Krainski v. Nevada Ex Rel. Board of Regents

parties authority cited peal. a matter of the award as justify

does course, not find the Union’s do and we requests for frivolous. The to be

appeal denied. are therefore fees AFFIRMED. KRAINSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, Megan ex BOARD OF rel. NEVADA State SYS OF NEVADA REGENTS EDUCATION, on TEM OF HIGHER Nevada, University Las behalf Mill; Clark; Vegas; Richard Rebecca Jiminez; Burns; Phillip Su Nannette Tyree Pini; Carrasco; Leslie Wal san Goff; Tramposch; lenfeldt; L. Brett Kenya Polee, Culver; Defendants- J. Appellees.

No. 08-17523. Appeals, United Court States Ninth Circuit. Dec. 2009. Argued Aug. Submitted Aug. Filed Bach; NV; Las Vegas,

Jason for the appellant. Linstrom; NV; Vegas,

Richard Las C. O’Brien; NV; Vegas, Carrasco Las Susan Henderson, NV; Gabroy; Christian James appellees. for the FLETCHER, Before: BETTY B. N. RANDY R. THOMAS and SIDNEY SMITH, Judges. Circuit THOMAS; Opinion by Judge Partial Dissent Judge and Partial Concurrence B. FLETCHER.

OPINION

THOMAS, Judge: Circuit Megan appeals the district court’s dismissal of her Section 1983 action Nevada, University of Las Ve- against the (“UNLV”)1 em- and various UNLV gas (“UNLV Employees”)2 their ployees Officer; Jiminez, Regents Student Conduct Nannette 1. State of Nevada ex rel. Board Education, Officer; Carrasco, System Higher Nevada Student Susan M. Conduct University Counsel; Pini, Nevada. Tyree behalf Assis- Assistant General Coordinator; Life Leslie Wal- tant Residential "University Employees” include Rebec- 2. The lenfeldt, Life Coordina- Assistant Residential Life; Mills, ca Vice President for Student Goff, tor; police L. and UNLV officers Brett Clark, Director of Student Conduct Richard Tramposch, J. and Culver. Life; Burns, Phillip Senior Residential capacities. official file a personal complaint against formal Defen- and state law viola- dant POLEE. an altercation arising tions WALLENFELDT, 28. Defendants roommate, Polee, Kenya former that led to PINI, and POLEE then contacted subjection Krainski’s arrest and to univer- UNLV Police and made false statements sity discipline.3 The district court dis- officer an attempt [sic] prej- federal claims with missed Krainski’s have Plaintiff arrested. jurisdiction udice and declined to exercise GOFF, 29. Defendant Officers TRAM- remaining law over the state claims. We POSCH, CULVER, knew, and or should jurisdiction pursuant to have 28 U.S.C. known, have allegations made § affirm. and we false, by Defendant POLEE were but alleged arrested Plaintiff for the crime I a Deadly Weapon. of Assault with to According complaint, Krainski’s arrest, Prior to making Defen- together Krainski and Polee roomed in GOFF, TRAMPOSCH, dant Officers housing residential at According UNLV. and CULVER did in- not conduct complaint, to the “a prominent Polee was vestigation by into the claims made De- UNLV, student-athlete listed on the POLEE, fendant had probable and no University’s top jump- website as ‘the long cause or warrant to arrest Plaintiff. among for ... long er the Rebels the top actions, aAs result of these alleg- (Mountain jumpers in the MWC West incarcerated, es that wrongly she was re- ” Conference).’ complaint liberty, stricted of subjected her and to began states that her troubles on Septem- psychological harm. 10, 2007, ber with when she met Defendant UNLV, Krainski further alleges that and her on-going Wallenfeldt “advised Mills, Clark, Burns, Jiminez, and Carrasco harassing threatening and by behavior” proceeded then to wrongly initiate student that, Polee. in “retalia- disciplinary against proceedings her. Her making complaint tion for her against a complaint explains: star athlete”: In October Defendants 11, 2007, September 27.On Defendants UNLV, MILLS, CLARK, BURNS, WALLEN-FELDT and PINI contacted JIMENEZ, and brought CARRASCO POLEE, Defendant without Plaintiffs against formal charges Plaintiff al- for