*1
Weaver, held: Court unambiguous On the basis Appeals erred as 17.237(301)(5)(c), 418.301(5)(c); the Court *2 wage imputed higher the of law when it substituted a matter average 356(1) plaintiff for the under subsection awarded the injury. weekly plaintiff date of wage before the that the interpretation of subsections no error in the 1. There was wcac’s 301(5)(c) plain language 356(1) of subsection The and weekly wage average compare of an requires magistrate the a weekly average employee with the from injury. employee This lan- wage the date of received before permit magistrate to con- guage unambiguous, and does not is may more have been awarded a increased benefits sider reading 356(1). plain injury A subsection two after under than only meaning. statutory susceptible one is of of 301(5)(c) statutory language Applying of subsection 2. nothing unjust produce result. There is an absurd and would not injured unjust between distinction or about the absurd postinjury are una- employees and those who who are able to work employ- subsequent injured employee gains ble to do so. When an the date was earned before much or more than ment and earns as compensable wage injury, Subsection loss. there has been no of recipients 356(1) 301(5)(c) enhanced benefits of subsection treats injured employees. differently In this all other classes of no subsequent employ- case, average plaintiff’s from she was earn- was far in excess of the ment properly ing her benefits were of her and before the date employment. terminated for the duration of plain language application subsection of the 3. Nor would policies purposes clearly 301(5)(c) and inconsistent with be injured employee compensation is entitled to An act. the worker’s if the work-related worker’s benefits 301(5)(c) of subsection resulted in a loss. The by terminating policies purposes act general and effects the injured employees a who cease to suffer wage loss benefits for compensable wage loss. Reversed. Kelly, dissenting, joined stated that Justice Justice Cavanagh, sub- consolidation must be construed read, inter- a literal becomes clear that When so it section 356(1) pretation render subsection would receiving by disqualifying persons meaningless Opinion Court they 356(1) job earning once return to the same or have they capacity equivalent wages injury. the time earned at purpose inequities to alleviate employee job paying when an result at a much less employee marketplace than the would be able to command in the education, training, or would soon be able to command because of and Once a so forth. rate has been made on the basis particular person money that a be more because of experience, illogical or education it would be to return that prior pay. statute, rate of when viewed as a contemplates whole, earnings on rate increase based injuries. would have made but for the The Court of conjunction read subsection with subsection incongruity. response, legislative found In and it considered intent, interpretation. logical arrived at a Bleakley plaintiff-appellee.
Frederick W. Granholm, Attorney General, M. Thomas Jennifer L. Casey, General, Solicitor Houk, Rose A. Assis- Attorney tant General, defendant-appellant. for the *3 In this case, J. we must decide whether Markman, Compensation Appellate Worker’s Commission (wcac) properly analyzed statutory provisions two Disability Compensation Worker’s Act (wdca), MCL et seq.-, 418.101 MSA et seq. 17.237(101) The provision first injured allows an employee oppor- tunity request to an increased benefit rate after two years disability of continuous if the employee’s earn- ings expected would have been to increase because of certain enumerated factors. MCL 418.356(1); MSA provision The 17.237(356)(1). requires second termi- injured nation of employee’s an loss wage employee’s average weekly wage (aww) from subsequent employment exceeds the aww employee injury. received before the date of MCL MSA 418.301(5)(c); 17.237(301)(5)(c). v West Shore question this Court must resolve is whether compensa- 301(5)(c) permits the worker’s aww compare injured employee’s
tion to an magistrate aww imputed to the injured employee under subsection more years injury. question the date of This than two after clearly resolved compare requires magistrate which 301(5)(c), weekly employee” from sub- “average wage sequent employment weekly with the “average injury.” the date before 418.301(5)(c); 17.237(301)(5)(c) (emphasis MSA added). injury” pre- “before the date of comparison injured employee’s cludes between employment AWWfrom and the Aww imputed under subsection 356(1) years injury. more than two after the date of the We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of and reinstate the order of the WCAC. 26,
On August Margaret DiBenedetto part-time employ- was in the course of her practical ment as a licensed nurse at West Shore Hos- pital. employer voluntarily paid Plaintiff’s her compensation $108.12 worker’s benefits at a rate of May 17, 1989, week. On more than two after injury, plaintiff requested an increased benefit rate under of the wdca. MCL pertinent 418.356(1); 17.237(356)(1) provides, part: injured employee personal who,
