THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff, v. MARCUS DARNELL HOOPER et al., Defendants and Respondents; STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS, Objector and Appellant.
A153313
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR
Filed 9/30/19
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. Nos. 02-324174-2, 01-180772-6, 01-178384-4, 01-179503-8, 01-181833-5, 01-180697-5, 05-161530-1, 02-322144-7, 02-322216-3, 05-170130-9, 01-179828-9, 04-189749-5, 05-160983, 02-324087-6, 02-324344-1, 02-325344-0, 02-324297-1)
The
In this case, a class of IST defendants sought sanctions against DSH pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Background
A court may not try or sentence a defendant in a criminal proceeding while the defendant is incompetent. (
In 2014, several IST defendants who were subject to prolonged detention while awaiting hospital admission in Contra Costa County filed habeas petitions seeking relief. (Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1028, 1035.) The court balanced petitioners’ liberty interests against DSH‘s interests and ruled that DSH must admit IST defendants “within not more than 60 calendar days of the court‘s order of commitment provided the defendant‘s complete information packet has been received by the hospital within five court days of the commitment order.” (Id. at p. 1036.) The court reasoned that a 60-day limit satisfies defendants’ due process rights while allowing time for DSH to place each defendant and to prepare the 90-day reports. (Ibid.) DSH appealed; Division Two of this Court affirmed the 60-day requirement in 2016.2 (Id. at pp. 1045, 1047.) Thus, although there is no statutory deadline for admission to DSH, the Loveton order is valid and applies to IST defendants committed to DSH in Contra Costa County. (Id. at pp. 1033, 1046.)
After the Loveton order became final, a class of 29 Contra Costa County defendants requested sanctions against DSH pursuant to
B. Factual and Procedural Background
The present case involves 11 IST defendants: Hooper, Martha, Martinez, Malloy, Riley, Saechao, Schulting, Starr, Wadley, White, and Wise, all of whom had been committed to DSH between March and August 2017. In June 2017, Wadley, Saechao, and Riley filed a Request for Sanctions Pursuant to
For each defendant, the trial court issued an Order to Show Cause Why Sanctions Should Not Be Ordered (OSC) to DSH. The court conducted hearings on the OSC on June 26, September 18, October 26, October 30, November 13, and November 17.
On September 18 and October 26, the trial court affirmed that it would follow Czirban and calculate the admission delay based on the date DSH received the 1370 packet. After DSH asserted that the dates proffered by defense counsel were incorrect, the court requested that both parties prepare documents as to the relevant dates. DSH also repeatedly requested an evidentiary hearing to show good cause and substantial justification for its alleged violations. The trial court did not rule definitively on DSH‘s requests. At the end of October, the court sent a letter to DSH, attaching the exhibit from defendants’ Request for Sanctions and asking whether DSH‘s records matched. DSH responded that defendants’ dates were incorrect but did not provide any contrary evidence.
At 4:00 p.m. on the day before the final hearing, DSH submitted a document entitled “Response to Supplemental Request for Sanctions; Request for an Evidentiary Hearing.” The court marked this document as “received” but not “filed” due to its untimeliness. On November 17, defendants provided seven exhibits showing the date of packet delivery, date of admittance, and number of days exceeding Loveton for each defendant; DSH presented no
The court issued 11 written sanctions orders in a total amount of $16,500. Each order included the date the court issued the OSC, a statement that the court “incorporated by reference” the Czirban decision, and a statement that the court imposed a fine of “$100 per day for every day past the 60th day admission requirement.”
DSH appeals the sanctions orders.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Properly Imposed Sanctions Under Section 177.5.
As a threshold matter, we note that defendants sought sanctions due to DSH‘s alleged failure to comply with Loveton, which required an IST defendant to be admitted ” ‘within not more than 60 calendar days of the court‘s order of commitment provided the defendant‘s complete information packet has been received by the hospital within five court days of the commitment order.’ ” (Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1036) The trial court in Czirban reinterpreted Loveton to require DSH to admit IST defendants within 60 days of its receipt of such defendants’ 1370 packet—a modification that the trial court in this case adopted, apparently without challenge from either party.3 Because the sanctions requests were founded upon DSH‘s failure to comply with Loveton (and not Loveton as refashioned by the trial court in Czirban), we review the record to determine whether the trial court erred in imposing sanctions based on Loveton.
