STEPHANIE STIAVETTI et al. v. STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, as Director, etc., et al.
A157553
In the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two
June 15, 2021
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
STEPHANIE STIAVETTI et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, as
Director, etc., et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
A157553
(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. RG15779731)
Five family members of IST defendants committed to DSH or DDS and two organizations (collectively plaintiffs) filed a petition for writ of mandate and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief (petition) challenging statewide delays in the
The trial court granted the petition in part, first finding, based on the evidence presented, that defendants systematically violate the due process rights of IST defendants in California who are committed to DSH pursuant to section 1370 or to DDS pursuant to section 1370.1, subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i). The court further found that due process requires defendants to commence substantive services for these IST defendants within 28 days of the date on which the order transferring responsibility for those defendants to DSH or DDS is served. For IST defendants committed to DSH, the court found that the transfer of responsibility date is the date of service of a packet of documents (commitment packet) the court is required to provide under section 1370, subdivision (a)(3). For IST defendants committed to DDS pursuant to section 1370.1, subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i), the court found that the transfer of responsibility date is the date of service of the commitment order, pursuant to 1370.1, subdivision (a)(2). The court phased in the 28-day constitutional deadline for commencing substantive services over a 30-month period.
found that plaintiffs had not presented evidence showing that defendants were violating the due process rights of those defendants.
On appeal, defendants contend (1) any uniform statewide deadline for admission of IST defendants is inappropriate and unnecessary, and constitutional limits should be determined on a case-by-case basis; (2) the trial court erred in imposing an arbitrary 28-day statewide deadline for admitting IST defendants to DSH and DDS because that deadline conflicts with precedential case law and is not derived from any relevant statutory or constitutional requirements, and (3) existing policy mechanisms are best positioned to address the mental health crisis at the root of the IST defendant waitlist.
In a cross-appeal, plaintiffs contend (1) the trial court erred in finding that the documentation requirement in subdivision (a)(3) of section 1370.1 absolves DDS of responsibility for timely admission of those IST defendants who have been charged with felony sex offenses and are committed to DDS pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii), and (2) equal protection demands a uniform transfer of responsibility point for all IST defendants committed to DDS.
For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we conclude that defendants have systematically violated the due process rights of all IST defendants in California by failing to commence substantive services designed to return those defendants to competency within 28 days of service of the transfer of responsibility document, which is the date of service of the commitment packet for all defendants committed to DSH and the date of service of the order of commitment for all defendants committed to DDS. We shall therefore affirm the judgment as to the issues raised in defendants’ appeal, but will reverse as to the issue raised in plaintiffs’ cross-appeal.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A person cannot be tried or sentenced while mentally incompetent. (
Under
DSH Commitments under Section 1370
When a court finds an IST defendant incompetent to stand trial due to a mental disorder, the trial shall be suspended and “[t]he court shall order the community program director . . . to evaluate the defendant and to submit
to the court within 15 judicial days of the order a written recommendation as to whether the defendant should be required to undergo outpatient treatment, or be committed to [DSH] or to any other treatment facility.” (
Once the court orders a defendant’s commitment, it must provide copies of certain documents prior to the defendant’s admission to DSH or other treatment facility where the defendant will be treated. (
When the court directs that the defendant is to be confined in a DSH facility, it shall commit the defendant to DSH, which then determines the state hospital to which the defendant is to be admitted. (
“shall evaluate each patient committed pursuant to [Section 1370] to determine the placement of the patient to the appropriate state hospital”].)
“Within 90 days of a commitment . . . , the medical director of the [DSH] facility . . . shall make a written report to the court . . . concerning the defendant’s progress toward recovery of mental competence . . . .” (
DDS Commitments under Section 1370.1
When the trial court suspends a trial because the defendant has been “found mentally incompetent and has been determined by a regional center3 to have a developmental disability” (
For most defendants committed under
sheriff . . . to a state hospital, developmental center, or any other [approved] residential facility . . . as will promote the defendant’s speedy attainment of mental competence, or be placed on outpatient status . . . .” (
For IST defendants charged with a felony offense specified in section 290 who have been denied bail because the court has found a substantial likelihood that the defendant’s release would result in great bodily harm to others, “the court shall order that the defendant be delivered by the sheriff to a state hospital for the care and treatment of persons with developmental disabilities unless the court [finds] that an alternative placement” would be more appropriate. (
“If the court orders that the defendant be confined in a state hospital or other secure treatment facility” pursuant to
treatment facility where the defendant is to be confined.” (
Within 90 days of an IST defendant’s admission pursuant to
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
IST Defendants Committed to DSH
IST defendants committed to DSH are treated at one of four state hospitals—Napa, Atascadero, Metropolitan, or Patton—or at one of its jail-
based competency treatment programs for patients who do not need the higher level of care provided by a state hospital.
DSH has created a patient management unit with a centralized referral intake system for receiving commitment packets and other documents electronically from the court, although some state hospitals still receive documents directly. After a commitment packet is reviewed by the patient management unit, it is electronically delivered to the admitting hospital or jail-based competency treatment program, where staff will double-check the commitment packet and then acknowledge that the patient has been accepted for admission, pending availability of a bed.
Because there is no space at DSH facilities for immediate admission of IST defendants, they are placed on a statewide waitlist based on the date of their commitment order. DSH endeavors to maintain a “first in, first out” system for admission from the waitlist. DSH tracks expected discharges of IST defendants from the state hospitals so it can schedule admissions from the waitlist.
IST Defendants Committed to DDS
The sole secure DDS facility for treatment of IST defendants with developmental disabilities who are committed to DDS is the Porterville Developmental Center’s secure treatment program (Porterville). When a court commits an IST defendant to DDS, the Porterville Regional Project is responsible for facilitating admission and, once it receives notice of a possible admission from the court or a regional center, it starts collecting certain documents as part of a referral packet.5 The Porterville Regional Project uses
the referral packet to conduct an assessment required by
Delays in Admission to DSH and DDS
The trial court used data from the first half of 2017, only to calculate the days of admission delays for IST defendants committed to DSH and DDS “because it [was] the most current information and the claims in [t]his case are for prospective injunctive relief.” The court relied on the calculations set forth in the report of plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Bruce Gage (the Gage report), regarding delays in the process of admitting IST defendants to DSH and DDS.
