Lead Opinion
The question presented is whether the plaintiffs wrongful death medical malpractice claim is barred despite the statute of limitations saving pro
i
The estate of the decedent Carolyn Lindsey filed this wrongful death medical malpractice action in the Wayne Circuit Court. The action alleged that defendant Harper Hospital and other named defendants failed to diagnose or to appreciate a postsurgicai infection that occurred between October 1, 1987, and December 17, 1987. These complications led to the amputation above the knee of the decedent’s right leg. Mrs. Lindsey died on January 7, 1988, allegedly as a result of the complications.
Plaintiff, decedent’s daughter, Lanya Lindsey, petitioned the Wаyne Probate Court to be appointed temporary personal representative. The probate court approved the appointment and issued plaintiff letters of authority as temporary personal representative on September 14, 1990. On October 4, 1990, the probate
Defendant Harpеr Hospital moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). Defendant asserted that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations saving provision, MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852, because the claim was filed more than two years after plaintiff’s appointment as temporary personal representative on September 14, 1990. Plaintiff responded that the claim was timely because it was filed within two years of the probate court’s issuance of the October 9, 1990, letters of authority as personal representative.
The circuit court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held that plaintiff’s claim was barred.
n
The period of limitation for a medical malpractice action is two years from the time a claim first accrues. MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4). However, where a potential claimant dies within thirty days after the statute of limitations has run or within
A
In arguing that the statute of limitations did not begin running until the letters of authority for the personal reрresentative were issued, plaintiff relies on Szydelko v Smith’s Estate,
The statute of limitations saving provision at issue in Szydelko stated in pertinent part that the cause of
action may be commenced by or against the executor or administrator of the deceased person or the claim may be proved as a debt against the estate of the deceased person, as the case may be, at any time within two years after granting letters testamentary or of administration .... [1929 CL 13981.]
Szydelko found that “the appointment of a special administrator was a matter quite apart from the issuing of ‘letters testamentary or of administration.’ ” Szydelko, supra at 522. The Court noted that, unlike the general administrator, the special administrator had no powers of general administration and served solely to conserve the estate until the executor or general administrator was appointed. Id. More importantly, a special administrator could not be sued in personal actions accruing before the death of the decedent. Id. at 523. Szydelko thus concluded that the two-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until the issuance of letters of general administration. Id.
We find Szydelko’s considеration of Probate Code provisions instructive. However, we also find Szydelko not controlling for two reasons. First, the case at bar is distinguishable from Szydelko because the instant case involves claims by, rather than against, an estate. Second, there have been significant changes to both the Judicature Act and the Probate Code since Szydelko that limit Szydelko’s precedential value.
The language addressed in Szydelko is inapplicable because MCL 700.175; MSA 27.5175 expressly provides that “[t]he temporary personal representative may commence and maintain actions as personal representative . . . .” The problem addressed in Szy
Furthermore, in 1988 the statute of limitations saving provision of the Revised Judicature Act was amended to no longer address actions against estates, so Szydelko no longer controls the interpretation of the saving provision. Other substantive changes were also made to the probate law that limit Szydelko’s applicability. In fact, this Court recognized this limited applicability in Rhule v Armstrong,
All language of the Court in the Szydelko case had to do with the filing and disposition of claims in probate against the estates of decedents, and the statutes pertaining thereto, as same stood when the Szydelko claim was filed in 1928 and was disposed of by the Court in 1932.
The Legislature has made significant changes to the authority and responsibility of the temporary personal representative. As addressed in part n(B), temporary personal representatives are by definition personal
B
Because Szydelko’s interpretation of the predecessor of the statute of limitations saving provision is not controlling, we are again faced with a question of statutory interpretation regarding when the statute of limitations saving provision began to run in this case. As amended in 1988, MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852 provides in pertinent part:
If a person dies before the period of limitations has run or within 30 days after the period of limitations has run, an action which survives by law may be commenced by the personal representative of the deceased person at any time within 2 years after letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations has run.
