*1 v. WILSON UNITED STATES March 24, 1992 January 15, 1992 Argued No. 90-1745. Decided *2 Thomas, J., opinion Court, delivered the Rehnquist, in which J., Blackmun, C. O’Connoe, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., dissenting opinion, White, J., filed a joined, in which post, p. 337.
Amy L. Wax the cause for the argued United States. Starr, Solicitor General Assist- With her on the briefs were Deputy ant Mueller, General Solicitor General Bryson, and Joel M. Gershowitz.
Henry A. Martin, Court, appointment U. S. 936, the cause for argued respondent. With him on the brief were Deborah S. Swettenam and Alan Morrison.
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of Court. A defendant convicted of federal crime has a under right 18 U. S. C. to receive credit for certain time spent in official detention before his sentence In begins. case, we must decide whether the District Court calculates the credit at the time of or whether it after the computes defendant has begun serve his sentence.
I respondent early Richard fall of In the summer County, Tennes- crimes Putnam committed several Wilson precise us crimes do not concern details of these see. The authorities ar- state that Tennessee here. It suffices to jail pend- 1988,and held him in rested on October Wilson prosecutions. ing After of federal and state the outcome eventually pleaded proceedings, preliminary Wilson certain charges. guilty to federal and state criminal various District Court 29, 1989, the United States November On sentenced Wilson for the District of Tennessee Middle imprisonment Act, 18 of the Hobbs months’ for violation *3 request § Wilson’s The District denied U. S. C. 1951. Court during presentence state cus- for credit for time served his tody. trial court sen- 12, 1989, December a Tennessee On robbery years’ imprisonment for tenced to several Wilson Court, to the District two other felonies. In contrast days granted 429 of credit toward court Wilson the state day, Tennessee authorities his sentence. Later that state began serving custody, and he Wilson to federal transferred his federal sentence. give appealed him the District Court’s refusal
Wilson
custody.
spent
the time
he had
in state
Revers-
credit for
Appeals
ing
of
Court,
the District
the United States Court
right
had
to credit
for the
Circuit held that Wilson
Sixth
it
should have awarded
to him.
and that
District Court
granted certiorari,
F. 2d 1115
II Attorney through the Bureau of Prisons General, The (BOP), responsibility imprisoning federal offenders. has 3621(a). § provision until See 18 U. S. C. From 1966 (1982ed.) § Attorney required at 18 U. S. codified C. prisoners General to award federal credit for certain time spent jail prior in of the commencement their sentences. provision, part, This stated: Attorney give any person
“The
General shall
such
any days spent
credit toward
of his
service
sentence
in connection with the offense or acts for
imposed.”
which sentence was
89-465,
Pub. L.
§4, 80
added).
(emphasis
Stat. 217
Attorney
implemented
provision by
com-
puting
taking custody
of
amount
credit after
of the sen-
Although
tenced federal
the federal
offender.
courts could
review the
determination,
General’s
participate
computation
court did not
See,
credit.
g.,
Morgan,
e. United States v.
In the Reform Act of 1984, U. S. C. 3551 seq., Congress et § which became effective in rewrote 3585(b). predecessor, 3568 and recodified it at Unlike its does not mention the General. Written passive in the voice, it states: given “A be shall credit toward the service defendant imprisonment term he prior
in official detention to the date the sentence commences—
“(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence imposed; was or
“(2) charge as a result of other for which the de- fendant was arrested after the commissionof the offense imposed; for which the sentence was against has “that not been credited another sentence.” 3585(b) added). § (emphasis 18 U. S. C. describing right
In jail-time the defendant’s to receive provision credit manner, in this the has created doubt about may whether impos- district courts now award credit when ing question significance sentence. The in this case 3585(b) § a defendant to of allows because the final clause only not been detention time “that has receive credit against the District another sentence.” When credited imposed 29, on Wilson’s96-month sentence November Court yet had received credit his detention 1989, Wilson not the However, courts. the time time from the Tennessee imprisoned 1989, on Wilson December General days of trial court had awarded Wilson 429 the Tennessee larger if receive a credit result, As a Wilson could credit. permitted crediting sentencing, be- at and thus the statute against had been credited another fore the detention time sentence. argues is that it the United States computes the the credit after the defendant
who amount of Appeals begins the erred his sentence and that Court ordering to award credit Wilson. Wil- District Court 3585(b) District Court to authorizes the son counters that sentencing. agree compute We of the credit at amount with United States.
