Lead Opinion
In this case, we granted leave to appeal to consider (1) whether the plaintiff’s action is governed by the sixty-day notice provision of MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121 or the 120-day notice provision of MCL 691.1404; MSA 3.996(104), (2) whether our rule in Hobbs v State Hwys Dep’t,
I. FACTS
On June 12, 1988, plaintiff Billy D. Brown was riding his motorcycle through Filer City, Michigan, near Manistee when he lost control attempting to avert a pothole. He filed a complaint on June 11, 1990, against defendant Manistee County Road Commission, alleging that he sustained serious injuries.
Brown claimed that the defendant was negligent because it failed to maintain the surface of the road under its control. Sixty-one days after the accident occurred, the road commission resurfaced the road. However, there is no allegation that it knew about the accident when it resurfaced the road.
On September 5, 1991, the defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), claiming that the plaintiff failed to comply with the sixty-day notice requirement of MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121.
n. THE 120-DAY PROVISION GOVERNS
We begin with the fundamental principle that governmental agencies are statutorily
In the present case, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the basis of plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 120-day notice provision. It held that the county was not prejudiced by repavement of the road before the expiration of the notice provision.
A
We have previously discerned the legislative intent “to provide uniform liability and immunity to both state and local government agencies.” Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing),
Unless the legislation creates a “classification scheme,” or “impinges upon the exercise of a fundamental right,” it is “accorded a presumption of constitutionality, and is reviewed by applying a rational
The only purpose that this Court has been able to posit for a notice requirement is to prevent prejudice to the governmental agency:
[A]ctual prejudice to the state due to lack of notice within 120 days is the only legitimate purpose we can posit for this notice provision .... [Hobbs, supra at 96.]
Notice provisions, therefore, permit a governmental agency to gather evidence quickly in order to evaluate a claim. In contravention of the stated purpose of the notice provision in Hobbs, defendant claims that another purpose for the notice provision is to enable the county to remedy any road defects and prevent future injury. A county cannot be prejudiced with respect to the injured party’s claim, as required by Hobbs, to enforce the notice provision because of the possibility of a future injury. A future injury does not affeсt a governmental agency’s ability to defend itself against the original claim.
The notice provision has the same purpose, therefore, irrespective of whether the action is brought against the state, a city, township, or county road
Therefore, despite a presumption of constitutionality, we are unable to perceive a rational basis for the county road commission statute to mandate notice of a claim within sixty days. During oral argument, attorney for defendant asserted that one could only “surmise” that the distinction is justified by the county road commission’s responsibility for “many miles of rural road.” However, we believe that there are no “facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed” that indicate a road commission requires a shorter notice period merely because it is responsible for rural roads.
B
We must now determine whether the 120-day notice provision is reasonable. Carver v McKernan,
We do not believe that a 120-day notice provision is unreasonably short. Both the six-month notice provision in Carver and the present 120-day notice provision provide a claimant sufficient time to serve the governmental agency with notice of an alleged injury and corresponding defect. Our decision is clearly supported by this Court’s subsequent decision in Hobbs, supra, in which we upheld the exact 120-day notice requirement of MCL 691.1404; MSA 3.996(104). Accordingly, we would hold that the plaintiff’s cause of action is subject to the 120-day notice provision.
We do not agree with the conclusion of the dissenting opinion that Hobbs should be overruled; rather, the doctrine of stare decisis mandates its reaffirmance.
This Court has stated on many occasions that “ ‘[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, principles of law deliberately examined and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction should not be lightly departed.’ ” Boyd v W G Wade Shows,
Moreover, this Court has consistently opined that, absent the rarest circumstances, we should remain faithful to established precedent. We have stated:
*366 “The rule of stare decisis establishes uniformity, certainty, and stability in the law .... Only in the rare case when it is clearly apparent that an error has been made, or changing conditions result in injustice by the application of an outmoded rule, should we deviate from following the established rule.” [People v Collins,438 Mich 8 , 41-42;475 NW2d 684 (1991) (Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting), quoting Parker v Port Huron Hosp,361 Mich 1 , 10;105 NW2d 1 (I960).]
With these principles in mind, we do not believe that Hobbs should be overruled. When this Court decided Hobbs in 1976, it carefully examined the notice provision and the reasons justifying it. In that case, this Court deliberately decided that actual prejudice to the governmental agency resulting from lack of notice within 120 days was the only legitimate purpose it could posit for the notice provision. Further, this Court deliberately decided that, unless actual prejudice is shown, the plaintiffs claim is not barred by failure to give notice within the requisite period.
