LARAMIE STERLING HINKLE, Plaintiff - Appellant, and JARROD HINKLE, Plaintiff, v. BECKHAM COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; SCOTT JAY, in his individual capacity; STRIDER ESTEP, Deputy Sheriff, in his individual capacity, Defendants - Appellees.
No. 18-6202
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
June 22, 2020
PUBLISH. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 5:15-CV-00497-SLP)
Wellon B. Poe (Jamison C. Whitson with him on the brief), of Collins Zorn & Wagner, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees, Scott Jay and Strider Estep.
Carson C. Smith (Robert S. Lafferrandre with him on the brief), of Pierce Couch Hendrickson Baysinger & Green, L.L.P., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee, Beckham County Board of County Commissioners.
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
A series of coincidences and mistaken beliefs led to the arrest of Laramie Hinkle for possessing a stolen trailer that was not even stolen. And things got worse from there. Despite Hinkle‘s recently having served as police chief in a nearby Oklahoma town and having voluntarily presented himself for booking, the sheriff‘s office immediately subjected him to a body-cavity strip search. Soon after that, the sheriff published a press release on his office‘s website chock full of incriminating allegations from the deputy‘s arrest-warrant affidavit. After further investigation showed Hinkle innocent, he sued, alleging as unlawful his arrest, the press release, and the body-cavity strip search. We sympathize with Hinkle. But we conclude that the deputy sheriff had probable cause for the arrest, that the deputy arrested Hinkle based on that probable cause, and that the district court did not err in dismissing Hinkle‘s claim that the sheriff issued the press release to retaliate against Hinkle. That said, we conclude that the body-cavity strip search was unreasonable under the
I. Factual Background
A. The Investigation
On November 6, 2012, Scott Jay defeated a challenger to win re-election as the Beckham County Sheriff. The next day, Laramie Hinkle resigned his office as the Chief of Police for Erick, Oklahoma, situated in Beckham County. Hinkle had supported Sheriff Jay‘s opponent during the campaign.1
In May 2013, Rod and Lynne Smith reported to the Beckham County Sheriff‘s Office that for the past two weeks someone had abandoned a trailer on their property. Mr. Smith told Deputy Strider Estep that Hinkle or Hinkle‘s father-in-law, Vaughn Keown, might own the trailer. Keown had recently done some work for the Smiths on their property.
Deputy Estep went to the Smiths’ property and viewed the trailer. He wrote down its vehicle identification number (VIN) and information from a trailer-dealership decal. Deputy Estep accessed the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, but that revealed nothing suggesting that the trailer had been stolen. Next, after seeing its name on the decal, Deputy Estep called T-N-J Trailers, a South Carolina trailer dealership. A dealership representative told him that the Carpenter‘s Church in Anderson, South Carolina, had bought the trailer in 2001.
With this information, Deputy Estep called the Anderson County Sheriff‘s Department about the 2003 trailer theft. That office confirmed the theft of a trailer as described but advised that its investigative report did not list a VIN for the trailer stolen from the Carpenter‘s Church.
Finally, Deputy Estep called the church‘s insurer, the Palmetto Insurance Agency. Its representative confirmed the pastor‘s account of the stolen trailer and its having paid the church‘s claim. Importantly, when Deputy Estep provided the Oklahoma trailer‘s VIN, the insurer told him that it matched the VIN of the stolen trailer.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Hey, is this Vaughn?
VAUGHN KEOWN: Yes
DEPUTY ESTEP: Hey Vaughn, this is John Larson. I was out there on Lynne Smith‘s property the other day . . .
VAUGHN KEOWN: On whose?
DEPUTY ESTEP: Lynne Smith‘s, just east of Erick over there.
VAUGHN KEOWN: Yeah.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Yeah, hey there‘s a little trailer out there, a little V-nose white trailer . . .
VAUGHN KEOWN: Yeah
DEPUTY ESTEP: Hey, is that yours?
VAUGHN KEOWN: Umm . . . Now who is this?
DEPUTY ESTEP: This is John Larson. Can you hear me?
VAUGHN KEOWN: . . . I don‘t reckon I know you.
DEPUTY ESTEP: I‘m from over by Cordell, I just do some work for them, just kind of a salesman, but I saw that trailer out there, and they said, uh, you there?
VAUGHN KEOWN: Yeah, I‘m here. Are you interested in buying it or something?
DEPUTY ESTEP: No, nah, I was just out there the other day, and they said they didn‘t know whose it was, but they thought it might be yours, and I just was wondering if you were interested in selling that thing?
VAUGHN KEOWN: Um, I don‘t know. Actually, my son-in-law owns that. I can ask him.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. Who‘s your, is that, Laramie? They said it was either yours or Laramie‘s.
VAUGHN KEOWN: Really? Um, man you‘re breaking up something fierce.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Alright, hey, let me get to a better spot and I‘ll call you back.
Appellee‘s Suppl. App. vol. 1 at 00:10–00:12, 01:24–03:10.
Again using the “John Larson” alias, Deputy Estep called Hinkle to ask about the trailer:
LARAMIE HINKLE: Hello?
DEPUTY ESTEP: Is this Laramie?
LARAMIE HINKLE: Yes, it is.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Hey, Laramie, this is John Larson, I know ol’ Lynne Smith over there in Erick.
LARAMIE HINKLE: Yes, sir.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Hey, I was over there the other day and we were just kind of tooling around their property and saw a little V nose trailer out there, about a 16 footer.
LARAMIE HINKLE: Yes, sir.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Yeah, hey, they said it might be yours or your father-in-law‘s, I called your father-in-law, he said it was yours.
LARAMIE HINKLE: Right.
DEPUTY ESTEP: And I was wondering if you would be willing to sell that thing.
LARAMIE HINKLE: Well, let me tell you something, Mark -- I mean, John, let me call you right back, can I get a number from you, I‘m right in the middle of something here, and I need to try to take care of it, let me call you right back, okay, partner?
DEPUTY ESTEP: You there?
