In re
A162583
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
Filed 12/19/22
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
(Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCR319528)
In this proceeding, Walter Chunn III was found incompetent to stand trial under
After multiple evidentiary hearings and rounds of briefing, the trial court issued a countywide standing order finding that the DSH was not adequately meeting its primary responsibility for the assеssment and treatment of IST defendants. The court concluded that notwithstanding DSH‘s claimed inability to provide comprehensive competency restoration services due to the lack of bed space in its hospitals, DSH had at its disposal a number of processes that would allow it to undertake assessment and treatment services to stabilize and manage client symptoms while IST defendants await placement. Finding the “plain meaning of the statutes at issue and the constitutional rights of the defendants” entitled them to relief, the court set forth a lengthy and detailed order, outlining steps DSH was ordered to implement within specific timeframes to meet their obligations to provide treatment and competency restoration services to all IST defendants in Solano County. DSH timely appealed from that order.
In the meantime, almost four months after the trial court in this case issued its standing order, Division Two of this court issued its opinion in Stiavetti v. Clendenin (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 691 (Stiavetti). The Stiavetti
On appeal in this case, DSH argues that the trial court‘s standing order is flawed in numerous respects. DSH argues the order (1) violates separation of powers principles, (2) conflicts with Stiavetti‘s statewide deadline for the provision of substantive services to restore competency and its holding regarding the point at which DSH becomes legally responsible for IST defendants, (3) improperly blames DSH for failings of county officials who have responsibility for conditions at the jail, and (4) erroneously permits the imposition of monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,500 per day for noncompliance with its order.
To add a further layer of complexity, since DSH appealed, the Legislature has twice amended statutes governing the process for admission of IST defendants and the responsibilities of DSH. We asked the parties for supplemental briefing about the effect of some of the recent changes to the law and whether this court should remand the matter to the trial court for reconsideration of its order in light of the Stiavetti decision and subsequent statutory changes.
For reasons we will explain, we conclude the trial court‘s thoughtful and considered ruling did not violate separation of powers principles at the time it was made, nor, for the most part, does it conflict with Stiavetti. We disagree that the trial court‘s weighing of the evidence and balancing of competing interests in this case reflected an abuse of discretion or that the court‘s imposition of deadlines consistent with statutory law, constitutional precedent, and legislative intent as reflected in then-existing law violated the separation of powers doctrine. We appreciate the complex and difficult problems created by limited funding, resources, and bed space to treat IST defendants at DSH facilities, and the many efforts by DSH, also acknowledged by the trial court in this proceeding, to address them. We also, however, agree with the trial court here and our many sister courts, that such challenges do not relieve DSH of its responsibility to provide treatment and competency restoration services within a reasonable period of time.
Nonetheless, due to changes in the law, we conclude some aspects of the order must be modified and others may be reconsidered. Accordingly, as we elucidate below, we will remand for the trial court to reconsider its order in light of Stiavetti and relevant statutory amendments.
A. IST Statutory Scheme
A mentally incompetent defendant is one who, “as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, . . . is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” (
Prior to making the commitment order, the court must order the community program director or a designee to evaluate the defendant and make a written recommendation as to the appropriate placement for the defendant. (
Once a court orders an IST defendant‘s commitment, it must provide copies of documents specified by statute to the DSH or other treatment facility, prior to the IST defendant‘s admission. (
In 2021, not long after the Stiavetti opinion issued, the Legislature enacted an omnibus health trailer bill, Assembly Bill No. 133 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 143.) (Assembly Bill 133). Effective July 27, 2021, the new legislation amended section 1370 to allow DSH to conduct evaluations of IST defendants in county custody, pursuant to newly added
In 2022, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 184 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 184), which аmended Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2 to eliminate the requirement that the program only serve defendants who have been waiting 60 days or more for admission.4 (
B. Factual and Procedural Background
In February 2016, Chunn filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in propria persona, asserting that he was competent to stand trial and that his constitutional rights had been violated because Napa State Hospital failed to admit and evaluate him, depriving him of a reasonable means of contesting his commitment. The trial court ordered DSH to show cause why the court should not impose an injunction requiring DSH to admit IST defendants in Solano County for evaluation and treatment within a set period of time.5
DSH filed a return, and Chunn, represented by appointed counsel filed a traverse, requesting an evidentiary hearing. The trial court granted his request for an evidentiary hearing.