An at the time of the injuiy, is entitled to a rate of less than 50% of applicable the then state as deter- *4 year injury pursuant mined for the in which the occurred may 355, section be entitled to an increase in benefits after 461 Mich 394 disability. years of continuous After of continuous disability, employee may petition hearing for a at which employee may present evidence, virtue of the employee’s age, education, training, experience, or other fairly which documented evidence would reflect employee’s capacity, employee’s earnings expected Upon presentation have been to increase. of this evidence, compensation magistrate a worker’s order an adjustment up of the rate to 50% of the state year employee’s for the which the compensation, occurred. The if ordered, employee’s shall be effective as of the date of the petition hearing. adjust- for the . . . There shall be ment made for an under this subsection. compensation magistrate The worker’s determined plaintiff totally was disabled as a result of her injuries work-related and was therefore entitled to plaintiff employ- benefits. The Aww received from her in 1986, ment before the date of her was magistrate plaintiff’s $141.61. The determined that expected aww would have been to increase from peti- $141.61 $365.38 the time she filed her 1989 injury. Applying tion, but for her 1986 work-related 356(1), magistrate awarded fifty percent benefits at 1986 state aww, Injury $207.35. Defendant Second Fund (sif), which responsible paying was the increased benefit plaintiff, appealed amount to which WCAC, magistrate’s affirmed the decision. subsequently Plaintiff returned to work at West Hospital, although employ- Shore not in her skilled practical ment as licensed nurse. She worked a part-time early 1991, schedule until late 1990 or began she employment full-time work. Her from this $250 $370.
fluctuated between In petitioned March the SIF for termination of *5 West Shore Opinion of the Court plaintiffs wage loss benefits under 301(5)(c), arguing plaintiff that earned more from her subsequent employment than the aww she received injury. 418.301(5)(c); before the date her 17.237(301)(5)(c) provides, pertinent part: disability pursuant
If (4), is established to subsection weekly wage entitlement loss benefits shall be deter- pursuant mined to this section and as follows:
[*]
[*]
[*]
(c)
employee
employed
weekly
If an
average
and the
wage
employee
equal
average
to or more than the
employee
received before the date of
injury,
employee
any wage
is not entitled to
loss bene-
employment.
fits under this act for the duration of such
compensation magistrate
The worker’s
denied the
petition
concluding
to terminate benefits,
SiF’s
plaintiffs
AWW had been revised
the subsection
wage
award and that her
loss benefits should
by comparing
earnings
be determined
her
from subse-
quent employment
to her revised aww. The sif
appealed
arguing
that the decision to ter-
WCAC,
wage
minate
loss benefits under subsection
requires
comparison
between the
em-
ployee’s
subsequent employ-
aww received from her
ment and the aww she “received before the date of
injury.”
plaintiff
Under
construction,
this
the amount
subsequent employment,
earned from her
between
compared
$250
$370
a week, would be
to the AWW
injury,
she
$141.61.
received before her The SIF
argued
given
comparison,
that,
this
provides
plaintiff
any
not be entitled to
additional
loss bene-
the date of the Thus, 301(5)(c), under since the Section wage is more than the date before any entitled to benefits for the duration she is not employment. Magistrate’s conclusion of law is of her *6 Campbell, corrected[,] Abbey Wyant Foundry v & Cannon Remand], App 341, 194 Mich NW2d [On [468 131] (1992), reversed, his decision is and the Fund’s Petition to Stop granted. (emphasis Mich ACO 10 [benefits] [1997 original).] in appeal Plaintiff leave to in the Court of sought Appeals, that the worker’s arguing mag- properly compared plaintiff istrate the Aww that received from her the aww to imputed to her more than two after date injury $365.38. under 356(1), Under this construction, would elimi- plaintiff’s wage only nate loss benefits when her aww employment received from exceeded $365.38. The Court of reversed the decision plaintiff’s of the wcac and with agreed position, hold- as follows: ing agree plaintiff Legislature
We that the cannot have applied § intended to be as it has been in this light legislative case in decision embodied in employee § That section allows a disabled under prove that, certain circumstances to but for her disability, earning greater wage she would be a than she injury. Presumably was at the time of the this sec- West Shore inequities tion is meant to alleviate the result employee job paying when an at a much less than would be able to command in the market- place or would soon be able to command because of educa- tion, training, person might part-time, and so forth. A work plaintiff, variety reasons, might like for a but have expected greater to work full-time and received much com- pensation interpretation in the near future. If the wcac’s correct, purpose underlying § were then the plaintiff § would be defeated. Even if earns $142 week, pres- a she would lose all benefits because her weekly wage ent would exceed the she earned injury by thirty-nine Moreover, at the time of her if cents. job paying $142 were to refuse the offer of a week, right pursuant she would forfeit her to benefits 301(5)(a). § illogical
In
give
order to avoid this
result and to
effect to
sections,
that,
employee successfully
both
we hold
when an
compensation pursuant
obtains an
356(1),
demonstrating
§
that the
would have
greater wage
imputed
earned a
higher
but for the
preiryury
should be
substituted for the
applying 301(5).
