*1 LOS OF COUNTY THE OF SHERIFF BLOCK, al. et v. RUTHERFORD ANGELES, al. et 3, 1984 July 28, 1984 Decided March Argued 83-317. No.
BURGER, J., Court, White, C. the opinion delivered of the in which Powell, Rehnquist, JJ., J., O’Connor, joined. Blackmun, and filed opinion concurring judgment, Marshall, J., post, p. an in the filed dissenting opinion, Stevens, JJ., a in which joined, post, Brennan and p. 596. argued
Frederick R. Bennett the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. argued respondents.
Alvin Bronstein J. the cause for With him on the brief were Edward I. Koren and Fred * Okrand. opinion of Burger delivered the
Chief Justice Court. pretrial granted to decide
We certiorari whether detainees right guaranteed have a the United States Constitution to contact visits and to observe shakedown searches of their by prison cells officials.
I Angeles principal County Los Central Jail is one of seven operated by Angeles County. facilities of Los the Sheriff three-story jail complex, Ange- located in Los downtown largest jail country, capacity in the a is the with of over les, facility primary Angeles It is the Los 5,000 inmates. pretrial majority County detainees, male the vast Attorney Reynolds filed General Lee and Assistant General *Solicitor urging as amicus curiae reversal. brief for the United States City New Peggy filed brief for the York Board of Correction C. Davis urging as amicus affirmance. curiae days weeks fewa facility most at remain
whom they trial. await while Jail, Central detainees pretrial respondents, 1975, §§1983, C. S.U. under action class brought a Central administrators certain Sheriff, County against challenging vari- Supervisors, County Board and Jail, their conditions jail and practices policies ous policy of challenges respondents’ Only confinement. visits contact detainees denying jail jail’s friends, children, relatives, spouses, shakedown irregularly scheduled permitting practice *3 occu- cell the of absence in the cells individual sustained Court District The Court.1 this before pants are F. Pitchess, 457 challenges. Rutherford of these both 1978). (CD Cal. Supp. 104 abil- “the that respondents agreed with Court District The time from his children wife his to embrace ity man aof awaiting is trial ishe while months or weeks during the time recog- yet it at id., him,” importance great matter greatly” add would visitation contact “unrestricted that nized ultimately court jail. Ibid. at security problems secu- low permitting danger of however, concluded, loved their “physical contact rity inmates risk deprivation great to warrant sufficiently not was ones” a “rea- was Striking it believed what Ibid. contact. such prison considerations twin between balance” sonable gener were visits suit, contact instituted respondents 1 When unmon allowed were Jail Central detainees However, all ally allowed. 8:30 a.m. of 8:30 hours day between each visits ‘noncontact itored month each visits 63,000 such over were there estimated It p.m. once. visitors accommodates visiting area air-conditioned an from visiting location individual each separated Privacy partitions visitors, from inmates separated panels glass clear others, and telephones. over visit who contraband cells effect, searches procedures search Under in- while irregularly conducted were items impermissible other cells. away from were mates security and the rights constitutional of the inmates, the court tentatively proposed to order contact visitation for those inmates who “have received high other than risk classi- fication,” and who have been incarcerated for more than two weeks. Ibid. respect
With to the cell searches, the District Court con- cluded that allowing inmates to watch from a distance while their cells are allay searched would inmate concerns that personal property will be unnecessarily confiscated or destroyed. The “[fjuture court concluded that shakedowns should be made while respective inmates remain outside their cells enough but near process to observe the and raise answer inquiry.” relevant Id., at 116. The District Court viewed both proposed of its orders as “the least restrictive alternatives consistent with purpose [respondents’] incarceration.” Id., at 108. The District Court judgment withheld respond- on all of ents’ complaints pending evidentiary further hearings. supplemental its memorandum followingthe additional hear- ings, the court acknowledged “many factors strongly against militate allowing App. contact visits,” to Pet. for Cert. 32, not the least of *4 being which that “establishment of program of contact [would] visits importa- the increase tion of narcotics jail, [the] into despite safeguards all pre- and cautions.” Id., at 31. again The court emphasized that if all or of most the inmates were allowed contact “great visits, a burden” imposed would be jail on the authorities and the public. Ibid. Modification existing visiting of areas, if not additional facilities, would be necessary. procedures New for processing possibly including per- interviews, visitors— sonal searches, and packages of all carried the visitors—would required. be Strip searches of inmates following contact visits would be needed. The court found that “hardship” on detainees being unable to “embrace their only loved ones” for days a few or a