Calculations from the Gage report showed that for IST defendants committed to DSH between January 1 and June 30, 2017, the mean, or average number of days between trial court commitment and admission to a state hospital was 86 and the median was 89. The mean number of days between receipt of the commitment packet by DSH and admission to a state
hospital in that time period was 64 and the median was 63.7 The court also relied on the Gage report to find that from 2014 through mid-2017, the number of IST defendants referred to DSH generally ranged from 250 to 300 per month and “pending placements gradually increased from approximately 400 in 2014, to approximately 500 in July 2017.” In early October 2017, there were approximately 758 IST defendants on DSH’s waitlist for admission.
For IST defendants committed to DDS between January 1 and June 30, 2017, the court relied on calculations from the Gage report showing that the mean number of days from trial court commitment to admission to Porterville was 53 and the median was 52.
Both parties presented evidence showing that DSH and DDS have faced growing demands for admission of IST defendants. As to DSH in particular,
Defendants also presented evidence that they “are working within budgetary constraints, are trying to make improvements, and are improving steadily.” For example, DSH had been working to increase beds for IST defendants and to expand jail-based competency treatment programs. DSH’s efforts also included securing funding from the Legislature for counties to
establish mental health diversion programs and other community-based programs. However, despite all of these efforts, “the number of referrals from the counties continue[d] to outpace the number of admissions by DSH . . . .”
DDS has also worked with the Legislature to provide treatment for individuals with developmental disabilities more promptly, leading to a 2015 increase in bed capacity of approximately 25 percent at Porterville, as well as creation of specialized enhanced behavior support homes in the community, which were intended in part to lessen civil commitments to Porterville. (See
In his report, Dr. Gage considered various external factors that might contribute to delays in admission to DSH and DDS, including receipt of required documents from the court and transporting the defendant, but found that none of these factors was a significant source of delay compared to the delays resulting from defendants’ own admissions processes. Although lack of capacity was the primary driver of the waitlists for DSH, “once capacity is increased, the admission process will become a source of delay.” Dr. Gage therefore concluded that “admission [to DSH] within 14 days should be achievable even with the current unwieldy and burdensome process.”
Dr. Gage further found that “[u]nlike DSH, DDS has been able to reduce the
waiting list . . . , suggesting that bed availability is not presently the primary problem. Thus, it is likely the admissions process itself that is currently
Finally, plaintiffs presented evidence that IST defendants suffer harm when incarcerated for a substantial period of time in jail before transfer to a facility for treatment, which affects the likelihood of their return to competence. Plaintiffs’ experts on mental health issues, Dr. Terry Kupers and Dr. Melissa Warren, each described the various ways in which defendants with serious mental illnesses or developmental disabilities are harmed by these delays.
In his report, Dr. Kupers summarized the harms to jailed IST defendants with mental health disorders: “Because of crowding, violence, isolation, the frequent use of force by staff and relatively inadequate mental health treatment and rehabilitation programs, individuals with serious mental illness are at risk of harm while incarcerated in the jail.” Based on these factors, Dr. Kupers concluded “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the longer an individual suffering from serious mental illness is consigned to jail, likely including time in isolation, and is not provided adequate mental health treatment, the worse his or her condition, disability and prognosis, and therefore the less likely there will be a restoration of competence (or, in a certain proportion of cases, the longer it will take for competence to be restored).”
In her report, Dr. Warren summarized the harms to jailed IST defendants with developmental disabilities: “Relative to other inmates, inmates with intellectual disabilities are more vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. Typically, they are subject to more types of abuse, a higher frequency of abuse, and abuse by multiple perpetrators. [¶] Inmates with intellectual disabilities are typically removed from the general population and housed in more restrictive, more isolating and more austere conditions. The loss of environmental cues, behavioral supports, and isolation has a deleterious effect upon their cognitive, emotional, and behavioral functioning. Their condition may deteriorate rapidly. [¶] Inmates with intellectual disabilities are more adversely affected by social isolation compared to other inmates. They often lack the necessary coping and adaptive functioning skills to tolerate the social and sensory deprivation of isolation cells. [¶] . . . [¶] The longer an inmate with an intellectual disability remains in jail, the more likely he or she is to suffer harm.”
Plaintiffs include five individuals—Nancy Leiva, Stephanie Stiavetti, Kellie Bock, Kimberly Bock, and Rosalind Randle—family members of IST defendants who were allegedly harmed while awaiting admission to DSH or DDS—and two organizations, the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California and the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California.
On July 29, 2015, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against Pamela Ahlin and Santi J. Rogers in their then-capacity as directors of DSH and DDS,
respectively,9 alleging three substantive causes of action for violating IST defendants’ state due process rights; their state right to a speedy trial; and their federal due process rights, by failing to timely accept transfer of IST defendants held in county jails. As a remedy, plaintiffs requested issuance of a declaration that defendant’s delays in admitting IST defendants violated their due process and speedy trial rights, and issuance of a writ of mandate and an injunction directing defendants to admit persons found incompetent to stand trial within a constitutionally permissible time following an order of commitment to DSH or DDS.
In a subsequent motion for peremptory writ of mandate filed on January 25, 2018, plaintiffs specifically requested that the court order (1) DSH to admit all IST defendants within the later of 21 days from receipt of the commitment order or 14 days from receipt of the commitment packet, and (2) DDS to admit all IST defendants within 21 days of receipt of the commitment order.
On April 19, 2019, following extensive briefing; presentation of evidence by both parties in the form of depositions, declarations, expert reports, and related documentation; and two hearings devoted to arguments of counsel, the court issued an amended order granting in part the petition for writ of mandate.10
In its 48-page order, the trial court addressed “whether persons found incompetent to stand trial and committed to the DSH or DDS have a constitutional due process right to substantive services within some time
period, whether the DSH and DDS have system wide failures to provide due process, and what remedy is appropriate.”
“Constitutional due process requires that DSH must commence substantive services to restore an IST defendant to competency within 28 days of the transfer of responsibility for an IST defendant to DSH. For the DSH, the ‘transfer of responsibility’ date is the date of service of the [section] 1370[, subdivision] (a)(3) commitment packet. The evidence shows that DSH systematically fails to provide due process.
“Constitutional due process requires that DDS commence substantive services to restore an IST defendant to competency within 28 days of the transfer of responsibility for an IST defendant [committed] to DDS. For the DDS, for commitments under [section] 1370.1[, subdivision] (a)(1)(B)(i), the ‘transfer of responsibility’ date is the date of service of the [section] 1370.1[, subdivision] (a)(2) order directing the IST defendant be confined in a DDS facility or placed on DDS outpatient status.11
For commitments under
[section] 1370.1[, subdivision] (a)(1)(B)(ii) or (iii), the ‘transfer of responsibility’ date is the date the IST defendant and the [section] 1370.1[, subdivision] (a)(3) documentation are delivered to a DDS facility.”
