Russello v. United StatesRussello v. United States
delivered the opinion of the Court. This is yet another case concerning the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chapter of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Pub. L. 91-452, Title IX, 84 Stat. 941, as amended,
On June 8, 1977, petitioner Joseph C. Russello and others were indicted for racketeering, conspiracy, and mail fraud, in violation of
Petitioner took an appeal to the former United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A panel of that court affirmed petitioner's criminal conviction,
United States
v.
Martino,
So far as the case in its present posture is concerned, the basic facts are not in dispute. The majority opinion of the en banc court described them succinctly:
“Briefly, the evidence showed that a group of individuals associated for the purpose of committing arson with the intent to defraud insurance companies. This association in fact enterprise, composed of an insurance adjuster, homeowners, promoters, investors, and arsonists, operated to destroy at least eighteen residential and commercial properties in Tampa and Miami, Florida between July 1973 and April 1976. The panel summarized the ring’s operations as follows:
“‘At first the arsonists only burned buildings already owned by those associated with the ring. Following a burning, the building owner filed an inflated proof of loss statement and collected the insurance proceeds from which his co-conspirators were paid. Later, ring members bought buildings suitable for burning, secured insurance in excess of value and, after a burning, made claims for the loss and divided the proceeds’.”681 F. 2d, at 953 (footnote omitted).
Specifically, petitioner was the owner of the Central Professional Building in Tampa. This structure had two parts, an original smaller section in front and a newer addition at the rear. The latter contained apartments, offices, and parking facilities. Petitioner arranged for arsonists to set fire to the front portion. He intended to use the insurance proceeds to rebuild that section. The fire, however, spread to the rear. Joseph Carter, another member of the arson ring, was the adjuster for petitioner’s insurance claim and helped him to obtain the highest payments possible. The resulting payments made up the aggregate sum of $340,043.09
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The sole issue in this case is whether profits and proceeds derived from racketeering constitute an “interest” within the meaning of this statute and are therefore subject to forfeiture. Petitioner contends that
In a RICO case recently decided, this Court observed: “In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of ‘a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’”
United States
v.
Turkette,
Here,
The term “interest” is not specifically defined in the RICO statute. This silence compels us to “start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.”
Richards
v.
United States,
This Court repeatedly has relied upon the term “interest” in defining the meaning of “property” in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. See
Perry
v.
Sindermann,
Petitioner himself has not attempted to define the term “interest” as used in
We do not agree. Every property interest, including a right to profits or proceeds, may be described as an interest in something. Before profits of an illegal enterprise are divided, each participant may be said to own an “interest” in the ill-gotten gains. After distribution, each will have a pos-sessory interest in currency or other items so distributed. We therefore conclude that the language of the statute plainly covers the insurance proceeds petitioner received as a result of his arson activities.
> HH
We are fortified in this conclusion by our examination of the structure of the RICO statute. We disagree with those
The evolution of these statutory provisions supplies further evidence that Congress intended
We note that the RICO statute’s definition of the term “enterprise” in §1961(4) encompasses both legal entities and illegitimate associations-in-fact. See
United States
v.
Turkette,
Petitioner stresses that
Petitioner, of course, correctly suggests that Members of Congress who voted for the RICO statute were aware of the Controlled Substances Act. See 116 Cong. Rec. 33651 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Brotzman); id., at 1180-1182 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond); id., at 33631 (remarks of Rep. Weicker); id., at 33646 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at 35318 (remarks of Rep. Anderson). It is most unlikely, however, that without explanation a potent forfeiture weapon was withheld from the RICO statute, intended for use in a broad assault on organized crime, while the same weapon was included in the Controlled Substances Act, meant for use in only one part of the same struggle. If this was Congress’ intent, one would expect it to have said so in clear and understandable terms.
Petitioner also suggests that subsequent proposed legislation demonstrates that the RICO forfeiture provision of 1970 excludes profits. Brief for Petitioner 29-34. The bills to which petitioner refers, however, were introduced in order to
Neither are we persuaded by petitioner’s argument that his position is supported by the fact that certain state racketeering statutes expressly provide for the forfeiture of “profits,” “money,” “interest or property,” or “all property, real or personal,” acquired from racketeering. Brief for Petitioner 8-9. Nearly all of the state statutes postdate the
Meyers
and
Thevis
District Court decisions. See,
e. g.,
y
If it is necessary to turn to the legislative history of the RICO statute, one finds that that history does not reveal, as petitioner would have us hold, see Brief for Petitioner 11-21, a limited congressional intent.
The legislative history clearly demonstrates that the RICO statute was intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots. Congress’ statement of findings and purpose in
Congress emphasized the need to fashion new remedies in order to achieve its far-reaching objectives. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 76 (1969).
“What is needed here . . . are new approaches that will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts.” Id., at 79.
Senator Scott spoke of “new legal weapons,” 116 Cong. Rec. 819 (1970), and Senator McClellan stressed the need for new penal remedies.
Id.,
at 591-592. Representative Poff, floor manager of the bill in the House, made similar observations.
Id.,
at 35193. Representative Rodino observed that “[djrastic methods . . . are essential, and we must develop law enforcement measures at least as efficient as those of organized crime.”
Id.,
at 35199. The RICO statute was viewed as one such “extraordinary” weapon.
Id.,
at 602 (remarks of Sen. Hruska). And the forfeiture provision was
The legislative history leaves no doubt that, in the view of Congress, the economic power of organized crime derived from its huge illegal profits. See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 237, 249-256 (1982). Congress could not have hoped successfully to attack organized crime’s economic roots without reaching racketeering profits. During the congressional debates, the sources and magnitude of organized crime’s income were emphasized repeatedly. See, e. g., 115 Cong. Rec. 5873, 5884-5885 (1969); 116 Cong. Rec. 590, 592 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan). From all this, the intent to authorize forfeiture of racketeering profits seems obvious. H. R. Rep. No. 91-1549, p. 57 (1970), recites that the forfeiture provision extends to “all property and interests, as broadly defined, which are related to the violations.”
It is true that Congress viewed the RICO statute in large part as a response to organized crime’s infiltration of legitimate enterprises.
United States
v.
Turkette,
We are not persuaded otherwise by the presence of a 1969 letter from the then Deputy Attorney General to Senator McClellan. See Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st
The rule of lenity, which this Court has recognized in certain situations of statutory ambiguity, see
United States
v.
Turkette,
We therefore disagree with the reasoning of the respective courts in the Marubeni, McManigal, Meyers, and Thevis cases, and we affirm the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 3
It is so ordered.
Notes
The Solicitor General, while perceiving “a factual distinction between Marubeni and the present case,” felt that “the holding and reasoning of Marubeni would require the Ninth Circuit to reach the opposite result from the Fifth Circuit on the facts of the instant case.” Memorandum for United States 4, n. 3. Accordingly, he joined in the prayer that a writ of certiorari be granted.
There may well be factual situations to which both subsections apply. The subsections, however, are clearly not wholly redundant.
In our ruling today, we recognize that we have not resolved any ambiguity that might be inherent in the terms “profits” and “proceeds.” Our use of those terms is not intended to suggest a particular means of calculating the precise amount that is subject to RICO forfeiture in any given case. We hold simply that the “interests” subject to forfeiture under