136 S. Ct. 305 | SCOTUS | 2015
Lead Opinion
On the night of March 23, 2010, Sergeant Randy Baker of the Tulia, Texas Police Department followed Israel Leija, Jr., to a drive-in restaurant, with a warrant for his arrest.
Leija entered the interstate and led the officers on an 18-minute chase at speeds between 85 and 110 miles per hour. Ibid . Twice during the chase, Leija called the Tulia Police dispatcher, claiming to have a gun and threatening to shoot at police officers if they did not abandon their pursuit. The dispatcher relayed Leija's threats, together with a report that Leija might be intoxicated, to all concerned officers.
As Baker and Rodriguez maintained their pursuit, other law enforcement officers set up tire spikes at three locations. Officer Troy Ducheneaux of the Canyon Police Department manned the spike strip at the first location Leija was expected to reach, beneath the overpass at Cemetery Road. Ducheneaux and the other officers had received training on the deployment of spike strips, including on how to take a defensive position so as to minimize the risk posed by the passing driver. Ibid .
DPS Trooper Chadrin Mullenix also responded. He drove to the Cemetery Road overpass, initially intending to set up a spike strip there. Upon learning of the other spike strip positions, however, Mullenix began to consider another tactic: shooting at Leija's car in order to disable it.
As Mullenix waited for Leija to arrive, he and another officer, Randall County Sheriff's Deputy Tom Shipman, discussed whether Mullenix's plan would work and how and where to shoot the vehicle to best carry it out.
Approximately three minutes after Mullenix took up his shooting position, he spotted Leija's vehicle, with Rodriguez in pursuit. As Leija approached the overpass, Mullenix fired six shots. Leija's car continued forward beneath the overpass, where it engaged the spike strip, hit the median, and rolled two and a half times. It was later determined that Leija had been killed by Mullenix's shots, four of which struck his upper body. There was no evidence that any of Mullenix's shots hit the car's radiator, hood, or engine block.
Respondents sued Mullenix under Rev. Stat. § 1979,
Mullenix appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Judge King dissented. She described the " 'fact issue' referenced by the majority" as "simply a restatement of the objective reasonableness test that applies to Fourth Amendment excessive force claims," which, she noted, the Supreme Court has held " 'is a pure question of law.' "
*308Mullenix sought rehearing en banc before the Fifth Circuit, but the court denied his petition. Judge Jolly dissented, joined by six other members of the court. Judge King, who joined Judge Jolly's dissent, also filed a separate dissent of her own.
We address only the qualified immunity question, not whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation in the first place, and now reverse.
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct " 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Pearson v. Callahan,
"We have repeatedly told courts ... not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality." al-Kidd,
In this case, the Fifth Circuit held that Mullenix violated the clearly established rule that a police officer may not " 'use deadly force against a fleeing felon who does not pose a sufficient threat of *309harm to the officer or others.' "
Anderson v. Creighton,
In this case, Mullenix confronted a reportedly intoxicated fugitive, set on avoiding capture through high-speed vehicular flight, who twice during his flight had threatened to shoot police officers, and who was moments away from encountering an officer at Cemetery Road. The relevant inquiry is whether existing precedent placed the conclusion that Mullenix acted unreasonably in these circumstances "beyond debate." al-Kidd, supra, at 741,
Far from clarifying the issue, excessive force cases involving car chases reveal the hazy legal backdrop against which Mullenix acted. In Brosseau itself, the Court held that an officer did not violate clearly established law when she shot a fleeing suspect out of fear that he endangered "other officers on foot who [she] believed *310were in the immediate area," "the occupied vehicles in [his] path," and "any other citizens who might be in the area."
