THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN R. ARIAS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. S155571
Supreme Court of California
Nov. 6, 2008.
169
Richard M. Doctoroff, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit, John H. Deist, Laurence K. Sullivan and Jill M. Thayer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
CHIN, J.—
We granted the People‘s petition for review in order to determine whether a violation of
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 25, 2005, Martinez Police Officer Nick Voyvodich stopped a 1996 Lexus because it lacked a front license plate. He searched the car after he had its driver and sole occupant, John R. Arias, exit the vehicle. Voyvodich first examined the “headliner,” a fabric-covered area between the sunroof and the car‘s frame. Unfastening Velcro strips attached to the fabric, he pulled down the headliner and looked into its interior. Finding nothing, he next looked at the area under the driver‘s seat, which also was empty.
When he looked up, Voyvodich noticed a plastic ball containing a white crystalline substance sticking out of a “gap” between the dashboard and steering column. Voyvodich pulled off the “loose” dashboard panel located “just above [a seated driver‘s] left knee” and removed the plastic, which contained three baggies containing a white substance. The space under the steering column and behind the dashboard contained wiring circuitry, and Voyvodich testified that it “didn‘t appear to be a storage area” or to have “a hand release or anything like a button on the glove compartment.” He noted that the panel easily “clipped” in and out, apparently to allow access to the wiring for “people working on the car.” Voyvodich testified it “would be hard to pull out” the baggies through the gap, that he would have needed “to manipulate [them] a lot.” When Voyvodich searched defendant, he found cash in three bundles stacked in a “crisscross fashion” that contained $300, $320, and $380, respectively, plus a separate folded bundle of cash in the amount of $425.
The baggies contained methamphetamine; they weighed 27.72, 23.01, and 3.31 grams respectively. A narcotics expert testified that, in his opinion, defendant possessed the drugs for sale. The expert based his opinion on the amount found in each baggie, the cash bundles that suggested separate sales in quarter-ounce amounts, and the fact that defendant did not appear to be under the influence of a drug or in possession of drug paraphernalia.
Defendant‘s mother owned the Lexus defendant had been driving. When asked “Did you personally do anything to the inside of the Lexus to change or modify any aspect of . . . it so that you could put drugs in there?” defendant testified, “No, my mother would kill me if I did anything like that.”
The Court of Appeal reversed defendant‘s conviction for possessing a false compartment. It concluded the trial court gave an erroneous instruction defining “false compartment” and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that defendant used or possessed a false compartment within the meaning of
II. DISCUSSION
With respect to this section, the trial court instructed the jury that “[e]very person who possesses, uses, or controls a false compartment with the intent to store, conceal, smuggle or transport a controlled substance within the false compartment is guilty of a violation of
The portion of the trial court‘s instruction italicized above was based on the interpretation of the statutory definition of false compartment set forth in People v. Gonzalez (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1405 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 434] (Gonzalez), a case in which brothers were jointly tried and convicted of several drug offenses. One brother, who was separately convicted of possession of a false compartment, contended the plain language of
In the present case, the Court of Appeal concluded that “[t]he history of
With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutory definition of “false compartment,” which is “any box, container, space, or enclosure that is intended for use or designed for use to conceal, hide, or otherwise prevent discovery of any controlled substance within or attached to a vehicle, including, but not limited to, any of the following: [¶] (1) False, altered, or modified fuel tanks. [¶] (2) Original factory equipment of a vehicle that is modified, altered, or changed. [¶] (3) Compartment, space, or box that is added to, or fabricated, made, or created from, existing compartments, spaces, or boxes within a vehicle.” (
We agree with the Court of Appeal that it would be unreasonable to interpret the phrase “intended for use or designed for use to conceal, hide, or otherwise prevent discovery of any controlled substance within or attached to a vehicle” in the above definition of false compartment to mean “intended [by
After examining the context in which the definition of false compartment appears and adopting the construction that best harmonizes the statute internally (Hsu v. Abbara, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 871), we conclude that, although awkwardly phrased, the language in subdivision (d) of
Initially, we find it significant that, in the phrase “false compartment,” the word “false” describes the compartment, not the individuals who use it. In that context, the word “false” has been defined by one authority as “[i]ntentionally deceptive,” with two examples provided: “a suitcase with a false bottom; false promises.” (American Heritage Dict. (4th ed. 2000) p. 638; see also 5 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 698, col. 2 [the word “false,” when describing “appearances” or “things,” means “deceptive“].) While a separate zipped compartment at the bottom of a suitcase
We agree with the Court of Appeal that “[i]f the ‘false compartment’ to which
We rely on the following rules of statutory construction in reaching our conclusion that, had the Legislature intended for original factory equipment of a vehicle to be included within the term “false compartment” whether or not the equipment had been modified, altered, or changed, it would not have included, as a second example of a false compartment, “Original factory equipment of a vehicle that is modified, altered, or changed.” (