LARAMIE HINKLE: Yes, sir. Can I call you right back? I‘m right here in the middle something, I can‘t really -- let me call you right back, okay, partner?
Appellant‘s App. vol. 5 at 1105–06. About an hour later, at Deputy Estep‘s direction, Beckham County Deputy Brett Moore stopped Hinkle‘s automobile. And about fifteen minutes after that, Deputy Estep arrived and identified himself to Hinkle as the phone caller, “John Larson.” Deputy Estep read Hinkle the Miranda warning, obtained Hinkle‘s consent to record their conversation, and began questioning Hinkle about the trailer.
Hinkle immediately told Deputy Estep that he had understood “John Larson” to be asking about a different trailer on someone else‘s property:
DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. All right. Here‘s the deal, I called your father-in-law.
LARAMIE HINKLE: Yes.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Is that Vaughn?
LARAMIE HINKLE: Yes.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. I described the trailer to him.
LARAMIE HINKLE: Right.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Down there on Lynne‘s place.
LARAMIE HINKLE: Right, yes, sir.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. And he said you‘re the one that owned that trailer, okay?
LARAMIE HINKLE: Okay. All right.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Because I‘m the one that called and asked if somebody wanted to sell it.
LARAMIE HINKLE: Ok. Sure, sure, okay.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. I described the trailer to him.
LARAMIE HINKLE: Right.
DEPUTY ESTEP: That that V nose trailer that‘s down there.
LARAMIE HINKLE: Okay. Now, explain to me, you say V nose, explain to me what the --
DEPUTY ESTEP: Just a V.
LARAMIE HINKLE: I know, but is it a cargo trailer or what is it?
DEPUTY ESTEP: It‘s an enclosed trailer.
LARAMIE HINKLE: Okay. Enclosed trailer, now, that‘s the part I‘m trying to get across.
DEPUTY ESTEP: All right. All right. And I talked to him and described the trailer to him, he said you were the one that owned it.
LARAMIE HINKLE: Yes, sir.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. Then I called you, you know, kind of described it to you, asked you if you were the one that owned it, and you said yeah.
LARAMIE HINKLE: No, no, wait a minute now, I‘m thinking you were talking about a flatbed trailer that I had over here. I misunderstood.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. Well, I told you the one over at Lynn‘s house, I kind of described it to you on the -- I got it on recording.
LARAMIE HINKLE: Okay. Well, that‘s fine, if you got a recording, but I‘m telling you, I don‘t own an enclosed trailer, I own a flatbed trailer.
DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay.
LARAMIE HINKLE: I don‘t even own that, I own one trailer in South Carolina and have a flatbed over here at Ms. Branson‘s (ph) neighbors‘.
DEPUTY ESTEP: All right. Well, I‘m going based off what you said to me and what your father-in-law said to me, okay.
LARAMIE HINKLE: Okay.
Appellant‘s App. vol. 5 at 1218–20. Later at his deposition, Hinkle explained that his uncovered, flatbed, V-nosed trailer was located “a little over a quarter of a mile
After Hinkle told his side of the story, Deputy Estep and Hinkle called Keown and asked that he come discuss the matter. This time, Keown said that the covered trailer was a “family trailer,” that “we all bought it kind of together” from the Carpenter‘s Church, and that Hinkle “didn‘t have anything to do with it.” Appellee‘s Suppl. App. vol. 3 at 07:28–07:52. Keown said that he was thirty minutes away and would come meet with Deputy Estep and Hinkle.
Over the next three hours, Deputy Estep called Keown at least three times, with Keown reporting each time that he remained lost in the “Breaks.” Appellant‘s App. vol. 2 at 392, 477–78. Getting nowhere, Deputy Estep testified that he called Assistant District Attorney Gina Webb. After hearing Deputy Estep‘s account, Prosecutor Webb advised him that he had probable cause to arrest Hinkle.3 Without
In his opening brief, Hinkle asserts that Deputy Estep, in coordination with Sheriff Jay, framed and arrested him, solely for Hinkle‘s having supported Sheriff Jay‘s election opponent. Indeed, Hinkle claims that Sheriff Jay himself made the “decision to arrest Hinkle.” Appellant‘s Opening Br. 8. But the district court found that Sheriff Jay had played only a “passing role,” noting that Deputy Estep‘s investigation had begun when the Smiths—and not Sheriff Jay—called him. Appellant‘s App. vol. 6 at 1412. The court stated that Hinkle had provided “nothing beyond [his own] suspicions” to show that Deputy Estep had framed him at Sheriff Jay‘s prompting. Id. at 1412, 1415.
Hinkle testified that, after the arrest, a different officer transported him to the Beckham County Detention Center (BCDC), but left him out front so the officer could respond to a report of a fleeing suspect.4 After voluntarily entering the BCDC,
After the body-cavity strip search, Officer Atwood led Hinkle from the private dressing room and handcuffed him to a bench in the booking area. Captain Bilbo, who was “in charge of the jail,” testified that this meant that at this time, “they had not made a decision on where he was going to be housed.” Id. at 361, 367. About an hour later, “because [Hinkle] was the [former] police chief,” the sheriff‘s office transported Hinkle to the Elk City jail to avoid placing him in the BCDC‘s general population. Id. at 326.6 According to the Beckham County Board of County
B. The Case Unravels
On May 14, 2013, just four days after Hinkle‘s arrest, an agent working for Palmetto Insurance drafted a letter addressed “[t]o whom it may concern.” Appellant‘s App. vol. 5 at 1318 (capitalization removed). The letter began by verifying that on October 23, 2003, a trailer was stolen from the Carpenter‘s Church. But what the letter said next undid Deputy Estep‘s case. The letter advised that in 2003 the church had owned two Haulmark trailers, and that Palmetto Insurance had now realized that it had mixed the two VINs in processing the stolen-trailer paperwork. The news was dire—Palmetto Insurance had “mistakenly reported the wrong VIN# as stolen” and would “be processing a correction.” Id. The letter
On May 21, 2013, the Carpenter‘s Church drafted its own letter addressed “[t]o whom it may concern” “to verify that Vaughn Keown [i]s the rightful owner of the trailer [the trailer in Oklahoma that Deputy Estep had called about].” Appellant‘s App. vol. 3 at 708. The church‘s letter advised that Vaughn Keown had “purchased the trailer from The Carpenter‘s Church in November, 2008.” Id.7
Deputy Estep testified that about “two to three weeks” after Hinkle‘s arrest (so sometime between about May 24 to June 1, 2013), a Palmetto Insurance representative called him. Id. at 524. The representative told Deputy Estep that the VIN of the church‘s stolen trailer did not match the VIN of the Oklahoma trailer. Deputy Estep testified that he “contacted the D.A.‘s office immediately” after hearing about the “grave mistake.” Id. at 522. Prosecutor Webb testified to the contrary, saying that she never received a phone call from Deputy Estep informing her “that the trailer in question was not stolen[.]” Appellant‘s App. vol. 5 at 1150.