Meanwhile, two other Solano County IST defendants, Pablo D. Stallings and Alan Wakefield, Jr., sought sanctions against DSH for failing to timely admit them for competency restoration treatment. The trial court informally joined Chunn‘s habeas proceeding with the Stallings and Wakefield matters because the three cases involved similar factual and legal issues.6
The parties submitted multiple declarations, witness lists, requests for judicial notice, and supplemental briefing addressing specific questions outlined by the trial court in a detailed written order. In February 2019, the evidentiary hearing commenced.7 The hearing took place on February 4, 5, and May 23, 2019. The parties submitted additional declarations and briefing after the hearing. The parties gave closing arguments in October 2020, and submitted further supplemental briefing and declarations after closing arguments.
On February 26, 2021, the trial court issued an amended 35-page standing order concluding that defendants had established their entitlement to meaningful relief. The court began by summarizing the factual backgrounds of Chunn, Stallings, and Wakefield, describing the delay in evaluation and
The trial court‘s order next summarized the evidence presented with respect to the lack of treatment for Solano County IST defendants in particular. Documents submitted by DSH Chief of Research, Evaluation, and Data Janna Lowder-Blanco showed that between 2015 and early 2020, Solano County IST defendants experienced average placement delays between 55 and 93 days to either a state hospital or JBCT program. The court noted that the parties had “offered substantial evidence that IST defendants receive little if any ameliorative care in Solano County pending IST placement.”
In particular, the trial court noted Deputy Sergeant Rondo Sands of the Solano County Sheriff‘s Department, who served as the liaison between the court and the DSH, testified regarding the circumstances of untreated IST defendants “languishing in his jail.” Sands described “a wide range of troubling behavior and IST defendant suffering, noting that they routinely engage in self-injurious behavior, feces smearing, and other shocking behaviors, and that they pose a significant risk of harm to staff and other inmates.” DSH, on the other hand, offered evidence of limitations in caring for IST defendants in Solano County which, it contended, exacerbated existing waitlist problems. Specifically, the court noted that DSH presented evidence that (1) local jail and mental health agencies undertake no meaningful effort to seek involuntary psychotropic medication orders for persons in distress, allowing defendants to decompensate without treatment; (2) there is no continuity of care for persons traveling in and out of jail, resulting in increased mental illness symptoms and reduced amenability to treatment; (3) the county offers no outpatient competency restoration services or alternatives for IST defendants; and (4) even after DSH developed funding for local mental health diversion programs, Solano County failed to submit a funding
IST defendants in Solano County, the trial court explained, “are usually held in solitary cells or restricted conditions for at least 6 weeks after the initial declaration of doubt regarding their competency as the court awaits alienist evaluations and placement recommendations. These defendants have often clinically deteriorated even before the DSH commitment order is made and quite often (as occurred in all 3 cases at issue here) their troubling symptoms have increased during the period of time after the commitment order and before DSH offers them a bed. The situation is dire for these patients as they routinely face another 60–90 days without treatment after the DSH commitment is made until treatment commences.” The court wrote, “The IST defendants in this case have established that they and other similarly-situated IST defendants have suffered and are suffering devastating injury as they are warehoused without meaningful treatment as they await DSH intervention,” noting “[t]his calamity presents specific challenges not necessarily present in other jurisdictions where local facilities provide at least some ameliorative care.” (Fn. omitted.)
In its legal analysis, the trial court examined at length the federal and state case law addressing the constitutional and statutory rights of IST defendants to compel assessment and treatment, the evidence of harm presented by Chunn, Stallings, and Wakefield, and the meaning of “commitment” in section 1370 as it relates to DSH‘s responsibility to undertake its duties to assess and treat IST defendants promptly.