consent confidentiality, and breach of leged violations of University Ne- and her informed vada, Vegas Las Student Conduct by made conspired Plaintiff with and Code.... Defendant POLEE story to fabricate a about Plaintiff attempting UNLV, to attack PO- MILLS, 33. Defendants scissors, LEE pair CLARK, with a BURNS, all before JIMENEZ, Plaintiff opportunity would have failed provide CARRASCO Plaintiff 3. Krainski named also Polee as a defendant. retaliation her for defense law Krainski's suit; responded by filing third-party Polee sought preliminary com- injunction she also plaint sought with reinstating cross-claims in which onto her the track team. dis implead Scott-Williams, Yvonne head trict court dismissed Polee’s federal claims team, coach of the UNLV preliminary track as a third- and denied the motion in party defendant. junction. disposed Polee appeal UNLV We of Polee's Mill, (9th wrongfully and Williams removed her from Fed.Appx. Krainski v. Cir. 2009) the track scholarship team and her (unpublished). revoked motion, reasoning that Eleventh of the formal hear- notice proper with immunity barred Krainski’s Amendment ing. ... MILLS, against UNLV, constitutional claims 34. Defendants BURNS; JIMENEZ, Employees in their official ca- CLARK, and the UNLV hearing on qualified immunity a formal pacities, held CARRASCO they at which time against November claims Krainski’s federal barred repre- Plaintiff to be failed allow each personal in their the UNLV advisers, her by assisted sented and/or Additionally, the capacities. district representation made despite explicit state a that Krainski failed to determined would be that Plaintiff Defendants for violation of her Fourth Amend- claim assist- represented to be allowed and/or rights, process due ment substantive advisers, intentionally causing ed said procedural rights, and representing to be ineffective at Plaintiff dismissing Krainski’s federal rights. After hearing.... at said herself prejudice, the district court claims fact no evidence Despite the jurisdiction over the declined to exercise support any of presented was ever remaining timely law state claims. This Plaintiff, made against the followed. appeal UNLV, MILLS, CLARK, Defendants JIMENEZ, BURNS, and CARRASCO II “Responsible” of Plaintiff to found The district court not err in dismiss- did completely ignoring the ev- charges, said ing against Krainski’s claims UNLV and Plaintiff, forever idence that exonerated in their Employees the UNLV official ca- transcript the and tarnishing educational a decision we review de novo. pacities, Plaintiff, causing as as of well record Yakama Indian Nation State Wash. physical inju- psychological and severe of (9th Revenue, 1241, 1245 Dep’t ries .... of Cir.1999). the ac- alleges that defendants’ Krainski opportunity of “depriv[ed] tions her bars “The Eleventh Amendment and further her ca- obtain an education its against agencies the State or for suits reer.” relief, types unequivocal all of absent con Krainski raised three Bible, by the state.” Romano v. 169 sent procedur- claims before the district court: Cir.1999) (9th (citing 1185 F.3d al due under the Fifth and Four- Halderman, 89, 100, 465 Pennhurst v. U.S. Amendments; pro- teenth substantive due (1984)). 67 79 L.Ed.2d Fifth Fourteenth cess under and jurisdictional Eleventh Amendment bar Amendments; un- Fourth Amendment and applies regardless of the nature relief imprisonment. In addi- lawful arrest and sought and extends to state instrumentali damages, “a monetary sought tion Allain, Papasan agencies. ties See Injunction, prohibiting De- Permanent 92 placing a agents from fendants their (1986). L.Ed.2d 209 transcript or placing hold on her academic findings or sanctions notation of immunity Amendment Eleventh her upon student file or against officials from official ca also shields state transcript.” Reserve pacity suits. See Central Life of (“Central N. Am. Co. v. Re Ins. Struve Employees sub-