On May 31, 2013, Palmetto Insurance‘s representative faxed to Deputy Estep a 2013 supplemental report generated by the Anderson County Sheriff‘s Office
Deputy Estep testified that “on his way out” of the Beckham County Sheriff‘s Office (he resigned on July 8, 2013), he “explained to Sheriff Jay the situation[,] . . . told him where everything was,” and told him “that there was conclusive evidence” that Hinkle did not steal the trailer. See Appellant‘s App. vol. 5 at 1139–40. Faced with Deputy Estep‘s testimony that he had informed Sheriff Jay about Hinkle‘s innocence “as he was getting ready to leave the department,” Sheriff Jay testified that he could not “recall [having] any conversation with him.” Appellant‘s App. vol. 2 at 240–41. But Sheriff Jay also said that he was “not saying it didn‘t happen.” Id. at 240.
Furthermore, Sheriff Jay testified that he did not “recall ever seeing” Palmetto Insurance‘s letter before being deposed on August 14, 2017. Id. at 237. Similarly, he
Despite the exculpatory evidence from the church and its insurer, Prosecutor Webb and the district attorney‘s office delayed dismissing the case. According to Prosecutor Webb, Sheriff Jay had told her that either the insurance commission or the attorney general‘s office was investigating the Palmetto Insurance Agency for fraud. The specifics of any such fraud investigation are unclear. Prosecutor Webb testified that the investigation might have involved the Palmetto Insurance‘s representative who had spoken with Deputy Estep: “I kind of think that‘s the lady that they were investigating.” Appellant‘s App. vol. 5 at 1156. Prosecutor Webb could not remember whether she called “the insurance commission or the attorney general‘s office” in South Carolina about the investigation. Id. at 1160–62. But she recalled that a person from one of those offices told her that the investigation had run into “a dead end.” Id. at 1160. Soon after that conversation, the district attorney‘s office moved to dismiss the charges against Hinkle. And on September 12, 2013, the state district judge dismissed the case.
C. The Press Release
Sometime after Hinkle‘s arrest, the Beckham County Sheriff‘s Office posted a press release on its website,8 entitled “Former Police Officer Arrested for Possessing
Sheriff Jay testified that he reviewed all press releases before authorizing them to be posted on the Beckham County Sheriff‘s Office‘s website. After posting the press release, Sheriff Jay left it on the website for almost two years after the court dismissed Hinkle‘s charges. In fact, the sheriff never deleted the press release—it remained available to the public until a network crash destroyed all the office‘s press releases. Nor did Sheriff Jay ever issue a press release about the dismissal of Hinkle‘s charges.
Hinkle sued Sheriff Jay, Deputy Estep, and the County under
Hinkle alleged that Sheriff Jay, Deputy Estep, and the County had violated his
First, the district court dismissed the
Second, the district court dismissed Hinkle‘s
Third, the district court dismissed Hinkle‘s claim that the County, through Sheriff Jay, had implemented an unconstitutional policy requiring body-cavity strip searches of all detainees. Because the BCDC “did not have a true segregation option,” the district court ruled that the policy was lawful under Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012). Id. at 1425. The court also concluded that Officer Atwood did not violate Florence‘s touching exception by touching Hinkle‘s beard—an unclothed area of the body.
Fourth, the district court dismissed Hinkle‘s claim that Sheriff Jay and Deputy Estep had conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights. The court stated that “[f]or allegations of conspiracy to successfully constitute a
After dismissing Hinkle‘s federal claims, the district court turned to Hinkle‘s state-law claims. Under
On appeal, Hinkle challenges only whether the district court properly dismissed his federal claims. We have appellate jurisdiction under
DISCUSSION
I. The Qualified-Immunity Standard
Deputy Estep and Sheriff Jay successfully asserted qualified immunity against Hinkle‘s
Qualified immunity insulates “officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.‘” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). When “a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff.” Estate of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F.3d 1204, 1212–13 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001)). To meet that
Even though a plaintiff bears the burden of meeting these two prongs, a defendant moving for summary judgment “must [still] ‘show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.‘” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 411 (10th Cir. 2014)). And as always, when deciding whether summary judgment is proper, we “may not weigh evidence and must resolve genuine disputes of material fact in favor of the nonmoving party.” Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (per curiam)). In Tolan, the Court emphasized “the importance of drawing inferences in favor of the nonmovant” for both prongs of the qualified-immunity analysis. 572 U.S. at 657.
We can affirm the dismissal of Hinkle‘s claims against Sheriff Jay and Deputy Estep under either prong or both. See Donahue, 948 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1289 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. I.B. v. Woodard, 139 S. Ct. 2616 (2019)). Here, we rule that Hinkle has not met his summary-judgment burden to show a constitutional violation by Sheriff Jay or
II. Hinkle‘s Fourth Amendment False-Arrest Claim
Hinkle raises three primary arguments to support his claim that Deputy Estep arrested him without probable cause. First, he claims that Deputy Estep falsely claimed in his arrest affidavit that Hinkle had admitted owning the trailer suspected of being stolen, and he argues that this admission was necessary for probable cause. Second, Hinkle claims that even if Deputy Estep had probable cause that Hinkle was involved with a stolen trailer, Deputy Estep would still have lacked probable cause to arrest, because Oklahoma law requires that the property be recently stolen. Third, Hinkle claims that Deputy Estep lacked probable cause to arrest because the statute of limitations had run on each of his charges.