1. Standard of Review
We review orders imposing sanctions for abuse of discretion. (People v. Ward (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1527 (Ward).) The trial court must exercise its discretion in a “reasonable manner with one of the statutorily authorized purposes in mind and must be guided by existing legal standards.” (Moyal v. Lanphear (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 491, 501.)
2. Authority to Sanction a Non-Party
DSH relies primarily on Vidrio v. Hernandez (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1443 (Vidrio) to argue that the court had no authority to impose sanctions. In Vidrio, which involved an underlying lawsuit between an insured and an injured third party, the trial court imposed sanctions on the insured‘s insurance company for failing to participate in good faith in a mandatory settlement conference. (Vidrio, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp.1450-1452.) The court of appeal reversed, holding that the insurer‘s conduct “did not violate any court order“—a requirement for
As noted by DSH, Vidrio also explained that sanctions against the insurance company were unwarranted because ”
We also disagree with DSH‘s argument that the legislature‘s amendment to
Finally, DSH argues that the proper remedy for a non-party‘s violation of a court order is contempt under
In sum, we conclude that the court did not err in imposing sanctions under
3. Sufficient Details in a Sanctions Order
DSH next argues that the sanctions orders failed to comply with
Each sanctions order in this case contains: (1) the date the trial court issued the OSC; (2) a statement that the court “incorporated by reference the [Czirban] decision, including all documents, testimony, and evidence“; (3) a statement that court heard arguments and found no changes since Czirban; (4) a statement that court imposed sanctions “based on the circumstances of the individual defendant and having regard for the DSH‘s failure to demonstrate good cause or substantial justification for its failure to comply with the standing Loveton order“; and (5) an exhibit setting forth the number of days by which the date of admission exceeded Loveton‘s 60-day requirement. Importantly, the court “incorporated by reference” the 40-page Czirban decision, which provides a detailed analysis of DSH‘s violations and addresses why each of the justifications DSH proposed at the time were insufficient to excuse its conduct. Because the court issued Czirban in August—in the middle of the hearings for this case—there is no reason to require the court to repeat itself to DSH. The sanctions orders were sufficiently detailed.
4. Whether Section 177.5 Sanctions Can Be Punitive
DSH also claims that the trial court erred by applying
5. Authority to Impose Daily Monetary Sanctions
DSH next contends the trial court had no authority to impose a “successive punishment” for each day past the deadline and to order DSH to compensate the county for the daily costs of housing the defendants. It is immaterial that no statute specifically authorizes the court to order daily sanctions because
DSH also claims the Legislature did not intend violations of
6. Violation of Separation of Powers
DSH further argues that the trial court “invade[d] the Legislature‘s constitutional authority” by using state hospital funds to compensate the superior court. DSH relies on Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 698, where our Supreme Court reversed a trial court‘s order to use funds from one school district to support another district. Butt is distinguishable, however, because the court in that case “diverted” funds that had been “earmarked” for a specific purpose. (Ibid.) Here, the court imposed sanctions because DSH violated a court order, not because the court sought to divert DSH‘s funds. That the sanctions might affect hospital funds is an unfortunate, but by no means unconstitutional, consequence of DSH‘s conduct.
B. The Trial Court Properly Admitted Defendants’ Evidence.
1. Standard of Review
We review rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. (Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 446-447 (Christ).) To
2. Proper Calculation of the 60-Day Deadline
As a corollary to its arguments regarding the admissibility of evidence, DSH also contends the trial court erred as a matter of law by determining that the 60-day admission requirement ran from the date of the commitment order, rather than the date DSH received the 1370 packet.
In its OSCs, the trial court wrote that DSH had violated the Loveton order by failing to admit each defendant within 60 days of the order of commitment. The court later stated, however, that it would follow Czirban and “have [the delay] calculated from the date the packet—packet was received until the admission.” Contrary to DSH‘s assertion, calculating the 60-day deadline as running from the date of commitment, as stated in the OSCs, was consistent with Loveton and did not constitute error. (Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1036.) As noted above, we will analyze the propriety of the sanctions orders in light of the evidence presented and the Loveton requirements, as Loveton was the basis for the sanctions requests. As discussed below, review of the evidence through that lens demonstrates that the court erred only in its order imposing sanctions as to defendant Riley.
