KARACZEWSKI v FARBMAN STEIN & COMPANY
Docket No. 129825
Supreme Court of Michigan
May 23, 2007
478 MICH 28
Argued October 4, 2006 (Calendar No. 11).
In an opinion by Justice CORRIGAN, joined by Chief Justice TAYLOR and Justices YOUNG and MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held:
1. The clear language of the statute provides that the agency has jurisdiction over an out-of-state injury only where the injured employee was a Michigan resident at the time of the injury and the contract of hire was made in Michigan. In this case, the agency lacks jurisdiction because the plaintiff was not a resident of Michigan at the time of the injury in Florida.
2. The opinion in Boyd must be overruled. The construction of the predecessor of
Reversed.
Justice WEAVER, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concurred in the decision to overrule Boyd, but dissented from applying that decision retroactively. Given the extensive reliance on Boyd by courts and nonresident injured employees, as well as the insurance decisions predicated on the Boyd interpretation of
Justice KELLY, joined by Justice CAVANAGH, dissenting, stated that the Court in Roberts and Boyd properly effectuated the Legislature‘s intent in enacting
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION - OUT-OF-STATE INJURIES - JURISDICTION.
The Workers’ Compensation Agency has jurisdiction over an out-of-state injury only where the injured employee was a Michigan resident at the time of the injury and the contract of hire was made in Michigan (
Kelman Loria, PLLC (by James P. Harvey), for the plaintiff.
Martin L. Critchell, for the defendants.
Amicus Curiae:
Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, for the Wayne County Prosecutor‘s Office.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
The parties stipulated the relevant facts:
Plaintiff was hired by defendant on October 4, 1984 to work in Michigan as a maintenance engineer. As of the date of hire, plaintiff was a resident of Detroit, Michigan and defendant employer was a resident employer in Michigan. The Contract of hire was made in Michigan. The Farbman Group continues to be a resident employer and is currently located at 28400 Northwestern Hwy, Southfield, Michigan.
Plaintiff worked for defendant in Michigan from the date of hire until September 1, 1986, when defendant transferred him to Fort Lauderdale, Florida to assume the position of building superintendent. On January 12, 1995, Plaintiff fell from a ladder in the course of his employment for defendant in Florida, breaking his left wrist and injuring his left knee. At the time of the injury, he was a resident of Florida. On September 27, 1996, plaintiff reinjured his knee while still working for defendant in Florida. He underwent surgery on November 6, 1996 for ACL [anterior cruciate ligament] reconstruction and microfracture ar-
throplasty. Plaintiff returned to work for defendant with restrictions on December 2, 1996. He received certain benefits pursuant to Florida‘s worker‘s compensation law.
Plaintiff continued to work for defendant until September 15, 1997. Since that time, he has worked as a project manager for Rotella, Toroyan, Clinton Group, a Florida Corporation.
Plaintiff continues to have problems with his left knee. There is no wage loss at this time. He has, however, incurred further expenses for treatment and anticipates the need for additional surgery(ies) and future closed period(s) of disability. These claims are not covered under Florida law.
Plaintiff has filed an application for mediation or hearing, claiming medical and wage loss benefits under Michigan law. Defendant disputes jurisdiction. It does not dispute the existence of a work related knee injury.