Probable cause is a concept “incapable of [a] precise definition or quantification into percentages.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). But an officer must have probable cause to obtain a warrant—the Constitution states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”
In reviewing “whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371). Such facts amount to probable cause “when [they] . . . are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1116 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 896 (10th Cir. 2004)). That belief must be anchored in a “substantial probability“—as opposed to “a bare suspicion“—that an offense took or
But probable cause “is not a high bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014) (citations omitted). Officers need “only the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013)). For that reason, in considering whether the government has shown probable cause to indict, grand juries need not hear the defendant‘s side of an argument, id. (citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992)), any cross-examination of the prosecution‘s witnesses, id. (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121–22 (1975)), or any exculpatory evidence, id. (citing Williams, 504 U.S. at 51)—a reasonably prudent person could find that the low bar of probable cause was met without technical analysis. Formulation of probable cause “does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121 (citation omitted). An officer‘s subjective state of mind is irrelevant to the probable-cause calculus because the crux of the inquiry is whether “the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the arrest].” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996)).
Though officers may not ignore evidence that would dissipate probable cause, not all new evidence does so. For instance, a soon-to-be arrestee‘s bare proclamations
B. Deputy Estep Had Probable Cause to Believe that Hinkle Was Involved in Crimes Connected to a Stolen Trailer.
Applying this framework, we agree with the district court that, at the time of Hinkle‘s warrantless arrest, Deputy Estep had probable cause that Hinkle had committed a crime. An objectively reasonable officer standing in Deputy Estep‘s place would have plentiful information from reputable sources to support a
As mentioned, Deputy Estep investigated for two weeks, obtaining incriminating information along the way from neutral, credible sources—the Smiths, the Carpenter‘s Church pastor, the Anderson County Sheriff‘s Office, and Palmetto Insurance. The reported VIN match alone furnished probable cause that the trailer was stolen.
Further, Deputy Estep had probable cause to attribute that crime to Hinkle. Both the Smiths and the pastor named Hinkle and Keown as men who might have the trailer, and Keown first stated that Hinkle owned the trailer. When Deputy Estep told Hinkle of Keown‘s statement, Hinkle did not protest, but just followed along by uttering “right.” Finally, after Deputy Estep later confronted Keown about his initial statement, Keown still described the trailer as a “family trailer.” And Hinkle was family—he was Keown‘s son-in-law.11
These facts gave Deputy Estep probable cause to believe that Hinkle had committed a crime. Indeed, Hinkle was charged with “conspiring and agreeing with Vaughn Keown to” knowingly conceal stolen property. Appellant‘s App. vol. 3 at 697. A criminal conspiracy takes two or more people, United States v. Keck, 643 F.3d789, 793 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir. 1992)), and Deputy Estep had a reasonable basis to believe that Keown and Hinkle were coconspirators. They were family members, they both had attended the Carpenter‘s Church in South Carolina, and they both were tied to the trailer by the Smiths and the pastor.
Accordingly, we conclude that Deputy Estep had probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed and that Hinkle was one of the people committing the crime.
C. Deputy Estep Had Probable Cause Even Without Hinkle‘s Confirmation of Ownership, and That Probable Cause Never Dissipated.
Hinkle asserts that “Estep . . . mischaracterize[d] Hinkle‘s statement of “Right” to be an affirmative statement of ownership.” Appellant‘s Opening Br. 27. He also claims that because “John Larson” did not clarify whether he was asking Hinkle about a covered trailer or a flatbed trailer, Hinkle‘s responding “right” was not a claim of ownership. Hinkle argues that “[w]ithout the “Right” there is nothing indicating Hinkle had any possession of the trailer.” Id. at 31.
We disagree. Even without Hinkle‘s utterance of “right,” the reported match of VINs gave Deputy Estep probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed. And even without “right,” Deputy Estep still had probable cause to believe that Hinkle had committed that crime because the Smiths, the pastor, and Keown had connected him to the trailer.
D. Recently Stolen Property Is Not an Element of Any of Hinkle‘s Charges.
Next, Hinkle argues that Deputy Estep lacked probable cause to arrest him because his suspected crimes required that the trailer have been recently stolen. Further, Hinkle disputes that “Estep . . . objectively establish[ed] that Hinkle had knowledge the trailer in question was stolen.” Appellant‘s Opening Br. 26–27 (citations omitted). He also claims that Deputy Estep made an unreasonable mistake of fact and that his mistake “cannot furnish probable cause.” Id. at 27 (citations omitted). We disagree.
The Information charged Hinkle with knowingly concealing stolen property, in violation of
Every person who buys or receives, in any manner, upon any consideration, any personal property of any value whatsoever that has been stolen, embezzled, obtained by false pretense or robbery, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe the same to have been stolen, embezzled, obtained by false pretense, or robbery, or who conceals, withholds, or aids in concealing or withholding such property from the owner, shall be guilty of a felony.
This statute does not require that the property be recently stolen. If Hinkle had received the trailer, believing that Keown had stolen it,12 or if Hinkle had aided Keown in concealing the trailer, he would have violated
In an attempt to write a recently-stolen element into the statute, Hinkle cites Jackson v. State, 508 P.2d 277, 279–80 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973), and Miller v. State, 481 P.2d 175, 178 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969), for the proposition that under
Hinkle also argues that Deputy Estep lacked probable cause that Hinkle knew the trailer was stolen. We agree with Hinkle that Deputy Estep needed to develop probable cause for each element of the offense. See Donahue, 948 F.3d at 1188 n.14 (“[A] court can “determin[e] whether an officer had probable cause to make an arrest for a violation of state law” by “applying the Fourth Amendment standard” to the “identif[ied] . . . elements of a crime, based on state law.“” (omission and second and
In this case, Deputy Estep relied on information he received from unbiased sources. That information led him to believe that Hinkle and his father-in-law had possessed the trailer. If that were true, Deputy Estep could reasonably have believed that Hinkle knew the trailer was stolen. And though the church and insurance
E. Because the Charges Were for Continuing Crimes, the Statute of Limitations Had Not Run.
Finally, Hinkle argues that a three-year statute of limitations applies to the suspected Oklahoma property and conspiracy crimes. See
Hinkle‘s argument rests on the mistaken position that the statute of limitations began to run when the Carpenter‘s Church reported the trailer as stolen. As a general rule, criminal statutes of limitations begin to run, at the earliest, when a wrongful act is completed, not when the victim later recounts the wrongful act to others. United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The limitations period will normally begin to run when a crime is “complete,” thereby “encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.“” (citation omitted)); 22A C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 596 (“[N]ormally a statute of limitation begins to run from the time the crime is complete . . . .“).