Further, the court looked to timelines in section 1370 and other statutory schemes, including the criminal code and the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (
In its discussion of the legal issues presented, the trial court highlighted “a separate question that recent litigation has not addressed: Assuming delays in placement following a commitment order to DSH, is DSH responsible for patient care pending placement?” Drawing on evidence in the record that “DSH has a range of tools at its disposal to increase its treatment capacity,” including “jail-based treatment and telecare,” the trial court concluded that DSH had demonstrated its ability to provide psychiatric assessment and treatment services “notwithstanding the alleged unavailability of bed space.” The court noted the provision of ameliorative care pending placement of IST defendants would serve several important legislative goals of section 1368, by (1) identifying section 1368 outliers (either malingerers or individuals unlikely to be restored to competency) who could promptly be redirected from the IST waitlist; (2) ensuring that the continued commitment of IST defendants is justified by progress toward restoration of competency; and (3) most importantly, treating symptoms and easing the suffering of IST defеndants.
At the conclusion of its order, the trial court summarized its findings and issued a detailed, county-wide standing order. Specifically, the court found that (1) DSH had failed to provide IST defendants in Solano County prompt treatment or assessment services after their commitment for competency restoration services; (2) defendants were suffering from “extreme, severe, debilitating mental and physical conditions, to such a degree that it violates our concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency“; (3) defendants were not being afforded adequate local treatment for their conditions; (4) DSH justifications for their failure to promptly afford treatment services did not negate their obligation to do so and the plain meaning of the statutes at issue and the constitutional rights of defendants supported their right to relief; (5) notwithstanding DSH‘s failure to promptly place IST defendants, DSH had a “separate responsibility to provide prompt psychiatric and medical assistance to these suffering mentally ill persons until such time as full competency restoration treatment can commence“; and (6) the “more detailed and formal structure of a general order” would enhance the court‘s capacity to protect defendants’ rights, while alleviating their suffering and creating a compliance structure for the imposition of “meaningful and effective sanctions” should the orders fail to result in improved responses.
Accordingly, the court ordered as follows:
“1. For purposes of this order, each Solano County IST defendant shall be deemed committed to the care of DSH upon receipt by DSH of the court‘s commitment order.
“2. Upon receipt of that commitment order, if defendant cannot be placed in a designated state hospital facility within 72 hours, DSH shall commence meaningful engagement with the defendant and psychiatric treatment prior to the expiration of those 72 hours. At a minimum that DSH shall evaluate defendant‘s condition and determine whether defendant is suffering from significant cognitive, emotional and/or physical symptoms of his mental illness which will continue or be exacerbated if placement does not immediately occur. If such symptoms are present, DSH shall undertake prompt and meaningful efforts to treat defendant‘s symptoms.
“3. If defendant is in need of psychotropic medication or other medical interventions, DSH shall pursue such interventions either voluntarily, though [sic] meaningful engagement efforts with defendant in a clinically-appropriate manner, or by initiating proceedings to seek authorization for the involuntary administration of such medications.
“4. If DSH fails or declines to assess and undertake meaningful treatment to address defendant‘s immediate psychiatric needs and attempt to alleviate defendant‘s severe symptoms within 72 hours, then placement in a DSH facility must occur within 7 days of the commitment order.
“5. If DSH does not place defendant within 7 days, it shall, within seven days of placement order, determine when defendant is likely to be placed in a state hospital, JBCT program, or other competency restoration program and shall notify the court and counsel of the anticipated placement date. If placement is not anticipated to occur within 28 days of commitment order, DSH shall develop a written remediation treatment plan to actively treat defendant‘s significant symptoms pending commencement of full IST placement. DSH shall provide a copy of that written plan to the court and counsel.
“6. The treatment detailed in that remediation plan shall continue unabated, as medically appropriate, throughout the course of defendant‘s continued placement in jail awaiting entry into a DSH facility or program.
“7. If DSH has failed to place defendant in a state hospital, JBCT program, or other program within 28 days of the court‘s commitment order, DSH shall provide to the court a weekly written report describing its efforts to remediate the symptoms of defendant, the treatment plan, the nature and extent of defendant‘s ongoing symptoms, and an estimate of date of projected admission. That report shall also address DSH capacity to complete the competency evaluation within 90 days of the placement order.