The Court of Appeals summarized the proceedings before the magistrate and the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC):
In the proceedings below, defendants contended that pursuant to the plain language of the statute which determines the bureau‘s jurisdiction,
MCL 418.845 , to be entitled to benefits, an injured worker must be a resident of Michigan at the time of the injury. In response, plaintiff contended that pursuant to the interpretation ofMCL 418.845 , as set forth in Boyd v WG Wade Shows, 443 Mich 515; 505 NW2d 544 (1993), there is no residency requirement for an injured worker, and the bureau has jurisdiction over a petition filed by an injured worker when, as in the instant case, the contract of hire was executed in Michigan and the employer is a resident employer in Michigan. The magistrate agreed with plaintiff and concluded that the bureau had jurisdiction in this matter.Defendant appealed the decision to the WCAC. The WCAC noted that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Boyd
reaffirmed an interpretation of the jurisdictional statute originally set forth in Roberts v IXL Glass Corp, 259 Mich 644; 244 NW 188 (1932). The WCAC opined that Roberts contravened the express language of MCL 418.845 , but agreed with the magistrate that Boyd and Roberts are binding. Defendants were granted leave to appeal the WCAC‘s decision.1
The Court of Appeals affirmed the WCAC decision because “pursuant to Roberts and Boyd, the WCAC properly concluded that the bureau has jurisdiction over plaintiff‘s petition for benefits.” Id. at 5. We granted defendant‘s application for leave to appeal, directing the parties to address whether the “proposed overruling of [Boyd] is justified under the standard for applying stare decisis discussed in Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463-468 [613 NW2d 307] (2000).”2
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case requires us to interpret the language set forth in
III. ANALYSIS
A. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
This statute in its initial enactment in 1921 PA 173, was an amendment3 of the Michigan Workmen‘s Compensation Act, 1912 (1st Ex Sess) PA 10.4 This amendment was enacted after the decision in Crane v Leonard Crossette & Riley, 214 Mich 218; 183 NW 204 (1921). In Crane, this Court held that because participation in the workers’ compensation system was elective, the requirements of the law were considered to be incorporated into the employment contract when an employer chose to participate in the system. Thus, it was irrelevant that the injury did not occur in Michigan.5
In 1932, this Court considered the 1921 amendment in Roberts, supra. The Roberts Court stated that the new statutory requirements focusing on residence at the time of the injury “would come with much, if not controlling, force if it were not in conflict with other
In 1943 PA 245, the Legislature expressly repealed § 8412. With that action, the Legislature effectively eliminated the central rationale of the Roberts decision, i.e., the Court‘s declination to repeal by inference § 8412. The 1943 amendment thus left § 8458 as the unquestioned law. At that juncture, then, the Legislature had addressed the problem that had precluded the Roberts Court from enforcing § 8458, and the Roberts rationale for declining to enforce § 8458 no longer applied.
Indeed, the appellate courts of this state implicitly recognized this point in eight of nine cases where issues concerning § 8458 and its successor statutes arose from 1943 until the Boyd decision in 1992.
In Daniels v Trailer Transport Co, 327 Mich 525, 527, 530; 42 NW2d 828 (1950), this Court implicitly required that the statutory prerequisites of § 8458 be met. In that case, the Court concluded that where a Michigan employer had made an employment contract in Texas,
Without reconciling Daniels, however, the Court of Appeals in Austin v W Biddle Walker Co, 11 Mich App 311, 313, 318; 161 NW2d 150 (1968), followed what it understood to be the Roberts holding when it concluded that a nonresident of Michigan, hired in Michigan but injured outside Michigan, could collect workers’ compensation benefits in Michigan.7
Later, in Crenshaw v Chrysler Corp, 394 Mich 513, 515-516; 232 NW2d 166 (1975), this Court determined that the WDCA did not apply when the contract of hire with a Michigan company was executed in Ohio and the injuries occurred in Ohio.8
Next, in Jensen v Prudential Ins Co of America, 118 Mich App 501, 503-504; 325 NW2d 469 (1982), the Court of Appeals, after noting that both Michigan residence and a Michigan contract of hire are required, concluded that the WDCA did not apply because the employee was not a Michigan resident and the contract was not entered into in Michigan.
In Shaw v Grunwell-Cashero of Milwaukee, 119 Mich App 758, 761; 327 NW2d 349 (1982), the Court of Appeals found no indication of either a Michigan contract or a Michigan resident employee. Thus, no jurisdiction existed over a Wisconsin employer.
After noting that
Finally, in Hall v Chrysler Corp, 172 Mich App 670, 672-673; 432 NW2d 398 (1988), the Court of Appeals held that no jurisdiction existed over an out-of-state injury because although the contract had been entered in Michigan with a Michigan company, the employee was not a Michigan resident.
At this point, two Supreme Court holdings and six Court of Appeals holdings left no doubt that § 8458 and its successors, 1948 CL 413.19 and
Paying no heed to (1) the rationale of Roberts, (2) the unmistakable effect of the 1943 statutory amendment, and (3) the nine later cases implicitly recognizing these matters, the Boyd Court seized on the dicta in Roberts discussing the “humane purposes” of the WDCA. The Boyd Court asserted that
B. STARE DECISIS
We conclude that overruling Boyd is warranted under the doctrine of stare decisis as set forth in Robinson.