F. Because the False-Arrest Claim Against Deputy Estep Fails, Hinkle‘s Derivative False-Arrest Claims Against Sheriff Jay and the County Fail.
Hinkle claims that Sheriff Jay, as the County‘s “final policy maker” and Deputy Estep‘s supervisor, can be held liable for ratifying Hinkle‘s false arrest. Appellant‘s Opening Br. 19. To establish liability against a supervisor under
As for the County, Hinkle admits that “municipal liability under
III. Hinkle‘s First Amendment Retaliation Claim
We now turn to Hinkle‘s argument that Deputy Estep and Sheriff Jay retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights by supporting Sheriff Jay‘s opponent in the 2012 election. Hinkle must establish three elements to show First Amendment retaliation:
(1) that [he] was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the defendant[s‘] actions caused [him] to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that the defendant[s‘] adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to [his] exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.
Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Deputy Estep and Sheriff Jay concede that for purposes of summary judgment, “Hinkle‘s allegations . . . involving political support/association and suffrage [are] sufficient for the first element of “constitutionally protected activity.“” Appellees Scott Jay and Strider Estep‘s Response Br. 19. They also agree that “an arrest or the publication of a press release regarding that arrest could satisfy
Hinkle‘s First Amendment retaliation claim has two bases: (1) that Deputy Estep arrested him in retaliation for supporting Sheriff Jay‘s election opponent, and (2) that Sheriff Jay posted a false press release and sanctioned criminal charges against Hinkle for the same reason.16
A. Arrest
In addition to the three Worrell elements, a First Amendment retaliation claim based on a false arrest requires a separate “threshold showing“—generally, a plaintiff must show a false arrest. See Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019). Hinkle concedes that “[w]hen an unlawful arrest is at the heart of a First Amendment retaliation claim, such as here, a lack of probable cause must be shown.” Appellant‘s Opening Br. 32 (citation omitted). And in Nieves, the Supreme Court recently explained that “[t]he plaintiff pressing a retaliatory arrest claim must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the arrest.” 139 S. Ct. at 1724. The Nieves Court adopted this objective test of probable cause to avoid an unwelcome result of using an officer‘s subjective state of mind: “[a]ny inartful turn of phrase or perceived slight during a legitimate arrest could land an officer in years of litigation.” Id. at 1725. A subjective-mindset test could subject officers to suit despite an arrestee‘s legitimate
We have already concluded that Deputy Estep had probable cause to arrest Hinkle. So, under Nieves, Hinkle‘s retaliatory-arrest claim must fail. And though Nieves carves out a narrow exception—that probable cause will not defeat a retaliatory-arrest claim if the plaintiff could show that officers would usually not arrest under similar circumstances, id. at 1727, Hinkle has not argued that officers would forego arrests under his circumstances.17
B. Press Release
Hinkle also alleges that “Jay amped up the retaliation against Hinkle by overseeing the publication and dissemination of . . . false information through a Press Release detailing Hinkle‘s arrest.” Appellant‘s Opening Br. 35. As mentioned, Sheriff Jay has conceded that Hinkle established the first two Worrell elements for purposes of summary judgment; thus, the sole question before us is whether Sheriff Jay‘s “adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to [Hinkle‘s] exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.” Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1212 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The district court concluded that Hinkle had failed to demonstrate this was so. It noted that Hinkle had “not provided anything except suspicions and a
On appeal, Hinkle does little to contest the district court‘s analysis. Hinkle claims that Sheriff Jay must have been targeting him because an “alleged theft of a trailer going back 10 years is hardly a “high profile” crime spree deserving of being blasted out on the internet by the Sheriff via his website or to media at his direction.” Appellant‘s Opening Br. 38. He also asserts that “the Press Release and its impact cannot be construed in a vacuum. An inference of retaliation via the release is certainly stronger in this case where a false Press Release follows immediately on the heels [of] an arrest without probable cause.” Id. Finally, he argues that this court has “opened the door for consideration” of evidence regarding past instances where Sheriff Jay may have retaliated against other political opponents. Id. at 39.
We agree with Hinkle that we must consider surrounding circumstances in evaluating his retaliation claim. But doing so here shows an absence of retaliation:
Second, Hinkle‘s argument that this was not a high-profile matter fails to acknowledge his status as a former local police chief. Though the alleged crimes are not the most serious ones under Oklahoma law, an arrest of a former police chief is a high-profile arrest.
Finally, Hinkle alleges that in Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1537 (10th Cir. 1995), implicitly overruled on other grounds by Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 916 (10th Cir. 2001), this court “opened the door” for Hinkle to show that Sheriff Jay‘s alleged retaliation against others supports his claim that Sheriff Jay retaliated against him as part of a larger pattern of harassing political adversaries. Appellant‘s Opening Br. 38–39. Gehl Group does not support that assertion. In Gehl Group, the plaintiffs—two chapters of the Fraternal Order of Police, their solicitation agent, and their regional manager—argued that certain law-enforcement officials and other local officials “filed baseless criminal charges against them and selectively and vindictively prosecuted them” because they were “soliciting charitable contributions
Likewise, here, Hinkle was arrested once, his arrest was supported by probable cause, and the press release merely reported the details of that lawful arrest. So Gehl Group does not support Hinkle‘s argument—it undermines it. Nor does it support Hinkle‘s argument that other instances of Sheriff Jay‘s possible retaliation against others was evidence that he retaliated against Hinkle. See id. (considering whether the defendants had treated other groups “in a different manner” to determine if they had “singled [the plaintiffs] out for prosecution“).
