BROWN v MANISTEE COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION
Docket No. 99566
Supreme Court of Michigan
Decided July 16, 1996
452 Mich 354
Argued December 6, 1995 (Calendar No. 11).
In separate opinions, the Supreme Court unanimously held:
The 120-day notice provision of
In an opinion by Justice CAVANAGH, joined by Chief Justice BRICKLEY, and Justices LEVIN and MALLETT, the Supreme Court additionally held:
As decided in Hobbs v State Hwys Dep‘t, 398 Mich 90 (1976), absent a showing of actual prejudice to the governmental agency, the notice provision of
1. Governmental agencies are statutorily immune from tort liability. Exceptions include failure to properly maintain highways and county roads in reasonable repair. As a condition of the exception, notice of the alleged injury and defect is required to be served on the appropriate governmental agency. Two potentially governing statutes provide different notice periods.
2. Notice provisions permit a governmental agency to gather evidence quickly in order to evaluate a claim, irrespective of whether the action is brought against the state, a city, township, or county road commission. Despite a presumption of constitutionality, there is no rational basis for the county road commission statute to mandate notice within sixty days. There are no facts either known or that could reasonably be assumed that indicate a road commission requires a shorter notice period than the state merely because it is responsible for rural roads. Accordingly, the sixty-day notice provision is unconstitutional, and the plaintiff‘s cause of action is subject to the 120-day provision.
3. Hobbs should not be overruled; rather, the doctrine of stare decisis mandates its reaffirmance. Despite the Legislature‘s ability to change the statutory language or disapprove of this Court‘s interpretation of
Reversed and remanded.
Justice RILEY, joined by Justice BOYLE, dissenting, stated that while the plaintiff must comply with the 120-day notice requirement, the requirement of showing prejudice to the governmental agency engrafted upon the statutory notice provision by Hobbs is insupportable and should be rejected. Hobbs should be overruled. On the basis of the facts of this case, proper application of the statute bars plaintiff‘s cause of action bеcause he failed to provide the county road commission with notice of his claim within 120 days of
The statutory provision at issue in this case is straightforward, clear, and unambiguous. However, in Hobbs, the Supreme Court specifically required a showing of prejudice to the state before enforcement of its notice provision. This “constitutional” requirement engrafted by the Court is illusory. When scrutinizing economic and social legislation, the Supreme Court must apply the rational basis standard of rеview. The only inquiry, then, is whether this social legislation creating a 120-day notice requirement has a rational basis. This particular legislation passes the minimal rational basis test. The Court in Hobbs was without authority to require a showing of prejudice in each case.
Justice WEAVER took no part in the decision of this case.
204 Mich App 574; 516 NW2d 121 (1994) reversed.
Keller & Katkowsky, P.C. (by Lawrence S. Katkowsky), for the plaintiff.
Smith, Haughey, Rice & Roegge (by Jon D. Vander Ploeg and Craig R. Noland) for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
CAVANAGH, J. In this case, we granted leave to appeal to consider (1) whether the plaintiff‘s action is governed by the sixty-day notice provision of
I. FACTS
On June 12, 1988, plaintiff Billy D. Brown was riding his motorcycle through Filer City, Michigan, near Manistee when he lost control attempting to avert a pothole. He filed a complaint on June 11, 1990, against defendant Manistee County Road Commission, alleging that he sustained serious injuries.
Brown claimed that the defendant was negligent because it failed to maintain the surface of the road under its control. Sixty-one days after the accident occurred, the road commission resurfaced the road. However, there is no allegation that it knew about the accident when it resurfaced the road.
On September 5, 1991, the defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), claiming that the plaintiff failed to comply with the sixty-day notice requirement of
II. THE 120-DAY PROVISION GOVERNS
We begin with the fundamental principle that governmental agencies are statutorily3 immune from tort liability.4 The Legislature has, however, provided exceptions to immunity, including liability for failure to properly maintain highways5 and failure to maintain county roads6 in reasonable repair. As a condition of this particular waiver of immunity, qualified by
In the present case, the trial court denied the defendant‘s motion for summary disposition on the basis of plaintiff‘s failure to comply with the 120-day notice provision. It held that the county was not prejudiced by repavement of the road before the expiration of the notice provision.11 However, if the sixty-day notice provision applies, the defendant may have been prejudiced because after the road was repaved, it was unable to photograph, examine or otherwise evaluate plaintiff‘s claim. We, therefore, must determine with which notice provision the plaintiff was required to comply. In doing so, we remain loyal to this Court‘s recent commitment “to interpret the cur-
A
We have previously discerned the legislative intent “to provide uniform liability and immunity to both state and local government agencies.” Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 614; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). We, therefore, note that thе distinct notice periods in the two statutes are suspect because it is clear that
Unless the legislation creates a “classification scheme,” or “impinges upon the exercise of a fundamental right,” it is “accorded a presumption of constitutionality, and is reviewed by applying a rational
The only purpose that this Court has been able to posit for a notice requirement is to prevent prejudice to the governmental agency:
[A]ctual prejudice to the state due to lack of notice within 120 days is the only legitimate purpose we can posit for this notice provision . . . . [Hobbs, supra at 96.]