A 3585(b) accept argument that author- We do Wilson’s sentencing. court to at Section izes district award credit 3585(b) may against a defendant receive credit indicates that specifies imposed,” It also a sentence that “was depends on the time that defendant amount of the credit “prior spent” detention date the sen- “has in official Congress’ signifi- use of a verb tense tence commences.” construing g., States, See, United e. Otte v. cant in statutes. (1974); Gwaltney Ltd. v. Smithfield, 49-50 U. S. Bay Chesapeake Foundation, Inc., 49, 63-64, U. S. n. present perfect By using past these verbs computation Congress tenses, has indicated begins his sentence. A dis- must occur after the defendant sentencing. apply court, cannot therefore, trict begin always to serve their sen- defendants do not Federal immediately. In the District sen- case, tences Court *5 tenced Wilson on 29, 1989, November but Wilson did not begin sentencing, his sentence until December 12, 1989. At only speculated the District Court could have about the spend prior amount of Wilson would in detention to the sentence; commencement of his the court did not know proceedings when the state-court would end or when the fed- custody. eral authorities would take Wilson into Because 3585(b) § bases the credit on how much time defendant “has (not spent” spent”) prior beginning “will have his sen- compute tence, the District Court could not the amount of sentencing. credit 3585(b) § phrase interpretation. The final confirms this only As noted above, it authorizes credit for time that “has against argues been credited another sentence.” Wilson phrase prevent receiving that this does not him from “ha[d] because his official detention not been credited” against imposed the state sentence when the District Court logic, the federal sentence. Under this if however, the Dis- trict Court had sentenced Wilson a few weeks later than it 3585(b). did, he would not have received credit under This interpretation of the statute would make the award of credit arbitrary, presumed lightly. a result not to be See United (1981) (absurd States Turkette, v. U. S. results avoided). imagine why Congress are to be We can no reason presentence would desire the credit, detention which deter- spends prison, depend mines how much time an offender timing sentencing. on the of his For these reasons, we con- 3585(b) clude does not authorize a district court compute sentencing. the credit at
B agree We with the United States that the Gen- compute eral must continue to the credit under as §3568. Congress he did under the former When writes a passive statute in the voice, it often fails to indicate who required must take a action. This silence can make the
335 meaning See, to ascertain. difficult of a statute somewhat 112, 430 S. g., Train, v. U. I. Pont de Nemours & Co. e. E. du (1977); Village Bellwood, 441 Gladstone, Realtors v. 128 3585(b) § though no Yet, even 91, 102-103 U.S. longer not see how General, we do mentions the jail- determining of a defendant’s the amount can avoid he credit. time the At- offender, a federal a district court sentences
After responsibility through torney for ad- General, BOP, has the 3621(a) (“A § per- ministering the sentence. See 18 U. S. C. imprisonment. . sentenced to a term of . son has been who to of the Bureau of Prisons shall be committed imposed”). expiration To fulfill this of the term until the duty, know how much of the sentence the offender BOP must right offender has a to cer- to Because the has left serve. §3585(b), jail-time because the district credit under and tain of the credit at sentenc- cannot determine the amount court ing, but make the de- has no choice to imprisoning as administrative matter when an termination the defendant. long jail oper-
Crediting against sentences time federal Congress 1966, manner. After enacted 3568 ated in this guidelines developed procedures and for deter- BOP detailed mining prisoners. See Federal Prison the credit available 1979) (Sept. System Program 5, No. 5880.24 Statement Operations of Prisons Memorandum No. Federal Bureau (Oct. 1989), Apps. B and C Brief for 23, DM 154-89 EMS computing jail- procedures (stating BOP’s United States determinations); Lucas, United v. see also States 1990). (CA11 regulations have af- 2d Federal F. computation prisoners review of forded administrative (1990); §§542.10-542.16 Lucas, credits, their see CFR judicial supra, prisoners been able to have seek computations exhausting after their adminis- review of these Bayless, 940 2d v. F. remedies, trative see United States (CA8 1991); Flanagan, 2d v. 868 F. 304-305 United States (CA11 1989); 1544,1546 United States Martinez, v. 837 F. 2d (CA9 1988). Congress’ 861, 865-866 conversion of an active passive sentence in 3568 into a sentence in strikes ground presuming us as a rather slim an intention to change procedures. lightly these well-established “It is not Congress depart be assumed that long intended to from a policy.” *7 established Robertson v. Railroad Bd., Labor (1925). U. S.