The statute has the effect of extending the period of limitation set forth in MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805 where a death occurs either before the period of limitation has run or within thirty days after the period
Because the term personal representative is not defined in the statute, we examine the Revised Probate Code for a definition. The saving provision of the statute of limitations and the Probate Code are intended to work together to preserve legal actions that survive death and to define the running of the statute of limitations where a person dies before or within thirty days of the running of the period of limitation. Under the rule of construction of statutes in pari materia, it is appropriate to harmonize statutory provisions that serve a common purpose when attempting to discern the intent of the Legislature. Jennings v Southwood,
The statute of limitations saving provision of the Revised Judicature Act was amended by
This streamlining of the probate nomenclature also reflected substantive changes in the responsibility and authority of temporary personal representatives.
executor, administrator, administrator with will annexed, administrator de bonis non, a temporary or successor personal representative, and a person who performs substantially the same functions in respect to the estate of a decedent under the law governing their status. [MCL 700.9(3); MSA 27.5009(3).]
Further, the Legislature added an entirely new section to the Probate Code that provides:
If the temporary personal representative becomes the personal representative, all special requirements of sections 174 to 178 shall be waived and the temporary personal representative shall be accountable as though he were the personal representative from the date of appointment as temporary personal representative. [MCL 700.179; MSA 27.5179.]
We hold that these amendments evidence an intent to allow temporary personal representatives to perform essentially the same functions and to bear the same responsibilities as personal representatives.
c
Our conclusion is consistent with the purposes of the statute of limitations saving provision, MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852, which is intended to presеrve actions that survive death in order that the representative of the estate may have a reasonable time to pursue such actions. Morse v Hayes,
full power and authority to take possession, collect, preserve, manage, and dispose of all the property of the estate according to law, and to perform all acts permitted or required by statute, court rule, and orders and decrees of this court ....
The letters of authority were identical in their delegation of powers as those issued to plaintiff as personal representative a few weeks lаter, the only difference being that the September 14, 1990, letters of authority included the word “temporary.”
Further, as stated above and unlike its predecessor, the Revised Probate Code does not limit the temporary personal representative to pursuit of actions involving the preservation and collection of assets of the estate. Compare 1929 CL 15589 with MCL 700.175; MSA 27.5175. Under the Revised Probate Code, a temporary personal representative is empowered to pursue and defend all claims on behalf of the estate.
Because we find no constructive difference in the Revised Probate Code regarding the authority and responsibility of temporary personal representatives and that of personal reрresentatives, we hold that the statute of limitations saving provision ran from September 14, 1990, when plaintiff was appointed temporary personal representative. Therefore, plaintiffs claim was not timely under MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852.
Plaintiff argues that even if this Court holds that the statute of limitations saving provision ran from her appointment as temporary personal representative, that holding should be applied prospectively only. The general rule is that judicial decisions are to be given full retroactive effect. Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents,
Prospective application of a holding is appropriate when the holding overrules settled precedent or decides an “ ‘issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.’ ” People v Phillips,
The fact that a decision may involve an issue of first impression does not in and of itself justify giving it prospective application where the decision does not announce a new rule of law or change existing law, but merely gives an*69 interpretation that has not previously been the subject of an appellate court decision. [Jahner v Dep’t of Corrections,197 Mich App 111 , 114;495 NW2d 168 (1992).]
We do not find that the balance of justice demands prospective application in this case. Though plaintiffs claim may seem unfairly barred by our holding, it cannot be denied that all statutes of limitation set arbitrary time limits for legal claims. Statutes of limitation serve to protect defendants from stale claims. This purpose must be balanced with the purpose of exceptions to statutes of limitation, such as the saving provision. The saving provision preserves a plaintiffs claim, but, as an exception to a statute of limitation, must be narrowly construed. Mair, supra.
Plaintiff, by the letters of authority as temporary personal representative and by the provisions of the Revised Probate Code, had full authority to commence and maintain actions on behalf of the estate. Indeed, plaintiff immediately exercised her authority under MCL 700.703; MSA 27.5703
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and this decision is applied to this case, pending cases, and future cases interpreting MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852.