This Court has considered excessive force claims in connection with high-speed chases on only two occasions since Brosseau . In Scott v. Harris,
The dissent focuses on the availability of spike strips as an alternative means of terminating the chase. It argues that even if Leija posed a threat sufficient to justify deadly force in some circumstances, Mullenix nevertheless contravened clearly established law because he did not wait to see if the spike strips would work before taking action. Spike strips, however, present dangers of their own, not only to drivers who encounter them at speeds between 85 and 110 miles per hour, but also to officers manning them. See, e.g., Thompson v. Mercer,
Even so, the dissent argues, there was no governmental interest that justified acting before Leija's car hit the spikes. Mullenix explained, however, that he feared Leija might attempt to shoot at or run over the officers manning the spike strips. Mullenix also feared that even if Leija hit the spike strips, he might still be able to continue driving in the direction of other officers. The dissent ignores these interests by suggesting that there was no "possible *311marginal gain in shooting at the car over using the spike strips already in place." Post, at 315 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). In fact, Mullenix hoped his actions would stop the car in a manner that avoided the risks to other officers and other drivers that relying on spike strips would entail. The dissent disputes the merits of the options available to Mullenix, post, at 314 - 315, but others with more experience analyze the issues differently. See, e.g., Brief for National Association of Police Organizations et al. as Amici Curiae 15-16. Ultimately, whatever can be said of the wisdom of Mullenix's choice, this Court's precedents do not place the conclusion that he acted unreasonably in these circumstances "beyond debate." al-Kidd,
More fundamentally, the dissent repeats the Fifth Circuit's error. It defines the qualified immunity inquiry at a high level of generality-whether any governmental interest justified choosing one tactic over another-and then fails to consider that question in "the specific context of the case." Brosseau v. Haugen,
Cases decided by the lower courts since Brosseau likewise have not clearly established that deadly force is inappropriate in response to conduct like Leija's. The Fifth Circuit here principally relied on its own decision in Lytle v. Bexar County,
Cases that the Fifth Circuit ignored also suggest that Mullenix's assessment of the threat Leija posed was reasonable. In Long v. Slaton,
Other cases cited by the Fifth Circuit and respondents are simply too factually distinct to speak clearly to the specific circumstances here. Several involve suspects who may have done little more than flee at relatively low speeds. See, e.g., Walker v. Davis,
Finally, respondents argue that the danger Leija represented was less substantial than the threats that courts have found sufficient to justify deadly force. But the mere fact that courts have approved deadly force in more extreme circumstances says little, if anything, about whether such force was reasonable in the circumstances here. The fact is that when Mullenix fired, he reasonably understood Leija to be a fugitive fleeing arrest, at speeds over 100 miles per hour, who was armed and possibly intoxicated, who had threatened to kill any officer he saw if the police did not abandon their pursuit, and who was racing towards Officer Ducheneaux's position. Even accepting that these circumstances fall somewhere between the two sets of cases respondents discuss, qualified immunity protects actions in the " 'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.' " Brosseau, supra, at 201,
Because the constitutional rule applied by the Fifth Circuit was not " 'beyond debate,' " Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. ----, ----,
It is so ordered.
Justice SCALIA, concurring in the judgment.
I join the judgment of the Court, but would not describe what occurred here as the application of deadly force in effecting an arrest. Our prior cases have reserved that description to the directing of force sufficient to kill at the person of the desired arrestee. See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. ----,
Thus, in Scott v. Harris,
It was at least arguable in Scott that pushing a speeding vehicle off the road is targeting its occupant for injury or death. Here, however, it is conceded that Trooper Mullenix did not shoot to wound or kill the fleeing Leija, nor even to drive Leija's car off the road, but only to cause the car to stop by destroying its engine. That was a risky enterprise, as the outcome demonstrated; but determining whether it violated the Fourth Amendment requires us to ask, not whether it was reasonable to kill Leija, but whether it was reasonable to shoot at the engine in light of the risk to Leija. It distorts that inquiry, I think, to make the question whether it was reasonable for Mullenix to "apply deadly force."
Although Mullenix disputes hearing Byrd's response, we view the facts in the light most favorable to respondents, who oppose Mullenix's motion for summary judgment. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. ----, ----,
Dissenting Opinion
Chadrin Mullenix fired six rounds in the dark at a car traveling 85 miles per hour. He did so without any training in that tactic, against the wait order of his superior officer, and less than a second before the car hit spike strips deployed to stop it. Mullenix's rogue conduct killed the driver, Israel Leija, Jr. Because it was clearly established under the Fourth Amendment that an officer in Mullenix's position should not have fired the shots, I respectfully dissent from the grant of summary reversal.
I
Resolving all factual disputes in favor of plaintiffs, as the Court must on a motion for summary judgment, Mullenix knew the following facts before he shot at Leija's engine block: Leija had led police officers on an 18-minute car chase, at speeds ranging from 85 to 110 miles per hour.
Mullenix had no training in shooting to disable a moving vehicle and had never seen the tactic done before.
II
When confronting a claim of qualified immunity, a court asks two questions. First, the court considers whether the officer *314in fact violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz,
Respondents here allege that Mullenix violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable seizures by using deadly force to apprehend Leija. This Court's precedents clearly establish that the Fourth Amendment is violated unless the " 'governmental interests' " in effectuating a particular kind of seizure outweigh the " 'nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests.' " Scott v. Harris,
Balancing a particular governmental interest in the use of deadly force against the intrusion occasioned by the use of that force is inherently a fact-specific inquiry, not susceptible to bright lines. But it is clearly established that the government must have some interest in using deadly force over other kinds of force.
Here, then, the clearly established legal question-the question a reasonable officer would have asked-is whether, under all the circumstances as known to Mullenix, there was a governmental interest in shooting at the car rather than waiting for it to run over spike strips.