The court phased in the requirement that DSH and DDS “commence substantive services for all IST defendants within 28 days from the transfer of responsibility date” over 30 months, beginning with a 60-day deadline within 12 months of the court’s order. In addition, the court stated in its order that “[t]he phrase ‘all IST defendants’ is to be read as ‘substantially all IST
Also, on April 19, 2019, the court issued its judgment.12
On June 13, 2019, defendants filed a notice of appeal. On July 2, 2019, plaintiffs filed a notice of cross-appeal.13
those services. In addition, for all defendants committed to DSH and those defendants committed to DDS under subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) of
The court also found that baseline medical services provided by county jails do not constitute “substantive services” for purposes of its order, although DSH or DDS could provide “substantive services through a state hospital, treatment facility, outpatient program, jail based competency program, or other facility or program under their supervision.”
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The parties disagree about the applicable standard of review. Defendants argue that we should review the entirety of trial court order de novo because “[t]he material facts are not in dispute, and the issues raised are purely questions of law.” Plaintiffs argue that the trial court’s determination of “the scope and necessity of equitable relief” should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, while “the purely legal question of whether IST defendants have a due process right to timely competency treatment” should be reviewed de novo.
In In re Loveton (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1028 (Loveton), a panel of this Division set forth the general rule regarding review of a permanent injunction: “ ‘ “The trial court’s decision to grant a permanent injunction rests within its sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.] Notwithstanding its discretionary component, a permanent injunction must be supported by substantial evidence in the record. [Citation.] [¶] . . . . [Moreover], when
discretion to order a 28-day statewide admission deadline [for DSH] commencing from the date of service of the commitment packet and that the order is not only reasonable, but necessary.”
We have granted defendants’ unopposed request for judicial notice of (1) the “Consumer Population Categories” subsection of the “Whom DDS Serves” section of DDS’s Fact Book for fiscal year 2017-2018; (2) the “State Operated Facilities Program” section of the “Governor’s Budget Highlights” for DDS for fiscal year 2020-2021, dated January 2020; and (3) “The Community Care Collaborative Pilot” subsection of the Governor’s highlights for DSH for fiscal year 2020-2021, showing the proposed budget and estimates for DSH’s contracted outpatient services. We have also granted plaintiffs’ unopposed request for judicial notice of DSH’s “May Revision Highlights,” dated May 14, 2020, showing revisions to the
reviewing the interpretation and application of a statute where the ultimate facts are undisputed, we exercise our independent judgment to determine whether the injunction was proper. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Loveton, at pp. 1042–1043; see also In re Butler (2018) 4 Cal.5th 729, 738-739 (Butler) [standard of review for a ruling on a motion to modify or vacate an injunctive order is abuse of discretion, while court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo and its factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence]; Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712 [abuse of discretion standard “is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review[:] The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious”], fns. omitted.)14
Based on the relevant law, we conclude it is appropriate to review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s weighing of the evidence presented and its balancing of the competing interests involved in determining the necessity for and scope of equitable relief. To the extent the court interpreted relevant statutory and constitutional requirements, our review is de novo. Finally, we review the court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (See Butler, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 738–739; Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1042–1043.)
II. Relevant Constitutional Provisions and Case Law Concerning the Rights of IST Defendants
“Both the federal and state Constitutions compel the government to afford persons due process before depriving them of any [liberty] interest. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend. [‘nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law’]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a) [‘A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . .’].) In light of the virtually identical language of the federal and state guarantees, we have looked to the United States Supreme Court’s precedents for guidance in interpreting the contours of our own due process clause and have treated the state clause’s prescriptions as substantially overlapping those of the federal Constitution. [Citation.]” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212.)
In Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715 (Jackson), the United States Supreme Court addressed the liberty interests of IST defendants placed in state hospitals for indefinite periods of time. The court found that, “[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” (Id. at p. 738.) The court therefore held that “a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future,” and that the “continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal.” (Ibid.)
In In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 801 (Davis), the California Supreme Court “adopt[ed] the rule of the Jackson case that no person charged with a
criminal offense and committed to state hospital solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial may be so confined more than a reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial likelihood that he will recover that capacity in the foreseeable future.”15 Our high court also “accept[ed] Jackson’s premise that due process demands that the duration of commitments to state hospitals must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose which originally justified the commitment.” (Jackson, at p. 805.)
More recently, a number of California Courts of Appeal have relied on the due process principles set forth in Jackson and Davis to address a related issue involving defendants found incompetent to stand trial: what constitutes a reasonable period of time for IST defendants to be held in a county jail after a court orders them committed to a state hospital or Porterville, but before they are admitted and treatment is begun? (See Williams, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 [“Although the court in Davis referred to commitment to a ‘state hospital,’ the same due process concerns apply when someone is being held in confinement prior to transportation to such hospital or other facility”]; see also Craft v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1545, [“Because commitment and treatment are the intertwined rationales for suspending criminal proceedings against a mentally incompetent defendant [citation], it follows that where there is no commitment and no treatment, the time an incompetent defendant spends in jail is
towards a finding of prolonged incarceration under the state constitutional speedy trial guarantee”].)
Given the “snowballing wait times” for admission to state hospitals, “courts began adding admission deadlines to their commitment orders to protect IST defendants’ constitutional and statutory rights . . . . [Citations.] These admission deadlines ranged from as short as 14 days to as long as 60 days from issuance of the commitment order. [Citations.] DSH nevertheless continued not to admit IST defendants in a timely manner, leaving them to languish in county jail.” (In re Kareem A. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 58, 64 (Kareem A.).)
First, in Mille, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at page 640, an IST defendant committed under
progress toward recovery of mental competence. (
Shortly thereafter, in Williams, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pages 1013–1015, Division Eight of the Second District Court of Appeal relied on Jackson and Davis in addressing the due process time limits for placing an IST defendant with a developmental disability in the appropriate facility, pursuant to
The Williams court observed that the case before it “reflects a statewide problem in finding adequate housing for persons declared mentally incompetent to stand trial, especially those who are developmentally disabled. We urge the legislative and executive branches to work towards finding a solution to this problem to ensure that persons found mentally incompetent are provided the treatment they require and are not released
onto the streets where they may pose a significant risk to themselves and to public safety.” (Williams, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1018–1019.)
