ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, APPELLANT, v. HORMEL FOODS CORP., APPELLEE.
No. 19-CV-0397
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
September 2, 2021
Arguеd June 30, 2020. Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (CAB-4744-16) (Hon. Anthony C. Epstein, Trial Judge)
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.
David S. Muraskin, with whom Kelsey Eberly, of the bar of the State of California, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, was on the brief, for appellant.
Aaron D. Van Oort, of the bar of the State of Minnesota, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, with whom Frank S. Swain, Tyler A. Young, of the bar of the States of Massachusetts and Minnesota, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, and Martin J. Demoret, of the bar of the States of Iowa and Nebraska, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, were on the brief, for appellee.
Allison M. Zieve and Scott L. Nelson filed an amicus curiae brief for Public Citizen Litigation Group in support of appellant.
Cheryl Leahy, Sarah Hanneken, and Wendy Watts filed an amicus curiae brief for Animal Outlook f/k/a Compassion Over Killing, Animal Equality, and The Humane League in support of appellant.
Craig L. Briskin filed an amicus curiae brief for National Consumers League in support of appellant.
Katherine Campbell, Robert George, of the bаr of the States of Arkansas and Oklahoma,
Before THOMPSON, MCLEESE, and DEAHL, Associate Judges.
DEAHL, Associate Judge: The Animal Legal Defense Fund sued Hormel Foods in connection with meat products it advertises as “Natural Choice.” ALDF claims the ads are misleading in violation of the District of Columbia‘s Consumer Protection Procedures Act. See
ALDF now brings this appeal. It argues: (1) contrary to the trial court‘s ruling, the Consumer Protection Procedures Act, or CPPA, modifies Article III standing requirements with a statutory test that it satisfies; (2) in any event, it had Article III standing under the “organizational standing” doctrine; and (3) its claims are not preempted by federal law.
We agree with ALDF on its first point. The CPPA confers standing upon “public interest organization[s]” bringing suit “on behalf of the interests of a consumer or a class of consumers,” so long as they have a “sufficient nexus” to “adequately represent those interests.”
I.
ALDF is a nonprofit organization whose core mission is to “protect the lives and advance the interests of animals through the legal system.” It advances that objective through a variety of strategies, including legal advocacy and public outreach related to animal welfare. Important here, ALDF fulfills its mission, in part, by trying to ensure consumers are provided with accurate information about the treatment of animals raised for consumption so as to reduce demand for factory-farmed products. Factory farming, as ALDF describes it, “involves packing animals into cramped, unsanitary settings, in many cases so small the animals are barely able to move.”
Hormel produces and sells food products containing meat and poultry. In 2006, it launched its Natural Choice® line of deli meats, which include beef, ham, turkey, and chicken products. Before they hit the market, Hormel was required by law to submit proposed labeling to the U.S. Department
Shortly after Hormel began its campaign, ALDF discovered that the pigs slaughtered to make Hormel products had been subjected to what it describes as “egregious and stomach-churning” treatment. It made that discovery while covertly investigating a pig-breeding facility it later identified as a Hormel supplier. ALDF lobbied the USDA to prohibit use of the term “natural” on the labels of all meat and poultry products that are factory-farmed—a particularly inhumane and unnatural means of animal husbandry, in its view. According to ALDF, the descriptor trades on consumers’ mistaken beliefs that meat products described as natural are sourced from humanely raised livestoсk. It specifically identified Hormel‘s Natural Choice deli meats as misleading consumers in that way, despite the USDA‘s approval of their labeling. ALDF later published its advocacy efforts online, along with the findings from its covert investigation. ALDF also engaged in other advocacy it maintains was, at least in part, undertaken to combat Hormel‘s Natural Choice campaign. It lobbied against a regulation proposed by the USDA concerning a pig slaughter inspection program, and it continued to challenge so-called “Ag-Gag” laws—prohibiting undercover investigations of agricultural facilities1—as it had done since 2011.
In addition to its advocacy efforts, ALDF sued Hormel in the D.C. Superior Court, alleging its advertising campaign violated the CPPA. See
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted Hormel‘s motion. It concluded ALDF lacked standing to sue under the CPPA. It also concluded that ALDF‘s claims were preempted by federal labeling laws—namely, the Federal Meat Inspection Act and the Poultry Products Inspection Act. ALDF now appeals, challenging those rulings.
II.
