013) (slip op., at 5, 6, n. 4). We hold today, in accord with
This case presents a second question. The claim in suit concerns performance of the petitioner‘s contract with the Federal Government. Does the sovereign‘s immunity from suit shield the petitioner, a private enterprise, as well? We hold that the petitioner‘s status as a Government contractor does not entitle it to “derivative sovereign immunity,” i.e., the blanket immunity enjoyed by the
I
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA or Act)
Petitioner Campbell-Ewald Company (Campbell) is a nationwide advertising and marketing communications agency. Beginning in 2000, the United States Navy engaged Campbell to develop and execute a multimedia recruiting campaign. In 2005 and 2006, Campbell proposed to the Navy a campaign involving text messages sent to young adults, the Navy‘s target audience, encouraging them to learn more about the Navy. The Navy approved Campbell‘s proposal, conditioned on sending the messages only to individuals who had “opted in” to receipt of marketing solicitations on topics that included service in the Navy. App. 42. In final form, the message read:
“Destined for something big? Do it in the Navy. Get a career. An education. And a chance to serve a greater cause. For a FREE Navy video call [phone number].” 768 F. 3d, at 873.
Campbell then contracted with Mindmatics LLC, which
Respondent Jose Gomez was a recipient of the Navy‘s recruiting message. Alleging that he had never consented to receiving the message, that his age was nearly 40, and that Campbell had violated the TCPA by sending the message (and perhaps others like it), Gomez filed a class-action complaint in the District Court for the Central District of California in 2010. On behalf of a nationwide class of individuals who had received, but had not consented to receipt of, the text message, Gomez sought treble statutory damages, costs, and attorney‘s fees, also an injunction against Campbell‘s involvement in unsolicited messaging. App. 16-24.
Prior to the agreed-upon deadline for Gomez to file a motion for class certification, Campbell proposed to settle Gomez‘s individual claim and filed an offer of judgment pursuant to
his costs, excluding attorney‘s fees, and $1,503 per message for the May 2006 text message and any other text message Gomez could show he had received, thereby satisfying his personal treble-damages claim. Id., at 53a. Campbell also proposed a stipulated injunction in which it agreed to be barred from sending text messages in violation of the TCPA. The proposed injunction, however, denied liability and the allegations made in the complaint, and disclaimed the existence of grounds for the imposition of an injunction. Id., at 56a. The settlement offer did not include attorney‘s fees, Campbell observed, because the TCPA does not provide for an attorney‘s-fee award. Id., at 53a. Gomez did not accept the settlement offer and allowed Campbell‘s
Campbell thereafter moved to dismiss the case pursuant to
After limited discovery, Campbell moved for summary judgment on a discrete ground. The U. S. Navy enjoys the sovereign‘s immunity from suit under the TCPA, Camp-
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment entered for Campbell. 768 F. 3d 871. The appeals court disagreed with the District Court‘s ruling on the immunity issue, but agreed that Gomez‘s case remained live. Concerning Gomez‘s individual claim, the Court of Appeals relied on its then-recent decision in Diaz v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp., 732 F. 3d 948 (2013). Diaz held that “an unaccepted
Next, the Court of Appeals held that Campbell was not entitled to “derivative sovereign immunity” under this Court‘s decision in Yearsley or on any other basis. 768 F. 3d, at 879-881. Vacating the District Court‘s judgment, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings.3
We granted certiorari to resolve a disagreement among the Courts of Appeals over whether an unaccepted offer can moot a plaintiff‘s claim, thereby depriving federal courts of
II
In Genesis HealthCare, the Court considered a collective action brought by Laura Symczyk, a former employee of Genesis HealthCare Corp. Symczyk sued on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
JUSTICE KAGAN, writing in dissent, explained that she would have reached the threshold question and would have held that “an unaccepted offer of judgment cannot moot a case.” Id., at ____ (slip op., at 3). She reasoned:
“When a plaintiff rejects such an offer-however good the terms-her interest in the lawsuit remains just what it was before. And so too does the court‘s ability to grant her relief. An unaccepted settlement offer—like any unaccepted contract offer—is a legal nullity, with no operative effect. As every first-year law stu-
dent learns, the recipient‘s rejection of an offer ‘leaves the matter as if no offer had ever been made.’ Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Columbus Rolling Mill, 119 U. S. 149, 151 (1886). Nothing in Rule 68 alters that basic principle; to the contrary, that rule specifies that ‘[a]n unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn.’Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 68(b) . So assuming the case was live before—because the plaintiff had a stake and the court could grant relief—the litigation carries on, unmooted.” Ibid.