C. Monell Liability
The district court dismissed Hinkle‘s First Amendment retaliation claim against the County because it had already ruled that Sheriff Jay and Deputy Estep had not violated Hinkle‘s First Amendment rights. See Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, 239 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he City cannot be held liable where, as here, the officers did not commit a constitutional violation.“). Because neither Sheriff Jay nor Deputy Estep violated Hinkle‘s First Amendment rights, the district court properly dismissed Hinkle‘s First Amendment claim against the County.
Hinkle argues that he has also raised a “defamation plus” claim based on the press release and Sheriff Jay‘s “sanction[ing] of criminal charges.” Appellant‘s Opening Br. at 35–36 (capitalization and emphasis removed). Hinkle alleges that, even though his “defamation plus claim was briefed, it was not analyzed by the district court.” Id. at 36. We do not fault the district court for not considering this claim, because Hinkle‘s briefing—both here and in the district court—overlays his First Amendment retaliation analysis with his Fourteenth Amendment stigma-plus analysis.19 But those analyzes are distinct. See, e.g., Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515, 521 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that First Amendment retaliation cases differ from defamation cases under the Fourteenth Amendment). Unlike First Amendment retaliation claims, Fourteenth Amendment stigma-plus claims require a plaintiff to prove “that the government has violated the Due Process Clause by damaging its reputation.” Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Kan. Dep‘t of Transp., 810 F.3d 1161, 1184 (10th Cir. 2016). Thus, the stigma-plus doctrine exists within the procedural-due-process framework. See Al-Turki v. Tomsic, 926 F.3d 610, 614, 617 (10th Cir. 2019). And courts “ask two questions” when considering procedural-
In the stigma-plus context, we have recently provided guidance on what a plaintiff must show to satisfy the first element—i.e., a deprivation of a protected property or liberty interest. In Al-Turki, 926 F.3d at 617, we said that “[w]hat is needed in addition to stigma . . . is some change in legal status.” That “change in status must be ‘significant[].’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976)). We ruled that to satisfy the first procedural-due-process element through stigma, plaintiffs must meet two sub-elements: “that (1) the government made a false statement about [the plaintiff] . . . that was sufficiently derogatory to injure his reputation, and that (2) [the plaintiff] experienced a governmentally imposed burden that significantly altered his status as a matter of state law.” Id. at 618 (alterations and omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1224 (10th Cir. 2004)). As actions sufficient to satisfy the second sub-element, we have included “the state’s taking away the right to operate a vehicle or revoking parole.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1167 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 711). And in Gwinn, we concluded that a plaintiff had satisfied the “‘stigma-plus’ standard” by alleging that the government had falsely labeled him as a sex offender and further required him “to register as a sex offender.” 354 F.3d at 1224 (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 710–11). Registration as a sex offender is “a governmentally imposed burden that ‘significantly altered [his] . . . status as a matter of state law.’” Id. (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Paul, 424 U.S. at 710–11).
Even if we were to conclude that Sheriff Jay defamed Hinkle, Hinkle would still need to satisfy the second sub-element: that he suffered a “governmentally imposed burden that significantly altered his status as a matter of state law.” Al-Turki, 926 F.3d at 618 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In his opening brief, Hinkle states that “the press release was false, and it was coupled with the imminent sanction of Hinkle being subjected to criminal charges.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 36 (some capitalization removed). Hinkle argues that the collateral hardships defendants face during criminal trials—“humiliation, damage to reputation and a concomitant harm to future employment practices”—are similar to those he faced from having the press release posted on the Beckham County Sheriff’s Office’s website. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, as we understand him, Hinkle argues that his “governmentally imposed burden” was humiliation, an injured reputation, and difficulty obtaining future employment.20
V. Hinkle’s Civil-Conspiracy Claim
Hinkle argues not only that his constitutional rights were violated, but that they were violated through a conspiracy. Specifically, Hinkle asserts that “Jay and Estep, acting in concert, accomplished the impermissible goal of unlawfully arresting
For a valid
VI. Hinkle’s Fourth Amendment Strip-Search Claim21
We next address whether Hinkle’s body-cavity strip search was reasonable under the
A. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders
In 2005, Albert Florence was stopped by a New Jersey state trooper. Florence, 566 U.S. at 323. During the stop, the trooper learned of an outstanding 2003 bench warrant. Unknown to the trooper, the warrant had mistakenly remained active in a law-enforcement database despite Florence’s having paid the underlying fine. Id. The trooper arrested Florence and took him to the Burlington County Detention Center, where “every arrestee” was required “to shower with a delousing agent.” Id. Per the jail’s policy, as arrestees showered, officers checked their bodies “for scars, marks, gang tattoos, and contraband[.]” Id. After being subjected to this procedure, Florence was “instructed to open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn around, and lift his genitals.” Id. At Burlington, Florence “shared a cell with at least one other person and interacted with other inmates following his admission to the jail.” Id.
After six days in the Burlington County jail, Florence was transferred to the Essex County Correctional Facility, where “all arriving detainees passed through a metal detector and waited in a group holding cell for a more thorough search.” Id. at 324. During that second search, detention officers examined each detainee’s “ears, nose, mouth, hair, scalp, fingers, hands, arms, armpits, and other body openings.” Id. To search “other body openings,” the detention officers required Florence “to lift his genitals, turn around, and cough in a squatting position as part of the process.” Id.
