BOYD v W G WADE SHOWS
Docket No. 93145
Supreme Court of Michigan
Decided August 31, 1993
443 Mich 515
Argued May 5, 1993 (Calendar No. 11).
In an opinion by Justice MALLETT, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH, and Justices LEVIN and BOYLE, the Supreme Court held:
The Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation has jurisdiction under
1. Although
2. Intermediate appellate case law to the contrary is not controlling. Roberts has not been overruled by the Supreme Court and remains valid precedent. Although the Court of Appeals may express its belief that a decision of the Supreme Court was wrongly decided or is no longer viable, such conclu-
Justice BRICKLEY, concurring, stated that although Roberts was incorrectly decided, because the Legislature has declined to take any action in reenacting the statute that would indicate disagreement with the interpretation offered in Roberts, stare decisis should prevail.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice RILEY, joined by Justice GRIFFIN, dissenting, stated that the plain language of
Braun, Kendrick, Finkbeiner (by Scott C. Strattard and Mark I. Domsic) for the plaintiff.
John D. Reseigh for the defendants.
MALLETT, J. The present case involves the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation. We hold that the bureau has jurisdiction and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
The Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation addressed the current dispute on a brief stipulation of facts that Willie Boyd was an Illinois resident, that he entered into a contract of employment in Michigan, that while executing his duties pursuant to the contract he sustained a personal injury and died in Indiana, and that the injury and death arose out of and in the course of his employment.
II
Section 845 of the workers’ compensation act grants extraterritorial jurisdiction to the Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation over claims resulting from injuries that occur outside Michigan.
The bureau shall have jurisdiction over all controversies arising out of injuries suffered outside this state where the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of injury and the contract of hire was made in this state. Such employee or his dependents shall be entitled to the compensation and other benefits provided by this act. [
MCL 418.845 ;MSA 17.237(845) .]
In addition, the act broadly defines employees covered by the act.
Every person performing service in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of an employer at the time of the injury, provided the person in relation to this service does not maintain a separate business, does not hold himself or herself out to and render service to the public, and is not an employer subject to this act. [
MCL 418.161(1)(d) ;MSA 17.237(161)(1)(d) .]
Juxtaposed against these statutory provisions is Roberts v IXL Glass Corp, 259 Mich 644; 244 NW 188 (1932), the landmark case interpreting an
This Court disagreed, and concluded that the claimant was entitled to compensation even though he was not a Michigan resident.
[W]e are satisfied that the reasonable construction and the one necessary to carry out the legislative intent appearing from the whole act is that it covers nonresident as well as resident employees in those cases wherein the contract of employment is entered into in this State with a resident employer.2
The Court interpreted the jurisdictional provision in pari materia with the respective statutory provisions broadly defining the term “employee”3 and
[Defendant‘s] contention [regarding residency] would come with much, if not controlling, force if it were not in conflict with other portions of the statute. It is quite significant that this recital as to the employee being a resident at the time of injury was embodied by the amendment in the procedural part (part 3) of the act only; but was not inserted in the part of the act (part 1) which defines and fixes the rights and liabilities of employers and employees. . . . Further, the quoted portion of section 65 seems conclusive of the fact that the original enactment was intended to cover “all employees” regardless of residence or the locus of the accident. [Roberts, supra at 647.]
This Court further noted that the statute expressly provided for compensation to the dependents of a fatally injured employee regardless of the residence of the dependents. “As a matter of legislative policy it would be quite inconsistent”6 to deny compensation to an injured employee because he was a nonresident, while awarding compensation to the dependents of a fatally injured employee regardless of residence.
At the time this Court decided Roberts, the workers’ compensation act was elective, that is, an employer was not automatically subject to the act‘s provisions. However, the Legislature
Some time later, in Austin v W Biddle Walker Co, 11 Mich App 311; 161 NW2d 150 (1968), the Court of Appeals reaffirmed Roberts. Austin was a Kentucky resident who contracted in Michigan with a Michigan corporation. Austin worked for a brief period in Michigan, but was transferred to Kentucky, where he sustained an injury. The WCAB found that because the contract of employment was entered into in Michigan, the board had jurisdiction pursuant to Roberts. The Court of Appeals affirmed and concluded that statutory amendments making the act compulsory had no effect on the holding in Roberts.8 Judge LEVIN dissented because of his disagreement with the majority‘s emphasis on the place of contracting. Nonetheless, he persuasively asserted that strict adherence to the residency requirement in § 845 is neither warranted nor desirable.