We now adopt JUSTICE KAGAN‘s analysis, as has every Court of Appeals ruling on the issue post Genesis HealthCare.4 Accordingly, we hold that Gomez‘s complaint was not effaced by Campbell‘s unaccepted offer to satisfy his individual claim.
As earlier recounted, see supra, at 3-4, Gomez commenced an action against Campbell for violation of the TCPA, suing on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. Gomez sought treble statutory damages and an injunction on behalf of a nationwide class, but Campbell‘s settlement offer proposed relief for Gomez alone, and it did not admit liability. App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a. Gomez rejected Campbell‘s settlement terms and the offer of judgment.
Under basic principles of contract law, Campbell‘s settlement bid and
The Federal Rule in point,
In urging that an offer of judgment can render a controversy moot, Campbell features a trio of 19th-century railroad tax cases: California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308 (1893), Little v. Bowers, 134 U. S. 547 (1890), and San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 116 U. S. 138 (1885). None of those decisions suggests that an unaccepted settlement offer can put a plaintiff out of court. In San Pablo, California had sued to recover state and county taxes due from a railroad. In response, the railroad had not merely offered to pay the taxes in question. It had actually deposited the full amount demanded in a California bank in the State‘s name, in accord with a California statute that “extinguished” the railroad‘s tax obligations upon such payment. 149 U. S., at 313-314. San Pablo thus rested on California‘s substantive law,
In contrast to the cases Campbell highlights, when the
THE CHIEF JUSTICE‘S dissent asserts that our decision transfers authority from the federal courts and “hands it to the plaintiff.” Post, at 10. Quite the contrary. The dissent‘s approach would place the defendant in the driver‘s seat. We encountered a kindred strategy in U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18 (1994). The parties in Bancorp had reached a voluntary settlement while the case was pending before this Court. Id., at 20. The petitioner then sought vacatur of the Court of Appeals’ judgment, contending that it should be relieved from the adverse decision on the ground that the settlement made the dispute moot. The Court rejected this gambit. Id., at 25. Similarly here, Campbell sought to avoid a potential adverse decision, one that could expose it to damages a thousand-fold larger than the bid Gomez declined to accept.
In sum, an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff‘s case, so the District Court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate Gomez‘s complaint. That ruling suffices to decide this case. We need not, and do not, now decide whether the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff‘s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount. That question is appropriately reserved for a
III
The second question before us is whether Campbell‘s status as a federal contractor renders it immune from suit for violating the TCPA by sending text messages to unconsenting recipients. The United States and its agencies, it is undisputed, are not subject to the TCPA‘s prohibitions because no statute lifts their immunity. Brief for Petitioner 2; Brief for Respondent 43. Do federal contractors share the Government‘s unqualified immunity from liability and litigation? We hold they do not.
“[G]overnment contractors obtain certain immunity in connection with work which they do pursuant to their contractual undertakings with the United States.” Brady v. Roosevelt S. S. Co., 317 U. S. 575, 583 (1943). That immunity, however, unlike the sovereign‘s, is not absolute. See id., at 580-581. Campbell asserts “derivative sovereign immunity,” Brief for Petitioner 35, but can offer no authority for the notion that private persons performing Government work acquire the Government‘s embracive immunity. When a contractor violates both federal law and the Government‘s explicit instructions, as here alleged, no “derivative immunity” shields the contractor from suit by persons adversely affected by the violation.
Campbell urges that two of our decisions support its “derivative immunity” defense: Yearsley, 309 U. S. 18, and Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U. S. 377 (2012). In Yearsley, a landowner asserted a claim for damages against a private company whose work building dikes on the Missouri River pursuant to its contract with the Federal Government had washed away part of the plaintiff‘s land. We held that the contractor was not answerable to the landowner. “[T]he work which the contractor had done in the river bed,” we observed, “was all authorized and directed by the Government of the United States” and “performed pursuant to
In Filarsky, we considered whether a private attorney temporarily retained by a municipal government as an investigator could claim qualified immunity in an action brought under
At the pretrial stage of litigation, we construe the record in a light favorable to the party seeking to avoid summary disposition, here, Gomez. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 587 (1986). In opposition to summary judgment, Gomez presented evidence that the Navy authorized Campbell to send text messages only to individuals who had “opted in” to receive solicitations. App. 42-44; 768 F. 3d, at 874. A Navy representative noted the importance of ensuring that the message recipient list be “kosher” (i.e., that all recipients had consented to receiving messages like the recruiting text), and made clear that the Navy relied on Campbell‘s representation that the list was in compliance. App. 43. See also ibid. (noting that Campbell itself encouraged the Navy to use only an opt-in list in order to meet national and local law requirements). In short, the current record reveals no basis for arguing that Gomez‘s right to remain message-free was in doubt or that Campbell complied with the Navy‘s instructions.