3. Admissibility of Defendants’ Exhibits
DSH contends that the court prejudicially erred by relying on “unauthenticated hearsay documents.” This claim has no merit.
At the final hearing, defendants prepared seven exhibits supporting their contentions as to when DSH received each 1370 packet. After marking these exhibits for identification—but before admitting the them into evidence—the trial court explicitly asked DSH for its objections. DSH addressed only Exhibit C (Wadley), Exhibit C (Wise), and Exhibit A (Wadley).
Exhibit C (Wadley) and Exhibit C (Wise) consist of two tables documenting the date of packet receipt, the date of admission, and the
We now turn to Exhibit A (Wadley). This exhibit contains a table of patient names and relevant dates along with a cover letter from Samuel Rosales, stating that he is the Health Services Administrator for Contra Costa Health Services-Detention Health Services and that the attached evidence is “a true and accurate record of information retrieved from files kept by Detention Health Services Health Information Management Unit regarding patient‘s [sic] records” sent to DSH. DSH objected only that this exhibit was “not properly authenticated” because Rosales’ letter was not a custodian of records declaration signed under penalty of perjury. As DSH did not assert a hearsay objection, it cannot now complain on this basis. (SCI California, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 563-564 [defendant‘s trial objection that expert‘s testimony was “speculative and irrelevant did not encompass” the claim on appeal that expert employed an improper methodology].) Moreover, a writing need not be authenticated by a custodian of records declaration signed under penalty of perjury, as the
As to Exhibit A (Wise), Exhibit B (Wise), Exhibit B (Wadley), and Exhibit D (Wadley), DSH failed to object and has thus forfeited its right to complain on appeal. (SCI California, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 563-565.) We conclude that the court properly admitted all seven of defendants’ exhibits.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Shift the Burden of Proof.
According to DSH, the trial court improperly placed the burden on DSH to show the correct dates of packet receipt rather than requiring defendants to provide competent evidence that DSH violated the Loveton order. We disagree.
During the November 13 hearing, DSH again contended that “[t]here‘s no evidence for any of this stuff,” without offering its own evidence. In the last scheduled hearing, defendants presented the seven exhibits described above. The court admitted these exhibits, noting, “I haven‘t heard any countervailing evidence from [DSH].” At this point, DSH told the trial court it would submit its own evidence, but the court rejected the implied request to continue the hearing for yet another day, stating, “No, we‘re done. Today is the day.” Because DSH had months to present its own evidence, we decline to find that the trial court erred by not giving DSH unlimited future opportunities to do so.
Under the abuse of discretion standard, the trial court must have only a “reasonable or fairly debatable justification” for its rulings. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 957.) The trial court provided both parties with a fair opportunity to present evidence supporting their version of the facts, but DSH failed to do so. As explained above, it was not “arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd” for the court to accept defendants’ evidence and base its rulings thereon. (Christ, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 447.) Additionally, while defendants had the burden to prove their allegations in the trial court, DSH has the burden to demonstrate reversible error on appeal. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609.) We are not persuaded that the court shifted the burden, as the court did not err in admitting defendants’ evidence and DSH did not present any controverting evidence despite having numerous opportunities to do so.
DSH next argues that the trial court abused its discretion and violated due process by refusing to grant DSH an evidentiary hearing to show good cause or substantial justification for its alleged violations.
First, the court provided DSH adequate notice. In Seykora, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1078, the court ordered sanctions after giving a verbal warning only one day prior, without issuing an OSC or holding an evidentiary hearing. The Seykora court found that, under the circumstances of the case, one-day notice satisfied the notice requirement‘s rationale to “advise the responding party that the imposition of sanctions is being considered, and to give the party an opportunity to prepare for the hearing.” (Id. at p. 1081.) Here, the trial court issued a written Order to Show Cause Why Sanctions Should Not Be Ordered for each defendant, with the earliest being in June 2017. DSH clearly knew the trial court was contemplating sanctions and it had five months of preparation time between the first OSC and the November hearings. This was sufficient.