It is now 35 years since Roberts was decided. Whatever may have been the legislative intention at the time of adoption of the residency require-
ment (CL 1948, § 413.19 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.193]), it would be inappropriate at this late date to attempt to breathe new life into a statutory provision which was aborted so long ago. If the legislature desired to insist on a residency requirement, it could have done so at any time within the last 35 years; it was inferentially invited to do so in Roberts, p 649.9
Despite the continued vitality of Roberts as recognized in Austin, the Court of Appeals has begun to interpret § 845 in contravention of Roberts. In Wolf v Ethyl Corp, 124 Mich App 368; 335 NW2d 42 (1983), the plaintiff was hired in Michigan by a Virginia corporation. Following a transfer to and while working in New York, the plaintiff resided in Connecticut. The plaintiff subsequently sustained injuries in a work-related car accident in New York and filed for disability benefits in Michigan. The WCAB concluded that the plaintiff ‘s nonresidence in Michigan at the time of the accident precluded jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed and held that the clear and unambiguous language of § 845 requires both that the injured employee be a resident of Michigan at the time of injury and that the employment contract was consummated in Michigan.
We find that the case of Roberts v IXL Glass Corp, 259 Mich 644; 244 NW 188 (1932), which can be read as suggesting a different result, is not applicable to today‘s modern mandatory workers’ compensation scheme. . . . The present statutory scheme has been made mandatory and has been revised and refined. Being bound not to usurp legislative power, see
Const 1963, art 3, § 2 ; Michigan Harness Horsemen‘s Ass‘n [v Racing Comm‘r, 123 Mich App 388; 333 NW2d 292 (1983)], we must
apply the clear legislative mandate of the modern act‘s jurisdictional provisions.10
The Court then retreated from announcing a new bright line rule by limiting the holding to the facts in that case, because “[q]uestions of residency, dual residency or temporary domicile to perform contractual employment must await case-by-case interpretation.” Wolf, supra at 370.
A few years later, the Court of Appeals followed Wolf in a similar case. In Hall v Chrysler Corp, 172 Mich App 670; 432 NW2d 398 (1988), reconsideration den 432 Mich 931 (1989), the plaintiff was hired in Michigan and later accepted a transfer to Delaware. While working and residing in Delaware, the plaintiff alleged a disabling personal injury and filed for benefits. The WCAB dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Because of the different nature of the 1912 Workers’ Compensation Act, the Wolf Court held the Roberts decision to be inapplicable to the plain language of the Michigan WDCA. We agree with the reasoning contained in the Wolf decision and find that a person must be a resident of the state at the time of the injury and be subject to the terms of an employment contract entered into in Michigan.11
III
Wolf and Hall indicate that Roberts is no longer controlling because of amendments made in the workers’ compensation act after Roberts was decided. Specifically, those cases suggest that because
As the Court of Appeals repeatedly noted, it is the Supreme Court‘s obligation to overrule or modify case law if it becomes obsolete, and until this Court takes such action, the Court of Appeals and all lower courts are bound by that authority. Edwards v Clinton Valley Center, 138 Mich App 312; 360 NW2d 606 (1984); McMillan v Michigan State Hwy Comm, 130 Mich App 630; 344 NW2d 26 (1983); Ratliff v General Motors Corp, 127 Mich App 410; 339 NW2d 196 (1983); Schwartz v City of Flint (After Remand), 120 Mich App 449; 329 NW2d 26 (1982), rev‘d on other grounds 426 Mich 295; 395 NW2d 678 (1986). While the Court of Appeals may properly express its belief that a decision of this Court was wrongly decided or is no longer viable, that conclusion does not excuse the Court of Appeals from applying the decision to the case before it. People v Mitchell, 428 Mich 364; 408 NW2d 798 (1987). Because this Court has never overruled Roberts, it remains valid precedent. The rule of law regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction as expressed in Roberts should have been applied by the bureau in the present case.