As discussed, the text of
We discern no basis to conclude that Boyd has become so fundamental to expectations that overruling it would produce practical, real-world dislocations. Overruling Boyd will not affect any employees who are injured in Michigan because
Moreover, nonresidents who are injured in other states remain free to seek workers’ compensation benefits from the states in which they live or suffer injury. For example, plaintiff suffered an injury in his home state of Florida and obtained benefits under the Florida workers’ compensation system. We see no indication that, as a Florida resident who was injured in Florida, plaintiff harbored an expectation of receiving benefits under the Michigan workers’ compensation system in addition to the benefits he received from the Florida system.12
In considering the reliance interests at stake, we believe it is significant that the holding in Roberts has not consistently been the law in Michigan since 1932. In truth, Roberts was legislatively overruled by the 1943 amendments of the workers’ compensation act. Indeed, the Wolf decision recognized the legislative abrogation and properly applied the plain language of
In addition, we believe that the clarity of the statutory language suggests that overruling Boyd will advance rather than disrupt reliance interests. Indeed, we made this very point in Robinson:
Further, it is well to recall in discussing reliance, when dealing with an area of the law that is statutory..., that it is to the words of the statute itself that a citizen first looks for guidance in directing his actions. This is the essence of the rule of law: to know in advance what the rules of society are. Thus, if the words of the statute are clear, the actor should be able to expect, that is, rely, that they will be carried out by all in society, including the courts. In fact, should a court confound those legitimate citizen expectations by misreading or misconstruing a statute, it is that court itself that has disrupted the reliance interest. When that happens, a subsequent court, rather than holding to the distorted reading because of the doctrine of stare decisis, should overrule the earlier court‘s misconstruction. The reason for this is that the court in distorting the statute was engaged in a form of judicial usurpation that runs counter to the bedrock principle of American constitutionalism, i.e., that the lawmaking power is reposed in the people as reflected in the work of the Legislature, and, absent a constitutional violation, the
courts have no legitimacy in overruling or nullifying the people‘s representatives. Moreover, not only does such a compromising by a court of the citizen‘s ability to rely on a statute have no constitutional warrant, it can gain no higher pedigree as later courts repeat the error. [Robinson, supra at 467-468.]
The same reasoning applies here. We decline to perpetuate the distorted construction of
IV. RESPONSE TO JUSTICE KELLY‘S DISSENT
In her dissent, Justice KELLY disagrees with the legislative policy reflected in the clear language of
Under our constitution, “all political power is inherent in the people.”
Here is a law that is perfectly clear to the reader.
Despite this unassailably clear language, Justice KELLY asserts that the Boyd Court correctly identified the “intent behind § 845” as providing “jurisdiction over extraterritorial injuries without regard to the employee‘s residence, provided the employment contract was entered into in Michigan with a resident employer.” Post at 51 (emphasis added). In other words, Justice KELLY says that the employee‘s residence is simply irrelevant, despite the Legislature‘s express statement to the contrary.
Presumably, Justice KELLY denies that she is arrogating to herself the power to rewrite the law. The clear statutory language quoted above naturally leads one to ask this question: Precisely what part of the word “and” is difficult to understand? Surely anyone who reads this statute can follow what it says without difficulty: jurisdiction is conferred where (1) the injured employee lives in Michigan at the time of injury and (2) the contract of hire was made in this state.
Despite all this, Justice KELLY has opined that the Legislature did not mean what it so clearly said. Justice KELLY offers no explanation for how the language of
Finally, we note that Justice KELLY repeats her criticisms about the overruling of a prior decision. See her dissent in Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197; 731 NW2d 41 (2007). Justice MARKMAN‘S concurrence in Rowland offers a thoughtful and illuminating response to those criticisms. I fully endorse the views that Justice MARKMAN expressed in that case.
V. CONCLUSION
We hold that under the plain language of
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the majority‘s decision to overrule Boyd v WG Wade Shows, 443 Mich 515; 505 NW2d 544 (1993), but dissent from applying this decision retroactively. It should not be applied against this plaintiff and should only be applied prospectively because there has been extensive reliance for years on Boyd and its predecessors.