“8. The Court finds and orders that the 90 day evaluative report mandated by
Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (b)(1) shall be due 90 days fromits commitment order. For all the reasons discussed in this ruling, the Court rejects the DSH assertion that the clock for this requirement does not start running until defendant has been placed in one of its facilities. “9. Nothing in this order shall preclude DSH from relying on local treatment providers or contractors to assist it in complying with the terms of this order. DSH may contract with, seek to compel, or otherwise pursue all available avenues to induce local agencies to assist it in complying with these orders and provide prompt, meaningful psychiatric assistance to these defendants.
“10. The Court finds that each day of delay in placement or commencement of treatment poses a substantial risk of significant harm and injury for each IST defendant. Accordingly, for purposes of both recognizing the gravity of this suffering and encouraging prompt DSH compliance with this order, the Court shall deem each 24-hour period of non-compliance a new, separate and distinct violation of its orders for purposes of imposing potential sanctions under
Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 . The trial court managing each case, may, in its discretion, schedule daily contempt hearings during the period of delays in commitment at which time the court may seek to impose daily sanctions, presumably in an amount equal to the costs of actually providing these defendants treatment each day, but in no circumstances more than $1500 per day or event.”
The court stayed implementation of the standing order to September 1, 2021, to allow DSH time to fully develop its ability to comply with the standing order. The court also observed that the imposition of sanctions against DSH in the Stallings and Wakefield matters would not be productive “in light of the significant passage of time since commencement of these proceedings,” but offered appreciation to both defendants for their “partiсipation and willingness to allow their individualized circumstances to demonstrate the systematic problems with our competency restoration processes.” DSH timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The trial court‘s standing order in this case was a permanent injunction. On appeal, we review the decision to grant injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. (In re Loveton (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1042–1043 (Loveton); Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 705.) As our Supreme Court has explained, that standard “is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court‘s ruling
B. Due Process Rights of IST Defendants
Before turning to the merits of the parties’ arguments, we will briefly review relevant legal authority regarding the constitutional rights of IST defendants.8 Under both the federal and California Constitutions, IST defendants have constitutional due process liberty interests. (
For more than a decade now, California courts have wrestled with the problem of timely hospital admissions for IST defendants once they have been ordered committed because the number of IST defendants has outstripped space available for treatment in DSH facilities.9 (People v. Kareem A. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 58, 66–67 (Kareem A.).) IST defendants subjected to lengthy wait times have sought and obtained relief in various forms, resulting in a patchwork of decisional law governing the reasonable admission deadlines to treatment facilities and consequences for failure to meet them. (See In re Mille (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 635, 649–650 [84-day wait for admission to state hospital was not reasonable in light of statutory requirement that DSH report on progress toward restoration of competence within 90 days]; In re Williams (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 989, 1014, 1018 [two years between incompetency finding and placement order for treatment was unreasonable; developmentally disabled defendant was to be placed in treatment facility within 45 days or released]; People v. Brewer, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 137–143 (Brewer) [court did not violate separation of powers or abuse its discretion in issuing amended standing order requiring transfer of Sacramento County IST defendants to DSH within 14 days of commitment order, but appellate court remanded for reconsideration of deadline in light of statutory changes]; Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1043–1044 [upholding 60-day limit for transfer of Contrа Costa County IST defendants to DSH-Napa]; People v. Hooper (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 685, 688–689 [affirming award of monetary sanctions for violation of Contra Costa County standing order requiring IST defendants be admitted within 60 days]; Kareem A., at pp. 68–71, 76–77 [affirming awards of monetary sanctions against DSH for failure to admit IST defendants within 60 days or more of commitment and rejecting challenge to 30-day deadline imposed by trial court for admission of IST defendants in commitment orders]; People v. Serus (9th Cir. 2016) 822 F.3d 1037, 1046 (Trueblood II); Advocacy Center v. Louisiana Dept. of Health (E.D. La. 2010) 731 F. Supp.2d 603, 621–624, 627 [imposing 21-day deadline for admission of IST defendants in Louisiana].)
Aguirre (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 652, 655–659, 670 (Aguirre) [affirming award of sanctions against DSH for failing to timely admit San Joaquin County IST defendants].)