Notes
In Szydelko, supra at 520, a wrongful death action was filed against the estate of Mrs. Smith. The Smith estate was represented at first by a special administratrix appointed on January 9, 1928, who later became the general executrix on October 2, 1929. The question presented was whether the statute of limitations began to run from her appointment as special administratrix or as general executrix.
MCL 700.9(3); MSA 27.5009(3).
MCL 700.179; MSA 27.5179.
The probate law in effect in 1932 permitted special administrators to commence and maintain actions only for the purposes of collecting the goods, chattels, and debts of the deceased. 1929 CL 15589.
Under MCL 700.703; MSA 27.5703, the personal representative shall, and the temporary personal representative may, publish notice to creditors that claims against the estate not presented within four months of publication of the notice will be barred.
Dissenting Opinion
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that the 1988 Legislature has amended the Revised Probate Code to expand the authority and the responsibility of a temporary personal representative. Thus, I agree with the conclusion that the statute of limitations saving provision begins to run when the probate court issues letters of authority to a temporary personal representative. However, I would give this rule prospective application only.
The single question in this case is whether the “personal representative” envisioned by Revised Judicature Act § 5852 includes a temporary personal representative. The statute states in pertinent part:
If a person dies before the period of limitations has run or within 30 days after the period of limitations has run, an action which survives by law may be commenced by the personal representative of the deceased person at any time within 2 years after letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations has run. But an action shall not be brought under this provision unless the personal representative commences it within 3 years after the period of limitations has run. [MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852 (emphasis addеd).]
In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff asserts that the appointment of a temporary personal representative does not trigger the limitation period. She
The foundation for plaintiffs argument is Szydelko v Smith’s Estate.
The Court of Appeals stated that plaintiff’s reliance on Szydelko was misplaced. It reasoned that Szydelko involved a suit against, not on behalf of, an estate. Also, the tolling statute and an assortment of probate statutes defining the powers of estate fiduciaries had been amended since Szydelko.
Although I agree with the Court of Appeals that the Probate Code has been substantially revised since that time, the revision has not been interpreted by this Court during the interim. Therefore, the statutory interpretation that this Court now gives sets forth a new rule. I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that this case is not a case in which prospective application of the law should apply. Jahner v Dep’t of Corrections,
Neither party disputes the facts of the case. Carolyn Lindsey died from complications following surgery performed at defendant Harper Hospital. Plaintiff, Lindsey’s daughter, is the personal representative of the estate. The lawsuit is a malpractice/wrongful-death action against the hospital and several of its doctors.
The period of limitation for a malpractice action is two years. MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4). However, when an action is brought on behalf of a decedent’s estate, MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852 is triggered. It allows a “personal representative” an additional two years to file after letters of authority hаve been issued.
The parties agree that the date of the first alleged malpractice was October 1, 1987. Consequently, October 1, 1989, became the deadline for filing a lawsuit. However, because this is a malpractice claim brought by an estate as a wrongful death action, the tolling provision is triggered. We have been asked to interpret the tolling provision.
For purposes of comparison, before 1988 the statute read:
*73 If a person dies before the period of limitations has run or within 30 days after the period of limitations has run, an action which survives by law may be commenced by or against the executor or administrator of the deceased person or the claim may be proved as a debt against the estate of the deceased person, as the case may be, at аny time within 2 years after letters testamentary or letters of administration are granted, although the period of limitations has run, subject to the limitations provided in section 20 of chapter 8 of Act No. 288 of the Public Acts of 1939, being section 708.20 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. But no executor or administrator shall bring an action under this provision unless he commences it within 3 years after the period of limitations has run. [1961 PA 236 .]