A second principle of statutory construction explains that, when a particular class of things modifies general words, those general words are construed as applying only to things of the same nature or class as those enumerated. (Scally v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 806, 819 [100 Cal.Rptr. 501].) This canon of statutory construction, which in the law is known as ejusdem generis, ” ‘applies whether specific words follow general words in a statute or vice versa. In either event, the general term or category is “restricted to those things that are similar to those which are enumerated specifically.“’ [Citation.]” (International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 319, 342 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 693, 165 P.3d 488].) Here, although the definition of false compartment is not limited to the three examples provided in
The same principle of statutory construction applies to the restrictions involved in all three examples of a false compartment the Legislature has provided. Each example of a “false compartment” set forth in
As noted above, the Gonzalez court relied on the fact that “the statute specifies that a false compartment includes but is not limited to [the] enumerated examples,” and on the general rule of statutory construction that “[u]se of the language ‘including, but not limited to’ in the statutory definition is a phrase of enlargement rather than limitation,” to conclude that a false compartment could include a space used to conceal controlled substances in a vehicle even “without any modification of the physical configuration of the space.” (Gonzalez, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414.) Although the Gonzalez court correctly reasoned that the examples set forth in subdivision (d)‘s definition of false compartment are not an exclusive list of all possible false compartments under
Alternatively, were we to conclude that inclusion of the qualifiers in the second example, in conjunction with the general “including but not limited to” language, created an ambiguity regarding whether original factory equipment was excluded from the definition of false compartment in
Based on our statutory construction analysis of
At trial, Officer Voyvodich testified he first saw the plastic ball containing the baggies of methamphetamine because it was sticking out of a “gap” between the dashboard and steering column of the 1996 Lexus defendant was driving. Voyvodich said the drugs were stuffed between the steering column and adjacent wiring behind part of the dashboard and that he easily removed that “loose” dashboard panel because it clipped in and out to facilitate access to the electrical circuitry in that area. The prosecutor never asked the officer whether he tried to determine whether this space, or any other part of the Lexus, was standard in that model or whether it had been modified, altered, or changed in any way in order to prevent the discovery of controlled substances. Voyvodich addressed the issue only when asked on
The prosecutor told the jury in her opening statement that she was confident it would find defendant guilty of transporting methamphetamine “in a secret compartment inside the car. A compartment that is not used primarily for storing items, such as the glove compartment.” In her closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury the place where the drugs were found was a “hidden compartment,” although anyone would “be able to see that methamphetamine” in the “big gap” as they were “getting into that driver‘s seat.” She argued the space in which the drugs were found is not a place “where you are going to put your wallet. It‘s not where you are going to put your registration. This is solely for the purpose of harboring these drugs . . . .” Significantly, the prosecutor never suggested to the jury that any of the original factory equipment of the Lexus had been modified, changed, or altered in order to create a space that was intended to prevent the discovery of controlled substances.
Here, where no evidence was presented suggesting there had been an aftermarket modification of, or alteration to, the original factory equipment of the vehicle in which illegal drugs were found, we conclude the trial court‘s instruction that a false compartment is a space in a vehicle used to conceal controlled substances “even without any modification of the physical configuration of the space” was prejudicial. In addition, we agree with the Court of Appeal that, “entirely apart from the instructional error, [defendant‘s] conviction for using a ‘false compartment’ cannot stand for the independent reason that the evidence was insufficient to sustain it.”
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
George, C. J., Kennard, J., Werdegar, J., Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.
BAXTER, J., Concurring.—I agree with the majority that defendant‘s conviction for using a false compartment is not supported by substantial evidence. As the majority explains, a false compartment within the meaning of
The analysis above is sufficient to dispose of this case, inasmuch as defendant may not be retried on this count. (Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 18 [57 L.Ed.2d 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141].) But the majority goes on to hold that a compartment that is false within the meaning given above—i.e., that is constructed in a manner to intentionally deceive an untrained observer by concealing its existence—is nonetheless not false within the meaning of the statute if the compartment is part of the vehicle‘s original factory equipment. In other words, the majority holds that a false compartment does not qualify as a false compartment within the meaning of the statute unless the compartment is a product of aftermarket changes to original factory equipment. The distinction the majority purports to draw between a defendant‘s intent to conceal drugs in a vehicle‘s false compartment that is installed or created aftermarket (which is a felony) and a defendant‘s same intent to use the same false compartment when that compartment is part of the vehicle‘s original factory equipment (and, hence, innocent conduct) is unnecessary to the decision in this case, is not supported by the statutory language, and leads to absurd results. I write separately to distance myself from that analysis.