injured employee
thereby
An
§
will
receive
unemployed,
the benefit
§of
while
will receive no
wages
benefits if
augmented
from favored work exceed the
wage rate,
eighty percent
and will receive
of the difference
up
pays
maximum if the favored work
less
augmented wage
App
223, 228-229;
rate.
[229
(1998) (emphasis
original).]
This
questions
Court reviews
law
any
involved in
final order of the wcac under a de novo standard of
Oxley Dep’t
review.
v
Military Affairs, 460 Mich
536, 540-541; 597 NW2d 89
of fact
(1999). Findings
adopted by
made or
scope
wcac within the
of its
powers are conclusive on
appeal,
the absence of
fraud,
subject
but a decision of the
isWCAC
to reversal
if it is based on
legal
erroneous
or the
reasoning
Mich 394
461
402
Opinion
the Court
418.861a(14);
framework.
wrong legal
Foods,
(After
Bil-Mar
Inc
v
17.237(861a)(14); Goff
214
512;
(1997);
563 NW2d
Remand),
507,
454 Mich
1, 13;
Fund,
App
234 Mich
Injury
Taylor v Second
(1999).
When
and
effect to
tion,
purpose
give
is to discern
our
Tele
Michigan
v
Bell
Murphy
intent.
Legislature’s
NW2d 310
We
Co,
93, 98;
(1994).
447 Mich
523
phone
of the statute.
plain language
begin
examining
unambiguous,
presume
we
language
Where that
is
clearly
meaning
intended the
Legislature
is
judicial
further
construction
expressed—no
be
required
permitted,
or
and
statute must
Facil
Tryc Michigan
as written.
v
Veterans’
enforced
must
129, 135;
(1996).
NW2d 642
We
ity, 451 Mich
ordinary
their
the words of a statute
give
meaning,
where
the statute to ascer
ambiguous
we look outside
Club Ins
tain the
intent. Turner v Auto
Legislature’s
Ass’n,
27;
The of statutes is Legislature. first to ascertain the intent of the criterion specific language determining of the statute. intent is the Legislature presumed meaning to have intended the plainly expressed. If of the statute is it necessary. clear, judicial interpretation is re no further [In Compensation (Ramsey Kohl), Lien 231 Mich Worker’s App 556, 561; (1998) (internal 591 NW2d citations omitted).] statute should Finally, the wdca is a remedial “ deny rather ‘liberally grant
be construed to ” Sobotka Goff, supra, quoting benefits.’ *8 403 v West Shore Opinion the Court of Chrysler Corp (After Remand), 1, Mich n (1994) (opinion J.). 18; 523 NW2d of Boyle, interpretation We find no error in of sub- wcac’s sections and The of requires 301(5)(c) magistrate to com- pare “average weekly wage employee” from “average weekly her with the wage the date before of injury.” 418.301(5)(c); 17.237(301)(5)(c) (emphasis added). plain statutory language is permit unambiguous, magistrate and it not does plaintiff may consider increased benefits a have been awarded more two after 356(1). plain reading under subsection A of statutory language susceptible at issue is meaning. one injury” clearly
received “before the
date
was
$141.61,
$365.38.