Notice provisions, therefore, permit a governmental agency to gather evidence quickly in order to evaluate a claim. In contravention of the stated purpose of the notice provision in Hobbs, defendant claims that another purpose for the notice provision is to enable the county to remedy any road defects and prevent future injury. A county cannot be prejudiced with respect to the injured party‘s claim, as required by Hobbs, to enforce the notice provision because of the possibility of a future injury. A future injury does not affect a governmental agency‘s ability to defend itself against the original claim.
The notice provision has the same purpose, therefore, irrespective of whether the action is brought against the state, a city, township, or county road
Therefore, despite a presumption of constitutionality, we are unable to perceive a rational basis for the county road commission statute to mandate notice of a claim within sixty days. During oral argument, attorney for defendant asserted that one could only “surmise” that the distinction is justified by the county road commission‘s responsibility for “many miles of rural road.” However, we believe that there are no “facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed” that indicate a road commission requires a shorter notice period merely because it is responsible for rural roads.15 Shavers, supra at 613-614. This fact bears no relationship to the stated purpose оf the notice provision. There may be no dispute that the governmental agencies under
B
We must now determine whether the 120-day notice provision is reasonable. Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich 96; 211 NW2d 24 (1973). In Carver, the Court held that a notice provision with a legitimate purpose “does not necessarily violate the constitution.” Id. at 100. The Court held, however, that “even though some notice requirement may be permitted, a particular provision may still be constitutionally deficient.” Id. Upholding the six-month notice requirement of the accidеnt claims act,
We do not believe that a 120-day notice provision is unreasonably short. Both the six-month notice provision in Carver and the present 120-day notice provision provide a claimant sufficient time to serve the governmental agency with notice of an alleged injury and corresponding defect. Our decision is clearly supported by this Court‘s subsequent decision in Hobbs, supra, in which we upheld the exact 120-day notice requirement of
We do not agree with the conclusion of the dissenting opinion that Hobbs should be overruled; rather, the doctrine of stare decisis mandates its reaffirmance.17 Additionally, despite the Legislature‘s ability to change the statutory language or disapprove of this Court‘s interpretation of § 4, it has acquiesced in the Hobbs decision for nearly twenty years.
This Court has stated on many occasions that “[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, principles of law deliberately examined and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction should not be lightly departed.” Boyd v WG Wade Shows, 443 Mich 515, 525, n 15; 505 NW2d 544 (1993), quoting People v Jamieson, 436 Mich 61, 79; 461 NW2d 884 (1990). Further, this Court has stated that it “will not overrule a decision deliberately made unless [it] is convinced not merely that the casе was wrongly decided, but also that less injury would result from overruling than from following it.” Boyd at 524 (citation omitted).
Moreover, this Court has consistently opined that, absent the rarest circumstances, we should remain faithful to established precedent. We have stated:
“The rule of stare decisis establishes uniformity, certainty, and stability in the law . . . . Only in the rare case when it is clearly apparent that an error has been made, or changing conditions result in injustice by the application of an outmoded rule, should we deviate from following the established rule.” [People v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 41-42; 475 NW2d 684 (1991) (CAVANAGH, C.J., dissenting), quoting Parker v Port Huron Hosp, 361 Mich 1, 10; 105 NW2d 1 (1960).]
With these principles in mind, we do not believe that Hobbs should be overruled. When this Court decided Hobbs in 1976, it carefully examined the notice provision and the reasons justifying it. In that case, this Court deliberately decided that actual prejudice to the governmental agenсy resulting from lack of notice within 120 days was the only legitimate purpose it could posit for the notice provision. Further, this Court deliberately decided that, unless actual prejudice is shown, the plaintiff‘s claim is not barred by failure to give notice within the requisite period.
We are not convinced that Hobbs was wrongly decided. Further, we believe that more injury would result from overruling it than from following it. The rule in Hobbs has been an integral part of this state‘s governmental tort liability scheme for almost two decades. It should not be lightly discarded. Although the law of governmental tort liability in this state has changed over the years, the continued validity of the Hobbs rule will not result in injustice. Rather, a reaffirmance of the rule will maintain the uniformity, certainty, and stability in the lаw of this state.