The threshold question on appeal is whether ALDF has standing to maintain its suit under the CPPA. In ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment regarding standing, the trial court rejected ALDF‘s argument that it had standing as
ALDF asserts on appeal, as it did in opposing summary judgment, that it has standing under two distinct theories. First, it argues that it has so-called “representational standing” under
A.
ALDF claims it has representational standing under CPPA provision
1.
The District of Columbia‘s local courts, “established by Congress pursuant to Article I, are not [constitutionally] bound by the requirements of Article III.” District of Columbia v. Walters, 319 A.2d 332, 338 n.13 (D.C. 1974); see also Rotunda v. Marriott Int‘l, Inc., 123 A.3d 980, 987 (D.C. 2015); District of Columbia v. Grp. Ins. Admin., 633 A.2d 2, 12 (D.C. 1993). Our courts nonetheless generally follow Article III‘s guidance to adjudicate only “cases” or “controversies“—as implemented via standing doctrine—albeit “for prudential reasons.” Fraternal Order of Police v. District of Columbia, 113 A.3d 195, 199 (D.C. 2015). We do so in recognition of the sound judicial policy “that an adversary system can best adjudicate real, not abstract, conflicts.” Grayson, 15 A.3d at 233 (citation omitted). But that prudential judgment is subject to legislative override, and nobody “questions the [D.C.] Council‘s authority to remove prudential limits on standing.” Id. at 259 (Ruiz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).2
A division of this court, in Grayson,4 endorsed the view that those 2000 amendments jettisoned Article III standing requirements. But we revisited the issue en banc and ultimately rejected that position. Grayson, 15 A.3d at 238. We reasoned that “[e]limination of our constitutional standing requirement would be so unusual” that we would not “lightly infer such intent on the part of the Council” absent a clear expression—from the text and “context of the legislative and drafting history“—to do so. Id. at 238, 243-44. Finding no “mention of this court‘s constitutional standing requirement” in the legislative record, and no sufficiently clear intent to dispense with it in the statutory text or enactment history, we concluded there was no “clear expression of an intent by the Council to eliminate our constitutional standing requirement.” Id. at 243-44.
The year after we decided Grayson, the Council once again amended the CPPA in 2012. Most relevant here, it enacted two new subsections,
(i) Subject to sub-subparagraph (ii) ... a public interest organization may, on behalf of the interests of a consumer or a class of consumers, bring an action seeking relief from the use by any person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District if the consumer or class could bring an
action [in their own capacity] for relief from such use by such person of such trade practice.
(ii) An action brought under sub-subparagraph (i) of this subparagraph shall be dismissed if the court determines that the public interest organization does not have sufficient nexus to the interests involved of the consumer or class to adequately represent those interests.
The limitations to bringing suit under this provision reveal the Council‘s intent to modify traditional Article III standing requirements with the above statutory test. Those statutory limitations are threefold: (1) rather than permitting any person or legal entity to bring suit, (k)(1)(D) applies only to those nonprofits organized and operating, at least in part, on behalf of consumers; (2) the consumer or class of consumers must be capable of bringing suit in their own right; and (3) the public interest organization must have a “sufficient nexus to the interests involved of the consumer or class ... to adequately represent those interests.”
Two additional points make that intent particularly clear. First, (k)(1)(D) would be pointless if it incorporated Article III‘s restrictions. Recall that (k)(1)(C) already expressly empowers a nonprofit organization to bring suit on behalf of itself or its members, so that if (k)(1)(D) were likewise interpreted as incorporating that requirement, it would serve no independent function. Hormel‘s reading would leave (k)(1)(D) as imposing three additional restrictions to nonprofits bringing suit—outlined in the previous paragraph, supra—so that it would never make sense for nonprofits to bring a (k)(1)(D) suit when they might sidestep those additional barriers through a (k)(1)(C) suit. That would violate the “basic principle” of statutory interpretation that “each provision of the statute should be construed so as to give effect to all of [its] provisions, not rendering any provision superfluous.”6 Grayson, 15 A.3d at 238 (quoting Tangoren v. Stephenson, 977 A.2d 357, 360 n.12 (D.C. 2009)). It would also contravene the maxim that where the legislature implements a significant chаnge in language, as it did when it created (k)(1)(D), courts presume a significant change in meaning. See In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837,
847 n.11 (D.C. 1995) (collecting authorities); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 256 (2012).