UNLV the UNLV (9th serve”), F.2d 1160-61 Cir. Krain- filed motion to dismiss sequently 1988). A exception narrow exists “where granted complaint. The district ski’s 70-71, According- sought prospective is nature U.S. at S.Ct. 2304. relief ongoing ly, may on an violation bring and is based not action statuto- plaintiffs against constitutional or or UNLV the UNLV federal ry (emphasis in rights.” origi- Id. at 1161 capacities in their official under Monell. 277-78, nal); Papasan, also 478 U.S. at see III 2932; Indep. Living Ctr. S. S.Ct. Cal., Maxwell-Jolly, Inc. properly The district court dismissed Cir.2009) (9th (“[A] may ... plaintiff against Krainski’s constitutional claims action to compel maintain federal state Employees in personal capac- their compliance with prospective official’s qualified immunity. ities basis (citations rights.”) omit- plaintiffs federal State officials are entitled to ted). qualified immunity damages suits that the conclude district court We as their “insofar conduct does violate properly dismissed claims clearly statutory established constitu against the Eleventh UNLV under rights tional of which a person reasonable Amendment. concedes the would have known.” v. Fitzger Harlow University system Nevada and its constitu ald, agencies ent institutions are and instru (1982). “Determining L.Ed.2d 396 wheth mentalities of State within of Nevada qualified immunity er officials are owed the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. (1) whether, inquiries: involves two taken v. Rights

See Disabled Action Comm. Las light most party favorable to the Inc., Events, Vegas 861, n. 17 883 asserting injury, the facts show (9th Cir.2004) (noting that the Nevada the officer’s conduct a violated constitu System Higher of Education is immune (2) so, right; tional if whether the from suit under the Eleventh Amend right clearly was light established in ment). Accordingly, the district court specific context of the case.” v. al-Kidd properly dismissed Krainski’s claims (9th Cir.2009) 949, Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 964 against UNLV. Katz, 194, 201, (citing Saucier v. 533 U.S. (2001)). 2151, 121 S.Ct. 150 L.Ed.2d 272 The district court also properly dis right clearly “For constitutional be against missed the claims UNLV Em established, its contours must suffi ployees in capacities. their official See Police, clear that ciently a reasonable official Dep’t v. Mich. Will 491 State of 71, 58, 2304, doing U.S. 109 would understand that what he is S.Ct. 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) Pelzer, right.” that that (clarifying against Hope suits violates v. state 536 730, 739, 2508, in their official are 122 capacity officials no U.S. 153 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (2002) (internal different from against suits the state it quotation 666 marks omit self). ted). “It is within our ‘sound discretion’ to any two prongs sequence address these Krainski also asserts a theory under al-Kidd, fit.” we see 580 F.3d at 964 Monell that rights her constitutional were — Callahan, (quoting Pearson v. U.S. infringed a “de facto policy” of UNLV —, 808, 818, 129 172 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 565 Employees. and the UNLV See Monell v. (2009)). N.Y., Dep’t Social Servs. 436 U.S. 658, 2018, n. 690 56 A (1978). However, L.Ed.2d 611 the Su- The district preme expressly properly Court has declined ex- theory Goff, municipal liability police tend Monell’s concluded that officers UNLV Will, § under 1983 to state Tramposch entities. and Culver violated Krainski’s against from action UNLV right to be free Fourth Amendment probable absent cause. based on defendants’ entitlement arrest warrantless by- supported immunity. must be qualified A warrantless arrest the Fourth comport cause to with probable B States, Henry United Amendment. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134