not the
benefit rate of
Plaintiff concedes that subsection
unambiguous.
ambigu-
However, she contends that an
ity appears
when subsections
and
together
application
are considered
because the
employee’s
would eliminate wage”
“entitlement
an enhanced
awarded under
Plaintiff views this
an
as
absurd
unjust
citing
result,
Salas v
Clements, (1976),
proposition
103, 109;
a statute is
when such construction would
an 356(1), give and subsection would “no effect” to tion meaningless. render that subsection would somehow 301(5)(c) can- that subsection The dissent concludes must isolation,” not be viewed “in but be construed 356(1) with” subsection and “in consolidation 356(1) employees who have received a subsection of disa- after two continuous bility under must be accorded different treatment injured employees. 301(5)(c) than other at Post 407-408. respectfully disagree
We with both and statutory applying dissent that produce 301(5)(c) an and absurd unjust unjust nothing absurd or about result. There injured employees distinction between post-injury are and who are who able to work those injured employee gains to When an sub- unable do so. sequent employment than and earns as much or more ir\jury, simply was has earned before date there plain- compensable wage case, no loss. In this been was far tiff’s from AWW excess of the AWW she was before the date properly her were terminated and employment. subsequent for the duration of such recipients 301(5)(c) treats Subsection differently 356(1) all other enhanced benefits no injured employees. note classes of We that subsection statutory provisions 356(1) was two the first these West Shore January to PA 357, be enacted effective 1, Subsection 1982. was enacted PA January Leg- 1, and was also effective 1982. The obviously 356(1) was islature aware it drafted subsection Nevertheless, Legislature provide chose for termination of an injured employee’s compari- benefits on the basis of earnings employment son between injury.” and the aww “before the date of 418.301(5)(c); 17.237(301)(5)(c). Contrary suggestion, the dissent’s we do not treat subsection though plaintiff’s as it is irrelevant to case. Rather, we read subsections together, Legislature conclude chose not adopt exception to injured employees in subsection adjust- had
who received a benefit 356(1). Although ment under subsection the dissent *10 “illogical” feels this is an result, we decline to rewrite plain language the and substitute our own policy already by decisions for those made the Legislature.1 disagree
We further with both and the dis- application plain language sent that of the of subsec- “clearly tion would be inconsistent with the proposes policies” and of An the wdca. employee is entitled to worker’s wage if the work-related resulted a disagrees interpretation The dissent with our of subsection interpretation disqualify because that receiving someone from sub they job section benefits once return to the same or have capacity equivalent wages they injury. to the at earned the time of This required exactly by 301(5)(c)—termination the result of injured employee’s subsequent employ loss benefits when an aww from equals injury. ment or exceeds the aww before of the date We that believe by compelled policy the in this result case those choices made the Legislature when it enacted subsections and 461 Mich Leasing, Transport Indiana, Inc, Haske
loss. (1997). Justice NW2d 896 As 628, 642-643;566 partial explained in her concurrence: Weaver by provisions concept wage loss is reflected 301(5)(a), compensation act such as subsection worker’s employee disqualifies eligible, if the disabled which an work, employee and has favored refused employee disqualifies eligible, 301(5)(c), disabled which an before, iryury more as earns as much or after who Thus, employee earning. where duration of such by refusing effectively removes himself from the workforce or he more than before favored work where earns injury, he is not entitled benefits because effectively no loss. at has suffered [Id. 674-675.] of subsection effects The general purposes policies termi- wdca injured employees nating wage loss benefits for who compensable wage loss. cease to suffer Finally, disagree the dissent’s conclusion we narrowly we the statute [d] have “construe broadly employer, rather than in favor of favor plain statutory employee.” lan- Post at 408. requires guage 301(5)(c), which magistrate to consider the aww injury” simply read the date of cannot be “before imputed consideration of the allow employee aww after the date of no matter two liberally how is construed. unambiguous On the basis of the lan- guage 301(5)(c), we hold that the Court Appeals erred as a matter of law when it substi- *11 “imputed higher wage” awarded tuted 356(1) under subsection injury.” plaintiff received “before the date of Shore West Dissenting Cavanagh, Opinion by J. policy While we are not oblivious to the rationale that might support in well exist of the results reached Appeals, the Court we nevertheless find that the Legislature, drafting 301(5)(c) did, subsection as it disregard chose to this rationale. The decision of the Court of reversed, the order of the reinstated. wcac