Second, the legislative history—far from being silent as it was with the 2000 amendments interpreted in Grayson, 15 A.3d at 243-44—makes the Council‘s intent to modify Article III requirements clear. A report from the Council‘s Committee on Public Services and Consumer Affairs explained that the amended language “respond[ed] to Grayson by being more explicit about what kinds of suits the Council intends to authorize.” See Consumer Protection Act of 2012, Report on Bill 19-0581, at 4 (Nov. 28, 2012). That Committee Report explains that subsection (k)(1)(D) “responds most directly to Grayson and the Committee‘s desire” to confer “maximum standing” to public interest organizations:
Subparagraph (D) is intended to reach, for [public service organizations], the full extent of standing as may be recognized by the District of Columbia courts. This may include bases for standing that ... the D.C. courts have not yet had occasion to recognize .... Subparagraph (D) is intended to explicitly and unequivocally authorize the court to find that a public interest organization has standing beyond what would be afforded under sub-paragraphs (A)-(C), beyond what would be afforded under a narrow reading of prior D.C. court decisions, and beyond what would be afforded in a federal case under a narrow reading of prior federal court decisions on federal standing.
Id. at 6.
This report demonstrates that the Council intended public interest organizations bringing suit under (k)(1)(D) to be free from any requirement to demonstrate their own Article III standing. Any contrary conclusion would defeat the Council‘s “explicit[]” and “unequivocal[]” intent for (k)(1)(D) to confer standing “beyond” what is afforded under (k)(1)(C). Id. It would likewise fall short of the Council‘s stated intention that (k)(1)(D) reach “the full extent of standing as may be recognized by the District of Columbia courts,” where we have made clear that extent exceeds Article III‘s bounds where the Council so provides, as we conclude it did here.
Hormel counters that the legislative history favors its view because an earlier draft of the 2012 bill explicitly eliminated the injury-in-fact requirement for nonprofit organizations, yet the Council removed that provision from the final draft. But that earlier draft would have eliminated Article III strictures for all nonprofit organizаtions “regardless of whether or not the organization itself has suffered or would suffer an injury in fact.” The excision of that clause came in conjunction with the addition of (k)(1)(D); that one-two punch effectively resurrected Article III barriers for generic nonprofits (which had been jettisoned in the earlier draft, as
Hormel points out) while carving out public interest organizations as the lone subset of nonprofits that are exempt from those strictures. That drafting history conforms to our view that the Council ultimately retained Article III restrictions in (k)(1)(C)
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the trial court interpreted our precedents as holding that the CPPA does not modify Article III requirements, even after the 2012 amendments, citing Stone v. Landis Construction Co., 120 A.3d 1287, 1289 (D.C. 2015), Little v. Suntrust Bank, 204 A.3d 1272, 1275 (D.C. 2019), and Floyd v. Bank of America Corp., 70 A.3d 246, 251 (D.C. 2013). All of those cases concerned suits brought by individuals, and none purported to interpret (k)(1)(D)‘s separate treatment of public interest organizations (or (k)(1)(C)‘s treatment of the broader set of nonprofit organizations, for that matter). They are thus inapposite. The trial court also ascribed to the Council an “inten[t] and expect[ation]” that Article III apply to all CPPA actions, but it did so by quoting a section of the Committee Report dealing exclusively with (k)(1)(C). It did not consider the same Committee Report‘s section describing the purpose and scope of (k)(1)(D). As emphasized above, that section forcefully declares the Council‘s intent that (k)(1)(D) confer “maximum standing,” “beyond” that conferred by (k)(1)(C).
The legislative history strongly points to the Council‘s intent, with respect to suits brought by public interest organizations under (k)(1)(D), to modify Article III standing requirements with a statutory test. Unlike in Grayson, we hold that intent is now sufficiently explicit.
2.