If the allegedly “out-dated” Roberts decision is overruled by this Court, then a significant gap in coverage will exist in this state‘s compensation scheme. Specifically, all Michigan employees who suffer an out-of-state injury in the course of their employment and who reside in neighboring states
In the majority of states, the local statute will be applied if the place of injury, or the place of hiring, or the place of employment relation is within the state. Two-thirds of the states will take jurisdiction of out-of-state injuries if either the place of hiring or the place of employment relation is within the state. These two factors figure in most of the other states in different combinations.13
Roberts remains an effective means of retaining a fair and consistent scheme for extraterritorial jurisdiction. This Court has stated that a court will not overrule a decision deliberately made unless the Court is convinced not merely that the case was wrongly decided, but also that less injury would result from overruling than from following it. Dolby v State Hwy Comm‘r, 283 Mich 609; 278 NW 694 (1938). Clearly, because of the gap in
The dissent‘s assertion that Roberts was wrongly decided and contrary to the plain meaning of the statute14 does not change the fact that the Legislature has acquiesced in extraterritorial jurisdiction as expressed in Roberts for over sixty years, despite numerous opportunities in the statutory history of the workers’ compensation act to amend § 845. This Court has stated that the doctrine of stare decisis applies with full force to decisions construing statutes or ordinances, especially where the Legislature acquiesces in the Court‘s construction through the continued use of or failure to change the language of a construed statute. Consumers Power Co v Muskegon Co, 346 Mich 243; 78 NW2d 223 (1956).15 In Dean v Chrysler Corp, 434 Mich 655, 664; 455 NW2d 699 (1990), we stated,
When, over a period of many years, the Legislature has acquiesced in this Court‘s construction of a statute, the judicial power to change that interpretation ought to be exercised with great restraint. On more than one occasion our Court has quoted with approval the statement that stare decisis “is especially applicable where the construction placed on a statute by previous decisions has been long acquiesced in by the legislature, by its continued use or failure to change the language of the statute so construed, the power to change the law as interpreted being regarded, in such circumstances, as one to be exercised solely by the
legislature.” [Consumers Power Co v Muskegon Co, 346 Mich 243, 251; 78 NW2d 223 (1956), quoting 21 CJS, Courts, § 214, pp 388-390. See also In re Clayton Estate, 343 Mich 101, 107; 72 NW2d 1 (1955)].16
We further noted that the principles of stare decisis are particularly applicable when the Legislature has reenacted the statutory language without change. Id. at 665. The Legislature has revised the WDCA several times but has yet to take any action that would indicate its disapproval of the Roberts interpretation of § 845. Because of its failure to amend § 845, the Legislature has accepted the interpretation of that section given by this Court in Roberts as an important part of the entire workers’ compensation scheme. Thus, we believe that this Court should not disturb the Roberts interpretation.
IV
We conclude that pursuant to § 845 of the workers’ compensation act and Roberts v IXL Glass Corp, supra, the Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation shall have jurisdiction over extraterritorial injuries without regard to the employee‘s residence, provided the contract of employment was entered into in this state with a resident employer. In the present case, the bureau erred in failing to find that it had jurisdiction over the
Reversed and remanded.
CAVANAGH, C.J., and LEVIN and BOYLE, JJ., concurred with MALLETT, J.
BRICKLEY, J. Although I concur in the majority‘s opinion, I write separately to express my agreement with the dissent in one respect. I, too, believe that Roberts v IXL Glass Corp, 259 Mich 644; 244 NW 188 (1932), was incorrectly decided. I believe that the dissent is correct in finding that the Roberts Court‘s interpretation of the jurisdictional provision of the WDCA was contrary to the plain meaning of the language of the statute. I also agree that the Roberts Court erroneously determined that the definition of employee found in the act conflicted with the jurisdictional provision. However, I concur with the majority because I agree with its determination that, after fifty years of legislative acquiescence, the Roberts decision has become ensconced as part of the overall workers’ compensation scheme. I believe that the principle of stare decisis prevails over the need to correct an incorrect interpretation of the statute.
In all other respects, I agree with the majority. Accordingly, I concur with its opinion.
RILEY, J. (dissenting). In this case we are presented with the issue whether workers’ compensation death benefits are available to the widow of a nonresident worker employed in Michigan for work to be performed outside Michigan. Because I believe the plain language of the workers’ compen-
I
Plaintiff is the widow of a carnival operator who was killed in a motor vehicle accident in Indiana. Plaintiff ‘s decedent was a resident of Illinois and was employed in Michigan to move a carnival from Michigan to Mississippi. The Michigan magistrate and workers’ compensation appellate commission agreed that plaintiff was precluded from bringing a workers’ compensation claim in Michigan. The Court of Appeals denied leave “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.”2 This Court granted leave to appeal.
II
The statute defining the limit of the jurisdiction of the bureau is clear and unambiguous: jurisdiction over controversies arising out of injuries suffered outside Michigan exists where (1) “the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of injury and [(2)] the contract of hire was made in this state.”
