CHRISTOPHER CUMMINGS, PETITIONER, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, RESPONDENT.
No. 21-AA-0821
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
Decided May 18, 2023
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.
Chesseley A. Robinson for petitioner.
Stacey L. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, with whom Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia at the time the brief was filed, Caroline Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for respondent.
Before DEAHL and HOWARD, Associate Judges, and THOMPSON, Senior Judge.
THOMPSON, Senior Judge: Petitioner Christopher Cummings seeks review of a decision by the Director of the District of Columbia Department of Motor Vehicles (the “DMV“) upholding a DMV notice that announced Mr. Cummings‘s lifetime disqualification from holding a commercial driver‘s license (“CDL“). The DMV concedes in its brief that a remand is in order for the Director to modify Mr. Cummings‘s disqualification so that he is eligible for possible reinstatement after 10 years (as described in
We remand to the DMV for it to modify Mr. Cummings‘s disqualification to specify that he will be eligible to seek reinstatement of his CDL after 10 years. For the reasons discussed below, we otherwise affirm the Director‘s decision.
A. The CDL Statute and Regulations
The Uniform Classification and Commercial Driver‘s License Act of 1990 (“UCCDLA“), D.C. Law 8-161, 37 D.C. Reg. 4665 (codified at
The federal law was amended in 1999 to require the Secretary of Transportation to issue amended regulations that would not only require disqualification of CDL holders who are convicted of alcohol- or drug-related offenses while driving commercial vehicles, but that would also require “disqualification . . . from operating a commercial motor vehicle of an individual who holds a [CDL] and who has been convicted of . . . a drug or alcohol related offense involving a motor vehicle (other than a commercial motor vehicle).” Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (“MCSIA“), Pub. L. No. 106-159, § 201(b)(2), 113 Stat. 1748; see
In May 2005, the DMV issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend the District‘s CDL regulations to provide, inter alia, for disqualification from holding a CDL for drivers convicted of a drug- or alcohol-related offense involving any vehicle, an update “suggested by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration [“FMCSA“] to establish conformity with federal law[.]” 52 D.C. Reg. 5084, 5088 (May 27, 2005). In August 2005, the DMV followed up with the adoption of emergency rules to make the same change (and some other changes) immediate, in advance of anticipated but not-yet-scheduled Council hearings. 52 D.C. Reg. 7831, 7832 (Aug. 12, 2005). The notice of emergency rulemaking explained that the DMV had received notice from the FMCSA that
The emergency rulemaking and corresponding final rulemaking promulgated on March 24, 2006, modified
B. Petitioner‘s CDL and Driving History and the DMV Notice of Disqualification
On March 27, 2021, the DMV sent Mr. Cummings an Official Disqualification Notice, stating that he was “disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for LIFE” pursuant to
Mr. Cummings objected to the Disqualification Notice and demanded that it be rescinded, asserting inter alia, through counsel, that he had “never been convicted of driving a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol” and had not “committed 2 or more serious traffic violations that involved the operation of a commercial vehicle within a 3 year period.” He contended that the Disqualification Notice therefore was issued in contravention of
II. Analysis
A. Whether the Disqualification Based on Mr. Cummings‘s Non-Commercial-Vehicle Driving Record Was in Contravention of Law
The DMV Director rejected Mr. Cummings‘s argument that the Notice of Disqualification premised on
In rejecting Mr. Cummings‘s objection to the disqualification, the DMV Director stated without further explanation “DMV does not agree with your argument of a conflict between the code and regulations.” The DMV argues in its brief that this court owes deference to the agency‘s interpretation that there is no conflict between
Mr. Cummings is correct that
Moreover, the legislative history of the District‘s CDL statute shows that the Council was focused on the “various requirements for state participation and compliance with the [federal CMVSA],” Bill 8-505 § 2 (D.C. 1990), and on bringing the District into compliance with the federal legislation. Report on Bill 8-505 at 1. As described above, in enacting the UCCDLA, the Council directed the Mayor to “[c]omply with any . . . requirement mandated by section 12009” of the CMVSA, which sets out the requirements for disqualification. See
Mr. Cummings would have us reach a contrary conclusion based on the fact that the Council “has had 20 years to amend its code” to effect the “any vehicle” change but has “chosen not to do so.” To be sure, the Council might have amended the CDL statute, specifically
B. Whether the Disqualification Is Invalid on the Other Grounds Asserted by Mr. Cummings
Mr. Cummings raises a number of other challenges to his CDL disqualification, which we address in turn. First, he asserts that the DMV lacked jurisdiction to disqualify him based on offenses committed in Maryland and committed while Mr. Cummings was a Maryland resident. He further complains that it was improper for the DMV to base a disqualification on conduct that occurred before his CDL licensure in the District in 2019, and he asserts that it is possible that he was under the influence of a Maryland controlled substance other than alcohol that does not meet the District‘s definition of a controlled substance. Mr. Cummings did not raise these objections or even allude to them in his letter to the DMV objecting to the disqualification. We conclude that these arguments were forfeited, and we therefore do not consider them. See D.C. Hous. Auth. v. D.C. Off. of Hum. Rts., 881 A.2d 600, 611 (D.C. 2005) (“Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.” (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952))).