Most recently, in Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th 691, Division Two of this court considered the trial court‘s imposition of a statewide deadline to protect IST defendants’ rights to due process. The Stiavetti court approved a statewide deadline requiring that IST defendants begin receiving competency restoration services within 28 days from the date of service of the commitment packet, a time that reflects the “maximum constitutionally permissible delay in commencing substantive services.” (Id. at pp. 727, 730.) We turn now to Chunn‘s argument that the trial court‘s standing order in this case violates several aspects of Stiavetti.
DSH contends that the trial court‘s order “is facially inconsistent” with Stiavetti in “multiple significant respects.”
As noted previously, about four months after the trial court entered its standing order in this case, Division Two of this court issued its opinion in Stiavetti. In that case, family members of IST defendants and two organizations filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against DSH and the Department of Developmental Services. (Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 694, 703.) After extensive briefing and presentation of evidence, the trial court сoncluded that DSH had systematically violated the due process rights of IST defendants who are committed to DSH.10 (Id. at pp. 703–704.) The trial
court determined that due process requires DSH to commence substantive services to restore an IST defendant to competency within 28 days of the date of service of the commitment packet that the court is required to provide under
The Court of Appeal affirmed the order as to IST defendants. Following a thorough review of relevant constitutional provisions and case law regarding the rights of IST defendants, the appellate court considered the propriety of a statewide deadline to remedy the ongoing violation of IST defendants’ due process rights. (Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 706–714.) The court rejected DSH‘s argument that the “reasonable length of time for admission of IST defendants must be decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on the factual circumstances.” (Id. at p. 713.) Rather, the court acknowledged the many efforts of California courts through individual and standing orders to resolve the problem of increasing delays in admitting IST defendants to DSH, but noted such “[a]ttempts to enforce the constitutional rights of IST defendants on a case-by-case—or even county-by-county—basis have not succeeded . . . because they do not provide the uniformity and predictability essential to effective enforcement.” (Id. at p. 714.)
“Considering the evidence of longstanding and continuing delays in admission of IST defendants, the absence thus far of legislative action on this specific issue, and the necessarily piecemeal nature оf the remedies imposed by the Courts of Appeal of this state,” the Stiavetti court concluded “the trial court reasonably determined that a uniform statewide deadline is necessary to ensure the commencement of substantive services for these defendants within a ‘reasonable period of time.‘“(Ibid.) The Stiavetti court also affirmed the trial court‘s conclusion
Turning to the issue of the ” “maximum constitutionally permissible delay’ before provision of competency services,” the court rejected DSH‘s argument that a 28-day limit was arbitrary and improper. (Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 724–727.) First, the court concluded that the trial court had appropriately balanced IST defendants’ private interests in their fundamental right to liberty, the government‘s interests in its fiscal and administrative constraints, statutory reporting requirements, and in bringing those accused of crime to trial, and “reasonably found, after weighing the relevant interests involved, that defendants’ systematic deprivation of IST defendants’ ‘substantive liberty interests under the
1. DSH Responsibility for IST Defendants
DSH first asserts the trial court in this case erred in concluding that Solano County IST defendants “shall be deemed committed to the care of DSH upon receipt by DSH of the court‘s commitment order.” Chunn concedes that the trial court‘s standing order must be modified to provide that responsibility for the treatment of IST defendants transfers to the DSH upon service of the commitment packet under
We agree. Stiavetti held that the “transfer of responsibility point for DSH is the date of service of the commitment packet.” (Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 722.) The commitment packet contains documents that
2. 28-day Deadline
DSH next argues the trial court‘s order requiring meaningful engagement and psychiatric treatment of a defendant within 72 hours and placement in a DSH facility within seven days if that does not occur is plainly inconsistent with Stiavetti‘s constitutional rule. Chunn responds that the trial court‘s standing order is consistent with Stiavetti, because like the order in Stiavetti, the order in this case requires commencement of substantive competency restoration services within 28 days.