few weeks justify could not imposition of these substantial fac- believed, court However, 32. Id., at burdens. detainees for impracticable rendering visitation contact tors compel- considerably less periods are short for incarcerated prolonged. is detention ling when dangers and scope, burden “the that reasoned court The substantially visitation] be would [of contact program [a] “who to detainees limited visitation contact were diminished” and more or custody a month for uninterrupted in been escape risks,” or drug oriented be determined who visits contact number total imposed on the ceiling added). (emphasis Id., provide. jail must that visita- contact suggested, a court limitations, the these With alteration” “[m]odest only require program would tion said, the Alternatively, court facility. Ibid. existing visits facility for contact occupy a new or build could Sheriff necessary. forth, as back transport inmates supplemental in the reaffirmed also Court District The be should inmates that conclusion earlier its memorandum that believed court The searches. cell to observe allowed pos- meager protecting “in inmates interests upon burden in increase small outweigh[ed] the sessions 36.2 Id., [petitioners].” Circuit Ninth for Appeals appeal Court On consideration for Court District the case remanded S. U. Wolfish, Bell v. intervening decision light of our petitioners ordered Court District detainee each week to each once visit contact available “make whom concerning more, and one month for jail in the held been has however, provided, propensities; escape drug or indication no there any one allowed need visits such hundred fifteen than more no Cert. to Pet. App. week.” directed further Its order *5 of their inspection ‘shakedown’ when area general “[ijnmates ... to their sufficiently proximate to be permitted be ... is undertaken cells to such respond process may observe they cells respective Id., may indicate.” circumstances requests such make questions (1979), noting, among other things, that rejected we suggestion Wolfish that existence of less restrictive means for achievement of security objectives proof of an exaggerated response to security concerns. App. to Pet. Cert. 17. The District Court on remand prior reaffirmed its orders, “[finding] nothing in Bell v. that rendered] Wolfish in-
appropriate any of the . . . challenged orders.” Id., at 24. Although the court acknowledged that the Central Jail authorities were not “consciously by motivated a desire to punish,” it reiterated its belief practices that the policies question were “excessive” in relation to the underlying security objectives. Id., at 25. It petitioners’ characterized rejection of all proposals for contact visitation as an “over- reaction,” id., at 26, which “stem[med] from an unreasonable upon fixation security,” id., at 25. The District Court conceded that invalidated a Wolfish
similar order requiring that detainees be allowed to observe searches of their cells, but it went on to identify several factors that thought it distinguished its order from that in Wolfish.3 petitioner’s
On second appeal, the Court of Appeals af- firmed the District Court’s orders requiring that certain the detainees be allowed contact visits and that inmates allowed to watch searches of their cells.4 Rutherford 3Unlike the cell procedure search ordered in Wolfish, said the court, the procedure it ordered would not allow inmates to frustrate the search “ ‘distracting personnel and moving contraband from one room to another ahead of the search team.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 27 (quoting Wolf ish, S.,U. 555). Second, the Court of Appeals in had failed to specify the provision constitutional it upon relied to invalidate the cell search rule under review in that case. In contrast, the District Court noted, it had specifically found that a refusal to allow inmates to observe cell searches violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4The Court of Appeals reversed the third order —not in issue here— which had jail directed officials to reinstall the transparent windows in the cells from which they had been removed. *6 582 held Appeals of (1983). Court The 572 2dF. 710
Pitchess, “fits visitation contact order Court’s District the that following cases federal of pattern” [the] harmoniously within the of security interests important the “recognizing] Wolfish psy- the recognizing] time same the but institution [penal] of loss prolonged the which effects punitive chological and 2d, F. 710 . . . upon detainees has visitation contact visits contact of prohibition blanket that suggested It exaggerated “unreasonable, an be would detainees all Ibid. security concerns.” response to contention petitioners’ rejected Appeals also of Court The pretrial detainees order an precluded that Wolfish Appeals, of The Court cell searches. observe permitted differences” “significant identified Court, District the had by entered in invalidated Wolfish the order between Court.5 District the of importance the both of because granted certiorari We facilities detention of administration issue S. 464 U. Appeals.6 Courts among Federal conflict (1983). reverse. We 959 ad had Appeals, 5 the Court case, said this in Court District The in Court District by the ignored jail officials— concerns
dressed distracting person efforts search frustrate could inmates Wolfish—that District The team. search ahead relocating contraband nel cells, de their from inmates remove officials allowed here order Court in them bring searched, and row a cell while dayroom ain them tain Addition cells. respective only the search individually to observe District exclusively on rested had order ally, while Fourth under “unreasonable” were conclusion Court’s “largely” based was case order Court’s District Amendment, process. due guarantee Amendment’s Fourteenth upon constitu detainees 6 held Circuits five At least 2d 749 Wolke, 615 F. v. Jordan visits. contact entitled tionally denied, 450 1980), cert. (CA10 559 F. 2d Lamm, 639 v. Ramos (CA7 1980); 2d F. Pierce, 612 County Jail v. Allegheny (1981); Inmates 1041 S.U. v. Oxendine 1978); (CA1 364 F. 2d Sampson, 570 Feeley 1979); (CA3 754 curiam). Circuit Ninth 1975) (per (CA4 Williams, F. 2d II *7 separate jail The administration of seven facilities for a metropolitan people area more than seven million is a task proportions. of monumental in Housed facilities these annu- ally persons awaiting are 200,000 trial and confined because they requirements are unable meet for release on bail. value, Generalizations are of little but no one familiar with problems even the barest outline of the of the administration prison jail, of a or or with the administration of criminal justice, fail could to be of the aware ease with one can which personal very recognizance. obtain release bail or pending significant fact of nonrelease trial thus is a factor bearing security imperative on the measures that are proper administration of a detention facilitv. ago, (1979),
Four Terms
in
v.