We do not overlook that subcontractor Mindmatics, not Campbell, dispatched the Navy‘s recruiting message to unconsenting recipients. But the Federal Communications Commission has ruled that, under federal common-law principles of agency, there is vicarious liability for TCPA violations.
*
*
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 14-857
CAMPBELL-EWALD COMPANY, PETITIONER v. JOSE GOMEZ
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[January 20, 2016]
JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.
The Court correctly concludes that an offer of complete relief on a claim does not render that claim moot. But, in my view, the Court does not advance a sound basis for this conclusion. The Court rests its conclusion on modern contract law principles and a recent dissent concerning
I
The text of
A
Modern settlement procedure has its origins in the law of tenders, as refined in the 18th and 19th centuries. As with much of the early common law, the law of tenders had many rigid formalities. These formalities make clear that, around the time of the framing, a mere offer of relief was insufficient to deprive a court of jurisdiction.
At common law, a prospective defendant could prevent a case from proceeding, but he needed to provide substantially more than a bare offer. A “mere proposal or proposition” to pay a claim was inadequate to end a case. A. Hunt, A Treatise on the Law of Tender, and Bringing Money Into Court §§1-2, 3-4 (1903) (Hunt) (citing cases from the 1800‘s). Nor would a defendant‘s “readiness and an ability to pay the money” suffice to end a case. Holmes v. Holmes, 12 Barb. 137, 144 (N. Y. 1851). Rather, a prospective defendant needed to provide a “tender“—an offer to pay the entire claim before a suit was filed, accompanied by “actually produc[ing]” the sum “at the time of tender” in an “unconditional” manner. M. Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Law, 314-315, 321 (1856) (citing cases from the early 1800‘s).
Furthermore, in state and federal courts, a tender of the amount due was deemed “an admission of a liability” on the cause of action to which the tender related, so any would-be defendant who tried to deny liability could not effectuate a tender. Hunt §400, at 448; see Collier v. Stimpson, 18 F. 689, 691 (Ore. 1883) (explaining that a tender constitutes “an admission of the cause of action“); The Rossend Castle Dillenback v. The Rossend Castle, 30 F. 462, 464 (SDNY 1887) (same). As one treatise explained, “[a] tender must be of a specific sum which the tenderor admits to be due“—“[t]here must be no denial of
the debt.” Hunt §242, at 253 (emphasis added). The tender had to offer and actually deliver complete relief. See id., §2, at 4; Sheredine v. Gaul, 2 Dall. 190, 191 (Pa. 1792) (defendant must “brin[g] the money into Court“). And an offer to pay less than what was demanded was not a valid tender. See, e.g., Elderkin v. Fellows, 60 Wis. 339, 340-341, 19 N. W. 101, 102 (1884).
Even when a potential defendant properly effectuated a tender, the case would not necessarily end. At common law, a plaintiff was entitled to “deny that [the tender was] sufficient to satisfy his demand” and accordingly “go on to trial.” Raiford v. Governor, 29 Ala. 382, 384 (1856); see also Hunt §511, at 595.*
This history demonstrates that, at common law, a defendant or prospective defendant had to furnish far more than a mere offer of settlement to end a case. This history also demonstrates that courts at common law would not have understood a mere offer to strip them of jurisdiction.
B
Although 19th-century state statutes expanded the common-law-tender regime, the law retained its essential features. See Bone, “To Encourage Settlement“: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1561, 1585 (2008) (Bone). These changes, for example, allowed defendants to offer a tender “during the pendency of an action,” as well as before it commenced. Taylor v. Brooklyn Elevated R. Co., 119 N. Y. 561, 564, 23 N. E. 1106, 1107 (1890); cf. Colby v. Reed, 99 U. S. 560, 566 (1879) (at common law, generally no “right of tender after action brought“). Statutes also expanded the right of tender to cover types of actions in which damages were not certain. Compare Dedekam v. Vose, 7 F. Cas. 337, 338 (SDNY 1853) (“[T]ender could not be maintained, according to the strict principles of the common law” in cases where damages were not easily ascertainable), with Patrick v. Illawaco Oyster Co., 189 Wash. 152, 155, 63 P. 2d 520, 521 (1937) (state statute “extend[ed] the common-law rule” to tort actions).