Florence sued under
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reciting the overarching principle that “[c]orrectional officials have a significant interest in conducting a thorough search as a standard part of the intake process.” Id. at 330. The Court derived this interest from at least four concerns: (1) the possibility that new detainees will bring
In view of these concerns, the Court declared that “courts must defer to the judgment of correctional officials unless the record contains substantial evidence showing their policies are an unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail security.” Id. at 332–33. In other words, because prison officials have certain expertise that judges lack, the Court stressed that the judiciary must give prison officials considerable discretion before disturbing their policies. Id. at 326. This means that “a regulation impinging on an inmate’s constitutional rights must be upheld if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Only when plaintiffs show “substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to [legitimate security interests]” should courts refuse to defer to prisons. Id. at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584–85 (1984); then quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979)).
Thus, the Court ruled against Florence and concluded that he had suffered no constitutional deprivation. Id. at 339–40. By sanctioning the policies at the Burlington County Detention Center and the Essex County Correctional Facility, the Court followed the course it set in Bell, 441 U.S. 520. In Bell, the Court upheld indiscriminate strip-search practices requiring all Metropolitan Correctional Center inmates to undergo body-cavity searches after their contact visits with outsiders,
In applying Florence, we must remember (1) that Florence was arrested on a bench warrant, and (2) that the Court recognized that judicial deference to strip searches might well lessen in other circumstances.25 In light of these factors, the Court recognized that Florence extends only so far. For instance, in Part IV of the opinion (joined by three other Justices), Justice Kennedy identified possible future exceptions from the Court’s ruling. 566 U.S. at 338–39.26 First, he acknowledged that “[t]his case does not require the Court to rule on the types of searches that would be
Second, Justice Alito considered it important “that the Court does not hold that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee whose detention has not been reviewed by a judicial officer and who could be held in available facilities apart from the general population.” Id. at 341 (Alito, J., concurring). He then emphasized that “[t]he Court does not address whether it is always reasonable, without regard to the offense or the reason for detention, to strip search an arrestee before the arrestee’s detention has been reviewed by a judicial officer.” Id. at 342.29
B. Florence Does Not Sanction the County’s Policy of Body-Cavity Strip Searching All Detainees Before Deciding Whether Particular Detainees “Will Be” Housed in the Jail’s General Population.
Sheriff Jay testified that he was “the final policy maker for the sheriff’s department” and that the County’s policy was to body-cavity strip search every detainee arriving at its jail. Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 218–19; id. at 284 (“By policy, everyone that’s booked into the Beckham County Jail is strip searched.”).30 Sheriff Jay had authority to implement this policy because, as he explained, “everybody in Beckham County Sheriff’s Department answers to [him]” and “the buck stops with [him].” Id. at 218. And the record demonstrates that the jailers enforced the County’s policy.
Further, Captain Diana Bilbo, “the captain in charge of the jail,” testified that she never had occasion to “discipline Jason Atwood for the way that he conducted a strip search[.]” Id. at 361, 370. When asked whether “the standard operating procedure was to strip search everybody [who] came in,” Captain Bilbo said, “Yes.” Id. at 365.33 Corroborating Officer Atwood’s testimony that jailers would not know a detainee’s charges or personal information before the strip search (and by extension, would be unable to determine a detainee’s housing designation), Captain Bilbo noted that it was “consistent with [her] experience” that arresting officers would not provide to jailers a completed custody-authorization form until after the strip search. Appellant’s App. vol. 4 at 912.
In strip searching Hinkle, the BCDC’s jailers enforced this policy. Hinkle testified that on self-reporting to the jail, he was immediately strip searched, was booked, and was handcuffed to a bench in the booking area for about an hour until being transported to the Elk City jail. When questioned about why Hinkle was handcuffed to the bench and “what may have been taking place,” Captain Bilbo explained that as arising from their not yet having “made a decision on where he was going to be housed.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 367.35 The County confirms that “at the time [Hinkle] was strip searched, there had been no determination made regarding how [Hinkle] was going to be classified or where he would be housed.” Appellee Beckham Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs Resp. Br. 4.
We would reject any argument that the County—for administrative convenience—could treat all its incoming detainees as bound for its jail’s general population, thus allowing universal strip searches.38 Body-cavity strip searches are not so trivial. And had the County tried to claim that before the strip search it had
If we were to accept the County’s argument and conclude that Florence permits jail policies by which detainees are first strip searched and later sorted out for jail-housing placement, we would render Florence’s general-population condition meaningless. Florence does not sanction such a policy—strip searching detainees not destined for the jail’s general population, or even as here, for the jail itself. See Fonder v. Sheriff of Kankakee Cty., 823 F.3d 1144, 1146 (7th Cir. 2016) (concluding that under Florence, two class-action plaintiffs “ha[d] good claims that their rights have been violated” if they had been “arrested, strip searched, and then immediately released”). We therefore conclude that Florence does not protect the County’s policy.40
1. Hinkle’s strip search was unreasonable.
Having concluded that Florence does not authorize the County’s strip-search policy, we must still decide whether Hinkle suffered an unreasonable search under the
But because the jail officials never decided that Hinkle “will be” housed at the county jail, no one had any reason to fear that Hinkle might have secreted contraband that he could take into the jail’s general population. In this circumstance, even our pre-Florence cases do not apply—they too concerned the problem of detainees taking contraband into the general population. But for detainees like Hinkle who will not be housed in the jail’s general population, the County needs far more to justify a body-cavity strip search—probable cause that detainee is secreting evidence of a crime. See Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1447–49 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that outside of the “jail context,” detainees “may only be subjected to [body-cavity searches] if
2. Monell Liability
Before the County can be held liable for Hinkle‘s unlawful strip search, Hinkle must show that by enforcing the County‘s policy an employee caused the Fourth Amendment violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (noting that the policy or custom must be the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Specifically, Hinkle “must prove ‘(1) official policy or custom[,] (2) causation, and (3) state of mind.‘” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 998 (10th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep‘t, 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013)).