441
Wolfish,
Bell
U.
520
S.
security
light
time,
we considered for the first
of these
scope
protection
concerns, the
of constitutional
that must
pretrial
respondents
be accorded
detainees. The
in Wolfish
challenged
numerous conditions
at the
confinement
pretrial
poli-
facility
City
detention
New York
various
practices
cies and
of that institution.
where it
that,
We held
liberty
alleged
deprived
is
that a
detainee has been
process,
dispositive inquiry
without due
is whether
challenged
practice,
policy
punish-
condition,
or
constitutes
“[fjor under the Due
ment,
Clause,
Process
a detainee must
punished
adjudication
prior
guilt
not be
to an
in accordance
omitted).
(footnote
process
Id.,
with due
law.”
at 535
case,
Fifth Circuits have held
this
Second and
that the Constitution
detainees, at
require
does
contact visits for
least in certain contexts.
Chinlund,
sub
(CA2),
Marcara
v.
2d 1231
595 F.
vacated and remanded
Marcera,
Diamond,
nom. Lombard v.
Jones v.
(1979);
“[I]f a govern- legitimate reasonably ato related is detention to more, amount without not, objective, it does mental is or condition Conversely, aif restriction ‘punishment.’ goal arbi- it is legitimate reasonably ato related —if may infer that permissibly purposeless court trary or —a punishment is governmental action purpose of upon detainees constitutionally be inflicted may not (footnote citation 539 atS., 441 U. qua detainees.” omitted). very guidelines, reaffirmed we setting these forth In play administration in the should courts role
limited specific restric- assessing whether facilities. detention said, security we interests, “reasonably related” tion should courts pecu- warning ‘[s]uch considerations our
“heed expertise professional province liarly within of substantial absence in the and, officials, corrections have officials to indicate record evidence considerations response these exaggerated their judgment expert ordinarily to their defer should courts in such matters.’” Id., at 540-541, n. 23 (quoting Pell Procunier, U. (1974)). S. 817, 827 We also cautioned: “[P]rison [are administrators be] accorded wide-
ranging deference adoption in the poli- and execution of practices cies and that in judgment are needed to preserve internal order discipline and to maintain institutional security.” 441 cases). U. S. at (citing principles articulated in govern resolution of this case.
Ill A Petitioners’ first contention is that it was error to conclude that even low risk detainees incarcerated for more than a month are constitutionally entitled to contact visits from friends and relatives. Petitioners they maintain, throughout these proceedings that, the interest of institu- public tional and security, it is within their discretion as offi- cials facility detention impose prohibition an absolute on contact visits.7 The District Court did not find, nor did Appeals Court of suggest, that purpose petitioners’ *9 of policy denying of contact punish visitation is to the inmates. To contrary, the District Court petitioners found that are
7We did not have occasion to address specifically the issue of contact
visitation in
We did suggest, however,
Wolfish.
that prohibiting contact
visitation might
represent
well
permissible
alternative to the admittedly
intrusive body cavity searches there challenged.
S.,
441 U.
at 559-560,
n. 40. We subsequently vacated and remanded for
in light
consideration
of
a Second Circuit
holding
decision
that the denial of contact visits
was unconstitutional. Marcera v. Chinlund,
On this record, we must conclude that the District Court
simply misperceived the
scope
limited
judicial
inquiry
under
When the
Wolfish.
District Court found
many
factors
against
counseled
contact visits, its inquiry should
have ended. The court’s further “balancing” resulted in an
impermissible substitution of its view on
proper
adminis-
tration of Central Jail for that of
experienced
adminis-
trators of
facility.
Here, as in
“[i]t
Wolfish,
plain
[the]
from
opinions that the lower
simply
courts
disagreed
judgment
[the jail]
officialsabout the extent of the
security interests affected and the
required
means
to further
those interests.”