C argues Wilson that our conclusion conflicts with the famil Congress iar maxim that, when alters the words of a statute, change it meaning. must intend to the statute’s Rus See sello v. United States, 464 U. S. 23-24 He asserts by removing explicit that, Attorney reference to the Gen §3585(b), Congress eral expressed when it enacted a desire Attorney to process remove the General from the of com puting Congress sentences. Otherwise, Wilson contends, modify provision would have had no reason to as it did. difficulty general We have no presumption with the Congress contemplates change whenever it amends a stat ute. In this presumption case, however, we find that over come our per conclusions that the District Court cannot necessary form the calculation at the time of Attorney implementing that the in General, the defendant’s computing sentence, cannot avoid the credit. candidly acknowledge
We hap- that we do not know what pened Attorney during the reference to the General Congress § entirely revision. We do know that rewrote 3568 changed 3585(b). present when it it to its form It re- arranged rephrased its passive clauses, its central idea in the length. voice, and more than doubled its In view of these changes, interpretation and because require other would meaning us to stretch the of the words that now likely includes, we think it that the former reference to the simply General was lost in the shuffle. §3585(b), interpretation not render does however, Our §3568 meaningless. Congress altered the 1987 revision 3585(b). ways First, Con- enacted at least three when it “custody” gress replaced the the term “official term with Congress made clear that defendant Second, detention.” detention time. not receive a double credit his could eligible Congress enlarged the class of defendants Third, law, could receive credit. Under old a defendant receive only spent in connection with “the for time imposed.” for which sentence was Under offense ... may receive credit both law, new defendant connection with in official detention in and for time charge “any after which the defendant was arrested other was for which the sentence the commission the offense foregoing light imposed.” revisions, and for the In of these may con- reasons, we conclude that the judgment compute of the credit. tinue amount *8 Appeals is of of the Court
Reversed. joins, White Stevens, with whom Justice Justice dissenting.
Today’s rigid interpretation is of remedial statute a history, underlying poli- legislative by supported or the text, States, 494 U. In S. of the statute. Crandon v. United cies determining (1990), “[i]n the said that 158 this Court 152, only particular meaning [a] the look not to statute, of we design statutory language, of as a the the statute but to object policy.” The failed to its and Court has whole and to 3585(b), today. 18 S. C. issue, do this The statute U. right gives to term of have his the convicted defendant by imprisonment has al- the amount of time he shortened ready spent as a result of in either federal or state 338 offense,
his the that time has not been provided cred- already ited another sentence.1 against to defendant’s the full credit authorized the right by
statute is an Both obviously important the right. the have sentencing judge duty respect it clear the protect Moreover, is event right. there is a between the over dispute to a parties right credit, must be dispute resolved court. No one contends that the Attorney General has unreviewable discre- tion to determine the credit in appropriate case.2 any
In most cases, the calculation of the credit a routine, task ministerial that will not give any rise Occa- dispute.3 however, as this case sionally, demonstrates, there be a may difference legitimate either about opinion meaning or statute about the relevant facts.4 Such dispute 1 provides: Title S. 18 U. C. Custody “(b) Credit given —A defendant shall be for credit Prior imprisonment toward the service of a term of any he prior official detention to the date the sentence commences— “(1) as a result of the imposed; offense which the sentence was or “(2) charge as a result of other which the defendant was ar- rested after the of the commission offense for which the sentence was imposed;
“that
against
has not been credited
another sentence.”
Prior to
when
statute assigned
the initial responsibility for
determining
length
General,
to the
it was
subject
settled that his
was
judicial
determination
review after the
prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies. See
Han
Chua
Mow v.
States,
(CA9
1984),
United
730 F.
denied,
2d
cert.
470 U. S.
respondent acknowledged,
As
“the arithmetical
figuring
task of
out the
exact date
offender
serving
an
will finish
essentially
his sentence” “is
an
*9
4;
administrative ministerial function.”
