86 Cal.App.5th 639
Cal. Ct. App.2022Background
- Walter Chunn III (and two other Solano County defendants) were found incompetent to stand trial (IST); Chunn waited ~75 days for admission to Napa State Hospital and alleged DSH failed to commence timely competency assessment/treatment.
- After evidentiary hearings, the Solano County trial court entered a countywide standing order requiring DSH to begin meaningful engagement/treatment within 72 hours of commitment (or place the defendant within 7 days), to provide remediation plans if placement would exceed 28 days, and to file weekly reports; the order also authorized sanctions up to $1,500 per day for noncompliance.
- DSH appealed; after the trial court’s order, Division Two of this court decided Stiavetti v. Clendenin, holding a 28-day statewide maximum constitutional delay to commence substantive competency-restoration services and that DSH’s responsibility transfers on service of the commitment packet.
- The Legislature enacted and then amended Welfare & Institutions Code § 4335.2 (Assembly Bill 133; SB 184), authorizing DSH, in its “authority and sole discretion,” to conduct telehealth or in-person reevaluations of IST defendants (originally for waits >=60 days, later without a 60-day threshold).
- The Court of Appeal: (1) affirmed much of the trial court’s reasoning, (2) held the trial court must treat DSH’s responsibility as transferring on service of the statutory commitment packet, (3) vacated the 72-hour evaluation mandate as inconsistent with the statutory grant of sole discretion in § 4335.2, (4) limited sanctions under Code Civ. Proc. § 177.5 to $1,500 per defendant (not per day), and (5) remanded for reconsideration to align the standing order with Stiavetti and recent statutory changes while affirming requirements for remediation plans, continued treatment pending placement, and weekly reporting when placement is not anticipated within 28 days.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Chunn) | Defendant's Argument (DSH) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does DSH’s legal responsibility for an IST defendant begin? | Responsibility attaches on the court’s commitment order | Responsibility should attach when DSH receives a complete packet or when DSH is able to act | Responsibility attaches on service of the commitment packet as required by § 1370(a)(3); trial court order modified accordingly (followed Stiavetti). |
| Are the trial court’s short deadlines (72-hour evaluation/treatment; 7-day placement) consistent with law and Stiavetti’s 28-day rule? | 72-hour and 7-day requirements are needed to prevent decompensation and protect due process | The 72-hour/7-day deadlines conflict with Stiavetti’s statewide 28-day constitutional outer limit and exceed judicial authority | 72-hour evaluation/treatment order conflicts with post‑enactment § 4335.2 (DSH sole discretion) and is vacated; the court remanded to reconsider the order in light of Stiavetti’s 28‑day maximum and statutory changes. The 28‑day marker remains an important constitutional limit. |
| Did the trial court violate separation of powers by imposing treatment, reporting, and remediation-plan obligations on DSH? | Orders enforce statutory goals (speedy restoration) and protect constitutional rights; they are proper judicial enforcement | Orders improperly rewrite or add executive duties and reporting requirements beyond statute | Court found setting deadlines and requiring remediation plans/weekly reports is within judicial authority to enforce § 1370 and due process; but 72‑hour evaluation order conflicted with new statutory amendments and must be vacated. |
| Are monetary sanctions under Code Civ. Proc. § 177.5 limited to $1,500 total or $1,500 per day? | Trial court’s per-day cap needed to incentivize compliance (Chunn reluctantly agreed per-day was incorrect) | Statute and legislative history limit sanctions to $1,500 per violation; do not authorize unlimited per‑day penalties | Statute limits sanctions to $1,500 per defendant (per violation)—trial court’s per‑day sanction scheme must be modified. |
Key Cases Cited
- Stiavetti v. Clendenin, 65 Cal.App.5th 691 (Cal. Ct. App.) (trial court may impose a statewide constitutional outer limit of 28 days to commence substantive competency-restoration services)
- Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (U.S. 1972) (IST defendants may not be held longer than reasonable to determine or effect restoration; continued commitment must be justified by progress)
- Jackson v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.5th 96 (Cal. 2017) (statutory framework for IST proceedings and reporting obligations)
- People v. Brewer, 235 Cal.App.4th 122 (Cal. Ct. App.) (trial court may set transfer/admission deadlines to enforce statutory reporting and restoration timelines)
- In re Loveton, 244 Cal.App.4th 1025 (Cal. Ct. App.) (upholding county deadline as constitutional outer limit and rejecting separation-of-powers challenge)
- Trueblood v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 822 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.) (federal decisions addressing short statewide admission deadlines for competency restoration)
- Oregon Advocacy Center v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir.) (upholding injunctive relief imposing short deadlines for admission to state hospital to protect due process)
- People v. Hooper, 40 Cal.App.5th 685 (Cal. Ct. App.) (upholding sanctions under § 177.5 applied to multiple defendants within statutory cap)