U.S. The district court did not err in conclud (1959). if the “Probable cause exists facts qualified immunity ing precluded to the officer and circumstances known Krainski’s substantive due claims believing man in prudent warrant a against the In or individual defendants. committed.” Id. offense has been [an] viability qualified of a der to determine if the mistaken that officers were “[E]ven claim, immunity we whether the determine existed, they cause arrest ... probable right violated constitutional defendants liability if are nonetheless immune right and whether the constitutional was Fuller v. their mistake was reasonable.” clearly established the time of the de (9th Jewelry, M.G. Katz, fendants’ actions. Saucier (citation omitted). Cir.1991) and footnote S.Ct. 150 L.Ed.2d (2001). Callahan, Under Pearson Here, Krainski herself admitted — —, Goff, Tram officers (2009), may begin L.Ed.2d 565 we her pursuant and Culver arrested posch immunity qualified analysis considering by Polee and two UNLV to statements clearly is a violation of whether there es Life Coordinators and other Residential law indicating determining without whether investigative information tablished pair had attacked Polee with a violation occurred. allege Krainski failed to scissors. guarantee of substantive any complaint argument at oral facts “heightened protec process provides had of the officers suggesting tion government interference against suspect falsity of reason to the state liberty rights fundamental and in certain other made the victim two ments Washington Glucksberg, v. 521 terests.” instead, university employees; merely she 2258, 117 U.S. S.Ct. 138 L.Ed.2d conclusory in a fashion that (1997). guaranteed “liberty” 772 “knew, known, have officers or should yet fully the Due Process Clause has ... false” and that were presents “a rational circumscribed investi they adequate to conduct an faded which, in broadly speaking, continuum gation. any The record does contain from a freedom all substantial arbi cludes genuine would create a information that trary impositions purposeless re material fact as to whether the issue of straints, and which ... recognizes also sufficiently had facts detailed to officers require particularly that certain interests person to cause a reasonable believe a scrutiny careful needs asserted state crime had been committed and that Raich v. justify abridgment.” their con perpetrator. Krainski was the We (9th Cir.2007) Gonzales, 850, 500 F.3d qualified immunity as applies, clude that 497, Ullman, 543, (quoting Poe v. 367 U.S. “a officer could have be reasonable (1961) (Har 6 L.Ed.2d his lawful” lieved that or her conduct was lan, J., protections dissenting)). “The of suspect following re arresting when process have for the most substantive due and a university employees two port from relating to matters part been accorded an We thus af alleging student attack. and the family, procreation, marriage, court’s firm the district dismissal right integrity.” Albright Oli- bodily cause of Fourth Amendment ver, process protection S.Ct. than as Ewing, (1994) (citations omitted). L.Ed.2d 114 does not allege she was suspended or dismissed from the university, but merely her right Krainski claims that of sub- that she received a disciplinary notation on process stantive due was violated when a In her record. the absence of any other university allegedly placed official an un- precedent affirming a pro- substantive due disciplinary warranted notation on her cess violation under facts analogous to transcript.4 here, those we are compelled to conclude To determine whether a constitu the contours of right Krainski been right “clearly tional has established” asserts were not sufficiently clear qualified immunity purposes, we must reasonable official would understand that “survey legal landscape and examine he what or she is doing right. violates that are those cases that most like the instant Accordingly, affirm we the district court’s Gates, case.” Trevino v. quali- dismissal of the claim on the basis of (9th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). The in immunity fied without reaching the under- quiry in light “must be undertaken lying question. case, specific context of the not as a broad Saucier, general proposition.” C 201, 121 Finally, that UNLV has pres been unable to and various UNLV violated persuasive procedural ent us with binding process or au due rights in con- thority proposition for the that a nection with a disciplinary school hearing. substan process Qualified immunity tive due protects violation occurs when a school offi- university cials from places official these unwarranted claims. disciplinary on notation a transcript. The A procedural claim only case that has been cited to us as has two deprivation elements: of a consti supporting proposition Regents is tutionally protected liberty property in University Michigan Ewing, 474 U.S. terest and adequate procedural denial of (1985). 88 L.Ed.2d 523 protection. Brewster Bd. of Educ. of There, the Supreme Court considered a Dist., Lynwood Sch. Unified public university student’s dismissal ac (9th Cir.1998). grounds six-year ademic degree noted, previously As we have 215-16, at program. Id. 106 507. S.Ct. doctrine of qualified immunity protects Supreme Court denied the student’s state actors when the right substantive due claim on factual at issue was not “clearly at established” grounds, “assum[ing] the of a existence” Saucier, time the of the actions at issue. constitutionally protected interest that de 202, Here, U.S. at 121 533 2151. the implied

rived “an right contract to law was clearly not established that the continued enrollment free from arbitrary type injury of alleges constituted 223, 507; dismissal.” at See id. 106 S.Ct. constitutionally a protected “liberty” or 228-29, (Pow see also id. at 106 S.Ct. 507 “property” interest. ell, J., concurring) (arguing that it was “unnecessary to assume the existence” of The Supreme Court has had to occasion a such right). “dubious” Krainski’s case consider inquiry this threshold in several presents a weaker claim First, to in substantive due cases. Lopez, Goss v. 419 U.S. dispute 4. The disciplinary defendants placed transcript has not the into placed notation was on transcript, her and evidence.