Subsequently, in People v. Brewer (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 122 (Brewer), the Third District Court of Appeal addressed the validity of a standing order in Sacramento County requiring the transfer of IST defendants to DSH within 14 days of the order of commitment. The court rejected DSH’s separation of powers challenge, stating: “In setting a deadline for transfer, a court is not rewriting or adding to the statute. Instead, the court is enforcing the statutory imperative for a meaningful progress report within 90 days of the commitment order. The court can do this only by ‘ensur[ing] that the defendant is actually transferred to the state hospital within a reasonable period of time.’ [Citation.] Setting a deadline—establishing the outer limit of a reasonable time—does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. A court acts within its constitutional core function and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine when it interprets and applies existing laws and carries out the legislative purpose of statutes. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 137, quoting Mille, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 650.)16
The following year, in Loveton, this court addressed a DSH challenge to the trial court’s standing order setting a deadline of 60 days from the order of
The Brewer court ultimately dissolved the trial court’s standing order pending reconsideration on remand of DSH’s motion to set aside that order, based on recent changes in the relevant law. (Brewer, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 143.)
commitment to
We further found that the trial court did not undermine DSH’s discretion to conduct individualized assessments of IST defendants by imposing a 60-day time limit in Contra Costa County: “In crafting its order, the trial court examined several competing interests: Contra Costa County IST defendants’ due process right to receive treatment within a reasonable period of time; the statutory requirements of
In 2019, following our decision in Loveton and the trial court’s modification of the standing order, Division Four of this District upheld the trial court’s award of monetary sanctions to a group of Contra Costa County IST defendants for violations of the 60-day time limit for admission. (People v. Hooper (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 685, 688–689, 696, 700–701.)
Recently, in Kareem A., the trial court imposed monetary sanctions against DSH for 247 individual IST defendants who had not been admitted to a state hospital until 60 days or more after the trial court’s order to commit each defendant within approximately 30 days. (Kareem A., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 68.) In DSH’s consolidated appeals, Division One of the Second District
IST defendants in Contra Costa County must be placed in a state hospital “within no more than 60 days of the court’s order of commitment to DSH, provided the defendant’s complete information packet has been received by the hospital or other treatment facility within five days of the commitment order.” (In re Loveton (Contra Costa County, Apr. 1, 2016), amended order [2016 WL 9825779].)
The court in Kareem A. also rejected DSH’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that DSH did not have good cause and substantial justification for its failure to comply with the commitment orders because it had “ignored the reality of the fact that ‘DSH cannot build new beds overnight.’ ” (Kareem A., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 78.) On the contrary, the trial court had considered DSH’s efforts and had reasonably found that “those efforts did not constitute a valid excuse for continuing to violate the court’s orders beyond . . . the 60-day mark that DSH itself advocates as the reasonable outer limit for admission.” (Id. at pp. 79, 80.)
Most recently, in People v. Aguirre (May 24, 2021, No. C088852) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2021 WL 2070079], the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s award of sanctions to 31 IST defendants in San Joaquin County who were not timely admitted to a state hospital for competency treatment. The trial court, which had previously sanctioned DSH for such delays on multiple occasions, had explained in the introduction to its order that “ ‘[t]he responsibility to fix the problem falls squarely on the shoulders of [DSH]. This Court is convinced that none of the collaborative efforts over the past several years have given [DSH] sufficient incentive to carry out that responsibility, and the problem has not been fixed. [DSH] continues to violate the Court’s orders in a large number of cases each year.’ ” (Id. at p. *30, fn. omitted.) The appellate court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that DSH’s “insufficient efforts to address the waitlist problem did not constitute good cause or substantial justification for its repeated violation of a court order.” (Id. at p. *33.)
“we neither approve nor disapprove of a 30-day admit-by limit in any case beyond those presently before us.” (Kareem A., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 79, fn. 8.)
A. Whether an Across-the-Board Deadline is Ever Appropriate
In its order, the trial court first stated that relevant case law “confirm[s] that it is a violation of constitutional due process if a person is deprived of liberty for the sole purpose of providing substantive competency-restoration treatment and the person is confined more than a reasonable period of time necessary without receiving such treatment.”
Then, considering whether a statewide deadline was necessary to remedy the ongoing violations of California’s IST defendants’ due process rights, the court considered the extensive evidence in the record, as well as applicable case law.
That evidence included, inter alia, Dr. Gage’s calculations that the mean (average) of 64 and median of 63 days from commitment packet to admission to a DSH hospital indicate that the DSH did not provide substantive services to half of the IST defendants until over 60 days after the court served the commitment packet.” “The mean (average) of 53 [days] and a median of 52 days from trial court order committing [an] IST defendant to the DDS to admission at a DDS facility indicated that the DDS did not provide substantive services to half of the IST defendants until over 50 days after the court served the commitment order.”
The court also looked to relevant Supreme Court and California case law addressing the rights of IST defendants, including Jackson, supra, 406 U.S. 715; Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d 798; Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th 1025; Brewer, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th 122; Williams, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th 989; and Mille, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 635, as well as federal case law addressing statewide violations of IST defendants’ due process rights, due to delayed admission to state hospitals. (See, e.g., Oregon Advocacy Center v. Mink (9th
Cir. 2003) 322 F.3d 1101, 1120–1122 (Mink); Trueblood v. Washington State Dept. of Social & Health Services (W.D. Wash. 2015) 101 F.Supp.3d 1010, 1020–1023 (Trueblood), reversed in part on another ground in Trueblood v. Washington State Dept. of Social & Health Services (9th Cir. 2016) 822 F.3d 1037, 1046; Advocacy Center for the Elderly & Disabled v. Louisiana Dept. of Health & Hospitals (E.D. La. 2010) 731 F.Supp.2d 603, 621–624 (Advocacy Center); see also Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Service, Inc. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 316, 320 [“While we are not bound by decisions of the lower federal courts, even on federal questions, they are persuasive and entitled to great weight”]; accord, People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86.)
The
Defendants do not dispute that IST defendants’ treatment must begin within a constitutionally reasonable period of time. (See Jackson, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 738.) They maintain, however, that the trial court was wrong to impose “an across-the-board deadline” for commencement of services for IST defendants committed to DSH20 because, for purposes of the federal and state
rights to due process, “[w]hat constitutes a reasonable length of time will vary with the context.” (Mille, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 649; see Jackson, at p. 738; Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801.) Therefore, according to defendants, Jackson makes clear that a reasonable length of time for admission of IST defendants must be decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on the factual circumstances.