The trial court‘s standing order requires that if DSH does not place an IST defendant in one of its facilities within seven days, it shall “within seven days of placement order”11 determine whether placement will occur within 28 days, and if not, develop and implement a written remediation treatment plan to actively treat the defendant‘s symptoms pending commencement of full IST placement. It also requires that after 28 days, DSH shall provide weekly written reports to the court that describe its efforts to comply with the treatment plan and includе an estimate for projected admission. We agree that these aspects of the order identify 28 days as an important marker for admission to a DSH facility or treatment program, but they do not clearly state competency restoration services must begin within 28 days. Of course, the order was made before the Stiavetti decision, without the benefit of its guidance establishing a statewide constitutional maximum deadline of 28 days for commencement of substantive competency restoration services.
As to the provision of the court‘s order requiring “meaningful engagement” and “psychiatric treatment” within 72 hours, we disagree the trial court‘s order is inconsistent with the holding of Stiavetti. As the Stiavetti court explained, that case was concerned with “the maximum constitutionally permissible delay for commencement of substantive services for IST defendants after a trial court has found them incompetent and ordered them committed to DSH,” defining “substantive services” as the “receipt of substantive services to restore competency . . . with the goal of allowing criminal proceedings to resume.” (Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 694; see id. at p. 695 [DSH systematically violated due process rights of all IST defendants in California by “failing to commence substantive services designed to return those defendants to competency“].)
The trial court‘s order in this case requiring engagement with IST defendants and treatment of severe symptoms within 72 hours was aimed, as the court explained, at a different problem—what to do with IST defendants to stabilize their condition and provide humane treatment prior to their transfer to a DSH facility for commencement of full competency restoration services. As noted earlier, in its discussion of the legal issues presented, the trial court‘s order highlighted “a separate question that recent litigation has not addressed: Assuming delays in placement following a commitment order to DSH, is DSH responsible for patient care pending placement?” Drawing on evidence in the record that “DSH has a range of tools at its disposal to increase its treatment capacity,” including “jail-based treatment and telecare,” the trial court concluded that DSH had demonstrated its ability to provide psychiatric assessment and treatment services “notwithstanding the alleged unavailability of bed space.” The court also noted the provision of ameliorative care pending placement of IST defendants in DSH facilities would serve important legislative goals of
Stiavetti‘s holding that 28 days is the outer limit for a maximum delay in commencement of competency restoration services statewide does not mean that a trial court is without authority to consider, on the record before it, whether IST defendants are in need of services to treat the most severe symptoms of their mental illness and stabilize their condition before competency restoration services begin. Here, based on amрle evidence that the three defendants in this case decompensated quickly, suffered “severe harm,” and “their troubling symptoms [had] increased” while awaiting admission to a
DSH complains that the trial court‘s standing order in this case “resurrects one of the problems that Stiavetti‘s statewide deadline sought to solve—the piecemeal variation in timing from county to county.” But the problem the trial court‘s 72-hour requirement here addressed was a different issue than that addressed in Stiavetti—that is, not when competency restoration services must begin, but what obligations DSH has to IST defendants for whom it is responsible before restoration services begin. We acknowledge DSH‘s legitimate concern about the possibility that such orders imposed on a county-by-county basis could make compliance and enforcement challenging, but our review of the trial court‘s order is limited by the nature of that order. The trial court‘s decision in this case was a countywide order based on the record before it; unlike the Stiavetti court, we do not have before us a decision on a statewide basis.13
Although we conclude the trial court‘s order in this case does not conflict with the holding of Stiavetti, we also conclude, for reasons discussed further below, that the provision of the standing оrder requiring evaluation of IST defendants within 72 hours is problematic under recent statutory amendments.