In reasoning that
The majority‘s other rationale for excluding false compartments that are part of the vehicle‘s original factory equipment rests on a strained interpretation of the examples provided in
The majority relies on ejusdem generis, the general principle that when a particular class of things modifies general words, those general words are construed as applying only to things of the same nature or class as those enumerated. The majority reasons that this canon of statutory construction does not allow us “to broaden the meaning of false compartment with regard to original factory equipment beyond the restrictions set forth in the Legislature‘s second example” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 180), which refers to original factory equipment “that is modified, altered, or changed” (
Kraus considered whether a landlord‘s charge for prelease administrative services was an unrefundable security fee prohibited by
Instead of Kraus, I find instructive People v. Clark-van Brunt (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8 [205 Cal.Rptr. 144], which is cited in In re Forfeiture of $5,264, supra, 439 N.W.2d at page 255. Clark-van Brunt construed
Moreover, the majority offers no reason why the Legislature would have wanted to make the possession, use, or control of false compartments with the intent to conceal drugs therein a felony, unless the compartment is part of the vehicle‘s original factory equipment, in which case the possession of the compartment with the requisite intent is no crime at all under this section. The harm occasioned by the concealment of drugs in a false compartment that is part of the vehicle‘s original factory equipment is identical to the harm occasioned by the concealment of drugs in the same compartment that was installed as an aftermarket modification. (See People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 660–661 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 170 P.3d 623]; accord, Zurich American v. ABM Industries (2d Cir. 2005) 397 F.3d 158, 165 [applying ejusdem generis “would require us to ignore the phrase ‘but not limited to’ ” in the insurance policy].)
Finally, the majority‘s interpretation of the statute runs afoul of the canon of statutory construction that directs us to interpret legislative enactments to avoid absurd results. (See People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 604 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 695, 918 P.2d 999].) In seeming recognition of the implausibility of its construction of the statute, the majority seeks refuge in the rule of lenity, under which an ambiguous penal statute is construed, in very limited circumstances, in favor of the defendant. The rule, of course, does not apply every time there are two or more reasonable interpretations of a penal statute. (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 986 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 261, 135 P.3d 669].) Rather, the rule applies ” ‘only if the court can do no more than guess what the legislative body intended; there must be an egregious ambiguity and uncertainty to justify invoking the rule.’ ” (People v. Avery, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 58, italics added.) No such uncertainty exists here. Under the majority‘s approach,
Indeed, the majority‘s interpretation rips a substantial hole in the coverage of the statute. An illegitimate boat or trailer manufacturer that includes a false compartment for drug smuggling in the vehicle will be immune from liability under this statute, as will the individuals who actually possess or use the false compartment to store or conceal drugs. And if a legitimate vehicle manufacturer creates a false compartment for a lawful purpose—say, to safeguard jewelry—drug dealers once again will be immune from using those compartments to smuggle drugs. It is difficult to reconcile this cribbed construction of the statute with the Legislature‘s expectation that this law “would provide a necessary tool for law enforcement efforts to combat increasing use of false compartments in the drug trade.” (Sen. Com. Analysis, supra, at p. 2.)
The majority‘s unduly narrow construction of the statute also will shift the inquiry at trial from whether a compartment is false to whether a false compartment has been “modified, altered, or changed in any way.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 174.) Is it sufficient if the defendant has unscrewed a panel of an original compartment that would otherwise qualify as false and reattached it, but in doing so has screwed it in less tightly than before, resulting in a slightly larger interior space? Has the original factory equipment been “changed in any way” if the defendant does no more than remove a panel of such a compartment and reattach it? What if the defendant changes the panel‘s color or places a sticker on it? Does equipment installed by the dealer, such as a spoiler or upgraded audio equipment containing false compartments, qualify as original factory equipment? I find no evidence that the Legislature was concerned with these questions or believed that public safety turned on the answers to them. (Cf. Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1387–1388 [punitive
For the foregoing reasons, I join only in the judgment that there was insufficient evidence of a false compartment under