Arg.
id.,
Tr. of Oral
see also
10, 21, 52.
4Typically
dispute
centers on
questioned
whether the
time was “of
ficial
already
detention” or whether the time has
been “credited” to an
See,
(CA8
Beston,
other
g.,
sentence.
e. United States v.
339 The only question be must, course, by resolved judge. of is when resolve the shall remains, then, judge that is rep- time when defendant issue —at the of sentencing, defend- date, after the or at some later counsel, resented by to serve his sentence. ant has begun 14 a of almost at issue in this case was period The credit before he had in state spent custody months that respondent with federal prosecutor.5 entered into plea agreement effective 3585(b),6 §of which became Prior to the amendment least construed the Sixth Cir- by in the statute —at as for not authorize credit cuit where this case arose —did v. Blank- See United States in time state custody. spent (1984).7 that 2d 434 with enship, pre- 733 F. Consistent the District denied respondent’s amendment Court practice, that had credit the 14 months he spent for for request that from that are two emerge state There custody.8 points any position Court, not with 5In the Government did take the District credit, jail “as to respondent’s request stating for that defense’s respect to charges state crimes petition the time incarcerated on that conspiracy, up that’s to the court and prior to the federal which occurred Tr. In the Court of government position takes no as to that.” 86. however, respondent was Appeals, the Government contended (CA6), Appellee the credit. Brief No. 89-6583 entitled to See pp. 14-15. ed.) (1982 effective, governed U. S. C. 3568 Before 3585 became spent in detention. presentence credit official Garcia-Gutierrez, (CA5 585, 586 See also United States v. 835 F. 2d 3568). 1988) (construing former defendant “IT THE OF THIS COURT THAT IS JUDGMENT hereby custody of Bureau Prisons to the the United States committed for a term of: imprisoned to be thirty- (96), upward departure an
“Ninety months which includes six fine, or of his incar- pay is unable to the cost three months. Defendant given supervised will not be ceration or release. Defendant Record, custody.” Doc. spent in No. 56. for the time state Ap- brief the Court of ruling in its defended Government peals, arguing: to credit authority a defendant is entitled there is some
“Although lodged, detainer has been once a federal for time served state action law enforce- product federal must be the state confinement *10 340
ruling: erroneously First, the District Court construed the legal question statute, second, amended that the Dis- ripe trict Court decided was for decision at the time of sentencing. opinion today, emphasizes
In its the Court the fact that respondent the state court later awarded credit for his 14 pretrial arguing detention, months in that he therefore would not to a have been entitled federal credit if the federal determination made after had been the state sentence was imposed. argument ante, 338, This See 334. is mislead- ing First, for three reasons. if the Federal District Court granted respondent’s request, unlikely had it seems that the state court would also have allowed the al- Second, credit. though the assumes that the risk Court of double credit by postponing could be avoided the credit determination begins until after the convicted defendant to serve his fed- assumption eral sentence, is erroneous because state proceedings frequently do not terminate until after a defend- begins ant or, indeed, to serve his federal sentence in some until cases, after the defendant has been released from fed- custody. Third, eral when a correct includ- sentence, federal ing pretrial custody, imposed, a correct credit for has been subsequent concerning action of a state court the amount punishment may state offenses the defendant have purely committed is a matter of state concern. example, Sentencing
In if case, the Federal Guide- prescribed lines had sentence of less 14 months, than if Court, the District or indeed the General, had respondent proper awarded re- credit, and therefore custody, leased him from it would be bizarre to conclude that (6th Garcia-Gutierrez, ment officials. United States v. 585, F. 836 2d 586 Harris, (11th 1988); United States v. 1989), Cir. 876 F. 2d Cir. denied, cert. U. S. The federal detainer [493 1005] must be the prisoner exclusive reason state has not been released on bail. (6th 1984).” Blankenship, United States v. F. 2d Cir. Brief 89-6583, Appellee pp. in No. 14-15. if a rearrest him Tennessee should the Federal Government subsequently give *11 be- to him the same credit decided court already cus- 14months in have served almost he would cause possibility fulfilling tody, The his federal sentence. thus the same credit that a federal court will allow that state imposed is whenever a state sentence allows exists court it is made, determination is whether the federal credit after by Attorney by judge and the General the trial or made sentencing hearing or at com- is made at the the whether it the The likelihood that of the federal sentence. mencement after credit will a federal state court allow second byor whom remote no matter when been allowed seems has importantly, the More federal determination is made. the hypothetical in credits rare cases of a risk double existence jurisdiction involving overlapping is not a state and federal give refusing plain lan- to effect to the reason for sufficient problem guage in no such is of the statute cases which presented.
