OPINION
The appellant, Ronald Eugene Hainey, was convicted of Concealing Stolen Property After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies, in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CRF-82-3400. Appellant was sentenced to thirty (30) years imprisonment. We affirm.
On June 11, 1982, an antique shop in Edmond was burglarized and merchandise totaling Six Thousand ($6,000) Dollars was stolen. Twelve days later, the operator of another аntique shop, located in a shopping mall in Oklahoma City, purchased several of the missing items from a man calling himself Tommy Crawford. The appellant was later identified as the seller. When it was discovered that the items had been stolen, the police asked the shop operator to arrange for the purchase of additional goods. The appellant had given his correct address and telephone number when he made the sale. The purchase was arranged, and the appellant returned to the shop with a pair of antique scales. The scales were not a part of the stolen merchandise. The police had intended to make an arrest when the sale was completed, but did not because of the presence of several unexpectеd customers in the shop. In order to insure the safety of the customers, they allowed the appellant to exit into the mall area. The officers testified that although they were dressed in plain clothes, they believed the appellant spotted them when he left the shop and attempted to evade them by walking rapidly through the mall. The officers actually did lose sight of the appellant аnd finally arrested him when he returned to his vehicle. The arrest was witnessed by the appellant's wife, who had been waiting for him in the car. After he was arrested, the appellant spontaneously told an officer that the scales were not stolen.
At trial, the appellant’s wife testified that the appellant found the stolen items in a pillowcase at a dump located southeast of Edmond. She stated that they frequently went to the dump to look for firewood and abandoned property. A friend of the appellant’s wife testified that she had been with the appellant and his wife when the property was located. The friend and another witness also testified that the appellant had subsequently asked them to check the newspapers for reports or advertisements of stolen antiquеs. Finally, an attorney testified that he had reluctantly accompa *149 nied the appellant and his wife back to the dump in the latter part of July to look for more of the stolen merchandise. He stated that after about an hour of searching, the appellant found a second pillowcase full of antiques which had been stolen in the burglary.
I.
In his first assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to deliver an instruction concerning his theory of defense. Appellant claimed that he had found the antiques at the dump, had no reason to believe that they were stolen, and therefore, had no intent to withhold them from their true owner.
We first note that appellant neither objected to the trial court’s instructions nor requested any instructions of his own. In suсh circumstances, this Court has consistently held that a conviction will not be reversed unless the record demonstrates that the failure to instruct has deprived the defendant of a substantial right.
Wolf v. State,
In this case, the appellant was given the opportunity to present evidence regarding his defense; he was not restricted in his argument to the jury; and all of the trial court’s instructions correctly stated the law. In addition, thе instructions specifically informed the jury that the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knew or reasonably should have known that the property was stolen and that he intended to permanently deprive the owner of possession. Since the jury was fully apprised of the appellant’s claim, and since the trial court’s instructions contained thе substance of the appellant’s defense, we find that the failure to issue a special instruction sua sponte did not deprive the appellant of a fundamental right.
II.
A.
In his second assignment of error, appellant first contends that the trial court committed reversible error by issuing an instruction on flight. Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to justify an instruction, and that his alleged flight from the officers at the shopping mall was too remote to be conneсted to the earlier sale of the stolen antiques.
The record reveals, however, that two experienced police officers were of the opinion that the appellant was attempting to elude them, and in fact, did elude them temporarily. The appellant’s conduct in the mall could be interpreted as an attempt to avoid arrest. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to submit the issue to the jury.
Farrar v. State,
As to the question of the connection to the original sale, we note that the appellant was not charged with selling the antiques; he was charged with concealing stolen property. Concealing stolen property is a continuing offense. Therefore, we hold that when an accused who is charged with concealing stolen property sells some оf the stolen goods, later returns to the place of sale to conduct another transaction, and then takes evasive action to avoid an arrest in connection with the concealment, an instruction on flight is not error.
B.
Appellant also contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to define the term “flight” in the jury instructions.
See Wilson v. State,
C.
Appellant further contends that the trial judge committed error when he failed to determine on the record that the probative value of the flight evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect. However, appellant failed to object to the admission of the evidence, and thus waived any alleged error. See 12 O.S.1981, § 2104.
D.
Finally, appellant argues that he was entitled to an instruction telling the jury that they must consider any explanation of a defense witness regarding the alleged flight. Wilson, supra. Again, appellant failed to request such an instruction. Furthermore, the witness, appellant’s wife, did not see any of the evasive conduct inside the shopping mall, but merely observed the appellant walking toward the car outside the mall. Accordingly, the witness offered nо explanation for the flight, and an instruction was not appropriate.
III.
In his third assignment of error, appellant contends that his right to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel was prejudiced when the trial judge increased his bond during trial. We disagree.
The determination of bail lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not interfere absent manifest abuse.