In Jackson, when the United States Supreme Court held that due process precludes an IST defendant from being “held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain [competency] in the foreseeable future,” its refusal to articulate what specifically constituted a “reasonable period of time” was not based on the finding such a determination can only be determined from the circumstances of a particular case. (Jackson, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 738.) Instead, as the court explained, it was not in a position to address the issue in place of the courts of a particular state: “In light of differing state facilities and procedures and a lack of evidence in this record, we do not think it appropriate for us to attempt to prescribe arbitrary time limits.” (Ibid.)
As already discussed in part II., ante, in recent years, a number of California appellate courts have addressed the increasing delays in admitting
e.g., Brewer, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 137 [Sacramento County standing order requiring transfer of IST defendants to DSH within 14 days of order of commitment “establish[ed] the outer limit of a reasonable time” for transfer, and did not violate separation of powers]; Williams, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1018–1019 [finding that a two-year delay in placement of an IST defendant committed to DDS violated due process, and directing trial court to order defendant admitted to a facility within 45 days]; Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1044 [trial court properly analyzed evidence and balanced competing interests before issuing a standing order requiring admission of IST defendants in Contra Costa County to DSH-Napa within 60 days of commitment order]; Kareem A., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 77 [in consolidated cases of 247 defendants, trial court had properly balanced relevant factors in deciding that a 30-day admission deadline was reasonable].)
All of these decisions affirm the right of IST defendants to be admitted to DSH or DDS within a reasonable period of time, as well as the need to balance the interests of the IST defendant and defendants to determine an appropriate deadline. Attempts to enforce the constitutional rights of IST defendants on a case-by-case—or even county-by-county—basis have not succeeded, however, because they do not provide the uniformity and predictability essential to effective enforcement.
Considering the evidence of longstanding and continuing delays in admission of IST defendants, the absence thus far of legislative action on this specific issue, and the necessarily piecemeal nature of the remedies imposed by the Courts of Appeal of this state, we conclude the trial court reasonably determined that a uniform statewide deadline is necessary to ensure the commencement of substantive services for these defendants within a
“reasonable period of time.” (Jackson, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 738; see Butler, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 738–739; Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1042–1043; cf. Brown v. Plata (2011) 563 U.S. 493, 511, 530 [in context of rights of prisoners in overcrowded prisons, United States Supreme Court stated that courts “must not shrink from their obligations to enforce the constitutional rights of all persons,” even when the Legislature “has not been willing or able to allocate the resources necessary to meet the crisis”].)
Defendants nonetheless argue that imposition of a statewide deadline is inappropriate because there are a variety of factors, such as waitlists for admission, that can lengthen or shorten due to factors outside of their control. According to defendants, “a fixed across-the-board numerical ‘admit-by’ deadline is poorly suited to addressing the IST waitlist issue, and will almost
There will undoubtedly be exceptional circumstances requiring special accommodations, which is why the trial court included in its order the
provision that, in interpreting its admissions deadlines, “[t]he phrase ‘all IST defendants’ is to be read as ‘substantially all IST defendants.’ The DSH and the DDS will not be in violation of the judgment if they show good cause for not admitting a few IST defendants within the required timeframes.” The trial court further noted that it “retains the authority to make further amendments to the order or any judgment as warranted by the facts.” (See Butler, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 738 [“Courts retain power to vacate or modify [injunctive] orders at any point”].)22 The fact that delays in admission of individual IST defendants will occasionally be necessary does not justify ignoring the constitutional outer limit for commencement of substantive services for the vast majority of IST defendants whose due process rights continue to be violated.
We also reject defendants’ suggestions that as they continue to attempt to reduce delays, “a temporary period of longer-than-normal wait times may be reasonable while the problem is being addressed,” and that a court order directing a decrease in wait times is therefore “unnecessary and will not make the process go any faster.” The evidence in this and other cases demonstrates, however, that admission delays for IST defendants have continued for many years and that defendants’ efforts to remedy the problem have plainly been insufficient, given the increasing delays for DSH in particular since 2015, when this action was filed, and continuing delays for DDS. (See Kareem A., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 66 [“Since its creation, the
waitlist” for admission of IST defendants committed to DSH “has grown continuously”]; Carr v. Superior Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 264, 272 [sharing other courts’ concern about “what appears to be ‘a statewide problem in finding adequate housing for persons declared mentally incompetent to stand trial, especially those who are developmentally disabled’ ”], quoting Williams, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018.)
Contemplating these longstanding delays, the trial court in this case referred to the Loveton trial court’s finding in an August 16, 2017 order “that in the three years since the Loveton [trial court’s] decision the DSH had been provided ‘ample opportunity to plan and undertake steps’ but that DSH ‘was neither diligent nor effective in achieving the stated goal,’ ” and was failing to comply with the standing order’s 60-day deadline for admission. In light of this history of growing waitlists and delayed admissions, a statewide deadline will ensure that defendants undertake immediate additional measures to ensure timely commencement of competency treatment for IST defendants committed to DSH or DDS.
Like the trial court, we do not ignore the resource limitations or the complexity of the challenges DSH and DDS face. Still, “given the many years DSH [and DDS] ha[ve] had to address excessive wait times,” they simply have “not done enough to warrant continuous excusal from” commencing substantive services for all IST defendants in a timely manner. (Kareem A., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 79; see also Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1045 [“we cannot ignore the due process rights of Contra Costa County IST defendants at issue in this case, while simply hoping that DSH will admit them, and all IST defendants, in a more timely manner”].)
B. Special Considerations for IST Defendants Committed to DDS
Defendants contend that even assuming a uniform deadline is appropriate for IST defendants committed to DSH, it is not appropriate for IST defendants committed to DDS, due to statutory differences between
First, according to defendants, unlike IST defendants admitted to DSH under
As plaintiffs point out, the history of
subdivision (b)(1) to its current form, requiring DDS to submit a report within 90 days of admission. (Stats. 1996, ch. 1076, § 2.5.)23
Moreover, regardless of this puzzling history, we do not believe the Legislature could have intended this change in the wording of
This argument is not convincing. Under subdivision (a)(2) of
constitutionally reasonable time. (See In re Grimes (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1175, 1183 [administrative inconvenience does not justify deprivation of constitutional rights].) The trial court was aware of the statutory and regulatory requirements for DDS admissions and also considered evidence regarding reasons for DDS’s current delays, which suggested that excessive delays in the admissions process itself was currently driving the failure to commence substantive services for IST defendants committed to DDS in a timely manner.26
Finally, defendants assert that because the number of commitments to DDS is relatively small, with only 77 in 2016, it is appropriate to assess the
C. Loveton’s 60-Day Deadline for Admission of IST Defendants to DSH
Defendants next argue that even if the trial court may properly impose an across-the-board deadline for admission of California IST defendants to
DSH, the court would be bound by our decision in Loveton, meaning it could only impose the 60-day deadline we found proper in that case. (Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th 1025.)