The Boyd Court incorrectly held, contrary to
I dissent from the majority‘s decision to apply its ruling retroactively, given that Boyd has been the law in this state for 14 years—a substantial period during which nonresident injured employees and related parties have relied on the elimination of the residency requirement. As this Court held in Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 696; 641 NW2d 219 (2002), there are
three factors to be weighed in determining when a decision should not have retroactive application. Those factors are: (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of retroactivity on
the administration of justice. People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669, 674; 187 NW2d 404 (1971). In the civil context, a plurality of this Court noted that Chevron Oil Co v Huson, 404 US 97, 106-107; 92 S Ct 349; 30 L Ed 2d 296 (1971), recognized an additional threshold question whether the decision clearly established a new principle of law. Riley v Northland Geriatric Center (After Remand), 431 Mich 632, 645-646; 433 NW2d 787 (1988) (Griffin, J.).
Weighing the three factors leads to the conclusion, as in Pohutski, that prospective application is appropriate here. First, the purpose of the new rule is to correct an error in the interpretation of
KELLY, J. (dissenting). Today the majority adds to its exponentially growing list of overturned precedents.1 The well-reasoned decision of Roberts v IXL Glass
I. MCL 418.845 , ROBERTS, AND BOYD
The sole question here is whether appellants’ proposed overruling of Boyd is justified under the standard for departing from the rule of stare decisis discussed in Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).
The statute at the heart of this question is
The bureau shall have jurisdiction over all controversies arising out of injuries suffered outside this state where the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of injury and the contract of hire was made in this state. Such employee or his dependents shall be entitled to the compensation and other benefits provided by this act.
The landmark case interpreting the precursor to § 8454 is Roberts. The question presented in Roberts was:
Like the appellants here, the appellants in Roberts contended that the residency requirement of the precursor to
Additionally, the Roberts Court pointed out that part III, § 19 conflicted with § 6 of the act.5 The Court stated that § 6 allowed that the act protected “all employees”
The industrial accident board shall have jurisdiction over all controversies arising out of injuries suffered without the territorial limits of this state, in those cases where the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of the injury, and the contract of hire was made in this state, and any such employee or his dependents shall be entitled to the compensation or death benefits provided by this act.
Moreover, the Roberts Court reasoned that, as a matter of legislative policy, it would be “inconsistent . . . to deny compensation to an injured employee on the ground that he was a nonresident, but in case of fatal injury to award compensation to his dependents regardless of residence or citizenship.” Id. Therefore, it concluded, the “reasonable construction and the one necessary to carry out the legislative intent appearing from the whole act is that it covers nonresident as well as resident employees in those cases wherein the contract of employment is entered into in this State with a resident employer.” Id. at 648-649. The Roberts Court added that its construction was in accord with the “humane purposes” of the act. Id. at 649.
Nearly 61 years later, in Boyd, this Court revisited the reasoning and holding of Roberts. In that case, the employee was an Illinois resident who entered into a contract of employment in Michigan and was injured on the job in Indiana. Boyd v W G Wade Shows, 443 Mich 515, 516; 505 NW2d 544 (1993). The Court determined that the Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation had jurisdiction to award benefits under the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA).
The Boyd Court noted that, although the Court of Appeals had reaffirmed the holding and reasoning of
Specifically, Boyd noted that “[t]he fact that the act became compulsory subsequent to Roberts is irrelevant; the requirements of
Boyd also noted that, if Roberts were overruled, a “significant gap” in coverage would exist in Michigan‘s workers’ compensation scheme. Id. Specifically, it opined, all Michigan employees who suffer an out-of-state injury in the course of their employment and who reside in neighboring states would not be entitled to benefits. Id. at 523-524. This Court determined that Roberts remained “an effective means of retaining a fair and consistent scheme for extraterritorial jurisdiction.” Id. at 524.
Moreover, Boyd observed that, by that time, the Legislature had acquiesced for 60 years in extraterritorial jurisdiction as expressed in Roberts. Id. at 525. Following in the Legislature‘s footsteps, Boyd declined to disturb the Roberts interpretation. Accordingly, the Boyd Court concluded that “the Bureau of Workers’
II. THE ROBINSON FACTORS
In its decision today, the Court overrules Boyd. The same four justices who signed the majority opinion signed Robinson in 2000. In it, they set forth the factors to consider in overruling a decision while giving deference to the doctrine of stare decisis. Robinson, supra. They indicated that a court must first consider whether the earlier decision was wrongly decided. Robinson, supra at 464. It must also consider whether the decision “defies ‘practical workability,’ whether reliance interests would work an undue hardship, and whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the questioned decision.” Id.