No construction is required where the plain language of the statute identifies when an out-of-state injury is within the purview of the Michigan workers’ compensation act. See Owendale-Gagetown School Dist v State Bd of Ed, 413 Mich 1, 8; 317 NW2d 529 (1982). In
The earlier case of Roberts v IXL Glass Corp, 259 Mich 644; 244 NW 188 (1932), however, essentially eliminated the employee residency requirement from the jurisdiction provision. The Court found that the workers’ compensation act of 1921 contained inconsistent provisions, essentially the identical provisions existing in the present statute. Part 1 fixed the rights and liabilities of employees and employers. Part 3 was the procedural part of the act and contained the limitation on the jurisdiction of the industrial accident board. Id. at 647.6 Plaintiff in the instant case argues that after the
Subsequent decisions of the Court of Appeals have split in their treatment of Roberts. In Austin, supra at 314, a majority of the Court of Appeals acknowledged that
In Wolf v Ethyl Corp, 124 Mich App 368, 370; 335 NW2d 42 (1983), the Court of Appeals rejected Roberts, finding it inapplicable to “today‘s modern mandatory workers’ compensation scheme.” The Court of Appeals instead determined that Roberts applied only to the “earlier, voluntary workers’ compensation statute.” Id. The Court then held that a nonresident plaintiff who contracted for employment in Michigan but was injured in New York could not recover Michigan workers’ compensation benefits because the two requirements of
Other decisions, although involving Michigan resident employees, recognize the two requirements of
The legal premise of the Roberts decision is not persuasive in light of the compulsory nature of the present workers’ compensation act. The Roberts Court reasoned that its construction of the extraterritorial effect of the act was in accord with the construction of other optional compensation acts. Id. at 649. An optional act becomes a part of the employment contract when both the employer and the employee choose to be bound by the act‘s terms. It is arguable that, as with other contract terms such as wages and hours, the terms of the act would therefore follow the employee wherever the employee acted within the scope of his employment. Id. at 652; see also Crane v Leonard, Crossette & Riley, 214 Mich 218, 231; 183 NW 204 (1921).
Application of the terms of the workers’ compensation act is now required by statute, rather than by contract. Both the Crane and the Roberts Courts recognized the reasoning that distinguishes between these two types of acts.
“[I]t may be stated on the weight of authority that acts not construed to be contractual in character do not, in the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, apply where the injury occurs outside the State. . . .” [Crane, supra at 222, quoting 1 Honnold, Workmen‘s Compensation, § 8.]
“We are told that no distinction in construction is to be based upon whether the act is compulsory or elective. That is true as to some provisions of compensation acts. But that the statute is elective has controlling bearing on one thing that is most highly important. Where the statute is elective as to both employer and employee, payment of compensation is not the performance of a statute duty, but the performance of conditions in the contract of hiring. . . .” [Id. at 225.]
“Where the statute compels submission by the employer and employee, there is no contract, as a general rule, enforceable outside of the State.” [Id. at 226.]
“[A]cts not construed to be contractual in character do not, in the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, apply where the injury occurs outside the State, while, on the other hand, acts construed to be contractual protect one injured outside the State, where the contract of employment was made within the State and is governed by the laws of the State.” [Roberts, supra at 651.]
Whether the modern act covers an employee depends upon whether the requirements of the statute have been met. Therefore if the extraterritorial jurisdiction requirements are not met, an injury is not compensable under the act.
The majority asserts that if Roberts is overruled, “all Michigan employees who suffer an out-of-state injury in the course of their employment and who
The majority does not dispute that the language of the extraterritorial provision is clear or that the analysis in Roberts is no longer persuasive.10 Hence, the majority‘s argument rests primarily on the principle of legislative acquiescence, rather than on the propriety of the Roberts decision. “Because of the indirect nature of the support it
By failing to recognize the change in the nature of the compensation act, the majority imposes a responsibility on the employer beyond that which is required by statute. Despite contrary precedent from 1932, I would recognize the existing clear language of
GRIFFIN, J., concurred with RILEY, J.
Notes
The industrial accident board shall have jurisdiction over all controversies arising out of injuries suffered without the territorial limits of this state in those cases where the injured employe is a resident of this state at the time of the injury, and the contract of hire was made in this State, and any such employe or his dependents shall be entitled to the compensation or death benefits provided by this act.
arising out of injuries suffered outside this state where the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of the injury and the contract of hire was made in this state.
The term “employe” as used in this act shall be construed to mean . . . [e]very person in the service of another, under any contract of hire, express or implied .... Every person performing service in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of an employer at the time of the injury, provided the person in relation to this service does not maintain a separate business, does not hold himself or herself out to and render service to the public, and is not an employer subject to this act.
[S]uch employer accepts the provisions of this act for all his businesses, and to cover and protect all employes employed in any and all of his businesses, including all businesses in which he may engage and all employes he may employ while he remains under this act .... I disagree that a conflict existed in the former act between the definition of employer and employee rights and liabilities and the extraterritorial application of the act. Section seven of part one broadly defined employee. See Roberts v IXL Glass Corp, 259 Mich 644, 647; 244 NW 188 (1932). This provision encompasses all employees, even those who contracted for employment outside the state. The Court did not indicate how the place of hire then became a limitation on the definition of employee. As discussed above, satisfaction of the employee definition is the first step to determine whether the workers’ compensation act will apply.
It is arguable that these cases do not undermine Roberts because the out-of-state injury provision only applies where the injuries occurred outside Michigan.