The next question is whether ALDF meets (k)(1)(D)‘s statutory test. To do so, it needs to check three boxes: (1) it must be a public interest organization,
First, ALDF is a public interest organization, i.e., a nonprofit “organized and operating,” at least in part, “for the purpose of promоting interests or rights of consumers,”
The trial court concluded otherwise, taking the view that ALDF is organized not to promote “the interests and rights of the consumers of Hormel mеat products, but rather those of the consumed.” Those interests are not mutually exclusive. ALDF believes that consumers will alter their meat purchasing and consumption habits if they are aware of the realities about how their meat is sourced. That it
advocates on behalf of consumers only in service of some predominant purpose of promoting animal welfare is not fatal to its suit. Purposes regularly fall short of end goals. For example, one‘s purpose for going to the gym might be to get in shape, even if doing so is only in service of some overarching goal(s) of living longer, attracting a partner, or the like. We start with the assumption the Council meant “purpose” in that ordinary sense—that people and organizations routinely have multiple purposes at once, some subservient to others. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009) (“Statutory construction must begin with the language ... and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.“). We have confirmation of that assumption here where the Council made clear that promоting the interests of consumers need only be “part” of a nonprofit‘s purpose,
Second, ALDF adequately identifies the class of consumers it seeks to represent as D.C. consumers who are targeted, and have been or will be misled, by Hormel‘s Natural Choice ads. Hormel does not argue that such a class is too indefinite or hypothetical to sue on behalf of; rather, it acknowledges that class of meat eaters as “the most obvious group of interested consumers” ALDF could
represent.8 It instead maintains that “ALDF did not raise th[e] argument” that it was suing on behalf of that class of consumers “below and thus waived it.” The record is to the contrary. From the outset of its complaint, ALDF identified a substantial proportion of consumers who understood claims like “100% natural” as indicating qualities that were not true of Natural Choice meats. The trial court stated its understanding in open court, several months before summary judgment motions were filed, that ALDF was seeking an injunction “for the consumers that ALDF is suing on behalf of, not for the organization,” and Hormel‘s counsel responded, “[t]hat‘s the way I understood counsel‘s commеnts as well” and “we‘re fine with that.” The court verified with ALDF‘s counsel, who answered “Yes,” it was suing on behalf of those consumers. While ALDF additionally sought to maintain its suit on behalf of the general public under (k)(1)(C), that alternative ground for suit does not diminish the sufficiency with which it identified the
Third, ALDF has a “sufficient nexus” to the group of consumers it identified. This requirement is an “important limit[]” that functions to ensure that an “organization has a sufficient stake in the action” to pursue it “with the requisite zeal and concreteness.” Committee Report, at 6. ALDF has a sufficient stake in those consumer interests here, and neither the trial court nor Hormel has questioned its aptitude or zeal in prosecuting this suit. As the trial court found, ALDF has long sought to ensure that meat-eating consumers have “accurate information about factory farming conditions and practices” so they can make more informed decisions about meat consumption, with the intended result of reducing demand for factory-farmed products. This work continues ALDF‘s decades-long history of advocacy and legal action designed to promote consumers’ interest in “truth in meat and poultry advertising.”
Hormel counters that ALDF does not advance the interests of meat consumers because ALDF “would be happiest if consumers stopped eating meat entirely,” rendering ALDF‘s interests “antagonistic” to those of meat consumers. We disagree. There is nothing inconsistent about seeking to eliminate meat consumption while ensuring meat eaters have accurate information available to them when making their purchasing decisions. ALDF views the latter as a means to, or at least an incremental step toward, the former. Its immediate objectives include combatting false and misleading claims about how meat is produced, and those goals align with consumers’ interests in truthful advertising. Hormel further contends that its consumers “care about whether their meat is tasty, natural, and protected against spoiling without preservatives,” while “ALDF cares about none of those things.” That is not true, as ALDF cares about whether the meat is “natural” in one sense of the word that consumers may also care about.9 Moreover, at least some meat consumers also care about ethical considerations regarding the conditions in which animals are raised and slaughtered, as evidenced by Hormel‘s own insistence that it “humanely raises and slaughters the animals used in its products.” There is no genuine dispute that ALDF has a strong interest in shedding light on those ethical considerations, putting it in sufficient alignment with that class of meat-eaters who likewise care about them.
3.
Hormel argues that ALDF forfeited its argument for statutory standing under (k)(1)(D) because it did not specifically plead that provision as a basis for standing in its complaint. Hormel raised this objection in the trial court, which either rejected it sub silentio or simply neglected to address it; it skipped over the point and considered whether standing was in fact proper under (k)(1)(D). In either case, we see no grounds for finding this argument forfeited. The facts alleged in the complaint support a (k)(1)(D) theory of standing, and Hormel had sufficient opportunity to develop and dispute those facts, which were similarly relevant to ALDF‘s expressly
ALDF‘s complaint, in its statement of jurisdiction, stated simply that the trial court had “subject matter jurisdiction over this аction under the D.C. CPPA,
Contrary to Hormel‘s sweeping view that specific legal theories are forfeited unless they are pled, we have held that “complaints need not plead law,” nor do they have to “match facts to every element of a legal theory.” Chamberlain v. American Honda Fin. Corp., 931 A.2d 1018, 1023 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Krieger v. Fadely, 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). We have rejected the opposing view, in a CPPA case no less, that plaintiffs must in their complaints “cite the specific subsections of the CPPA” that they are invoking, reasoning that “matching allеgations of the complaint to corresponding subsections of the CPPA is a straightforward task.” Velcoff v. MedStar Health, Inc., 186 A.3d 823, 827 (D.C. 2018); see also Hatmaker v. Mem‘l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010) (Plaintiffs are “not required to plead legal theories,” and “[e]ven citing the wrong statute needn‘t be a fatal mistake, provided the error is corrected in response to the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment. . . .“).