The earlier version of the statute as well as the amended version is a saving provision designed to extend the period of limitation where death has occurred. Essentially, MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852 adds three years to the underlying statutory period of limitation wherever a party dies before the statute runs. Hence, in a medical malpractice case, where thе decedent dies within two years after the act of malpractice, the tolling provision extends the period of limitation another three years. Hardy v Maxheimer,
In the present case, suit was filed on October 1, 1992. Plaintiff contends that letters of authority were
Defendant, however, contends that the two-year period stated in the saving provision began to run when the letters of authority were first issued. Thus, defendant argues that the present action is barred and that plaintiff’s reliance on Szydelko was misplaced because that was an action against an estate and not by an estate. In order to fully comprehend the reason why the rule established by this Court today should apply prospectively, it is necessary to look at this Court’s decision in Szydelko.
On January 4, 1928, Mr. Szydelko was killed instantly when struck by a truck driven by an employee of Hattie B. Smith. Ms. Smith herself died four days later on January 8, 1928.
In short, excepting antiquated terminology and the possibly important distinction that Szydelko involved a suit against an estate, the issue in Szydelko was the same as in the present case: Did the extra two years for filing commence with the appointment of the special administratrix (now temporary personal representative) or with the appointment of the general executrix (now personal representative)?
The Szydelko Court held that the two yeаrs did not begin to run until the fiduciary was appointed general executrix. That meant that the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations. The key to the Court’s holding was 1929 CL 15589:
An administrator . . . shall collect all the goods, chattels and debts of the deceased, and preserve the same for the executor or administrator who may afterwards be appointed .... All personal actions, the cause of which does by law survive and which may be pending either for or against the intestate of such special administrator, may be proceeded with and be prosecuted by or against such special administrator ....
Taking note of the word “pending” in the statute, the Szydelko Court interpreted the statute as meaning that a special administrator could defend actions filed before the decedent’s death. It сould not be made the defendant in any new lawsuit. Unfiled litigation would have to await the appointment of a general administrator or executor. Therefore, the Court concluded:
[UJnder the probate statutes of this State it must be held that the two-year limitation period does not begin to run*76 until letters of general administration have been issued. [Szydelko, supra at 523.]
Szydelko thus supports the conclusion that the additional two years for filing this lawsuit began not when the plaintiff was appointed temporary, but rather when appointed permanent, personal representative.
The terminology changes between 1932 and the present should not affect the analysis. While it is true that RPC § 175 allows temporary personal representatives to file lawsuits,
The Szydelko case was problematic because it was a postdeath lawsuit against an estate. It was the one
When Szydelko was decided, the term “personal representative” had no meaning different from that of “executor” and “administrator.” The Court was concerned with gleaning the intent of the Legislature in enacting the tolling provision. Therefore, it examined the Probate Code as it existed in 1932 and saw that various limitations аnd restrictions had been imposed upon temporarily appointed “special administrators.” The conclusion was that the legislative intent was to toll the statute of limitations until the appointment of an executor or administrator with general, unrestricted authority.
There the law has rested for over forty years. If, dining that time, the Legislature ever intended to alter the ruling in Szydelko, it certainly had the time to do it. Plaintiff’s argument is that, if the Legislature had wanted to change the outcome in Szydelko, it would have revised both the tolling provision and the Pro
However, in 1978, the Legislature revised the Probate Code. In that revision, the term “personal representative” was introduced, but it was a term used in a generic sense, rather than to connote a specific status, position, or rank. MCL 700.9(3); MSA 27.5009(3).
The 1978 amendments did not alter either the wrongful death act or the RJA § 5852 tolling provision, which is the focus of this appeal. The legislative intent behind
In 1985, the Legislature rewrote the wrongful death act and added some special provisions to the Probate Code. Again, neither the statute of limitations nor the RJA § 5852 special tolling provisions were amеnded.