The trial court, however, correctly found Loveton distinguishable because in that case neither the trial court nor this court “addressed what due process standard applied statewide or the DSH’s statewide practices.” Loveton involved only one county—Contra Costa—and one state hospital—DSH-Napa. Hence, in finding the trial court’s 60-day admission deadline was not an abuse of discretion based on the evidence before it, we explained that the court had properly balanced several competing interests, including “Contra Costa County IST defendants’ due process right to receive treatment within a reasonable period of time; the statutory requirements of
Importantly, while we found that “the trial court’s order realistically places an outside limit on what is statutorily and constitutionally permissible,” we also observed “that any solution to the problem of the timeliness of placement of IST defendants at the county level cannot begin to resolve the issue statewide. With a handful of distinct orders across the state, priority in admission is given to defendants from counties with standing orders with the shortest admission deadlines, to the possible detriment of defendants both in counties that have standing orders with longer deadlines and, especially, in counties without standing orders. As noted, we believe the 60-day standing order in this case reasonably balances the various interests involved. Nonetheless, the necessarily piecemeal nature of countywide standing orders in
for a more uniform, statewide solution.” (Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047 & fn. 19.)27
These passages from Loveton make clear that we were not attempting to define an outside constitutional limit for admission to DSH for IST defendants statewide. Instead, given the complexities of imposing a standing order for a single county and a single hospital, while other counties had differing deadlines or no deadline at all, we found that a longer deadline was appropriate. In this case, we are addressing a very different situation involving a statewide order that includes all California counties and all DSH facilities. (Accord, Kareem A., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 76 [rejecting DSH’s argument “that Loveton established a rigid 60-day admission deadline statewide”].)
Defendants further argue that our determination in Loveton that due process required a 60-day outside time limit for admission of IST defendants, like the determinations in Mille and Brewer, was based on the statutory requirement that DSH prepare a progress report for the court within 90 days after an IST defendant is committed. (See
Costa County IST defendants’ admission to DSH-Napa. (See pt. IV.B., post [discussing the 90-day statutory reporting requirement].)
IV. The Maximum Constitutionally Permissible Delay
for Commencement of Substantive Services
In its April 19, 2019 order, the court stated that “[t]he due process issue presented in this case has two parts: (1) identifying the point in time when responsibility for an IST defendant transfers to the DSH or DDS and (2) determining the maximum constitutionally permissible delay between the transfer of responsibility and when the DSH or DDS commence[s] substantive services reasonably designed to restore the IST defendant to competency.”
As noted, the court explained that the transfer of responsibility point for IST defendants is the date on which the document transferring responsibility for those defendants to DSH or DDS is served, which is the date from which the constitutional outer limit for commencing substantive services is calculated. The court found that the transfer of responsibility date is different for each of three categories of IST defendants: those committed to DSH pursuant to section 1370; those committed to DDS pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) of section 1370.1; and those committed to DDS pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii) of section 1370.1.
1. IST Defendants Committed to DSH
The court found that for DSH, the transfer of responsibility point is the date of service of the commitment packet, explaining: “The court’s delivery of the commitment packet is in the nature of a condition subsequent to the court’s commitment order because the commitment order does not become effective until service of the commitment packet.” The court relied on section 1370, subdivision (a)(3)(A)-(I) as implicit support for its conclusion that “[t]he commitment order is conditional because it cannot be implemented until the court serves the commitment packet on the DSH.” (See
Neither party quarrels with the court’s general determination that the date of service of the commitment packet is the transfer of responsibility date for DSH. Defendants, however, believe that the court’s order is “problematic because it is potentially ambiguous as to when the clock starts for the 28-day deadline,” due to the fact that the order referred generally to “the commitment packet,” rather than to a “complete” commitment packet. According to defendants, “[p]resumably, the court intended to start the clock only once a complete [commitment] packet has been transmitted to DSH, and not merely through the transmittal of an incomplete packet.” Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that the court intended for the 28-day deadline to run from the date of service of the commitment packet, whether or not it is complete, not from receipt of a complete packet. We believe plaintiffs have the better argument.
The trial court explained that its determination of the transfer of responsibility date for DSH was based on the fact that, under
We agree that that the transfer of responsibility point for DSH is the date of service of the commitment packet, not the date DSH considers a commitment packet complete, which would only occur after DSH has received and reviewed the commitment packet to determine if documents are missing and requested any missing documents, and then not until any such documents are subsequently received, reviewed, and approved. The court was specific in its description of the transfer of responsibility date, as well as its unwillingness to allow DSH to dictate that date based on its review or approval of the commitment packet. Defendants’ interpretation of the court’s intended transfer of responsibility date contradicts the court’s explanation of its intent.
Moreover, to the extent DSH is concerned about delays in receiving documents required under
Dr. Gage also stated that the data, which reflected a mean time of 17 days from commitment order to packet receipt, 22 days from packet receipt to approval, and 30 days from approval to admission to DSH facilities, “demonstrate the DSH delays, as opposed to any delays in getting admission information from the counties, account for most of the time from commitment to admission.” Moreover, while it was not clear from the data “how much of the 22 days between receiving the packet and approving admission is due to waiting for additional information to complete the packet, . . . the deposition testimony cited indicates this is not a significant source of delay.”
The record thus strongly suggests that delays in receipt of required documents are in large part a result of DSH’s own administrative processes, rather than delays by the court or the counties in submitting those documents to DSH. This evidence supports our conclusion that the trial court reasonably found that the transfer of responsibility date for commencement of substantive services is service of the commitment packet, whether or not that packet is yet complete. Again, under the court’s order, DSH may request that the court find good cause for delay in an unusual case in which receipt of required documentation is unreasonably delayed due to causes beyond its control. (Compare Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1036 [60-day deadline for admission ran from earlier date of commitment order, assuming a complete commitment packet was received within five days of that order and, if not received within that time period, DSH could request an extension for filing 90-day report].)