I analysis premise. rests on an incorrect The Court’s entire two mandates one of assumes that the statute The Court starkly procedures: determination Either the credit different by always de- General after the be made the must always begun sentence, his or it must has to serve fendant sentencing. judge the time of the be made statutory compelled by procedures the these Neither of language plain ordinary reading statute’s An of the text. (“[a] given the service of a be credit toward defendant shall .”) suggests judge imprisonment the . . term calculating authority delegate ample the task of the credit to prosecutor, subject, probation course, or to the to a officer judicial first review, to it himself instance. or make statutory purports nothing Surely text there is in the proce- deprive judge to follow whichever of discretion given particular of a facts case. seems best suited dure specify passive who voice, does text, which uses jail Certainly will make the decision about credit. we give Congress’ should effect to choice of words, under- identify particular stand that the as text, written, does not appropriate therefore, decisionmaker, decisionmaker may judge depending be or either the on the circumstances.9
The statute does indicate that the should decision be made imposed” after “the was sentence and that the credit shall “prior include time in officialdetention to the date the sentence commences” even if some of that is after the sentencing hearing. If, as is cases, true in most the con- begins immediately victed defendant to serve his sentence imposed, perfectly after it is it is with consistent text judge such cases to have the determine credit at the *12 sentencing hearing. conclusion of the Even if the com- postponed mencement of the sentence until a later date, specifying an order the amount of the credit to which the directing defendant entitled, was then and that an additional given appropriate, credit be if conform to would also the statutory prohibit judge The statute text. does not the any resolving from the issue at the time after sentence has imposed.10 been short, In the text does not mandate particular procedure every in must be followed case. Appeals Those recognized Courts of that have the shared role of the sentencing judge the jail General in the decision to award g., See, credit include Circuit e. United Eighth the Ninth and the Circuit. Chalker, Beston, States v. 2d, 1258; United States 2d, 915 F. v. 936 F. at 363. 10“Instead, failing specify we conclude to whom power to such vested, Congress was intended the Attorney and the district authority grant courts to have concurrent to time served. As practical matter, holding give court, will our to the in district its discre tion, opportunity grant previously initial credit for served. fully compatible We be Congress’ believe this result pass with intent in ing Comprehensive Crime Control Report, Act of 1984. Senate discussing sentencing provisions in Act, specifically of the decried the certainty finality lack pre-Guidelines system under the ‘prisoners really to the effect that often do long they know how will voice leaves clearly use of passive Although Congress’ is with respect the decisionmaker of who the question open D- §3585 in credit, Subchapter the placement to jail called to deter- “the court” is upon in which Imprisonment, in- sentence, §3582, sentence, §3581, impose mine the §3583, and determine release, clude a term of supervised in or consecutively term is to run concurrently whether to the sentences, 3584, clearly points the case of multiple credit, in the is to calculate as the who person judge made this could have perfectly first instance. Congress §in but that “the court” clear by repeating phrase §3585 in a subchap- unnecessary by placing was made almost had responsibility every the court clearly ter which could also ac- taken, delegate needed to be but action that authorities. tions to appropriate
H-4 I—1 more amounts to nothing textual argument The Court’s because sometimes all issues relating an assertion that than not be for decision at determination will ripe to the credit court never has authority the trial the time of sentencing, that are even cases ripe the credit determination make flawed, the is so reasoning plainly Because this decision.11 Act, are released.’ Crime Control they very day prison until the spend 49, reprinted in U. S. Code *13 225, Cong., Sess. at 1984 Rep. No. 98th 2d S. court, Allowing the district in its discre- News at 3232. Cong. & Admin. imposed sentence is furthers tion, compute credit time when the crime by informing one convicted of a at the outset purpose congressional United they spend prison.” will precisely long how their sentence of omitted). (footnotes Chalker, 2d, F. at 1258 States v. 915 11 ripe that can arise that are Certainly are credit issues there some hearing. What constitutes “official the time of decision at an issue on which the Courts of It is also is one such issue. detention” in Moreland v. United example, currently For are divided. Appeals States, (1991), Eighth agreed Circuit with Moreland 690, F. 2d 692 932 community spent he at a treat for the time receive credit that he should Insley, 185, 186 (1991), States v. 927 F. 2d United center; however, in ment Insley’s of release did not consti- that conditions held Fourth Circuit 344 holding