B It has petitioners’ been practice, as it is of all such facil- ities, irregular conduct or random “shakedown” searches of the cells of detainees while the detainees away are at meals, recreation, or other Respondents activities. do not dispute the need for these they searches; challenge the only searches to the extent that detainees permitted are not to observe them. respond
Petitioners that their method of conducting cell security searches ais virtually measure identical to that chai- agree. We 555-557.10 atS.,U. lenged in Wolfish. follows: practice Wolfish described Court The in- searches unannounced conducts staff MCC “The These irregular intervals. living areas mate all during which ‘shakedowns’ unit formal are generally a team units, residential cleared are inmates [are] not [IJnmates . . . room. each guards searches Id., searches.” watch permitted essentially identical described practices search supra. 1,n. see Jail, at Central employed those principally distinguish attempt to Respondents *13 in invalidated order Court’s District the that ground the District the Amendment, while Fourth the on rested Wolfish holding that its predicated was here order Court’s rights their violate the detainees of absence the in searches Amend- Fourteenth the of Clause Process Due the under rule search room the that in hold didWe Wolfish ment. we But Amendment. Fourth the violate challenged not did search room the that contention the rejected explicitly also observation prohibiting rule the including feature the rule, due detainees’ the detainees, violated by the searches rights: process security restric- MCC four that think we do “Nor [one supra III, Part in described practices
tions in room permitting rule was which viola- in ‘punishment’ detainees] constitute the absence is case this in order Court’s District note also Petitioners invalidated Wolfish. from respect material indistinguishable it limited more is here order although the correct, essentially This cells at vicinity of general in the detainees those only requires observe allowed detainees, be all shakedowns, not time institu deference however, where context, cells. of their search required not are administrators touchstone is the administrators tional differences available, these means restrictive least employ magnitude. constitutional tion of rights detainees under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” 441U. S., at (footnote omitted). 560-561 We held that all of the restrictions “were reasonable re- sponses by [the] legitimate officials to security concerns.” Id., at 561. contrary Thus, respondents’ suggestion, previ- we have ously only considered not a Fourth challenge Amendment but also process a due challenge to a room procedure search al-
most identical to that used at Central Jail, and we sustained practice on both scores. We have no reason to recon- sider that issue; the arguments identical by respond- made ents here were advanced respondents in Wolfish. The security concerns that justified we held the same restric- tion in Wolfish, see id., at 555, n. 36, are no less compelling here.11 we Moreover, could not have been clearer in our holding in that this is a lodged matter in the sound discretion of the institutional officials. We reaffirm that “proper deference to the informed prison discretion of authorities they, demands that and not the courts, make the judgments difficult which reconcile conflicting claims affect- ing security of the institution, the prison welfare of the staff, property and the rights of the detainees.” Id., at *14 n. 38.12 11The District Court and Court of Appeals sought also to distinguish the order here from that entered in on the ground that the order in
this case accommodated the institutional concern that inmates not distract personnel during the search and succeed in moving contraband before guards arrive a particular at cell. This factual distinction is without legal significance. In effect, the order here merely attempts impose to on offi cials the least restrictive means available for accomplishment of their secu rity objectives. We reaffirm that administrative officials are not obliged to adopt the least restrictive means to meet their legitimate objectives. Wolfish, S., 441 U. 542, at n. 25. 12To the extent respondents’ in brief this Court can be read to raise a procedural process due challenge petitioners’ to cell-search procedure —a claim not made in reject the challenge. Wolfish —we The governmental 592 is Appeals of Court the judgment of
Accordingly, the reversed. so ordered. isIt judgment. the in concurring Blackmun,
Justice contact-visitation the that neither Court agree with I violates case in this policy issue at cell-search policy nor the Fourteenth rights under process due respondents’ I do however, because separately, I write Amendment. adequately has addressed Court believe claims. constitutional respondents’ gravamen of contact- treatment Court’s disagree 1. I has my the Court view, chiefly because, issue visitation administrative judicial deference principles of invoked litigation. As present place in the no judgment that (1979), U. S. Wolfish, Bell v. clear made the Court challenges who they pretrial detainee here, it reaffirms and amount ground that on the confinement conditions show must Clause Process Due theof in violation punishment punitive intent. product of are conditions aWhen at 584. ante, 20, nn. 19 538-539, id., punitive the existence attempts demonstrate detainee through a proof of motive through direct either intent, not “reason- challenged conditions demonstration objective,” governmental legitimate ato ably related good calling question necessarily into he S., at U. circumstances, those Under prison administrators. faith court that a perverse to insist somewhat me to be it seems prac- particular administrative rationality aof assessing see, detainees, in the absence search conducting interests undertaking under complex n. 36—a 555-556, and supra, Wolfish, g., e. posses- whatever institution —exceed 5,000-inmate in a conditions optimal More- search. by the implicated might be the detainees sory interests under property *15 deprivations erroneous risks over, believe we minimal. are procedure petitioners’ “ tice must prison accord administrators ‘wide-ranging defer- ence in adoption policies execution of practices that in judgment preserve are needed to internal order ” discipline and to maintain institutional security.’ Ante, quoting Bell v. Wolfish, U. S., at 547. Such a requirement boils down to a command that when a court is confronted with charge of administrative bad faith, it must evaluate charge by assuming good administrative faith. When a challenge constitutional prison conditions neces- sarily places good prison faith of administrators at issue, regard I it as improper to plaintiff make the prove his case by twice requiring a court to defer to puta- administrators’ professional tive judgment. I Instead, think it sufficient to rest on the process substantive due standard announced in Bell v. itself: absent proof direct punitive intent, “a court permissibly may infer that purpose [aof chal- lenged] governmental punishment” action is only if, but if, the action “is not reasonably related legitimate to a goal.” Id., at 539. requirement prison policies be reason- ably legitimate related to a goal hardly a stringent one, many and, for of the given reasons by the Court, ante, at 586-587, I have no doubt that requirement has been met on the presented record here. I mystified therefore am the Court’s insistence on invoking principles judicial deference, since principles those only inappropriate entirely but unnecessary to the result in this case. More generally, I am concerned about apparent Court’s willingness to substitute judicial rhetoric deference meaningful scrutiny of constitutional claims prison in the setting. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. (1981) S. 337, (opinion concurring judgment). Courts unquestionably should be reluctant to second-guess prison administrators’ opinions about the need for security measures; when con- stitutional standards look in whole or part to the effective- ness practices, administrative good-faith administrative *16 that weight. fact The substantial entitled are judgments does security, however, prison advance measures particular Wolfish, v. Bell Cf. constitutional. ipso them make not facto chal- constitutional recognize that I 20. n. at S., 441 U. chal- expansive similarly like conditions, prison lenges to danger of pose a institutions, workings other lenges however, time, same At the judicial intervention. excessive returning risk run of “deference” invocations careless then- ago, when decades of several passivity tous met many prisons were squalor barbarism prevailing As we approach. off” “hands eye and judicial blind awith responsibil- initial that fact Wolfish, v. recognized in Bell prison administrators in vested prisons is ity Nation’s for to be rights not are constitutional that mean not “does only because It is 562. Id., observed.” scrupulously this policy satisfies contact-visitation that satisfied amI join the I that Clause Process Due under standard judgment. Court’s policy miscon- cell-search treatment Court’s respond- that assumes The Court respondents’ claim. strues sub- searches cell from exclusion challenging their are ents decision hence grounds and process due stantive quite isIt 590-591. Ante, dispositive. v. Bell challenging the cell- respondents are however, clear, ofTr. grounds. process due procedural policy on search .. . process issue due procedural (“[Tjhis is a Arg. Oral a matter punishment as from of] freedom [an issue than rather Respondents 33-36. Brief process”); due substantive result searches arguing cell respondents essence, property personal deprivation of includes Amendment Fourteenth under them process due minimize in order cell to observe opportunity an address did the Court Because deprivations. erroneous something Wolfish, Bell process claim due procedural case. judgment in support the said must more
Under Mathews v. Eldridge,
frustrate
undoubtedly
there
moreover,
concerns,
security
apart from
by]
additional
[entailed
burdens
“administrative
Eldridge,
v.
Mathews
requirement.”
procedural
substitute
point out,
petitioners
example, as
For
atS.,U.
424
number
increased
an
dedicate
required to
would
jail now
from
detainee
each
accompanying
task
guards
being conducted.
search
while
cell
his
holding area
requirement
excused
exigencies
different
Just
g., Com-
e.
see,
contexts,
hearings
other
predeprivation
12n.
629-630,
614,
S.U.
Shapiro,
v.
missioner
Phillips
676-680;
S.,U.
Calero-Toledo,
(1976);
(1931);
Ameri-
North
596-597
S.U.
Commissioner,
*18
315-316
S.
Chicago,
U.
211
Storage
v.
Co.
Cold
can
a
against
tip
balance
considerations
(1908),
these
do
so
here.
detainees
pretrial
“hearing” for
predeprivation
defacto
Court.
of the
judgment
join the
I
that
reason
is
It
and
Brennan
Justice
whom
with
Marshall,
Justice
dissenting.
join,
Stevens
Justice
years
in recent
time
fourth
marks
case
This
condi-
claims
inmates’
ear
a deaf
turned
has
Court
Constitution.
Federal
violate
confinement
tions
(1981);
v.
Bell
337
Wolf-
S.U.
452
Chapman,
v.
Rhodes
p. ante,
Palmer,
v.
(1979); Hudson
S.
ish,
U.
and
good faith
confidence
unwarranted
an
Guided
concep-
by pinched
a
prison administrators
“expertise” of
Clauses
Process
Due
meaning
tion
increasingly
Court
majority of
Amendment,
Eighth
for which
prison condition
willing
sanction
appears
how
matter
no
rationale,
imagine a colorable
majority can
here,
So,
fact.
inis
condition
ill-justified
oppressive
Angeles
Los
force
policies
upholds two
the Court
detainee
one,
Under
County
Jail.
Central
family,
his
members
contact
any physical
permitted
regardless of
long
how
he is incarcerated pending his trial or
slight
how
is the risk that he will abuse a
privi-
visitation
lege. Under the other, detainees are not allowed to observe
searches of their
despite
cells,
the fact that such frequently result
in arbitrary destruction or confiscation
of the detainees’ property.
my
view, neither of these
policies comports with the Constitution.
(t—
In Bell v.
supra,
Wolfish,
the Court established a set of
principles defining constitutionally permissible
treatment
persons
incarcerated
who have not been convicted of crimes.
years
In the
since Wolfish, I have not
my
abandoned
view
the Court’s decision in that case was fundamentally
misconceived. See
599 secondary The literature buttresses these assertions,3 as do the conclusions reached other courts.4 significant The injury to familial wrought relations by the jail’s policy denying contact visitation means pol- icy must against be tested legal standard more constraining than the rule announced in Our cases Wolfish. leave no persons’ doubt that freedom to enter into, maintain, and cultivate familial relations is entitled to protec- constitutional g., tion. E. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. (1982). S. 745, 753 Among the relationships that we expressly have shielded from state interference are bonds spouses, between see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. (1978), 374 and between parents and their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. (1972); 205 Stanley v. supra. Illinois, special status of these relationships in our constitutional scheme derives from several considerations: the fact that traditionally they have regarded been important sacrosanct,5 the they role played fostering diversity pluralism in our culture,6 centrality to the emotional many life persons.7 Determination exactly how the doctrine established in the aforementioned upon cases bears a ban on contact visita-
3See, e. g., Zemans & Cavan, Marital Relationships of Prisoners, 49 J.