971 (1975), 729, “shoplifter” 565, designation 725 he the 95 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d damage reputation “serious- temporary held that would his Supreme Court the impair employment opportu- his future high ly school students suspensions public of nities,” Supreme the Court held that he hearing implicated without notice or “avoid[ing] in not state claim for violation of his protected interest did students’ procedural process rights. the edu- Id. at unfair or exclusion from mistaken 711-12, all of unfortunate 96 S.Ct. 1155. process, cational its 729. at 95 S.Ct. consequences.” Id. Here, allege Krainski does that the that, chosen “[hjaving The Court reasoned suspended or expelled to an to right extend the education conduct, that she her for her or was other generally, class appellees’ [the of people deprived an entitlement to edu wise of may right on not withdraw state] by by conferred the state or cation secured absent, of fundamen- grounds misconduct source independent some other or under procedures to determine whether tally fair standing. She that the de instead occurred.” Id. at the misconduct has reputation by her damaged fendants 95 S.Ct. of charging with violations the Student Code; Roth, finding the Su- Regents “Responsible” In Board Conduct of profes- charges; “tarnishing of those preme [her] Court held that assistant university transcript at a state educational and record.” Such sor without tenure mere constitutionally protected liberty allegations reputational or amount to had no and, employ- injury meaning within in his continued Paul property interest 564, 569, more, university. do not rise to level of a ment without (1972). constitutionally In deprivation protected L.Ed.2d property or interest. holding, liberty observed dicta so the Court suggestion allegation of “loss of future income” is there “no was State, materially indistinguishable the re- from the Paul declining re-employ defamatory him stigma plaintiffs assertion that spondent, imposed flyer employment future disability “impair that foreclosed his freedom would his other Likewise, advantage employment opportunities.” take of other are not “psychological trauma” sufficient opportunities.” Id. satisfy “stigma-plus” Paul’s test. Rolon Davis, Finally, Supreme Paul (2d Henneman, F.3d Cir. the reach of expressly Court circumscribed 2008) (humiliation, embarrassment, “reputa- Roth and held that both and Goss cognizable pro are not emotional distress alone, tangible from some more apart tion “ Paul). tected interests under Nor are or interests,” ‘liberty’ or does not constitute conclusory suggestions of the “loss of lib ‘property’ itself sufficient to invoke Graber, erty.” Sprecher v. F.2d Due Process procedural protection (2d Cir.1983) (speculative allegations 709-10, Clause.” insufficient). Thus, liberty as to loss of (1976); 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 see 96 S.Ct. opining constitutionality to the without as Miller, Technologies, Inc. v. also WMX conduct, easily of the we can conclude that 1315, (9th Cir.1996) (announcing F.3d clearly at the the law was not established test”). “stigma-plus a that Paul established put to on time so as a reasonable official challenged had the plaintiff The in Paul might that the actions violate the notice by dissemination to hundreds merchants constitution. him “active police flyer listing as an properly granted image. The district court shoplifter” depicting his 695-96, against Krainski her claim Although judgment at 96 S.Ct. 1155. If procedural police the who violation UNLV officers arrest- ed knew or have rights.5 Krainski should known false, allegations against her were police would officers have violated the IV clearly Fourth Amendment’s established court did not abuse its dis The district prohibitions. See Baldwin v. Placer Coun- denying in leave to cretion Krainski amend (9th Cir.2005). ty, 418 F.3d 970-71 complaint. her United States v. Smith- however, majority, The deems Krainski’s Beecham, Inc., Kline 1051 Fourth conclusory Amendment claim too (9th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). “Dis to survive. without leave to amend is improper missal complaint Krainski’s is than “legal more clear, review, upon it novo unless is de conclusions” or of the elements “recital[ ] could not saved complaint by any — action,” of a Iqbal, cause of Ashcroft Res., amendment.” Thinket Ink Inc. Info. U.S.