With regard to the first Robinson factor, I believe that Boyd was properly decided. The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the Legislature‘s intent. In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). In both Roberts and Boyd, this Court identified the intent behind
The Legislature has never indicated its disapproval of Roberts or Boyd.7 It has revised the WDCA numerous
Justice CORRIGAN‘S opinion propounds that the text of
[T]he claim to adhere to case law is generally powerful once a decision has settled statutory meaning, see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-173, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1989) (“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done“). In this instance, time has enhanced even the usual precedential force[.] [Shepard v United States, 544 US 13, 23; 125 S Ct 1254; 161 L Ed 2d 205 (2005).]
Also, Michigan‘s history reveals a consistent and long use of this tool by the courts. See Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452 Mich 354, 367-368; 550 NW2d 215 (1996), Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc, 438 Mich 488, 505; 475 NW2d 704 (1991), Craig v Larson, 432 Mich 346, 353; 439 NW2d 899 (1989), Wikman v City of Novi, 413 Mich 617, 638; 322 NW2d 103 (1982), Smith v Detroit, 388 Mich 637, 650; 202 NW2d 300 (1972), Magreta v Ambassador Steel Co, 380 Mich 513, 519-520; 158 NW2d 473 (1967), In re Clayton Estate, 343 Mich 101, 106-107; 72 NW2d 1 (1955), and Twork v Munsing Paper Co, 275 Mich 174, 178; 266 NW 311 (1936).
I also believe that Boyd was properly decided for the reason that the public policy concerns that existed when Boyd was decided remain today. As Boyd stated:
If the allegedly “out-dated” Roberts decision is overruled by this Court, then a significant gap in coverage would exist in this state‘s compensation scheme. Specifically, all Michigan employees who suffer an out-of-state injury in the course of their employment and who reside in neighboring states will not be subject to the bureau‘s jurisdiction. We believe that such a jurisdictional scheme is not only undesirable but also unduly restrictive. [Boyd, 443 Mich at 523-524.]
This concern over the gap in coverage correlates with the general principle that the WDCA, as a remedial statute, is to be liberally construed to grant, rather than deny, benefits. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000).
The majority contends that Boyd was not properly decided. It reasons that Boyd relied on Roberts and, when the Legislature repealed 1929 CL 84129 in 1943, the foundation of Roberts crumbled.10 This is untrue.
Moreover, Roberts held that, as a matter of legislative policy, it would be “inconsistent . . . to deny compensation to an injured employee on the ground that he was a nonresident, but in case of fatal injury to award compensation to his dependents regardless of residence or citizenship.” Id. at 648. Roberts also noted that its construction was in accord with the “humane purposes” of the act. Id. at 649. Therefore, contrary to the majority‘s claim, the reasoning in Roberts did not rely solely on the existence of 1929 CL 8412.
The majority also contends that Boyd was not properly decided because Boyd relied on Roberts after the Legislature made the workers’ compensation system mandatory. This argument was asserted before the Boyd Court and rejected. Specifically, Boyd noted that “[t]he fact that the act became compulsory subsequent to Roberts is irrelevant; the requirements of
For the reasons stated above, I believe that Boyd was properly decided, hence the first Robinson factor is not satisfied. Robinson, 462 Mich at 464. The Legislature has acquiesced in the Roberts and Boyd interpretation of
The remaining Robinson factors also support affirming Boyd. Those factors are: (1) whether the decision defies “practical workability,” (2) whether reliance interests would work an undue hardship if the authority
Roberts and Boyd do not defy practical workability. Rather, the interpretation of
The next concern is whether reliance interests would work an undue hardship if the authority were overturned. Robinson, 462 Mich at 464. “[T]he Court must ask whether the previous decision has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone‘s expectations that to change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations.” Id. at 466.
Overturning Roberts and Boyd would work an undue hardship. As has been repeatedly noted, the underlying rationale of Roberts, and therefore Boyd, has been in place for over seven decades. It is difficult to imagine a plausible argument that this rationale has not become a fundamental part of the workers’ compensation regime.
For decades, employers have been paying benefits to injured employees in reliance on Roberts and Boyd. Will those employees be required to return their benefits? At oral argument, appellate counsel for appellants suggested that his clients would forgo any attempts to retrieve previously paid benefits. While the appellants here might not seek a refund, there remain many other employers or insurance companies that may not view past benefits paid as “water under the bridge.” Accordingly, it seems incontestable that reliance interests would work an undue hardship if Roberts and Boyd are overturned.