L.,
Crim.
C. & P. S.
(1958);
50
Note, On Prisoners and Parenting: Preserv
ing the Tie that Binds, 87 Yale L.
1408,
J.
1416,
(1978).
1424
4See Jones v. Diamond, 636
1364,
F. 2d
(CA5),
1377
granted
cert.
sub
nom.
Jones,
Ledbetter v.
452 U.
959,
S.
cert. dism’d,
tion limitation “withdrawal argued that be could hand, it accompanies in- necessarily rights” that many privileges (1948), 285 266, S.U. Johnston, 334 v. Price carceration, are bonds familial inmates’ fact with combined something means ban, a by such altogether severed not to suffice would interest government “compelling” a than less theOn rights.8 inmates’ impairment legitimate important very only a suggest that factors two hand, other persons even First, policy. sustain purpose could public re- crimes being convicted after lawfully incarcerated innocent presumptively rights;9 important constitutional tain have we Second, no less.10 to surely entitled persons justifications persuasive very upon insisted previously prohibi- not but significantly, regulations government argu- rights;11 familial exercise tively, interfered How- here. control should stringent test similarly ably, a competing considerations balancing these a sensitive ever, minimum, aAt us. before case unnecessary resolve to J., (Marshall, (1984) 291, n. 15 Martin, U. S. 467 v. Schall 8 Cf. state strength “the which under test a (suggesting dissenting) degree upon depend] [would statute legitimate to needed interest (emphasis rights”)' fundamental upon encroaches the statute which (1979) 520, 569-571 S. 441 U. Wolfish, v. omitted); Bell citation original; dissenting). J., (Marshall, (freedom of (1974) Martinez, 9 396 S. 416 U. v. Procunier g., See, e. curiam) pro (equal (1968) (per 333 S.U. Washington, 390 v. Lee speech); (1974) 539, 555-556 McDonnell, S. 418 U. v. laws); cf. of the Wolff tection prisons Constitution between drawn curtain no iron (“There is country”). of this detainees, unlike 10 (pretrial 535, n. 16 Wolfish, supra, Bell v. Cf. punished). may not inmates, sentenced (invalidating (1978) 374, 387 11 Redhail, U. S. Zablocki v. g., e. See, but upon, seriously intruded persons, to most applied that, as a statute Education Board marry); Cleveland right abrogate, did regula administrative (striking down (1974) 632, 640 LaFleur, U. S. children). right teachers’ “heavy burden” imposed tions petitioners, prevail, required should be to show that the
jail’s policy materially advances a government substantial interest. *22 Petitioners have not made and, on this record, could not make such a demonstration.12 It should emphasized be petitioners that what must defend is not their reluctance to allow unlimited contact visitation, but rather their adopt refusal to specific reforms ordered by the lower courts. The District Court’s order, it should be recalled, was carefully circumscribed:
“Commencing not more than ninety days following the date of this order, the defendants will make available a contact visit once each week to each detainee that has been jail in held for one month or more, and concerning whom there is no indication drug escape propensities; provided, however, that no more than fif- teen hundred such visits need be allowed any in one week. In the event that the requested number of visits week exceeds fifteen hundred, higher or such number as the Sheriff voluntarily undertakes to accom- modate, a system reasonable of rotation or prior- other may ities be maintained. lengths of such visits shall remain in the discretion of the App. Sheriff.” to Pet. for Cert. object Petitioners to this order, and defend their current rule prohibiting all contact between inmates and their families, grounds. two main proffered Neither of the justifications scrutiny. survives petitioners
First, contend that a ban on contact visitation necessary prevent the introduction jail into drugs 12Respondents that, contend even if this case were by controlled standard enunciated in Wolfish, they should prevail, because petitioners have not advanced even a “legitimate governmental objective” in support jail’s of the policy. Because of the manner which I approach the case, I need not respondents’ address argument on this score. legitimate ais admitted be must It weapons. and show fail petitioners However, goal. important and adoption of by impaired materially be would realization its evi Indeed, Court. District ordered reforms contrary. Several establishes trial adduced dence imple could security procedures testified witnesses very contraband importation make would mented other effectively used precautions Among the difficult. visits; after and prisoners before are: institutions exami visitation; special clothes prisoners dressing of flu detectors metal visitors prisoners nation rejec visiting area; parcels from oroscopes; exclusion visiting rules; comply