Further, we emphasize that the Legislature has not changed the language of § 4 since Hobbs was
“When, over a period of many years, the Legislature has acquiesced in this Court‘s construction of a statute, the judicial power to change that interpretation ought to be exercised with great restraint. On more than one occasion our Court has quoted with approval the statemеnt that stare
decisis ‘is especially applicable where the construction placed on a statute by previous decisions has been long acquiesced in by the legislature, by its continued use or failure to change the language of the statute so construed, the power to change the law as interpreted being regarded, in such circumstances, as one to be exercised solely by the, legislature.’ ” [Boyd at 525-526, quoting Dean v Chrysler Corp, 434 Mich 655, 664; 455 NW2d 699 (1990), quoting Consumers Power Co v Muskegon Co at 251, quoting 21 CJS, Courts, § 214, pp 388-390. See also In re Clayton Estate, 343 Mich 101, 107; 72 NW2d 1 (1955).]
Because the Legislature has not reacted to this Court‘s interpretation of § 4 in the nearly twenty years since Hobbs was decided, we conclude that the Legislature has acquiesced in our interpretation of the statute. Smith v Detroit, 388 Mich 637, 650; 202 NW2d 300 (1972). Apparently, thе Legislature has been content with the way this Court has interpreted § 4.19
IV. CONCLUSION
We reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals that the sixty-day provision applies, and hold that the 120-day notice provision applies to lawsuits against a county road commission. Further, we hold that Hobbs is still good law. Finally, we hold that the defendant road commission has not established that it has suffered prejudice from the plaintiff‘s failure to serve
BRICKLEY, C.J., and LEVIN and MALLETT, JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.
RILEY, J. (dissenting). Although I agree with the majority‘s conclusion that plaintiff must comply with the 120-day notice requiremеnt, I dissent because I would reject the requirement of prejudice engrafted upon the statutory notice provision by Hobbs v State Hwys Dep‘t, 398 Mich 90; 247 NW2d 754 (1976). Accordingly, on the basis of the facts before the Court, I would hold that the statutory notice requirement bars plaintiff‘s cause of action. Although the Court of Appeals improperly concluded that the sixty-day notice provision governed, it properly upheld the trial court‘s grant of defendant‘s motion for summary disposition. Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on different grounds.
I
The statutory provision at issue in this case is straightforward, clear, and unambiguous. Nevertheless, this Court previously engrafted a requirement of prejudice upon it. The requirement has its origins in Reich v State Hwy Dep‘t, 386 Mich 617; 194 NW2d 700 (1972), in which this Court, in a cursory opinion, struck down the sixty-day notice requirement as violative of the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The Court reasoned that the notice requirement divided the natural class of victims of negligent tortfeasors into arbitrary subclasses: victims of governmental negligence who must meet
However, in Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich 96; 211 NW2d 24 (1973), the Court retreated from this position and held that notice provisions are not necessarily unconstitutional. The Court upheld the constitutionality of notice provisions in cases in which prejudice to the government for failure to give such notice could be demonstrated.
In the Court‘s subsequent decision in Hobbs, supra at 96, the Court upheld Carver and specifically required a showing of prejudice to the state before enforcement of the notice provision:
Because actual prejudice to the state due to lack of notice within 120 days is the only legitimate purpose we can posit for this notice provision, absent a showing of such prejudice the notice provision contained in
MCL 691.1404 ;MSA 3.996(104) is not a bar to claims filed pursuant toMCL 691.1402 ;MSA 3.996(102) .
This “constitutional” requirement engrafted by the Court is illusory. I note that “[w]hen scrutinizing economic and social legislation, this Court applies the rational basis standard of review.” Downriver Plaza Group v Southgate, 444 Mich 656, 666; 513 NW2d 807 (1994). The only inquiry, then, is whether this social legislation creating a 120-day notice requirement has a rational basis.
This particular legislation passes the minimal rational basis test, and the Court in Hobbs was without authority to require a showing of prejudice in each and every case. Notice provisions rationally and reasonably provide the state with the opportunity to investigate and evaluate a claim. The mere fact that in
The statute clearly survives rational basis scrutiny and, is constitutional. The statute, therefore, must be read and applied as written.2 In contrast, this Court in Hobbs created a condition for the application of a notice requirement that is not supported by the language of the statute.
Hobbs is, therefore, in clear derogation of the fundamental precepts of statutory construction. I am unable to agree with this judicial intrusion into a leg-
The admission of the obvious fact that a change in the policy of governmental immunity from liability in cases of the nature here involved is within the scope of legislative authority carries with it the further admission that such action is not within the scope of judicial powers.