Nevertheless, state statutes generally retained the core of the common-law tender rules. Most critically for this case, a mere offer remained insufficient to end a lawsuit. See, e.g., Kilts v. Seeber, 10 How. Pr. 270, 271 (N. Y. 1854) (under New York law, a mere offer was insufficient to preclude litigation). Like the common-law tender rules, state statutes recognized that plaintiffs could continue to pursue litigation by rejecting an offer. See Bone 1586.
C
The offer-of-judgment procedure in Rule 68 was modeled after a provision in the New York Field Code that was enacted in the mid-19th century. See id., at 1583-1584. That code abrogated many of the common-law formalities governing civil procedure. Among its innovations, the code allowed defendants in any cause of action to make an offer in writing to the plaintiff proposing to accept judgment against the defendant for a specified sum. See The Code of Procedure of the State of New York From 1848 to 1871: Comprising the Act as Originally Enacted and the Various Amendments Made Thereto, to the Close of the Session of 1870 §385, p. 274 (1870). The plaintiff could accept the offer, which would end the litigation, or reject the offer, in which case the offer was considered with-
In 1938, Rule 68 was adopted as part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and has subsisted throughout the years without material changes. See Bone 1564. As it did in 1938,
D
In light of the history discussed above, a rejected offer does not end the case. And this consistent historical practice demonstrates why Campbell-Ewald‘s offers do not divest a federal court of jurisdiction to entertain Gomez‘s suit. Campbell-Ewald made two settlement offers after Gomez sued—one filed with the District Court under
II
Although the Court reaches the right result, I cannot adopt its reasoning. Building on the dissent in Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U. S. ___ (2013), the Court relies on principles of contract law that an unaccepted offer is a legal nullity. But the question here is not whether Campbell-Ewald‘s offer formed an enforceable contract. The question is whether its continuing offer of
THE CHIEF JUSTICE‘s dissent argues that examining whether the requirements of common-law tenders have been met does not answer “whether there is a case or controversy for purposes of Article III.” Post, at 9, n. 3. As explained above, however, courts have historically refused to dismiss cases when an offer did not conform to the strict tender rules. The logical implications of THE CHIEF JUSTICE‘s reasoning are that the common-law-tender rules conflict with Article III and that the Constitution bars Article III courts from following those principles. But see Colby, supra, at 566 (stating that, to stop litigation, a party “must adopt the measure prescribed by the common law, except in jurisdictions where a different mode of proceeding is prescribed by statute“). That reasoning, therefore, calls into question the history and tradition that the case-or-controversy requirement embodies.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE also contends that our precedents “plainly establish that an admission of liability is not required for a case to be moot under Article III.” Post, at 10, n. 3. But we need not decide today whether compliance with every common-law formality would be necessary to end a case. The dispositive point is that state and federal courts have not considered a mere offer, without more, sufficient to moot the case. None of the cases cited by THE CHIEF JUSTICE hold that a retrospective claim for money damages can become moot based on a mere offer.
As explained above, I would follow history and tradition in construing Article III, and so I find that Campbell-Ewald‘s mere offers did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment only.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 14-857
CAMPBELL-EWALD COMPANY, PETITIONER v. JOSE GOMEZ
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[January 20, 2016]
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting.
This case is straightforward. Jose Gomez alleges that the marketing firm Campbell-Ewald (Campbell) sent him text messages without his permission, and he requests relief under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. That Act permits consumers to recover statutory damages for unauthorized text messages. Based on Gomez‘s allegations, the maximum that he could recover under the Act is $1500 per text message, plus the costs of filing suit. Campbell has offered to pay Gomez that amount, but it turns out he wants more. He wants a federal court to say he is right.
The problem for Gomez is that the federal courts exist to resolve real disputes, not to rule on a plaintiff‘s entitlement to relief already there for the taking. As this Court has said, “[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary‘s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 37 (1976)). If there is no actual case or controversy, the lawsuit is moot, and the power of the federal courts to declare the law has come to an end. Here, the District Court found that Campbell
I respectfully dissent.