Second, DSH had adequate notice that the court might deny an evidentiary hearing. DSH asked for a separate hearing to present additional evidence on the issues offered during the Czirban hearings, claiming, “Things have changed as well. This is a few months later since that hearing, so we have more to say.” The trial court stated that it would not re-litigate any of the issues recently decided in Czirban and that it saw “no basis at this time to reopen anything—any hearing for evidence.” The court made clear the uncertainty of a hearing when it said: “I think I should think about it . . . We‘ll see.” On November 13, the court again expressed doubt as to DSH‘s offer of proof, stating, “I don‘t know that a threshold of a new evidentiary hearing has been met.” Because the court never definitively stated it would grant DSH the requested evidentiary hearing, DSH should not have assumed that it would have a later chance to present evidence.
Third, the trial court provided DSH an adequate opportunity to be heard. DSH claims that the court relied on “old and insufficient evidence” from Czirban to make its ruling here when it should have permitted a separate hearing for new evidence. While DSH did contend that “[t]hings have
Lastly, the timeline between Czirban and this case suggests that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. The Czirban hearings concluded in April 2017, and the court issued its decision in August 2017. The court held hearings in this case between June and November 2017—only a few months after Czirban.
Accordingly, we conclude that DSH was denied neither notice nor an opportunity to respond before the court imposed sanctions.
E. Errors in Specific Cases
Finally, DSH contends that the court erred in certain cases. DSH argues it did not receive classification records from the sheriff for Hooper, Martha, Riley, Saechao, Wadley, and White and therefore could not timely perform “security assessment[s]” for these patients. But neither the
DSH next claims that it received the requisite records for Martinez, Saechao, and Riley more than five days after their commitment orders and that it therefore did not violate Loveton when it admitted these patients more than 60 days after receipt. DSH is correct that Loveton requires IST defendants to be committed within 60 days ” ‘provided the defendant‘s complete information packet [was] received by the hospital within five days of the commitment order.’ ” (Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1036.)
The court did not err in imposing sanctions based on DSH‘s untimely admission of Martinez or Saechao. The court signed Martinez‘s order of commitment on July 20, 2017. The record demonstrates that DSH received Martinez‘s 1370 packet four days later on July 24, 2017 and admitted Martinez more than three months later, on November 9, 2017. Similarly, the
The court signed a commitment order for Riley on March 29, 2017. However, according to defendants’ Exhibit C (Wadley), DSH received his 1370 packet on April 4, 2017, which is more than 5 days after the date of commitment. Accordingly, DSH did not violate Loveton with respect to Riley because it did not receive the requisite records ” ‘within five days of the commitment order.’ ” (Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1036.) The court thus erred in imposing sanctions as to this defendant.
DSH also complains that the final sanctions orders for Saechao and Wise erroneously refer to the incorrect dates on which the respective OSCs issued; specifically, DSH contends that the Saechao sanctions order mistakenly references an OSC from July 3 while the Wise sanctions order inaccurately states that the OSC in that case issued on October 17. It is true that the court signed the Saechow OSC on June 28, not on July 3, and the Wise OSC on October 31, not on October 17. These errors are harmless, however, as the OSC date is irrelevant to the number of days between the date of the commitment order and defendant‘s admission, which is the relevant calculation under Loveton.
Finally, DSH contends that the court erred by relying on inaccurate dates to find violations. It claims that the record “is replete with discrepancies,” citing errors in the dates that the court stamped, filed, and served various OSCs, orders of commitment, and orders for competency evaluations. Except with respect to Riley (as noted above), these discrepancies do not warrant reversal because DSH fails to show that such errors affect the validity of the court‘s findings that DSH violated Loveton.
DISPOSITION
The trial court had authority to sanction DSH under
BROWN, J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, ACTING P. J.
TUCHER, J.
People v. Hooper (A153313)
Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Patricia M. Scanlon
Counsel:
Robin Lipetzky, Public Defender, Stephanie Regular, Maya Nordberg, and Ian Mc Gratten, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendants and Respondents.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez and Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorneys General, Susan M. Carson, Hadara R. Stanton, and Gregory D. Brown, Deputy Attorneys General, for Objector and Appellant.