The final Robinson factor is whether changes in the law or facts make the decision no longer justified. Robinson, 462 Mich at 464. The majority attempts to argue that the state of the law regarding the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation over extraterritorial injuries has been in a state of flux. However, that argument crumbles under close analysis.
Only two decisions of this Court have thoroughly explored the issues presented in this case: Roberts and Boyd. Because neither had ever before been expressly overruled, both remained good law until now.
The majority relies on Daniels v Trailer Transport Co12 for the proposition that this Court has previously required that, before the workers’ compensation tribunal can exercise jurisdiction, both subsections of
This Court in Daniels relied on Cline v Byrne Doors, Inc,13 for the proposition that, ” ‘[u]nder the provisions in the Michigan statute on which plaintiff relies [i.e., the precursor to
Noticeably absent from the reasoning in Daniels was any attempt to distinguish or overrule Roberts. Additionally, Daniels did not specify that the commission had jurisdiction only over extraterritorial injuries of a Michigan resident whose contract of hire was made in Michigan. Rather, the Daniels Court simply noted that Cline required the contract of hire be made in this state.
Moreover, in Austin v W Biddle Walker Co,15 the Court of Appeals opined that the reasoning in Daniels was consistent with that of Roberts The sole issue before the Court of Appeals in Austin was whether the Michigan Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board had jurisdiction over a nonresident employee injured while working out of state under a Michigan employment contract. Austin v W Biddle Walker Co, 11 Mich App 311, 313; 161 NW2d 150 (1968). Employing the reasoning above, the Court of Appeals in Austin concluded that Daniels and Cline were consistent with Roberts. Id. at 318. It further concluded that Austin was governed by Roberts. Therefore, it opined, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board properly exercised jurisdiction, and, to be entitled to benefits, the nonresident claimant had only to be injured while under a Michigan contract of hire. Id. at 313, 318.
The majority also points to another decision by this Court, Crenshaw v Chrysler Corp,16 to support its proposition that the law after Roberts has been in a state of flux. However, that argument also withers under close analysis.
In Crenshaw, the plaintiff employee was injured while working out-of-state under an Ohio contract of hire. Crenshaw v Chrysler Corp, 394 Mich 513, 515; 232 NW2d 166 (1975). This Court quoted
Therefore, the majority‘s claim that two decisions of this Court have called the reasoning of Roberts into question is inaccurate. The two decisions it cites neither explicitly nor implicitly overruled Roberts. Rather, both Daniels and Crenshaw were consistent with Roberts. Accordingly, Roberts was still good law at the time this Court decided Boyd.
The majority also cites numerous Court of Appeals decisions that have questioned the Roberts decision. However, all of them predate Boyd. As this Court noted in Boyd:
[I]t is the Supreme Court‘s obligation to overrule or modify case law if it becomes obsolete, and until this Court takes such action, the Court of Appeals and all lower courts are bound by that authority. While the Court of Appeals may properly express its belief that a decision of this Court was wrongly decided or is no longer viable, that conclusion does not excuse the Court of Appeals from applying the decision to the case before it. Because this Court has never overruled Roberts, it remains valid precedent. The rule of
Accordingly, contrary to the majority‘s argument, Roberts and Boyd have continued to remain good law until today. In conclusion, none of the Robinson factors supports overruling Boyd.
III. RETROACTIVITY
I agree with Justice WEAVER that the majority‘s decision warrants prospective application. Generally, judicial decisions are given full retroactive effect. Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 695; 641 NW2d 219 (2002). But there are well-established exceptions to this rule. The Court should consider the equities involved and, if injustice would result from full retroactivity, should adopt a more flexible approach. Lindsey v Harper Hosp, 455 Mich 56, 68; 564 NW2d 861 (1997). Prospective application is appropriate where the holding overrules settled precedent. Id. As was noted in Pohutski:
This Court adopted from Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618; 85 S Ct 1731; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965), three factors to be weighed in determining when a decision should not have retroactive application. Those factors are: (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice. In the civil context, a plurality of this Court noted that Chevron Oil v Huson, 404 US 97, 106-107; 92 S Ct 349; 30 L Ed 2d 296 (1971), recognized an additional threshold question whether the decision clearly established a new principle of law. [Pohutski, 465 Mich at 696 (citation omitted).]