We have recognized as policies meeting this standard those arising from “a formal regulation or policy statement, an informal custom that amounts to a widespread practice, decisions of municipal employees with final policymaking authority, ratification by final policymakers of the decisions of subordinates to whom authority was delegated, and the deliberately indifferent failure to adequately train or supervise employees.” Pyle v. Woods, 874 F.3d 1257, 1266 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing
For the causation and state-of-mind elements, Hinkle can satisfy his burden by demonstrating that the County‘s policy is facially unlawful. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen an official municipal policy itself violates federal law, issues of culpability and causation are straightforward; simply proving the existence of the unlawful policy puts an end to the question.” (citation omitted)). The Court has explained that “[w]here a plaintiff claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so, resolving these issues of fault and causation is straightforward.” Bd. of Cty. Comm‘rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). A county‘s sanctioning of a facially unlawful policy establishes that it “was the moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff complains.” Id. at 405; see also Burge v. St. Tammany Par., 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Where an official policy or practice is unconstitutional on its face, it necessarily follows that a policymaker was not only aware of the specific policy, but was also aware that a constitutional violation will most likely occur.“). Further,
Thus, the next issue is whether the County‘s policy is facially unconstitutional. “A facial challenge is really just a claim that the law or policy at issue is unconstitutional in all its applications.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1127 (2019).44 Apart from its failed Florence argument, the County advances no argument denying that the policy is unconstitutional in all its applications. Under Florence, jail officials must decide that a detainee “will be” housed in the general population before strip searching him or her. And here, the County‘s strip-search policy permits strip searches before the key moment in which the jail official with authority decides that the detainee “will be” housed in the general population. So in enforcing the County‘s strip-search policy, jail officials strip search all detainees before reaching the operative decision of whether the detainee will be housed in the general population. For these reasons, we conclude that the County‘s strip-search policy is
Moreover, even if the County‘s policy were facially constitutional, Hinkle would still satisfy the causation and state-of-mind elements. For causation, we have explained that “the challenged policy or practice must be ‘closely related to the violation of the plaintiff‘s federally protected right.‘” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770 (quoting Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation Claims & Defenses, § 7.12[B] (2013)). This requires “a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 404. When a policy is facially constitutional, the burden of establishing causation (and culpability) is heavy. Id. at 405 (“Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee.” (citations omitted)).
Hinkle meets that heavy burden. By the terms of the County‘s policy, “[j]ailers strip searched incoming inmates at the very beginning of the booking process, before sitting down at the desk to begin the booking paperwork and before knowing where the inmate would be housed.” Appellee Beckham Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm‘rs Resp. Br. 4–5. Thus, the County‘s policy directs jailers to immediately strip search the detainees. By enforcing the policy, Officer Atwood caused Hinkle‘s unlawful strip search. Because the jail transported Hinkle to Elk City for detention, Hinkle obviously could not have smuggled contraband into the BCDC‘s general population.
Finally, “a plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a plaintiff‘s rights must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious consequences.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 407 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388). We have explained that “[t]he deliberate indifference standard may be satisfied when the municipality has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm.” Waller v. City & Cty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307). While typically notice is “established by proving the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct,” it can also be established “in a narrow range of circumstances where a violation of federal rights is a highly predictable or plainly obvious consequence of a municipality‘s action or inaction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307–08).
For instance, in Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 845 (10th Cir. 1997), this court concluded that a plaintiff‘s claim came “within the ‘narrow range of circumstances’ recognized by Canton and left intact by Brown, under which a single violation of federal rights may be a highly predictable consequence [of a
Likewise, the County‘s policy here reflects a deliberate indifference to the obvious consequences of its decision to strip search all detainees before making final housing assignments. Proceeding as if all inmates will be housed in the general population of the jail overlooks the reality that some detainees will not be placed in the jail‘s general population—for example, former local police chiefs. Yet the County strip searches all detainees, ignoring that any number of reasons might necessitate that a particular detainee be segregated. Accordingly, even though Hinkle has not pointed out a pattern of tortious conduct, we conclude that this case falls within the “narrow range of circumstances” in which it was “plainly obvious” that the County‘s policy of strip searching all detainees would result in a detainee being needlessly body-cavity strip searched.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment against Hinkle‘s
18-6202, Hinkle v. Beckham County Board of Commissioners
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
06/22/2020
TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, dissenting in part.
I disagree with the majority opinion‘s conclusion that a reasonably objective police officer would believe that probable cause existed to make a warrantless arrest of Mr. Hinkle. Even if probable cause arguably existed at some point during the investigation, I would conclude it dissipated upon Deputy Estep‘s pre-arrest exchanges with Mr. Hinkle and Mr. Keown, which established the latter owned the suspect trailer.
The majority opinion sets forth the series of compounding errors that gave rise to the arrest. Had Deputy Estep arrested Mr. Hinkle immediately upon their first face-to-face contact, it would have been a closer call. But Deputy Estep continued his investigation after having Mr. Hinkle detained at a traffic stop. At that point, he began an interview with Mr. Hinkle and, eventually, Mr. Keown. During these conversations, new information came to light—information that, in my view, dissipated the factual basis for Mr. Hinkle‘s warrantless arrest and demanded additional investigation.
We have observed that “probable cause becomes stale when new information received by the police nullifies information critical to the earlier probable cause determination.” United States v. Dalton, 918 F.3d 1117, 1128 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing Wayne Lafave, Search and Seizure § 4.7(a) at 822 (5th ed. 2012)); see also Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1988) (police “may not disregard facts tending to dissipate probable cause” in making arrests). I conclude the discussions between Deputy Estep, Mr. Hinkle, and Mr. Keown dissipated probable cause for Mr. Hinkle‘s arrest and compelled Deputy Estep to undertake further investigation.
At the very least, I would conclude these developments undermined a reasonable belief that probable cause existed, and created an obligation to investigate Mr. Hinkle‘s involvement more thoroughly before placing him under arrest. An objectively reasonable officer would have interviewed Mr. Keown or sought information regarding title and
I accordingly part ways with the majority opinion and conclude that Deputy Estep violated Mr. Hinkle‘s Fourth Amendment rights in deciding to arrest him subsequent to this exchange.
I also disagree with the majority‘s reversal of the strip search claim. For the reasons set forth by the district court I would affirm. The record shows that Mr. Hinkle would be placed in close proximity with other detainees and jail employees during the intake process, justifying a search for weapons or contraband.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.