with do who visitors tion *23 g., guards. E. by visiting area theof observation continuous that Nagel testified Mr. 4676-4577.13 4232, 4164-4166, Tr. except most the everything “prevent would procedures these institution.” drugs introducing into methods extreme against transmission protection Further 4170. Id., at by the provided is inmates to visitors from contraband have who inmates to order itsof restriction Court’s District to reason nois there short, risk. as low classified been would directive courts’ lower compliance with that think drugs flow negligible increase a than in more result jail.14 weapons into or visi- of contact allowance that contend petitioners Second, placed in who visitors endanger innocent would tation though Again, dangerous detainees. to proximity near measures of these some intrusiveness that implies majority The con allow to refusal petitioners’ justification an additional provides inmates some that possible is ante, 588, It n. at See visitation. tact such to submit than rather forgo visitation to decide might visitors them. left be should choice surely the but procedures, sig jail in weapons enter drugs and out pointed be It should 4526-4527; Tr. See routes. other several through quantities nificant insti other problems (describing similar 4589-4590, 4624-4625 id., cf. currently free jail think mistake thus be tutions). It would facility might enter amounts small contraband, and time. first facility for the infect would visitation through contact importance objective of the is apparent, the nexus between it jail’s and the policy current is not. As indicated above, the District Court’s applies order only to detainees who are unlikely try escape. And security measures could employed by petitioners that would very make it difficult for inmates to hurt or take advantage of visitors. supra, at 602. Finally, the administrators of other institutions that long permitted contact visits between inmates and their families testified at trial that violent resulting incidents from such visitation are rare, apparently because inmates value their visitation privileges highly.15 so majority seeks to up petitioners’ shore arguments two subsidiary miscellaneous claims. In an effort to dis- credit the limitations on the District Court’s order, the majority argues that determination of which inmates have sufficiently low propensity to misbehave would be difficult and time-consuming, especially light brevity “the detention and the constantly changing nature of the inmate population.” Ante, at 587. This by contention is rebutted the District finding Court’s that, after an inmate has been incarcerated for jail a month, officials have considerable regarding information background his patterns, behavior evidence in the jail record that already has a system classification that, with some modification and im- provement, could be used to evaluate *24 propensities detainees’ escape for drug App. abuse. to Pet. for Cert. 33.16 Next, the majority compliance contends that with the Dis- 15For example, Arnett Gaston, Warden of the New City York Men’s (Riker’s House of Detention Island), testified that significant physical confrontations have been largely absent from Id., his facility. at 4368. Lloyd Patterson, Superintendent of Deuel Vocational Institution for 10 years, testified that he could recall only three or four during incidents period. Id., at 4589. Mr. Nagel, drawing on his 11 years experience Jersey New prison system and visits to more than 350 other institu tions, corroborated those Id., observations. at 4167-4168. 16Lieutenant Thomas Lonergan testified at trial that, present, at identities and backgrounds of 70% the inmates are ascertained within three weeks of their Id., admission. at 4450-4451. expensive. Ante, n. 9. 588, order would be trict Court’s Again, findings decisive; are the court District Court’s changes jail only in the facilities would “modest” found App. required. 83. More funda- to Pet. for Cert. possible jail cheaply mentally, run a as desire to rights abridging legitimate the constitutional reason majority suggests occupants. Finally, itsof jail, might dissension in the cause some District Court’s order privileges resent denied visitation would because inmates granted privileges. Ante, There is at 587. no such those support speculative in the record to whatsoever evidence observation. majority petitioners shown
In neither nor sum, pretrial permitting have been detainees who low-risk occasionally than to have for more a month incarcerated spouses visits with their and children would frustrate contact achievement of substantial state interest.17 Because significantly im- alleviate the adverse such visitation would jail’s policies upon respondents’ pact of the current familial deprivation rights, its violates the Due Process Clause.