We are not convinced that Hobbs was wrongly dеcided. Further, we believe that more injury would result from overruling it than from following it. The rule in Hobbs has been an integral part of this state’s governmental tort liability scheme for almost two decades. It should not be lightly discarded. Although the law of governmental tort liability in this state has changed over the years, the continued validity of the Hobbs rule will not result in injustice. Rather, a reaffirmance of the rule will maintain the uniformity, certainty, and stability in the law of this state.
Further, we emphasize that the Legislature has not changed the language of § 4 since Hobbs was
“When, over a period of many years, the Legislature has acquiesced in this Court’s construction of a statute, the judicial power to change that interpretation ought to be exercised with great restraint. On more than one occasion our Court has quoted with approval the statement that stare*368 decisis ‘is especially applicable where the construction placed on a statute by previous decisions has been long acquiesced in by the legislature, by its continued use or failure to change the language of the statute so construed, the power to change the law as interpreted being regarded, in such circumstances, as one to be exercised solely by the, legislature.’ ” [Boyd at 525-526, quoting Dean v Chrysler Corp,434 Mich 655 , 664;455 NW2d 699 (1990), quoting Consumers Power Co v Muskegon Co at 251, quoting 21 CJS, Courts, § 214, pp 388-390. See also In re Clayton Estate,343 Mich 101 , 107;72 NW2d 1 (1955).]
Because the Legislature has not reacted to this Court’s interpretation of § 4 in the nearly twenty years since Hobbs was decided, we conclude that the Legislature has acquiesced in our interpretation of thе statute. Smith v Detroit,
IV. CONCLUSION
We reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals that the sixty-day provision applies, and hold that the 120-day notice provision applies to lawsuits against a county road commission. Further, we hold that Hobbs is still good law. Finally, we hold that the defendant road commission has not established that it has suffered prejudice from the plaintiff’s failure to serve
We remand for trial on the merits.
Notes
On March 18, 1991, the trial court denied a previous defense motion for summary disposition on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 120-day notice requirement. MCL 691.1404; MSA 3.996(104).
Common-law sovereign immunity was abrogated by statute. Pittman v City of Taylor,
Except as otherwise provided in this act, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise of discharge of a governmental function. [MCL 691.1407(1); MSA 3.996(107)(1).]
For a review of sovereign immunity and its origins and development in this state, see Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Reheamng),
MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) provides in relevant part:
Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over аny highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency. . . . The duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the imprоved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.
MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121 specifically addresses the county road commission’s liability and states in relevant part:
*359 It is hereby made the duty of the counties to keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be reasonably safe and convenient for public travel, all county roads, bridges and culverts that are within their jurisdiction and under their care and control and which are oрen to public travel.
[N]o board of county road commissioners, subject to any liability under this section, shall be liable for damages sustained by any person upon any county road, either to his person or property, by reason of any defective county road, bridge or culvert under the jurisdiction of the board of county road commissioners, unless such person shall serve or cause to be served within 60 days after such injury shall have occurred, a notice in writing upon the clerk and upon the chairman of the board of county road commissioners of such bоard, which notice shall set forth substantially the time when and place where such injury took place, the manner in which it occurred, and the extent of such iiyuries as far as the same has become known, the names of the witnesses to said accident, if any, and that the person receiving such injury intends to hold such county liable for such damages as may have been sustained by him. It is the intention that the provisions of this section shall apply to all county roads whether such roads become county roads under chapter 4 of the general highway laws .... [Emphasis added.]
“Political subdivision” means any municipal corporation, county, county road commission, township, charter township, school district, community college district, port district, or metropolitan district, transportation authority, or any combination thereof .... [MCL 691.1401(b); MSA 3.996(101)(b).]
“Municipal corporation” means any city, village, township or charter township, or any combination thereof, when acting jointly. [MCL 691.1401(a); MSA 3.996(101)(a).]
As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason of any defective highway, the injured person, within 120 days from the time the injury occurred, except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) shall serve a notice on the governmental agency of the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The notice shall specify the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the claimant. [MCL 691.1404(1); MSA 3.996(104)(1).]
Defendant essentially prejudiced itself by repaving, albeit unknowingly, before the expiration of the notice period in this particular case.
This is not the same equal protection issue raised in Reich v State Hwy Dep’t,
Social or economic legislation is generally subject to review under traditional equal protection tests, i.e., whether the legislation may be reasonably justified. People v Perlos,
Citing United States v Carolene Products Co,
Moreover, this arbitrary distinction does not even apply to Wayne County.
This rationale applies equally to claims brought pursuant to the governmental liability act. Hobbs, supra.
In Boyd v W G Wade Shows,
“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation.”