Bowman v. State,
In this case, the trial judge had heard the prosecutor’s opening statement and part of the evidence connecting the appellant to the crime. In addition, the appellant was a repeat offender who was facing a minimum sentence of twenty years in prison. Under the circumstances, the trial judge believed that a $2,500 bond was insufficient to insure that the appellant would continue to appear for trial. Furthermore, the appellant suffered no apparent prejudice because all possible precautions were taken to avoid alerting thé jury, and his attorney was guaranteed full access for consultation. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
IV.
In his fourth assignment of error, appellant contends that he was denied his right to a fair trial because the State introduced evidence of other crimes without giving him the notice required by this Court’s decision in
Burks v. State,
The testimony, however, did not indicate that the appellant had committed the burglary of the antique shop, or that he had concealed the antiques discovered after his arrest. The appellant was not accused of committing either crime. Accordingly, none of the testimony relating to those incidents constituted evidence connecting appellant to another crime.
On the other hand, the testimony relating to the sale of the other stolen item indicated that the appellant may have been guilty of concealing it as well. Since the appellant was not charged with concealing that item, he argues that the testimony was improper. However, the additional antique and the antiques which the appellant was charged with concealing were stolen in the same burglary, and the appellant claimed to have found them together at the *151 dump. Therefore, while it would have been the better practice to have charged the appellant with concealing the additional item, or to have given him notice of the State’s intent to use the evidence, we cannot say that the failure to do so constituted reversible error.
This Court addressed a similar issue in
Byrne v. State,
Y.
Appellant next contends that the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to deliver a cautionary instruction concerning the other crimes evidence. Appellant must claim fundamental error because he failed to object to the lack of instruction.
Lipe v. State,
VI.
In his sixth assignment of error, appellant contends that he was denied due process and equal protection of law because the State refused to honor a plea bargain, and forced him to trial solely because of his inability to make timely restitution. The appellant attempts to analogize his situation to that of an indigent defendant who is jailed because of a failure to pay a fine.
Cf. Morris v. Schoonfield,
This Court has previously held that the State is not required to plea bargain.
Gray v. State,
VII.
In his seventh assignment, appellant contends that the State prejudiced his right to a fair trial by improperly impeaching two defense witnesses and by making improper comments relating to the impeachments during final argument. We disagree.
*152 A.
First, appellant argues that the State improperly impeached his wife’s testimony by eliciting the fact that she had suffered a conviction which was more than ten years old at the time.
See
12 O.S.1981, § 2609(B). We first note that appellant failed to object to the testimony, and thus did not properly preserve the issue for appellate review.
Anderson v. State,
Appellant also claims that the State improperly argued that his wife testified as she did in order to save the appellant a prison term because “[s]he’s been up the river before. She knows what it’s all about.” Appellant asserts that there was no proof that his wife had been in prison as was implied by the comment. However, when the appellant objected to the comment at trial, the judge stated before the jury that the comment related only to the conviction, and was not improper. We agree that, so limited, the comment was based on evidence in the record.
B.
Next, appellant argues that a defense witness who confirmed his story about having found the stolen property at the dump was improperly badgered about a former conviction because she stated that the conviction was for “bogus checks” rather than the correct charge of uttering a forged instrument. In this instance, however, the record indicates that the prosecutor was merely bringing out the actual crime for which the witness had been convicted, and that any badgering was a result of the witness being somewhat argumentative as to the nature of the crime. The actual charge was important because the jury could have interpreted “bogus checks” to mean that the witness had written a check with insufficient funds to pay instead of the true charge of uttering a totally forged instrument. The latter charge is more indicative of a lack of honesty and testimonial credibility.
Finally, the appellant complains that the prosecutor acted improperly when he sarcastically asked the witness when it was that she had gone to the police or the district attorney to tell them that the appellant had found the property at the dump. Once again, however, the appellant waived any error by failing to object.
See
VIII.
In his eighth assignment of error, appellant contends that he was denied his right to fair trial because of improper prosecuto-rial comment during both stages of final argument. We disagree.
We first note that appellant failed to object to any of the alleged improper comments. A failure to object waives all but fundamental error.
Langdell v. State,
IX.
Appellant next contends that the trial court’s second stage instructions were fun *153 damentally inadequate and unfair in violation of his right to due process. Specifically, appellant complains that the trial court failed to submit instructions or verdict forms informing the jury of thе minimum sentence for Concealing Stolen Property without former conviction of a felony.
In this case, however, the appellant stipulated to the existence and propriety of his former convictions. In
Jones v. State,
X.
In his tenth assignment of error, appellant contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at trial. He objects to the fact that his attorney waived arraignment on his pri- or convictions, failed to require strict proof of the convictions at preliminary hearing, stiрulated to the convictions at trial, and failed to object to the conviction instructions and verdict forms. He also complains about counsel’s failure to object to the State’s improper closing argument.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.
Strickland v. Washington,
XI.
Finally, appellant contends that his enhanced punishment was excessive because the “after former” language contained on the face of the judgment and sentences of his prior convictions implied that he had committed additional crimes and because of the cumulative effect of all of the alleged errors which occurred during trial. We disagree.
As to appellant’s "after former” argument, this Court previously rejected an almost identical claim and held that the use of such judgment and sentences is not improper.
Louder v. State,
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.