Although I agree with the result in Hobbs that notice provisions are constitutional, I cannot agree with its rationale. This conclusion remains loyal to our recent decision in Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), where we stated that the grant of immunity “is expressed in the broadest possible language . . . .” Id. at 618. The statutory exceptions, however, are “narrowly drawn.” Id. Plaintiff in this case is only able to bring his court action because the Legislature created an еxception to governmental immunity. The Legislature requires timely notice of such a claim as quid pro quo for its relinquishment of immunity. I would uphold this notice requirement as written by the Legislature.
The majority relies on legislative acquiescence to uphold the Hobbs prejudice requirement.4 This argu-
II
While I agree that plaintiff‘s equal protection rights are violated by applying twо distinct notice periods to
BOYLE, J., concurred with RILEY, J.
WEAVER, J., took no part in the decision of this case.
Notes
For a review of sovereign immunity and its origins and development in this state, see Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 618; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). The majority also relies in large part on principles of stare decisis. As this Court previously stated in Wilson v Doehler-Jarvis, 358 Mich 510, 514; 100 NW2d 226 (1960):Except as otherwise provided in this act, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise of discharge of a governmental function. [
MCL 691.1407(1) ;MSA 3.996(107)(1) .]
Notwithstanding appellant‘s quoted understanding of the oft-discussed doctrine of stare decisis, this Court will not close its eyes to a possible error it may have committed in the past. We do not believe that the doctrine of stare decisis means that this Court and the evolution of the law should be controlled by the “dead hand
As Justice CAVANAGH noted in People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 27; 485 NW2d 866 (1992), “this Court alone is the ultimate authority with regard to the meaning and application of Michigan law.”Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiсtion in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency. . . . The duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.
It is hereby made the duty of the counties to keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be reasonably safe and convenient for public travel, all county roads, bridges and culverts that are within their jurisdiction and under their care and control and which are open to public travel.
[N]o board of county road commissioners, subject to any liability under this section, shall be liable for damages sustained by any person upon any county road, either to his person or property, by reason of any defective county road, bridge or culvert under the jurisdiction of the board of county road commissioners, unless such person shall serve or cause to be served within 60 days after such injury shall have occurred, a notice in writing upon the clerk and upon the chairman of the board of county road commissioners of such board, which notice shall set forth substantially the time when and place where such injury took place, the manner in which it occurred, and the extent of such injuries as far as the same has become known, the names of the witnesses to said accident, if any, and that the person receiving such injury intends to hold such county liable for such damages as may have been sustained by him. It is the intention that the provisions of this section shall apply to all county roads whether such roads become county roads under chapter 4 of the general highway laws . . . . [Emphasis added.]
“Political subdivision” means any municipal corporation, сounty, county road commission, township, charter township, school district, community college district, port district, or metropolitan district, transportation authority, or any combination thereof . . . . [
MCL 691.1401(b) ;MSA 3.996(101)(b) .]
On July 1, 1986, the Legislature amended this definition to include “county road commission.” Actions against a county road commission would seemingly be within the statute‘s purview. Notwithstanding this amendment, a reference in
MCL 691.1402 ;MSA 3.996(102) toMCL 224.21 ;MSA 9.121 for “liability, procedure and remedy as to county roads under the jurisdiction of a county road commission” remains. This language is clear and unambiguous, therefore, it is not susceptible to statutory construction: “When a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction or interpretation is unnecessary and therefore, precluded.” Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992).“Municipal corporation” means any city, village, township or charter township, or any combination thereof, when acting jointly. [
MCL 691.1401(a) ;MSA 3.996(101)(a) .]
As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason of any defective highway, the injured person, within 120 days from the time the injury occurred, except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) shall serve a notice on the governmental agency of the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The notice shall specify the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the claimant. [
MCL 691.1404(1) ;MSA 3.996(104)(1) .]
“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation.”
The difficulty we experienced in Hobbs was that we could not posit another purpose for the notice provision other than to prevent prejudice to the state. If the Legislature was not happy with our presumption, it could have responded in some fashion to the Hobbs decision. It could have further articulated the notice provision‘s purpose and possibly have created a presumption of prejudice to the governmental agency from the plaintiffs’ failure to give notice within 120 days. However, not only has the Legislature not attempted to revise the statute to respond to Hobbs, it also has not even criticized Hobbs in later legislative enactments or amendments in the almost twenty years since it was decided.The rationale of Carver is equally applicable to cases brought under the governmental liability act. Because actual prejudice to the state due to lack of notice within 120 days is the only legitimate purpose we can posit for this notice provision, absent a showing of such prejudice the notice provision contained in
MCL 691.1404 ;MSA 3.996(104) is not a bar to claims filed pursuant toMCL 691.1402 ;MSA 3.996(102) . [Id. at 96.]
When the Supreme Court has placed an interpretation on a statute over a considerable period of years it may indulge in the judicial assumption that the legislature has been content with that interpretation because of its failure to exercise its independent prerogative to restate the provision.