2. IST Defendants Committed to DDS Pursuant to Subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i)
The court found that for IST defendants committed to DDS pursuant to
B. The 28-Day Outer Limit for Commencing Substantive Services
Defendants contend “[t]he trial court’s determination that 28 days is the ‘maximum constitutionally permissible delay’ before provision of competency services is arbitrary and improper,” made in reliance “on inapposite cases from other jurisdictions and various statutory provisions that bear no relationship to the admission of IST defendants” in California.
“So-called ‘substantive due process’ prevents the government from engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the conscience [citation], or interferes with rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ [citation].” (U.S. v. Salerno (1987) 481 U.S. 739, 746; accord, Youngberg v. Romeo (1982) 457 U.S. 307, 315 (Youngberg) [“The mere fact that Romeo has been committed [to a state institution for the developmentally disabled] under proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment”].) “In determining whether a substantive right protected by the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to balance ‘the liberty of the individual’ and ‘the demands of an organized society’ ” by “weigh[ing] the individual’s interest in liberty against the State’s asserted reasons for restraining individual liberty.” (Youngberg, at p. 320.)
In determining the “statewide outside limit” for the commencement of substantive services for IST defendants to remedy the continuing violations of their due process rights, the trial court considered and gave “substantial weight” to a number of factors in reaching its conclusion that constitutional due process requires defendants to commence substantive competency services for IST defendants within 28 days of the transfer of responsibility date.29
1. Balancing of Interests
The court first considered and gave substantial weight to IST defendants’ constitutional “interest in not being confined before conviction of a crime and
The court therefore balanced three considerations: “ ‘First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 212–213.) The court observed that its “analysis track[ed] Trueblood,” supra, 101 F.Supp.3d at pages 1020–1023.
The court first considered IST defendants’ fundamental right to liberty, given that they have not been convicted of any crime and their incarceration is not intended to be punishment. (See Youngberg, supra, 457 U.S. at pp. 320–321; Trueblood, supra, 101 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1020–1021; see also have done, explaining that “[t]he purpose of commitment is not to simply relocate an IST defendant to another geographic location or transfer administrative responsibility for the IST defendant from the county jail to a state entity.”
Jackson, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 738 [“ ‘due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed’ ”].) The court then found that IST defendants are at risk of an erroneous deprivation of this interest due to defendants’ failure to promptly provide substantive services designed to promote speedy restoration to mental competence, and that a judicially defined constitutional outer limit would be a valuable additional procedural safeguard. (See Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 213; Trueblood, at p. 1021.)
Although not explicitly discussed by the trial court in this portion of its order, the deprivation of IST defendants’ liberty interest in freedom from incarceration is exacerbated by the undisputed harms these defendants suffer due to prolonged incarceration in county jails while awaiting transfer and treatment, which often delay their return to competence. (See, e.g., Mille, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 646 [quoting legislative history underlying
322 F.3d at p.1121 [lack of funds, staff, or facilities cannot justify state’s failure to provide IST defendants with treatment necessary for rehabilitation].)30 The court also found that defendants’ “interest in the preparation and transmission of documentation” “cannot justify confining a person ‘more than [the] reasonable period of time necessary,’ ” and noted that its “identification of transfer of responsibility dates take[s] into account the DSH’s and DDS’s need for documentation.”
In examining defendants’ interests, the court also considered the 90-day reporting requirement regarding the defendant’s progress towards recovery of mental competence. (
We believe the 90-day report requirement reflects the Legislature’s determination that defendants do not have an unlimited period of time in which to admit IST defendants, given that those defendants must begin receiving substantive services quickly enough for defendants to be able to
evaluate their progress and determine the likelihood that competency will be restored within 90 days. (See pt. III.B., ante [discussing differences in wording in
Therefore, this statutory provision is germane to the due process analysis. While it is by no means the only factor to be considered in determining the constitutional outer limit for commencement of services, the 90-day statutory
Finally, in addressing the governmental interests involved, the court observed that “the State’s primary governmental interest in regard to IST defendants is to bring those accused of a crime to trial.” (Citing
The trial court thus reasonably found, after weighing the relevant interests involved, that defendants’ systematic deprivation of IST defendants’ “substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment” was a significant factor in determining the maximum constitutionally permissible delay in commencing substantive services. (Youngberg, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 315)
2. Legislative Timelines
The court next considered “legislative timelines” in three different statutory schemes that it believed were relevant to its determination of the constitutional outer limit for commencing substantive services. The court believed it was particularly helpful to look at relevant statutory schemes because plaintiffs were seeking relief on a statewide basis “to address system day deadline].) Here, the parties have pointed to no evidence in the record regarding the amount of time DSH or DDS needs, following commencement of treatment, to evaluate a defendant and prepare a meaningful progress report.
wide due process violations rather than seeking relief for an individual based on individual facts.”
Second, the court considered “the phrase ‘reasonable period of time’ in light of” pretrial timelines in criminal matters generally, observing that “[t]he timelines in criminal prosecutions are fairly short.” (Citing Craft v. Superior Court, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1543 [measuring length of time between IST defendant’s commitment to DSH and admission to a state hospital “against the much shorter timeframes established by the Legislature”]; see, e.g.,
felony case, “the magistrate shall dismiss the complaint if the preliminary examination is set or continued beyond 10 court days from the time of the arraignment, plea, or reinstatement of criminal proceedings” pursuant to
Third, the court considered procedures for involuntary treatment under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (
The court found that these timelines, though statutory rather than constitutional in nature and addressing somewhat different issues, “are relevant to determining the outer limit of constitutional due process” and “suggest that the [L]egislature has determined that it is not reasonable for the state to involuntarily confine a person for more than approximately 10-20
days without meeting some substantial threshold.” Defendants maintain that the trial court’s reliance on statutory provisions that are not directly applicable to the admission of IST defendants to DSH or DDS facilities was improper and led it to choose an arbitrary deadline that is not tethered to California case law or the relevant statutory deadlines. We disagree.
The court did not suggest that the statutes it considered directly addressed the due process outer limit at issue in this case. Rather, it found helpful parts of
3. Federal Case Law
Finally, the court considered and gave substantial weight to federal case law imposing statewide deadlines of between 7 and 21 days from commitment to admission of IST defendants in other states. (See Mink, supra, 322 F.3d 1101 [seven-day deadline in Oregon]; Trueblood, supra, 101 F.Supp.3d 1010 [seven-day deadline in Washington]; Advocacy Center, supra, 731 F.Supp.2d 603 [21-day deadline in Louisiana].)