In 1988, the Legislature did amend RJA § 5852. The amendment came ten years after the major revision of the Probate Code, six years after Hawkins,
The interpretation of the act given by the Szydelko Court, where suit was brought against an estate, is no less valid when suit is brought by an estate. The internal language of the act does not make its interpretation dependent upon whether the estate is the plaintiff or the defendant. Distinctions continue to exist between those who are appointed only temporarily to conserve or protect assets and those who receive a permanent appointment to handle all an estate’s affairs. Hence, the Szydelko ruling continues to provide a rational and sensible interpretation of RJA § 5852. I find that plaintiff’s reliance on Szydelko is not misplaced. However, I think that the time has come to overrule Szydelko.
The Szydelko holding was motivated by concern that estates could avoid suit by delaying the аppointment of a permanent fiduciary. The present 1988 amendments of the tolling statute and the Revised Probate Code erase that concern.
The general rule is that judicial decisions are to be given complete retroactive effect. Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents,
In determining whether a change in the legal interpretation of a statute should be applied retroactively, the Court examines three factors: (1) the purpose of the new rule, (2) the general reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice. People v Young,
In this case, defendant advocates a change in the law in order to enjoy the benefit of a limitation defense that was not available under the rule set forth
Defendant’s is a technical interpretation of the statute. Thus, it is hard to identify any purpose behind the new rule defendant advocates other than to clarify a technical rule of law (i.e., Does appointment of a temporary personal representative now trigger the two-yеar limitation period of this statute?). Dismissing a medical malpractice wrongful death claim to clarify this issue extends a benefit to defendant far beyond the merits of the issue or the purpose for the new rule.
I have already alluded to the general reliance placed upon the rule in Szydelko. Someone searching for the effect of death upon the limitation period would find at § 5852 in the RJA that a personal representative has two years after appointment to file suit. It makes no reference to a temporary personal representative. Further amplification of this section in the annotations or through the Shepardization of cases would disclose the Szydelko case. Its holding would show that the two-year period runs from the appointment of the permanent personal representative of decedent’s estate. One could be expected, therefore, to place reliance upon the only precedent on point, a holding unchallenged for the last sixty-five years.
The administration of justice is not enhanced by our now jeopardizing lawsuits filed within two years of appointment of a personal representative if a temporary representative was appointed earlier.
Consequently, if § 5852 is now to be interpreted as triggering the two-year limitation period upon
I would overrule Szydelko. However, I would hold that this plaintiff was entitled to rely on it for the proposition that RJA § 5852 would be triggered two years after she was appointed (permanent) personal representative. Therefore, I would reverse the Court of Appeals decision and allow plaintiff to go forward with her lawsuit.
The 1988 amendment was made effective to estates commenced after January 1, 1989, and applied to this case. House Bill 5044 stated:
The bill would amend the Revised Judicature Act to delete a provision that establishes a statute of limitations on claims against estates. Currently, an action “by or against the executor or administrator” must be commenced within two years аfter letters of authority are issued, although the period of limitations has run, but*73 cannot be brought more than three years after the period of limitations has run. The bill would allow such an action, with those limitations, only by — and not against — the personal representative. [House Legislative Analysis, HB 5044, May 31, 1988.]
However, the earlier language, in effect at the time of decedent’s injury and death, is important in interpreting the 1988 act.
The opinion does not indicate whether Smith’s death was related to the accident.
“The temporary personal representative may commence and maintain actions as personal representative . . . .” RPC § 175.
“An administrator . . . may commence and maintain actions as an administrator . . . .” 1929 CL 15589.
1929 CL 15589 provided:
All personal actions, the cause of which does by law survive and which may be pending either for or against the intestate of such special administrator, may be proceeded with and be prosecuted by or against such special administrator ....
Similarly, RJA § 175 provides:
All personal actions, the cause of which by law survives and which may be pending either for or against the deceased, may be proceeded with, and be prosecuted by or against, the temporary personal representative ....
Hawkins, supra, overruled Rhule v Armstrong,
Therefore, MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852 operates to extend the time in which to bring such suits. That statute, quoted above, gives the fiduciary an additional two years from the date of issuance of letters testamentary in which to bring suit provided that, in any event, the fiduciary brings suit not more than three years after the limitations period has run. [Hawkins at 438.]