The majority does not point to any such interest here. It claims that Mullenix's goal was not merely to stop the car, but to stop the car "in a manner that avoided the risks" of relying on spike strips. Ante, at 311. But there is no evidence in the record that shooting at Leija's engine block would stop the car in such a manner.
The majority first suggests that Mullenix did not wait for the results of the spikes, as his superior advised, because of his concern for the officers manning the strips. But Leija was going to come upon those officers whether or not Mullenix's shooting tactic was successful: Mullenix took his shot when Leija was between 25 and 30 yards away from the spike strip, traveling at 85 miles per hour. Even if his shots hit Leija's engine block, the car would not have stopped instantly. Mullenix would have bought the officers he was trying to protect-officers who had been trained to take defensive positions-less than three-quarters of a second over waiting for the spike strips. And whatever threat Leija posed after his car was stopped existed whether the car was stopped by a shot to the engine block or by the spike strips.
Nor was there any evidence that shooting at the car was more reliable than the spike strips. The majority notes that spike strips are fallible. Ante, at 310 - 311. But Mullenix had no information to suggest that shooting to disable a car had a higher success rate, much less that doing so with no training and at night was more *315likely to succeed. Moreover, not only did officers have training in setting up the spike strips, but they had also placed two backup strips further north along the highway in case the first set failed. A reasonable officer could not have thought that shooting would stop the car with less danger or greater certainty than waiting.
The majority cites Long v. Slaton,
In this case, by contrast, neither petitioner nor the majority can point to any possible marginal gain in shooting at the car over using the spike strips already in place. It is clearly established that there must be some governmental interest that necessitates deadly force, even if it is not always clearly established what level of governmental interest is sufficient.
Under the circumstances known to him at the time, Mullenix puts forth no plausible reason to choose shooting at Leija's engine block over waiting for the results of the spike strips. I would thus hold that Mullenix violated Leija's clearly established right to be free of intrusion absent some governmental interest.
III
The majority largely evades this key legal question by focusing primarily on the governmental interest in whether the car should be stopped rather than the dispositive question of how the car should be stopped. But even assuming that Leija posed a "sufficient," ante, at 310, or "immediate," ante, at 309 - 310, threat, Mullenix did not face a "choice between two evils" of shooting at a suspect's car or letting him go. Scott,
Thus framed, it is apparent that the majority's exhortation that the right at stake not be defined at "a high level of generality," see ante, at 308, is a red herring. The majority adduces various facts that the Fifth Circuit supposedly ignored in its qualified immunity analysis, including that Leija was "a reportedly intoxicated fugitive, set on avoiding capture *316through high-speed vehicular flight, who twice during his flight had threatened to shoot police officers, and who was moments away from encountering an officer at Cemetery Road." Ante, at 309. But not one of those facts goes to the governmental interest in shooting over awaiting the spike strips. The majority also claims that established law does not make clear that "Mullenix's reasons were insufficient to justify" his choice of shooting over following his superior's orders to wait for the spikes. Ante, at 310 - 311. But Mullenix seemed to have no reasons to prefer shooting to following orders.
Instead of dealing with the question whether Mullenix could constitutionally fire on Leija's car rather than waiting for the spike strips, the majority dwells on the imminence of the threat posed by Leija. The majority recharacterizes Mullenix's decision to shoot at Leija's engine block as a split-second, heat-of-the-moment choice, made when the suspect was "moments away." Ante, at 309. Indeed, reading the majority opinion, one would scarcely believe that Mullenix arrived at the overpass several minutes before he took his shot, or that the rural road where the car chase occurred had few cars and no bystanders or businesses.
An appropriate reading of the record on summary judgment would thus render Mullenix's choice even more unreasonable. And asking the appropriate legal question would leave the majority with no choice but to conclude that Mullenix ignored the longstanding and well-settled Fourth Amendment rule that there must be a governmental interest not just in seizing a suspect, but in the level of force used to effectuate that seizure.
* * *
When Mullenix confronted his superior officer after the shooting, his first words were, "How's that for proactive?"
For the reasons discussed, I would deny Mullenix's petition for a writ of certiorari. I thus respectfully dissent.
The majority describes the choice between spike strips and shooting as the choice between "one dangerous alternative" and another, noting that spike strips can pose a danger to drivers that encounter them. Ante, at 310 - 311. But Mullenix could not have thought that awaiting the spikes was anywhere near as dangerous as shooting immediately before Leija hit the spikes. For one thing, Mullenix had no training in shooting to disable the vehicle and so no idea of the relative danger that shooting posed to a driver. For another, Leija would be subjected to the danger posed by the spike strips whether Mullenix shot or not. And, in fact, that is what happened: Leija's car hit the spike strips and then rolled two and a half times.