I
A
In 1793, President George Washington sent a letter to Chief Justice John Jay and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, asking for the opinion of the Court on the rights and obligations of the United States with respect to the war between Great Britain and France. The Supreme Court politely—but firmly—refused the request, concluding that “the lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between the three departments of the government” prohibit the federal courts from issuing such advisory opinions. 3 Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 486-489 (H. Johnston ed. 1890-1893).
That prohibition has remained “the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 96 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted). And for good reason. It is derived from Article III of the Constitution, which limits the authority of the federal courts to the adjudication of “Cases” or “Controversies.”
A case or controversy exists when both the plaintiff and the defendant have a “personal stake” in the lawsuit. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U. S. 692, 701 (2011). A plaintiff demonstrates a personal stake by establishing standing to sue, which requires a “personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant‘s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen, 468 U. S., at 751. A defendant demonstrates a personal stake through “an ongoing interest in the dispute.” Camreta, 563 U. S., at 701.
The personal stake requirement persists through every stage of the lawsuit. It is not enough that a dispute was “very much alive when suit was filed“; the “parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit” to prevent the case from becoming moot. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 477-478 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). If either the plaintiff or the defendant ceases to have a concrete interest in the outcome of the litigation, there is no longer a live case or controversy. A federal court that decides the merits of such a case runs afoul of the prohibition on advisory opinions.
B
Applying those basic principles to this case, it is clear that the lawsuit is moot. All agree that at the time Gomez filed suit, he had a personal stake in the litigation. In his complaint, Gomez alleged that he suffered an injury in
What happened next, however, is critical: After Gomez‘s initial legal volley, Campbell did not return fire. Instead, Campbell responded to the complaint with a freestanding offer to pay Gomez the maximum amount that he could recover under the statute: $1500 per unauthorized text message, plus court costs. Campbell also made an offer of judgment on the same terms under
When a plaintiff files suit seeking redress for an alleged injury, and the defendant agrees to fully redress that injury, there is no longer a case or controversy for purposes of Article III. After all, if the defendant is willing to remedy the plaintiff‘s injury without forcing him to litigate, the plaintiff cannot demonstrate an injury in need of redress by the court, and the defendant‘s interests are not adverse to the plaintiff. At that point, there is no longer any “necessity” to “expound and interpret” the law, Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 177, and the federal courts lack authority to hear the case. That is exactly what happened here: Once Campbell offered to fully remedy Gomez‘s injury, there was no longer any “necessity” for the District Court
It is true that although Campbell has offered Gomez full relief, Campbell has not yet paid up. That does not affect the mootness inquiry under the facts of this case. Campbell is a multimillion dollar company, and the settlement offer here is for a few thousand dollars. The settlement offer promises “prompt payment,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a, and it would be mere pettifoggery to argue that Campbell might not make good on that promise. In any event, to the extent there is a question whether Campbell is willing and able to pay, there is an easy answer: have the firm deposit a certified check with the trial court.
II
The Court today holds that Gomez‘s lawsuit is not moot. According to the Court, “An unaccepted settlement offer—like any unaccepted contract offer—is a legal nullity, with no operative effect.” Ante, at 7-8 (quoting Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U. S. ___ (2013) (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3)). And so, the Court concludes, if a plaintiff does not feel like accepting the
But a plaintiff is not the judge of whether federal litigation is necessary, and a mere desire that there be federal litigation—for whatever reason—does not make it necessary. When a lawsuit is filed, it is up to the federal court to determine whether a concrete case or controversy exists between the parties. That remains true throughout the litigation. Article III does not require the parties to affirmatively agree on a settlement before a case becomes moot. This Court has long held that when a defendant unilaterally remedies the injuries of the plaintiff, the case is moot—even if the plaintiff disagrees and refuses to settle the dispute, and even if the defendant continues to deny liability.
In California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308 (1893), the State of California brought suit against a railroad company for back taxes. Before oral argument in this Court, the railroad offered to pay California the entire sum at issue, “together with interest, penalties and costs.” Id., at 313. Although California continued to litigate the case despite the railroad‘s offer of complete relief, the Court concluded that the offer to pay the full sum, in addition to “the deposit of the money in a bank, which by a statute of the State ha[s] the same effect as actual payment and receipt of the money,” mooted the case. Id., at 314.