Court’s understanding legisla- must rest on its of the history. history tive on which the Court relies includes Reports no relevant comments in the Committee or the de- only prior It bates. consists of the fact that to 1987 the statute directed the General to make the credit ante, determination. at See 331-332. It seems to how- me, smidgen history merely ever, raises the issue answering Congress without carefully it. The fact that re- way wrote the relevant section in a that makes the defend- right significantly ant’s support more valuable tends to changes language conclusion that the were deliberate and ignored. should not be See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U. S. (1991); United States Railroad Retirement Bd. Fritz, v. Recognizing U. 166, S. the district court’s authority appropriate to enter an order at the conclusion sentencing hearing entirely congres- is consistent with a purpose sional right. to enhance the value of this
HH >—I statutory policy adversely by recog- No would be affected nizing authority the district court’s to make the initial credit appropriate impor- determination in and in cases, fact, two policies tant Ap- would be First, served. as the Court of peals supra, for the Ninth Circuit observed, 10, see n. allowing compute the district court, in its discretion, imposed credit when the sentence is furthers the interest in providing prisoners prompt, precise with accurate, in- they spend prison. formation about the time policy expressly must This Report describing identified in the Senate Brennan, purposes credit; tute in Ramsey v. 878 F. 2d (1989), Ramsey Seventh Circuit would not the time that spent halfway in a awaiting trial, house while United States and in v. Woods, 2d, 888 F. the Tenth Circuit held that Woods was not enti- tled to credit for the time he at a residential treatment center when cases, he was out In ripe on bond. each of these for decision issue was sentencing hearing. at the *14 “whereby procedure victim, the offender, the
the value of a prison society the date at the time of all know the release and by subject adjustments sentencing to minor court, the initial ” Rep. prison ‘good No. behavior called time.’ S. based on (1983).12 p. 46 98-225, allowing greater importance, the dis-
Second, and of even the determination furthers trict court to make the credit is the interest in uniform and evenhanded Sentencing centerpiece Act of 1984. Reform the entire by disputed that must be resolved When there are issues parties judge, proceeding, are in which the an adversarial place represented by proceeding in takes the counsel and guarantee of fair open best on is the record, court and the repre- defendant The convicted and accurate decision.13 usually sentencing, but trial at the time of sented counsel Committing after he is incarcerated. must fend himself after the defendant decision the the begun particularly his if he must serve to serve his sentence, facility district of convic- remote from the sentence some only participation of the effective defense tion, can minimize may generate pro it meritless se claims Indeed, counsel. by prompt credit that be avoided consideration could disposition delay sentencing, complicate well as as approach A that allows of meritorious flexible claims. judge how, credit determination when, to decide clear, Report of the Act was objective As made one the Senate “prisoners really do know in which often to redress situation very they spend prison day they are released.” long how will until the Rep. 98-225, S. No. at 49. assigning recognized advantages Several States have (“A (1991) jail Fla. 921.161 calculating court the task of credit. See Stat. im imprisonment begin run the date it is shall not before sentence credit posed, imposing a sentence allow a defendant but court shall jail county before sentence. The all of the time he provided for in the shall be specified period must be for of time and (West 2900.5(d) 1992); Supp. sentence”); Ann. see also Cal. Penal Code Mass. Gen. Laws 279:33A *15 should be made is consistent with the fully purposes statute and with its text.14
For the reasons, I affirm would foregoing judgment Court Appeals. required The information for the judge make a credit easily part determination could become routinely of the information provided judge presentence to the in the report. report Such already contains the prior convicted offender’s history, criminal which includes much of necessary the information eligible decide whether he is credit for time in custody. report could contain jail the amount of person to, credit the is entitled and if are there other pending sentences unserved, or a recommendation whether the current sentence should be concurrent prior or consecutive to sentences.