Likewise forfeited is the argument, which Mr. Cummings has advanced for the first time in his reply brief, that his 2016 conviction, which the record indicates was based on 2014 DWI offense in Maryland, was “not a conviction for the purpose of any disqualification or disability” under
Mr. Cummings also raises a number of claims relating to the documents contained in, or absent from, the material the DMV transmitted to this court as the administrative record. He contends that the “Full Driver‘s Record” that the DMV transmitted, which includes a February 2022 computer printout, contains material that was not available to the DMV at the time it issued the March 2021 disqualification notice. He contends further that this
We conclude that the record is sufficient to uphold the disqualification. The driving record identifies two separate offenses — one underlying a 2016 DWI conviction, and another underlying a 2021 DUI conviction — that were mentioned by (and thus known to) the DMV at the time it issued the disqualification notice, which thereby apprised Mr. Cummings of the basis for his disqualification. The DMV was not required to base the disqualification on certified or official court records or on MVA documents, because
Mr. Cummings‘s remaining arguments assert constitutional claims. He asserts that his lifetime disqualification from holding a CDL constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Assuming arguendo that the disqualification sanction constitutes punishment rather than a civil remedial measure,5 we are not persuaded that a lifetime disqualification conditionally subject to reinstatement after 10 years is grossly disproportionate to two alcohol-related driving offenses.6 Mr. Cummings provides no authority for the proposition, merely asserting that because non-CDL drivers may commit more of the same offense while facing more lenient restrictions, his punishment
Finally, Mr. Cummings argues that he was entitled to a pre-disqualification hearing “to determine whether the basis of [his lifetime disqualification was] valid.” He similarly asserted in his written objection to the disqualification that the DMV‘s failure to provide a pre-deprivation hearing violated his right to due process. The DMV does not question whether Mr. Cummings “has a property interest in the thing taken away,” Wall v. Babers, 82 A.3d 794, 801 (D.C. 2014) (pertaining to a DMV decision declining to renew a non-commercial driver‘s license); thus, we assume that he does have a property interest in his CDL.
We begin our analysis of this issue by observing that the DMV‘s March 27, 2021, Disqualification Notice informed Mr. Cummings that his disqualification would be prospective, i.e., effective as of April 10, 2021. As the DMV highlights in its brief, Mr. Cummings did not file his written objections to the notice until October 7, 2021, over six months after the date of the notice. These facts show that he had, but did not avail himself of, a pre-deprivation opportunity to challenge the announced sanction. And, in any event, as in Wall, Mr. Cummings‘s claim that he was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing is foreclosed by Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 115 (1977); Wall, 82 A.3d at 802. In Dixon, the Supreme Court concluded that summary revocation without a pre-deprivation hearing was consistent with principles of due process because of the “public interests present under the circumstances” of the case, namely an interest in “keep[ing] off the roads those drivers who are unable or unwilling to respect traffic rules and the safety of others.” Dixon, 433 U.S. at 115. That is precisely the interest the District‘s CDL regulations are designed to protect.
Further, it was incumbent upon Mr. Cummings in objecting to the disqualification to demonstrate the need for an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Cummings failed to do so. The only factual dispute he identified related to the precise 2021 disposition date of his 2020 offense, an immaterial matter which Mr. Cummings corrected and which the DMV does not dispute. As explained above, Mr. Cummings has effectively conceded that he incurred the two operative convictions; thus, “there were no contested facts that needed to be resolved at a . . . hearing.” Wall, 82 A.3d at 803. We have “rejected the notion that due process requires empty process,” such as a hearing where there are no contested facts that need to be resolved. Osborne v. District of Columbia, 169 A.3d 876, 885 (D.C. 2017). For all the foregoing reasons, we are satisfied that Mr. Cummings received adequate process.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the DMV decision to impose a disqualification, but remand the matter to the DMV for it to modify the disqualification to specify that Mr. Cummings will be eligible for possible reinstatement of his CDL after ten years.
So ordered.