The Court grounded its decision in San Pablo on the prohibition against advisory opinions, explaining that “the court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare, for the government of future cases, principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case.” Ibid. Although the majority here places great weight on Gomez‘s rejection of Campbell‘s offer of complete relief, San Pablo did not consider the agreement of the parties to
More recently, in Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U. S. 87 (2009), the Court found that a plaintiff‘s refusal to settle a case did not prevent it from becoming moot. In Alvarez, Chicago police officers had seized vehicles and cash from six individuals. The individuals filed suit against the city and two officials, claiming that they were entitled to a timely post-seizure hearing to seek the return of their property. The Court of Appeals ruled for the plaintiffs, and this Court granted certiorari.
At oral argument, the parties informed the Court that the cars and some of the cash had been returned, and that the plaintiffs no longer sought the return of the remainder of the cash. Id., at 92. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs—much like Gomez—“continue[d] to dispute the lawfulness of the State‘s hearing procedures.” Id., at 93. Although the plaintiffs refused to settle the case, and the defendants would not concede that the hearing procedures were unlawful, the Court held that the case was moot. As the Court explained, the “dispute is no longer embedded in any actual controversy about the plaintiffs’ particular legal rights,” and “a dispute solely about the meaning of a law, abstracted from any concrete actual or threatened harm, falls outside the scope of the constitutional words ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.‘” Ibid.
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. 85 (2013). In that case, Nike filed suit alleging that two of Already‘s athletic shoes violated Nike‘s Air Force 1 trademark. In response, Already filed a counterclaim alleging that Nike‘s trademark was invalid. Instead of litigating the counterclaim, Nike issued a unilateral covenant not to sue Already. In that covenant, Nike “unconditionally and irrevocably” promised not to
Already did not agree to Nike‘s covenant, and it did not view the covenant as sufficient to protect it from future trademark litigation. Already argued that without judicial resolution of the dispute, “Nike‘s trademarks [would] hang over Already‘s operations like a Damoclean sword.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9). This Court disagreed and dismissed the suit. It found that because Nike had demonstrated “that the covenant encompasses all of [Nike‘s] allegedly unlawful conduct,” and that the “challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur,” the counterclaim was moot. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 7-8).
These precedents reflect an important constitutional principle: The agreement of the plaintiff is not required to moot a case. In San Pablo, California did not accept the railroad‘s money in exchange for settling the State‘s legal claims; in Alvarez, the plaintiffs did not receive their cars and cash in return for an agreement to stop litigating the case; and in Already, the eponymous shoe company never agreed to Nike‘s covenant not to sue. In each of those cases, despite the plaintiff‘s desire not to settle, the Court held that the lawsuit was moot.
The majority attempts to distinguish these precedents by emphasizing that the plaintiffs in all three cases received complete relief, but that is not the point. I had thought that the theory of the Court‘s opinion was that acceptance is required before complete relief will moot a case. But consider the majority‘s discussion of Already: What did Nike‘s covenant do? It “afforded Already blanket protection from future trademark litigation.” Ante, at 10,
The majority is correct that because Gomez did not accept Campbell‘s settlement, it is a “legal nullity” as a matter of contract law. The question, however, is not whether there is a contract; it is whether there is a case or controversy under Article III.2 If the defendant is willing to give the plaintiff everything he asks for, there is no case or controversy to adjudicate, and the lawsuit is moot.3
* * *
The case or controversy requirement serves an essential purpose: It ensures that the federal courts expound the law “only in the last resort, and as a necessity.” Allen, 468 U. S., at 752 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is the necessity of resolving a live dispute that reconciles the exercise of profound power by unelected judges with the principles of self-governance, ensuring adherence to “the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.” Id., at 750 (internal quotation marks omitted).
There is no such necessity here. As the District Court found, Campbell offered Gomez full relief. Although Gomez nonetheless wants to continue litigating, the issue is not what the plaintiff wants, but what the federal courts may do. It is up to those courts to decide whether each party continues to have the requisite personal stake in the lawsuit, and if not, to dismiss the case as moot. The Court today takes that important responsibility away from the federal courts and hands it to the plaintiff.
The good news is that this case is limited to its facts. The majority holds that an offer of complete relief is insufficient to moot a case. The majority does not say that payment of complete relief leads to the same result. For aught that appears, the majority‘s analysis may have come out differently if Campbell had deposited the offered funds with the District Court. See ante, at 11-12. This Court leaves that question for another day—assuming there are other plaintiffs out there who, like Gomez, won‘t take “yes” for an answer.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 14-857
CAMPBELL-EWALD COMPANY, PETITIONER v. JOSE GOMEZ
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[January 20, 2016]
JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting.