In Carver v McKernan,
When Hobbs was decided three years later we held:
The rationale of Carver is equally applicable to cases brought under the governmental liability act. Because actual prejudice to the state due to lack of notice within 120 days is the only legitimate purpose we can posit for this notice provision, absent a showing of such prejudice the notice provision contained in MCL 691.1404; MSA 3.996(104) is not a bar to claims filed pursuant to MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102). [Id. at 96.]
The difficulty we experienced in Hobbs was that we could nоt posit another purpose for the notice provision other than to prevent prejudice to the state. If the Legislature was not happy with our presumption, it could have responded in some fashion to the Hobbs decision. It could have further articulated the notice provision’s purpose and possibly have created a presumption of prejudice to the governmental agency from the plaintiffs’ failure to give notice within 120 days. However, not only has the Legislature not attempted to revise the statute to respond to Hobbs, it also has not even criticized Hobbs in later lеgislative enactments or amendments in the almost twenty years since it was decided.
As this Court stated in Sheppard v Michigan Nat’l Bank,
When the Supreme Court has placed an interpretation on a statute over a considerable period of years it may indulge in the judi- ' cial assumption that the legislature has been content with that interpretation because of its failure to exercise its independent prerogative to restate the provision.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff must comply with the 120-day notice requirement, I dissent because I would reject the requirement of рrejudice engrafted upon the statutory notice provision by Hobbs v State Hwys Dep’t,
i
The statutory provision at issue in this case is straightforward, clear, and unambiguous. Nevertheless, this Court рreviously engrafted a requirement of prejudice upon it. The requirement has its origins in Reich v State Hwy Dep’t,
However, in Carver v McKernan,
In the Court’s subsequent decision in Hobbs, supra at 96, the Court upheld Carver and specifically required a showing of prejudice to the state before enforcement of the notice provision:
Because actual prejudice to the state due to lack of notice within 120 days is the only legitimate purpose we can posit for this notice provision, absent a showing of such prejudice the notice provision contained in MCL 691.1404; MSA 3.996(104) is not a bar to claims filed pursuant to MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102).
This “constitutional” requirement engrafted by the Court is illusory. I note that “[w]hen scrutinizing economic and social legislation, this Court applies the rational basis standard of review.” Downriver Plaza Group v Southgate,
This particular legislation passes the minimal rational basis test, and the Court in Hobbs was without authority to require a showing of prejudice in each and every case. Notice provisions rationally and reasonably prоvide the state with the opportunity to investigate and evaluate a claim. The mere fact that in
The statute clearly survives rational basis scrutiny and, is constitutional. The statute, therefore, must be read and applied as written.
Hobbs is, therefore, in clear derogation of the fundamental precepts of statutory construction. I am unable to agree with this judicial intrusion into a leg
The admission of the obvious fact that a change in the policy of governmental immunity from liability in cases of the nature here involved is within the scope of legislative authority carries with it the further admission that such action is not within the scope of judicial powers.
Although I agree with the result in Hobbs that notice provisions are constitutional, I cannot agree with its rationale. This conclusion remains loyal to our recent decision in Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing),
The majority relies on legislative acquiescence to uphold the Hobbs prejudice requirement.
n
While I agree that plaintiff’s equal protection rights are violated by applying two distinct notice periods to
As noted by Justice Coleman in her dissent in Hobbs, unlike private tortfeasors, the state must consent to be sued. She noted that the Legislature placed conditions on its surrendering of a portion of its immunity, i.e., the claim must be brought in the Court of Claims, there is a two-year statute of limitations for injuries resulting from a defective highway, and the governmental agency must be notified of the claim within 120 days of its occurrence.
“If the language used is clear and the meaning of the words chosen is unambiguous, a commоn-sense reading of the provision will suffice, and no interpretation is necessary.” Karl v Bryant Air Conditioning,
Justice Coleman aptly noted that “the law does not permit amendment of legislation by court edict.” Kerkstra v State Hwy Dep’t,
The majority also relies in large part on principles of stare decisis. As this Court previously stated in Wilson v Doehler-Jarvis,
Notwithstanding appellant’s quoted understanding of the oft-discussed doctrine of stare decisis, this Court will not close its eyes to a possible error it may have committed in the past. We do not believe that the doctrine of stare decisis means that this Court and the evolution of the law should be controlled by the “dead hand*373 from the past.” Nor do we believe that this Court must perpetuate error simply because it may have reached a wrong result in one of its earlier decisions.
Having concluded that this Court failed to apply the proper constitutional scrutiny, i.e., rational basis, and improperly engrafted a prejudice requirement, stare decisis is not a credible basis to perpetuate this error.
As Justice Cavanagh noted in People v Bullock,