It is apparent that the majority in this case states a new rule of law. In fact, it overturns decades of prece-
The first Pohutski factor is the purpose to be served by the new rule. The majority‘s purpose in its opinion here is to correct a statutory interpretation that it has found to be incorrect. Both prospective and retroactive application further such a purpose. Id. at 697.
The second factor is the extent of reliance on the old rule. Id. at 696. There are significant reliance concerns implicated by the overturning of Roberts and Boyd. The underlying rationale of these cases has been in place for seven decades. Attorneys, employers, insurance carriers, and various employees have relied on the holdings of Roberts and Boyd. Prospective application acknowledges the extensive reliance placed on the rationale of Roberts and Boyd. Retroactive application does not.
The final Pohutski factor is the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice. Id. Retroactive application of this case could have serious adverse implications for the administration of justice. Many employees have received benefits in accord with Boyd. Under the majority‘s holding, the employees could be called on to give up or repay those benefits. Prospective application would eliminate this harsh result and thus promote the administration of justice.
Accordingly, application of the Pohutski factors strongly indicates a need for prospective application of this decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority continues at its unparalleled rate of overturning this Court‘s precedent. For the reasons stated above, none of the Robinson factors supports
Boyd does not defy “practical workability.” Indeed, various workers’ compensation tribunals have been effectively applying Boyd since 1993 and Roberts since 1932. Reliance interests will work an undue hardship once Boyd is overturned because its underlying principles have been enmeshed in Michigan‘s workers’ compensation regime for decades. Benefits paid to numerous injured employees in reliance on Roberts and Boyd lie in jeopardy. Finally, no changes exist in the law or facts to justify questioning the Boyd decision. Contrary to the majority‘s argument, the holdings of Roberts and Boyd remained good law until today.
Accordingly, for the reasons I stated earlier, giving appropriate deference to the 74-year precedent established in Roberts and upheld by Boyd, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Given that the majority has overruled Boyd and Roberts, the Pohutski factors should be applied to determine whether the new decision should be given retroactive application. Once those factors are weighed, it is obvious that the decision in this case should be applied prospectively.
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.
Notes
[S]uch employer accepts the provisions of this act for all his businesses, and to cover and protect all employees employed in any and all of his businesses, including all businesses in which he may engage, and all employees he may employ while he remains under this act....
In eliminating the optional nature of coverage under the act and making coverage compulsory, and in eliminating the former statutory language that an electing employer agrees “to cover and
The Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial interpretations of existing law. Ford Motor Co v Woodhaven, 475 Mich 425, 439; 716 NW2d 247 (2006).protect all employees employed in any and all of his businesses,” the legislature eliminated the fundamental bases of the Crane, Huslwit, and Roberts holdings. [Id. at 326-327 (LEVIN, P.J., dissenting).]
[S]uch employer accepts the provisions of this act for all his businesses, and to cover and protect all employees employed in any and all of his businesses, including all businesses in which he may engage, and all employees he may employ while he remains under this act....
Moreover, after Boyd, this Court strongly criticized the doctrine of legislative acquiescence. In Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 261; 597 NW2d 574 (1999), we stated that ” ‘legislative acquiescence’ is a highly disfavored doctrine of statutory construction; sound principles of statutory construction require that Michigan courts determine the Legislature‘s intent from its words, not from its silence.” (Emphasis in original.) Justice BRICKLEY stated in his concurrence in Boyd that even though he believed Roberts was incorrectly decided, he concurred with the majority in Boyd because he agreed with its determination that, “after fifty years of legislative acquiescence, the Roberts decision has become ensconced as part of the overall workers’ compensation scheme.” Boyd, 443 Mich at 527 (BRICKLEY, J., concurring). Justice BRICKLEY‘S concern is even more applicable to the instant case because an additional 13 years have passed since Boyd was decided. During that period, the Roberts decision has become even more embedded as part of the overall workers’ compensation scheme.Considering the changes in the nature of the worker‘s compensation system, as well as the clarity of the statutory language, the principle of legislative acquiescence should not be used to continue a decision that lacks persuasive legal foundation. Moreover, the clarity of the conjunctive language used in
MCL 418.845 ; MSA 17.237(845) also supports the argument that the Legislature could not change the language of the statute after Roberts to add a residency requirement, because the clear language already existed in the statute and nothing else needed to be added. Therefore, legislative acquiescence to the Roberts decision is not as clear as the majority suggests. [Id. at 536.]