II majority brusquely rejects respondents’ challenge The jail’s policy refusing permit detainees to observe feasibility program by of the limited contact visitation ordered suggested Court is further the number of other institutions that District programs. Approximately 80% of the in the have similar inmates Califor Id., system prison permitted ap nia contact visitation. at 4587. It pears policy that the current of the Federal Bureau of Prisons is to allow privileges inmates and visitation both convicted detainees. id., City, except identifiably dangerous pretrial York at 1955. New all Id., permitted detainees are contact visits with their families. (Indeed, agency operation city’s that oversees the of the deten contending tion facilities has filed a brief that contact visitation is feasible punitive. City York and that its denial must be deemed Brief for New *25 9-29.) Board of Correction as Amicus Curiae searches of their ground cells on the respondents’ claim by foreclosed the decision in respondents’ If Wolfish. claim were indeed presented identical to that by the Wolfish plaintiffs, I would vote to affirm on this issue for the reasons my stated in dissenting opinion in See 441 U. S., Wolfish. at 576. In fact, however, the two cases differ in a crucial respect, and that provides difference an independent ground for sustaining judgment below. The Court in held that policy adopted by the Metropolitan Correctional Center of allowing detainees to observe searches of their cells did not violate the Fourth Amendment and did not punishment constitute vio- lative of the Due Process Clause. Id,., at 556-557, 560-561. Respondents in this case quite make a different claim. They assert that the Central policy Jail’s of searching cells and confiscating or destroying personal possessions found therein, allowing without inmates to observe those deprives searches, inmates property process without due of law. On the record before us, I respondents’ think claim is meritorious. One of purposes of the Due Process Clause is to reduce the incidence of deprivations error in liberty, life, prop- erty. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. (1972). S. 67, 80-81 One of ways such error can be reduced, in by turn, is allowing persons whose may interests be affected adversely by government decisions participate in those decisions. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. (1976), the Court complex identified a of considerations helpful that determining whether the Constitution partici- mandates such pation particular contexts: “[Identification specific of process dictates of due
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: private First, the interest that will be affected the of- ficial action; second, the risk of an deprivation erroneous of such through interest procedures used, and the probable any, value, if of additional or proce- substitute *26 interest, finally, the Government’s and safeguards; dural and admin- fiscal the and involved function including the proce- substitute or additional the that burdens istrative Id., entail.” would requirement dural case instant the of facts the to factors these Application courts the judgment support for strong provides private observed, aptly Court District theAs below. im- procedure are jail’s cell-search by the affected interests keep in to allowed is a man that possessions “The portant. a few things like to being limited indeed, meager are his cell perhaps an candy bars, and cigarettes, magazines, pictures, cherished are items Nonetheless, these pair socks. extra Next, 27-28.18 Cert. for App. Pet. to inmates.” by the jail’s current under risk, found Court District destroyed unnec- bewill possessions inmates’ policy, that searches shakedown Unannounced essarily is substantial. conducting officers hasty, and inevitably somewhat leave deciding to what in discretion significant them to observe allowed If at 28. Id., confiscate. to what preserve to officers persuade can inmates process, Fi- destroyed. Ibid.19 otherwise would possessions cells of their to witness detainees allow nally, to part concurring in J., (Stevens, ante, Palmer, Hudson 18 Cf. members, a family letters, snapshots (“Personal part) dissenting in manual training or a diary a kit, perhaps hobby cards, a souvenir, a deck inexpensive variety of Bible —a a trade, or even new in a apprentice an for past of his part some contact maintain prisoner a may enable items future”). a better possibility eye to an visit Judge’s Court District on the part finding based last 19 This jail: my memorandum is mentioned observation, limited “My own a for opportunity which upon instance an 1979, revealed February resulted behalf own his explanation an plea a make prisoner meant fact obvious It was confiscation. from property saving his significant justifies incident I believe him, and deal good id., at 36. 28; see Cert. to Pet. App. generalization.” impose would only slight burdens on jail officials. response to the District original Court’s petitioners order, developed alternative methods of conducting shakedown *27 searches, each of which possible made it for inmates to be present. One of procedures, those known as “Method C,” proved to be no less effectual, no more time-consuming, and only slightly expensive more practice than the challenged by respondents.20 The demonstrated feasibility21 and minor cost of option this renders my indefensible, in petition- view, ers’ insistence that permitted detainees not be to observe cell searches.
In sum, this seems a classic instance in which an “estab- lished state procedure,” distinguished from “a random and
20The District Court described this procedure, and compared it with the jail’s present policy, as follows:
“Method A involved searching all of the cells in a row while the inmates remained day room, which is the manner in which searches currently are conducted. In C, Method the men occupying particular cell were brought from the day room and stood outside their cell while it being was searched. When such search was completed, the men were locked in their cell and the remaining cells were searched successively in the same man- ner. Methods B and D are so unsatisfactory and expensive that no further comment concerning them is indicated.
“According to the statistics reported by the defendants, Methods A C take substantially the same amount of time, and C is slightly more ex- pensive, due to the need to utilize a few deputies more to escort prison- ers and to insure against upon assault the deputies that engaged searching the Id., cell.” at 35-36; see Tr. 4122-4143 (testimony of Deputy Lombardi). Sheriff 21In brief, petitioners object to Method C on ground one they did press not Relying below. on single comment made at by trial Deputy Sheriff Lombardi, petitioners contend that detainees, if allowed to observe cell searches, would learn they where could hide contraband with impu Id., at 4116. Deputy Lombardi offered no substantiation for her nity. prediction and indeed, when summarizing petitioners’ objections to Method C, did consider point important enough even to mention. id., at 4132-4133. Especially in the absence of any finding on this issue District Court, petitioners’ bald contention seems to me entitled to little weight. caus- the effect employee,” has by a state act
unauthorized Compare property. private unnecessary deprivations ing 435-436 422, S.U. Co., 455 Brush Logan v. Zimmerman v. Parratt p. 517, ante, Palmer, (1982), Hudson ease with (1981). view Taylor, S. 451 U. procedure alternative implement an could petitioners which in- destruction wanton incidence reduce would courts of the judgment affirm I would possessions, mates’ Process Due practice violates jail’s current below Clause.22 dissent. respectfully
I *28 concurring in J., (Stevens, ante, 4n. Palmer, Hudson 22 Cf. Court of the holding (observing that part) dissenting part the established it contended which “cases cover does Hudson prisoners risk create an unreasonable themselves procedures prison property”). deprived unjustifiably will be