The authority Hormel principally relies upon does not support dismissal here. See La Asociacion de Trabajadores v. City of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2010).10 Trabajadores affirmed a dismissal for lack of standing only after specifically highlighting how the plaintiff “failed to assert any factual allegations in its complaint” that would support the theory of standing pressed at the summary judgment stage. Id. at 1088. Were we to adopt that same approach—in some tension with our precedents that “a trial court‘s jurisdictional inquiry under 12(b)(1) may extend beyond the facts pled in the complaint”11—we would still have no cause to find this basis for standing forfeited
The complaint‘s allegations in this case substantiated each of the three critical components of (k)(1)(D) standing: (1) that it is a public interest organization organized and operating, in part, to advance consumer interests; (2) that it has a sufficient nexus to those consumers’ interests to adequately represent them; and (3) that there is a class of D.C. consumers who eat meat and were targeted by Hormel‘s Natural Choice ads (and further substantiating its view that they were likely to be misled by claims like “100% natural“). See
As to the first point, ALDF alleged it “is a national non-profit organization” “[a]dvocating for transparency in the meat industry and truth in meat and poultry advertising is central to ALDF‘s mission.”12 As to the second and related point, its complaint describes the organization‘s long history of advocacy on “consumer safety” issues, promoting “transparency in the meat industry,” and “educating consumers” of meat-based products “about the truth behind meaningless and misleading labels and advertising by meat compаnies.” It also detailed how ALDF devoted “substantial” “resources to counteract the misinformation” of Hormel‘s Natural Choice campaign, “educating consumers about this and other ‘natural’ claims, advocating for stronger standards for the ‘natural’ claim that fall in line with consumer expectations, and publicizing the truth about Hormel‘s farming practices.” As to the third point, ALDF alleged that “Hormel aims its ‘Make the Natural Choice’ advertising campaign at the District of Columbia,” and that its “consumers are concerned about how animals are raised ... and the nature of any additives.” It further detailed how “most consumers believe that ‘natural’ means that the animals were not subject to industrial, pharmaceutical-driven factory farm conditions” and how “it is material to consumers that animals not be subject to factory-farm conditions.”
Hormel was not unfairly prejudiced by ALDF‘s delay in pinpointing the (k)(1)(D) theory of standing where each of the above factors is likewise relevant to the organizational theory of standing expressly identified in ALDF‘s complaint. The organizational theory of standing required ALDF to dеmonstrate that Hormel‘s ads posed a “direct conflict” to its organizational mission. See infra Part II.B. That inquiry substantially overlaps with the questions whether ALDF is a public interest organization and whether it has a sufficient nexus to the consumers it was seeking to represent. Hormel issued many discovery requests addressed to those (k)(1)(D) concerns. In one interrogatory, it asked ALDF to “[i]dentify all of [its] organizational activities related to ‘[a]dvocating for . . . truth in meat and poultry advertising,’ including advertising claims unrelated to animal welfare.” In another, Hormel asked
In a distinct line of attack, Hormel asserts that ALDF used the absence of a (k)(1)(D) theory in its complaint as a shield to “oppose federal jurisdiction” so that it should not be permitted to switch tactics now. We disagree. ALDF never disclaimed (k)(1)(D) standing in its effort to remand the action from federal court after Hormel had removed it under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). ALDF maintained only that it was not bringing a Rule 23 class action under CAFA because it was seeking injunctive relief rather than monetary damages. See Rotunda, 123 A.3d at 989 (holding that even under the CPPA “the necessary vehicle for suits seeking class-wide damages remains Rule 23“); see generally
We reject Hormel‘s contention that ALDF forfeited its claim of (k)(1)(D) standing and cоnclude that ALDF established as a matter of law that it has standing to maintain its suit.
B.
ALDF also challenges the trial court‘s ruling that it did not have organizational standing under Article III as is necessary to maintain suit under
III.