D. Separation of Powers
DSH argues that the trial court‘s standing order violates separation of powers principles because it created “a host of new obligations that have no13
express or implied basis in California‘s statutory IST commitment scheme or
Our courts have repeatedly concluded that the setting of deadlines for the treatment and admission of IST defendants to state hospitals does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. In Brewer, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th 122, for example, the appellate court rejected DSH‘s argument that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to issue a countywide standing order requiring transfer of IST defendants within 14 days of the commitment order. Noting that
Under
The court also considered these statutory timelines in conjunction with the “entire statutory scheme for criminal defendants, which affords them meaningful rights to prompt adjudication of their cases pursuant to the
Further, in imposing a short deadline for evaluation and commencement of treatment, the court was considering not just the importance of the statutory mandate for “speedy” restoration of competence and the 90-day reporting requirement but examining IST defendants’ due process rights to timеly treatment. We have explained above the liberty interest that IST defendants have in being held no longer than reasonable to restore competency, and that their continued restraint must be justified by progress toward that goal. (Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).) In setting deadlines for treatment and admission of IST defendants, courts properly weigh “the liberty interests of the defendants against the interests of the government.” (Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 725; Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1043–1044 [trial court‘s setting of transfer deadline based on evidence in the record and balancing of interests did not violate
separation of powers]; Craft v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1545 [commitment and treatment are intertwined rationales for suspending criminal proceedings against an IST defendant].) That is precisely what the trial court did here.
As we have explained, we see no indication on this record that the trial court violated separation of powers principles at the time it issued its order requiring DSH to evaluate the condition of IST defendants in its care within 72 hours and undertake prompt and meaningful treatment of any significant symptoms. That said, as noted above, the Legislature has recently passed and amended legislation establishing a program for the evaluation of IST defendants awaiting admission to DSH facilities. As we will discuss in the next section, these recent changes do appear to conflict with the 72-hour evaluation and treatment component of the trial court‘s standing order, and thus require us to vacate those portions of the order and remand for the trial court to reconsider its order in light of the new amendments.
Finally, we reject DSH‘s argument that the trial cоurt‘s order requiring DSH to provide weekly reports and a treatment plan to the trial court in the
For the reasons we have already addressed, however, we conclude these provisions of the trial court‘s order do nothing to infringe on the constitutional sphere of the Legislature. First, we agree with the Stiavetti court‘s analysis that the maximum constitutionally permissible time for DSH to delay substantive restoration of competency services is 28 days. (Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 730.) DSH does not disagree with this holding, and in fact contends the trial court should be bound by Stiavetti. The trial court‘s order requiring a treatment plan and weekly updates on DSH‘s progress toward providing constitutionally mandated substantive competency restoration services does nothing to change or impair existing statutory reporting requirements; rather it is an appropriate mechanism to monitor DSH‘s efforts to comply with the law. (See, e.g., Trueblood I, supra, 101 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1024–1025 [establishing reporting requirements to ensure compliance with court‘s injunction].) In placing these requirements, the court is not rewriting the statute, but compelling obedience to the court‘s judgment protecting IST defendants’ constitutional rights to treatment. That is an entirely appropriate exercise of the court‘s jurisdiction. (People v. Hahn (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 349, 352 [court may compel obedience to lawful orders]; Fairfield v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 113, 120 [“Every court has power ‘[t]o compel obedience to its judgments, orders and process’ in an action or proceeding before it, and to use all necessary means to carry its jurisdiction into effect, even if those means are not specifically pointed out in the code.“].)
Moreover, the trial court‘s requirement that DSH develop and share treatment plans when it will exceed the constitutionally permissible maximum amount of time that an IST defendant can be held without treatment furthers the intent of the Legislature rather than contravenes it.
The Legislature has shown that it is concerned with the delays in treatment of IST defendants, by passing legislation authorizing reevaluations of IST defendants and, most recently, eliminating entirely any limitation on the amount of time an IST
efforts to compel DSH to comply with a statewide maximum constitutional deadline for delivery of substantive competency restoration services is consistent with this legislative intent and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
E. Recent Statutory Changes
As already discussed, in 2021 and 2022, the Legislature enacted new legislation, which, among other things, added
submit supplemental briefing addressing the impact of these provisions on the trial court‘s standing order in this case.18
Both parties agree that the new legislation conflicts with the trial court‘s order that DSH must evaluate IST defendants within 72 hours of the commitment order.