Weaver, C.J., and JJ., Taylor, Young, Corrigan, concurred with J. Markman, (dissenting). J. I Because would affirm
Cavanagh, Appeals, respectfully the decision of the Court of I majority dissent. The concludes: plain statutory language 301(5)(c)] subsection is. [of unambiguous, permit magistrate and it does not to con plaintiff may sider the increased benefits a have been awarded more than two after her under subsection 356( 1).[1] Although majority’s interpretation may textual 301(5)(c) if make sense subsection could be viewed isolation, I believe that subsection must be construed in consolidation with subsection majority though treats subsection as it by determining is irrelevant that literal construction principles analysis confine our Although majority opin- of 356(1), major- ion makes reference to subsection ity holds that a subsection increase will not be into factored benefit entitlement. Clearly, majority holding applies alone. Yet, this Court is not con- Ante, p 403. *12 Mich 394 461
408 Dissenting Opinion Cavanagh, J. 301(5)(c) in isolation. to consider strained may depart strict construction from Rather, the Court reading principles will of the statute when a literal illogical produce results, and this Court or absurd attempt give all effect to relevant to should Corp, provisions. Mich v Motors 448 Gross General (1995); Mich Landaal, In re NW2d 707 147; 528 (1935). Moreover, the Worker’s NW 897 248, 252; 262 Compensation Disability is a remedial stat- Act (WDCA) liberally in favor of be construed ute that should (After Remand), employee. Inc Foods, v Bil-Mar Goff (1997). 507; Sobotka 563 NW2d 454 Mich Corp Chrysler (After Remand), 20; 447 Mich (1994). NW2d 454 interpretation majority’s several of the violates majority gives principles. no
aforementioned
356(1)
a result that
and reaches
effect to
purposes underlying
clearly illogical
light
in
narrowly
the statute
WDCA. It further construes
broadly
employer,
rather than
favor
favor of the
employee.
Appeals
agree with the Court of
that subsection
I
conjunction
sub-
must be construed in
together,
it
When
becomes clear
read
section
interpretation
of subsection
literal
meaningless.
356(1)
A literal
would render subsection
disqualify persons
receiving
reading
sub-
they
356(1)
return to the same
benefits once
section
equivalent
wages
job
earning capacity
or have
injury. disagree
they
at
I
with an
earned
the time of
interpretation
301(5)(c) that
treats
employees
have
a subsection
who
received
adjustment
who
in the same manner as those
adjustment.
agree
Rather,
I
have not
v West Shore
Dissenting
Opinion
Cavanagh, J.
of with the Court
purpose
that the
of subsec-
inequities
tion
is to
“alleviate
job
result
aat
paying
much
less than the
would be able
com-
mand in
marketplace
or would soon be able to
command
of education,
because
training, and so
forth.” 229
App 223, 228;
Viewing Michigan’s compensation worker’s system from an perspective, historical it becomes clear that Appeals Court of decision was well reasoned. Under the injured employees have right no to WDCA, sue under negligence principles though they even may have lost the ability to work and advance in their fields of choice. MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131)(1). Subsection 356(1) of the compensates for lost wdca potential in helps a fashion that balance the all parties interests involved. If read without reference to subsection then 356(1), equities fall out alignment. majority employees Under the view, might be dis- couraged from work returning they because could higher receive compensation worker’s payments than salary. their Here, new salary nearly DiBenedetto’s 461
Dissenting J. by Cavanagh, Opinion majority’s prior Thus, entitlement. mirrors position this instance. On not seem harsh making five dollars had been hand, other salary, be off. would still cut more her 1986 she her worker’s The difference between could then be substantial. Appeals persuaded I that the Court am not plaintiff’s attempted to label adjustment preinjury wage. Neither did the as a Court squeeze attempt into the defi- provided I Rather, nition Appeals the Court of read subsection think that conjunction with subsection response, incongruity. In the Court of found logical legislative intent, and arrived at considered interpretation. therefore,
I affirm the decision of Court would, Appeals. Kelly, J., J. Cavanagh, concurred