Finally, we address whether ALDF‘s claims are preempted by federal labeling laws, as the trial court concluded. We note at the outset that the trial court, having found a lack of standing, should not have reached the question. When the plаintiff lacks standing, the court lacks jurisdiction. UMC Dev., 120 A.3d at 43 (a lack of standing is “a defect in subject matter jurisdiction“). “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause,” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998), and the “only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). Nonetheless, having found that ALDF does in fact have standing to bring its suit, supra Part II.A, we are left to confront the question whether ALDF‘s CPPA claims are preempted by federal labeling laws. We review that question of law de novo. Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 769 (D.C. 2009).
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI provides that “the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”
Hormel‘s thesis is that the FMIA and PPIA prohibit “false or misleading” labeling,
We disagree. States are free to regulate advertisements without regard to whatever terms the USDA approves as appropriate for labeling, so long as they do not encroach on the labeling itself. As always,
We see nothing in the FMIA or PPIA suggesting Congress meant to limit states’ (or the District‘s) traditional powers to regulate advertising. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (congressional purpose is “the ultimate touchstone“). “While it is true that the FMIA prohibits states from imposing ‘[m]arking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than, those’ mandated under the FMIA,
Unlike federal statutes that broadly regulate “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”15 or those explicitly regulating “labeling and advertising”16—neither the PPIA nor the FMIA says anything at all about advertising beyond the labeling itself. See
56 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1058 (1956) (describing “the adoption, in forty-three states, the District of Columbia and Hawaii, of more or less uniform statutes designed to punish ‘untrue, deceptive, or misleading’ advertising“); see also, e.g.,
Given such pervasive and longstanding state regulatory schemes, Congress must have been “aware[] of the prevalence of” those regimes. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 575; see Collins v. United States, 631 A.2d 48, 51 (D.C. 1993) (Congress is “presumed to know the law” when it acts) (alterations and citation omitted). “If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it surely would have” expanded PPIA and FMIA‘s “express pre-emption provision[s] at some point” in the 50-plus years since it enacted them. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 574; accord Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1677 (2019). It would not leave that enormous policy implication to an (in our view unsupported) inference that whatever claims pass USDA scrutiny for labeling purposes are necessarily fair game to broadcast in all manner of advertisements, with the states having nothing whatsoever to say about it.
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Wyeth is illuminating. In that case, the plaintiff sued a pharmaceutical company for failing to warn patients about the drug‘s risk of causing gangrene. 555 U.S. at 559-60. The company countered that her suit was impliedly preempted because
Hormel attempts to distinguish Wyeth on the ground that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, at issue in that case, differs from FMIA and PPIA in an important respect. Unlike the FMIA and PPIA, the FDCA permits drug companies to unilaterally change their product labels, and the Supreme Court has held that state suits may yet be preempted where the drug manufacturer “fully informed the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state law and [] the FDA, in turn, informed the drug manufacturer that the FDA would not approve changing the drug‘s label to include that warning.” Merck Sharp, 139 S. Ct. at 1678. The distinction is of no help to Hormel. Wyeth did not rely on this feature in rejecting the manufacturer‘s obstacle preemption claim. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573-78. It mentioned it in reference to a claim of “impossibility preemption,” id. at 570, 573—as did Merck Sharp a decade later, 139 S. Ct. at 1678—where it would literally be impossible to comply with both the state and the federal schemes. Hormel has not raised the specter of impossibility preemption in this case, nor could it. It is perfectly possible for Hormel to comply with federal labeling laws and the CPPA even if ALDF‘s suit is ultimately found to be meritorious: (1) it can cease advertising the offending products altogether, (2) it can submit a new label for approval to the USDA sans the offending claims, and there is no suggestion here that the USDA would not, if asked, approve labels minus the allegedly misleading descriptors, and (3) it may yet be able to run adverts consisting “entirely of a picture of the approved product label“—though Hormel contends this adverse preemption ruling would leave even that prone to a non-preempted attack—a question that is not presented by this case. Hormel also tries to distinguish Wyeth on the basis that the FDCA‘s legislative history “indicate[s] that it was not intended to preempt stаte failure-to-warn claims.” That is no point of contrast, however, as the FMIA and PPIA‘s legislative history likewise reveals no intention to preempt state consumer protection claims.
It is thus unsurprising that the majority of federal courts addressing the issue agree that these federal labeling laws do
The Ninth Circuit crystallized the point in Nat‘l Broiler Council v. Voss, 44 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 1994). There, three trade associations sued to invalidate a section of the
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.