In interpreting statutory language, our ” ‘fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.’ ” (People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1105.) Here, the express language of
On the other hand, the trial court made clear in its standing order that it was concerned not just with “the appropriateness of an ‘IST waitlist’ and placement delays associated therewith” but a separate question not addressed by recent litigation, viz., “Assuming delays in placement following a commitment order to DSH, is DSH responsible for patient care pending placement?” (Italics omitted.) The court observed that “[m]ost importantly, commitment must include an obligation for DSH to attempt to treat the symptoms and ease the suffering of these IST defendants. If it cannot do so in state hospitals, it must assume prompt responsibility for symptom management in the meantime.”
In his supplemental letter brief, Chunn asserts the trial court properly found the 72-hour evaluation and stabilization treatment provision “is necessary in order to protect the due process rights of IST defendants to freedom from incarceration and to restorative treatment and to ensure that IST defendants are not languishing in conditions that violate ‘concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency,’ ” and asks us to determine that
We decline Chunn‘s invitation to consider whether
F. County Jail Conditions
In its opening brief, DSH notes that the trial court‘s order “provides a detailed, case-specific accounting of how extended confinement in county jail without mental health treatment can adversely affect IST defendants.” However, it argues, “the court‘s concerns about inadequate mental health treatment in the county jail are misdirected in this case, as DSH has neither control over nor responsibility for county jail conditions.” DSH then summarizes the statutory and regulatory obligations imposed on county jails to provide care for IST defendants. In its reply brief, DSH argues that local officials play a critical role in the IST framework and can and should be made to take steps to improve conditions for IST defendants awaiting treatment while in their custody.
It is not clear to us what DSH is arguing. The condition of IST defendants in county jail awaiting treatment is highly relevant to the issues in this case.
G. Sanctions
In its standing order, the trial court ordered the imposition of monetary sanctions of up to $1,500 per day against DSH for noncompliance with its order pursuant to
” ’ ” ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute‘s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.) If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial construction and our task is at an end. If the language is reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning, however, we may examine extrinsic aids such as the apparent purpose of the statute, the legislative history, the canons of statutory construction, and public policy. (Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 838; People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 177.)
In People v. Hooper, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th 685, Division Four of this District considered whether the trial court could impose daily monetary sanctions under
As both parties agree, to the extent the statutory language is ambiguous, the legislative history suggests that the Legislature intended to strictly limit the amount of sanctions permitted under the statute to $1,500.21 In the original draft of Assembly Bill No. 3573 (1981–1982 Reg. Sess.) (Assem. Bill 3573), the proposed statutory languagе did not include any limitation on
Further, a Senate Judiciary Committee report analyzing Assembly Bill 3573 discussed existing options for enforcement of courtroom rules. One of the options it highlighted was “[c]oercive contempt,” which aims to correct bad acts or omissions that violate court orders. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill 3573 (1981–1982 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 3, 1982, pp. 3-4.) This was typically done, the report explained, “through imposition of a fine of so-much-per-day until the contemnor agrees to obey.” (Id. at p. 4.) However, despite this reference to per-day contempt sanctions, the report does not indicate that
In light of the plain language of the statute, judicial interpretations, and the legislative history, we conclude the trial court‘s order must be modified to limit any sanctions under
H. Remand
Although we must remand this matter for the trial court to modify and reconsider aspects of its ruling, we recognize and appreciate the substantial time and careful effort the court put into these proceedings and its thorough and thoughtful written order.
As we have already noted, the trial court‘s standing order must be modified in at least two respects. First, paragrаph 1 on page 33 of the standing order issued February 26, 2021, should be modified to state that “each Solano County IST defendant shall be deemed committed to the care of DSH upon receipt by DSH of the commitment packet described in
Beyond these modifications, we have also discussed that recent statutory changes require the trial court to reconsider other aspects of its standing
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is remanded for reconsideration and modification of the standing order in light of the statewide constitutional deadline announced in Stiavetti and the relevant statutory changes as discussed in this opinion.
MARGULIES, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BANKE, J.
DEVINE, J.*
A162583
In re Chunn
* Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
Trial Court: Solano County
Trial Judge: Hon. Daniel J. Healy
Counsel:
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney General, Gregory D. Brown and Kevin L. Quade, Deputy Attorneys General for Appellant Department of State Hospitals.
Michele E. Kemmerling for Petitioner and Respondent.