—, 1937, 1949, 1950, Inc., Microsystems, v. Sun (2009), L.Ed.2d 868 she alleges because (9th Cir.2004). To survive motion more simply than police lacked dismiss, to a complaint must contain suffi probable alleges cause arrest her. She cient a facially plau factual matter to state in some detail factual circumstances — Iqbal, sible claim relief. Ashcroft under place. which the arrest took See —, Majority Op. She also facts (2009). Here, L.Ed.2d 868 Krainski con that explain why proba lacked ceded that there were no new facts that namely, “knew, ble that the police cause— complaint would include to over known, or should have allega come shortcomings. its Under the circum tions[against were her] false.” stances, we conclude that the district court That allegation enough satisfy is Fed did not abuse its discretion in denying 8(a) eral Rule of Civil Procedure and to leave to her complaint. amend 12(b)(6). survive a under motion Rule The AFFIRMED. Supreme approved has expressly Court as adequate analogous complaint alleging FLETCHER, B. Judge, Circuit negligence. N.A., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema part concurring dissenting in part: 534 U.S. 513 n. district erred dismissing (2002) L.Ed.2d 1 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. Fourth Amendment claim (2000)). app. Form 9 “On June abused its discretion dismissing the public highway Boylston called Street in complaint without leave amend. I Boston, Massachusetts, negli defendant respectfully therefore dissent gently drove a motor against plain vehicle portion majority’s opinion that af- tiff who crossing was then highway.” said firms the district court’s decision in those app. Fed.R.Civ.P. Form 9.1 as Krain Just respects. complaint ski’s does respect to her Therefore, suggest complaint, did not in her the First Circuit's decision in Ga Newman, (1st briefing, argument or at oral 582 F.2d 100 brilowitz Cir. 1978), inapposite disciplinary hearing pre absence of counsel at the is to the circumstances here, sented and we decline argument, violated to address the constitution. At oral raised in circumstances that case. permitted she that the admitted defendants hearing attorney attend to the with her and arguing conceded that she was not that Appendix 1. "The forms in the suffice under representation hearing. was entitled to at simplicity the these rules and illustrate the Inc., claim, Microsystems, Form 9 Inc. v. Sun 368 F.3d Fourth Amendment Cir.2004)). (9th out of it the circumstances Here is clear factual sketches negligence complaint by claim for be legal the that the could saved which terms, when, where, amendment, in general majority’s even under the arose— But com- claim arose. Krainski’s how the current complaint. evaluation the more, not alleges explains for she plaint an opportunity Krainski is entitled to surrounding but only the circumstances any inadequacies complaint. the cure police the manner which precise the wrongly majority The asserts to arrest her. probable cause lacked there were facts Krainski conceded no new contrast, simply negli- by alleges Form could to save her complaint. that she use specifying why without the driver gence argument, when asked how At oral about for negligent (by driving quickly, too was complaint, amend he could the counsel distracted). being Krain- example, or Krainski stated: for a has stated a claim adequately ski certainly of many are aware more We violation of the Fourth Amendment. now facts than we were when we first majority right if were Even the complaint. essentially, the So drafted allegations Amendment Krainski’s Fourth allegations could add com- we to the wrong to conclusory, are it would still be plaint point specific at this is to be more court’s without affirm district dismissal conspiracy the actual took about to amend. leave between, who place, it occurred what did not address The district court even actually officials were involved school complaint. to amend request this. court’s failure to exer- district “[a] Because arg. at 4:46-5:10. Part Oral an abuse of dis- cise discretion constitutes course, conspiracy, of was the fact that the Co., cretion,” Optical v. Bristow Caudle police officers who made the arrest knew (9th (citation Cir.2000) have that the allegations or should known omitted), quotation marks we should Krainski were false. Counsel was against remand, requiring the district at least telling that he could “more thus us be way or its discretion one exercise why police about how and specific” the other. knew should have known the officers it importantly, easy is to think More majority pos- The be false. that could save the com- an amendment a concession that was never made. its majority’s from the strictures— plaint discovery Krainski is entitled to to sub- why specify and how Krainski could Amendment claim she stantiate Fourth “knew, known, that or should have complaint; pre- in her properly allegations [against were false.” her] facts, allege additional she should pared acknowledges majority rightly her complaint.2 be allowed to amend also im- leave to amend is without “[dismissal I therefore dissent. clear, upon de novo proper unless it is review, complaint not be could Op. Majority

saved amendment.” Res., (quoting Thinket Ink Info. hearing disciplinary while criminal brevity contemplate.” Fed. tion at that these rules against charges pending were her —could R.Civ.P. explicitly in an com- stated amended more Newman, plaint. See specifically that I note Gabrilowitz (1st Cir.1978). representa- claim—that she was allowed

Case Details

Case Name: Krainski v. Nevada Ex Rel. Board of Regents

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Date Published: Aug 2, 2010

Citation: 616 F.3d 963

Docket Number: 08-17523

Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.