Defendants argue that the trial court’s reliance on cases regarding IST defendants in other jurisdictions was improper and contributed to its choice
of an arbitrary deadline. The court, however, did not rely on federal cases as precedent. Instead, it considered the analyses and conclusions of cases involving the nearly identical issue of statewide constitutional outer limits for admission of IST defendants—something absent from prior California case
In sum, in view of the trial court’s careful consideration of the extensive evidence presented about IST defendants and defendants’ processes throughout California, its thorough analysis of the relevant case law and statutory schemes in light of that evidence, and its balancing of the individual liberty and governmental interests involved, we conclude the court acted within its broad discretion when it found that due process requires that defendants commence substantive competency services for IST defendants with 28 days of service of the order transferring responsibility to DSH or DDS. (See Butler, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 738–739; Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1042–1043)33
V. Existing Policy Mechanisms
In their final contention, defendants state that “DSH and DDS are firmly committed to reducing the IST waitlist, and have been working diligently towards that end.” They assert, however, that existing policy mechanisms are best positioned to address California’s broader mental health crisis, which they maintain is at the root of the IST defendant waitlist.
Defendants cite evidence presented in the trial court showing that DSH has obtained funding from the Legislature for diversion programs, which are intended to keep potential IST defendants out of the criminal justice system. (See, e.g.,
We have already described the evidence of defendants’ ongoing endeavors to lessen delays, both independently and in conjunction with the Legislature and other governmental entities, and we commend their efforts.
Nevertheless, unconstitutional delays in providing substantive services to IST defendants committed to DSH and DDS have continued for many years, despite all of defendants’ efforts. This history demonstrates that existing policy mechanisms alone cannot cure the problem, and we must not allow systematic violations of the due process rights of these vulnerable defendants to continue, while hoping that defendants’ efforts will eventually improve the situation. (See Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1045; cf. Kareem A., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 79 [trial court reasonably “concluded DSH did not have a valid excuse for violating commitment orders,” considering that “DSH has had over a decade to evolve in order to meet the rising demand of IST beds, and yet the IST waitlist has continued to grow”].)
VI. Plaintiffs’ Cross-Appeal
The court found that, unlike other defendants committed to DDS, for IST defendants committed pursuant to
Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal concerns this one aspect of the trial court’s order. They contend the trial court erred in finding that the transfer of responsibility date for IST defendants committed to DDS pursuant to
The court based the transfer of responsibility date for this category of IST defendants on the language of
As we shall explain, we agree with plaintiffs that the trial court’s determination of the transfer of responsibility date for IST defendants charged with sex offenses who are committed to DDS pursuant to
Consequently, we conclude the court’s finding was incorrect as a matter of law. (See Butler, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 738–739; accord, Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1043.) Instead, we find that the transfer of responsibility date for this category of IST defendants is identical to that of other IST defendants committed to a DDS facility or state hospital.35
First, in context, the only reasonable interpretation of the language in
In addition, except for defendants committed pursuant to
For example, multiple provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code reflect the fact that DDS is the sole entity responsible for making admissions that both statutes are intended to address the Legislature’s concern with particular risks involved in admitting or transferring certain IST defendants charged with sex offenses. Although
determinations for IST defendants committed under section 1370.1, and for
ultimately placing those defendants in a facility for provision of substantive
services. As the court in Williams explained, under
In addition, as previously discussed,
Williams, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017 [“While
As previously discussed, in 2018, DDS promulgated regulations governing its determination of whether it can safely admit any “dangerous person” committed pursuant to
By their terms, these regulations can only come into play after the clinical team at DDS has received and reviewed the relevant documentation and the assessment of the defendant and after it has determined that safety concerns require that a Safe-to Serve-Committee be formed to determine whether the defendant can be safely placed at Porterville or whether, pursuant to
Finally, the evidence presented in the trial court also confirms that DDS takes responsibility for all IST defendants committed pursuant to
order or earlier from the regional center that has evaluated the defendant—one of the first steps she takes is to collect various documents (the referral packet), which are required for each IST defendant committed to Porterville prior to any final admission determination. The documents needed for the referral packet are obtained primarily from the regional center, but also from the court, the district attorney, and/or the public defender.
In addition to the regional center’s placement recommendation based on its evaluation of the defendant pursuant to subdivision (a)(2) of
Once the
contacting the sheriff’s department for transportation of the defendant to Porterville.40
In sum, nothing in the relevant statutory scheme, regulations, or evidence regarding the procedures DDS utilizes materially distinguishes the admissions process for defendants committed to DDS pursuant to
Any other interpretation would mean that the constitutional rights of one category of IST defendants could be systematically violated without repercussions for months, or indeed years, until any such defendant for whom DDS has not yet authorized admission to a treatment facility would have to
be either civilly committed or released after two years in jail without substantive services, unless that individual defendant could convince a judge
For these reasons, we will reverse the portion of the trial court’s order finding that the transfer of responsibility date for IST defendants committed to DDS pursuant to
defendants committed to DDS pursuant to
VII. Conclusion
Over the past several years, both this and other appellate courts have suggested that the legislative and/or executive branches are in the best position to fashion a statewide solution to the longstanding delays in transferring IST defendants to DSH and DDS for substantive services intended to return them to competency and enable them to stand trial. (Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048, fn. 19; Brewer, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 154 (conc. & dis. opn. of Nicholson, J.); Williams, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1018–1019.) Despite recent legislative action and other initiatives discussed in this opinion, too many of these defendants’ due process rights continue to be violated due to lengthy waits in county jails. For this reason, we conclude the trial court’s imposition of a 28-day constitutional outer limit
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed except as to that part of the judgment challenged in plaintiffs’ cross-appeal, which is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to modify its order granting in part plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandate to reflect a uniform transfer of responsibility date for all IST defendants committed to DDS, as set forth in this opinion, and to likewise modify the judgment to reflect the views expressed in this opinion. Costs on appeal are awarded to plaintiffs.
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Kline, P.J.
We concur:
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Stewart, J.
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Miller, J.
Stiavetti et al. v. Clendenin, as Director, etc., et al. (A157553)
Notes
The court also observed that the Legislature had recently lessened the administrative burden on defendants by enacting a diversion program (