I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE‘s dissent. I agree that a defendant may extinguish a plaintiff‘s personal stake in pursuing a claim by offering complete relief on the claim, even if the plaintiff spurns the offer. Our Article III precedents make clear that, for mootness purposes, there is nothing talismanic about the plaintiff‘s acceptance. E.g., Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. 85 (2013) (holding that Nike‘s unilateral covenant not to sue mooted Already‘s trademark invalidity claim). I write separately to emphasize what I see as the linchpin for finding mootness in this case: There is no real dispute that Campbell would “make good on [its] promise” to pay Gomez the money it offered him if the case were dismissed. Ante, at 5 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). Absent this fact, I would be compelled to find that the case is not moot.
Our “voluntary cessation” cases provide useful guidance. Those cases hold that, when a plaintiff seeks to enjoin a defendant‘s conduct, a defendant‘s “voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a case moot because a dismissal for mootness would permit a resumption of the challenged conduct as soon as the case is dismissed.” Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U. S. 298, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 6-7). To obtain dismissal in such circumstances, the defendant must “bea[r] the formidable
Consider an offer of complete relief from a defendant that has no intention of actually paying the promised sums, or from a defendant whose finances are so shaky that it cannot produce the necessary funds. In both instances, there is a question whether the defendant will back up its offer to pay with an actual payment. If those cases were dismissed as moot, the defendant‘s failure to follow through on its promise to pay would leave the plaintiff forever emptyhanded. In the language of our mootness cases, those cases would not be moot because a court could still grant the plaintiff “effectual relief,” Knox, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted)—namely, the relief sought in the first place. The plaintiff retains a “personal stake” in continuing the litigation. Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted). An offer of complete relief thus will not always warrant dismissal.
How, then, can a defendant make “absolutely clear” that it will pay the relief it has offered? The most straightforward way is simply to pay over the money. The defendant might hand the plaintiff a certified check or deposit the requisite funds in a bank account in the plaintiff‘s name. See California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893). Alternatively, a defendant might deposit the money with the district court (or another trusted intermediary) on the condition that the money be released to the plaintiff when the court dismisses the case as moot. See
The Court does not dispute Campbell‘s ability or willingness to pay, but nonetheless concludes that its unaccepted offer did not moot Gomez‘s claim. While I disagree with that result on these facts, I am heartened that the Court appears to endorse the proposition that a plaintiff‘s claim is moot once he has “received full redress” from the defendant for the injuries he has asserted. Ante, at 10, n. 5 (discussing Already, supra, and Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U. S. 87 (2009)). Today‘s decision thus does not prevent a defendant who actually pays complete relief—either directly to the plaintiff or to a trusted intermediary—from seeking dismissal on mootness grounds.3
Notes
“(a) Making an Offer; Judgment on an Accepted Offer. At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending against a claim may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs then accrued. If, within 14 days after being served, the opposing party serves written notice accepting the offer, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter judgment.
“(b) Unaccepted Offer. An unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn, but it does not preclude a later offer. Evidence of an unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs.
“(d) Paying Costs After an Unaccepted Offer. If the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the un-
Already concerned a trademark owned by Nike. Already sought a declaratory judgment invalidating the trademark. The injury Already asserted was the ongoing threat that Nike would sue for trademark infringement. In response to Already‘s claim, Nike filed a “Covenant Not to Sue,” in which it promised not to bring any trademark claims based on Already‘s existing or similar footwear designs. 568 U. S., at ____ (slip op., at 2). The Court found this covenant sufficient to overcome the rule that “voluntary cessation” is generally inadequate to moot a claim. Id., at ____ (slip op., at 6). True, Nike‘s covenant was unilateral, but it afforded Already blanket protection from future trademark litigation. Id., at ____ (slip op., at 8). The risk that underpinned Already‘s standing—the Damocles’ sword of a trademark infringement suit—thus ceased to exist given Nike‘s embracive promise not to sue. In short, in both Alvarez and Already, the plaintiffs had received full redress for the injuries asserted in their complaints. Here, by contrast, Campbell‘s revocable offer, far from providing Gomez the relief sought in his complaint, gave him nary a penny.