NICHOLAS FRANCIS DEYO v. PHILLIP R. ECK, Manor Township Police; CPL. TICE, Manor Township Police; OFC. HAAS, East Hempfield Police; OFC. TORRES, East Hempfield Police; CHRIS MILLER, District Attorney; CODY WADE, District Attorney; and CHERYL STEBERGER, Warden of the Lancaster County Prison
CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-1658
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
September 27, 2023
Smith, J.
Smith, J. September 27, 2023
The pro se plaintiff, a pretrial detainee confined in a Pennsylvania county jail awaiting the resolution of firearm and other related criminal charges, is proceeding in forma pauperis in this action where he has now filed an amended complaint seeking relief under
I. ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The pro se plaintiff, Nicholas Francis Deyo (“Deyo”), commenced this action by filing a complaint against the Manor Township Police Department (“MTPD”) and MTPD Officer Phillip R. Eck (“Officer Eck”), which was docketed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on April 26, 2023.1 See Doc. No. 1. A day later, the Honorable Martin C.
Upon review of the docket, Deyo had not paid the filing fee or filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis when he filed the complaint. As such, the clerk of court entered an order on May 4, 2023, giving Deyo 30 days from the date of the order to remit the filing fee or file an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See Doc. No. 8. In response to this order, Deyo submitted an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (the “IFP Application”) and a prisoner trust fund account statement, both of which the clerk‘s office docketed on May 22, 2023. See Doc. Nos. 10, 11. Along with these two documents, Deyo submitted a motion for a preliminary injunction, see Doc. No. 9, which this court denied via an order entered on May 26, 2023. See Doc. No. 12.
After reviewing the IFP Application and screening the complaint pursuant to
On June 6, 2023, the clerk of court docketed several submissions from Deyo.5 See Doc. Nos. 15-20. These submissions included: (1) copies of two letters purportedly drafted by two other individuals incarcerated at LCP, see Doc. No. 15; (2) a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, see Doc. No. 16; (3) a copy of Deyo‘s prisoner trust fund account statement, see Doc. No. 17; (4) a motion for appointment of counsel, see Doc. No. 18; (5) a motion for extension of time to file answers and motions, see Doc. No. 19; and (6) a motion for writ of habeas corpus, see Doc. No. 20. On June 7, 2023, the court entered an order which denied Deyo‘s motions and directed that the clerk of court mail a copy of the standard form for the filing of a habeas petition under
Deyo‘s next activity in this case occurred on June 21, 2023, when he filed a notice of appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals instead of filing an amended complaint. See Doc. No. 21. Then, while Deyo‘s appeal was pending before the Third Circuit, he filed an amended complaint that the clerk of court docketed on August 10, 2023. See Doc. No. 25. Five days later, the Third Circuit dismissed Deyo‘s appeal for his failure to prosecute. See Doc. No. 26. With this dismissal, Deyo‘s amended complaint is ripe for screening under
A few minutes after returning to his cruiser, Officer Eck again approached Deyo‘s truck and “ushered him out of the vehicle [despite] lacking reasonable suspicion that there was any criminal activity afoot or that [Deyo] was armed or dangerous.” Id. Officer Eck then asked to see Deyo‘s identification, and Deyo provided him with “a valid New York State driver‘s license.” Id. Officer Eck then asked why Deyo was in the area, and Deyo explained the plans he had with Robinson, “which led to him calling Robinson to confirm [Deyo‘s] intentions.” Id. At this time, Officer Tice arrived, Officer Eck told Deyo that he needed to speak with Officer Tice. See id. at ECF p. 7.
Deyo observed Officer Eck go to his car, get “on and off the phone,” and “act[] strange.” Id. More than ten minutes later, Officer Eck returned to Deyo‘s truck and “began harassing” Deyo,
According to Deyo, while searching the truck Officer Eck “began to tear [it] apart and located the weapons in the back seat.” Id. Officer Eck then “stole [Deyo‘s] hardware,” handcuffed him, and placed him in the back seat of his police cruiser. Id. Deyo remained in the back of Officer Eck‘s cruiser for ten minutes before Officer Eck asked Deyo for consent to search the rest of the truck, “to which [Deyo] obliged.”7 Id. At that point, Officers Eck, Torres, and Haas “tore [Deyo‘s] truck apart, and stole his weapons, body armor, and ammunition (all of which [wa]s registered and serialized in his name, and all receipts for everything [were] in the truck), including his $1,000 USD Samsung phone.” Id. at ECF p. 8. At around the same time, ADA Wade advised Officer Eck to falsely charge Deyo with weapons offenses. See id. at ECF pp. 7–8, 15.
A tow truck was called to transport Deyo‘s truck, and while waiting for its arrival, Deyo observed Officer Eck use his personal phone to text someone the phrase “OH BOY.” Id. at ECF p. 8. Deyo was later transported to the MTPD station, where upon his arrival, Officer Eck “took [him] out of the car and wrenched his arms upward while he was cuffed, to which [Officer] Eck said ‘Sorry.” Id. Then, “sometime after [he] arriv[ed] at the station, Deyo was first advised of his Miranda rights. Id.
Deyo was not permitted to make a phone call, and he was “cuffed to a bench in the back of the station alone for hours and hours [until Officers] Eck and Haas came and admitted that they wantonly prejudiced [Deyo] as an ‘active shooter’ to which [Deyo] responded” he was not.
Affidavit of Probable Cause filed by [Officer] Eck (or one of the versions, anyway) he stated that he pulled up on [Deyo] without activating his lights, in a seeming attempt to assert that he had not engaged in an illegal action, among other serious factual flaws in the report such as that [Deyo was] a person not to possess firearms, as well as charging [Deyo] with altering serial numbers of a firearm, all while having no articulable reason to believe any such crimes occurred, nor were there any circumstances that would lead anyone to believe such things.
Id. at ECF pp. 14–15. Deyo further contends that in the “Application for a Warrant to Search,” Officer Eck falsely noted “that he had reason to believe there may be a presence of explosives and ‘anti-government literature’ all in an attempt to achieve some deliberate and malicious outcome.”8 Id. at ECF p. 15.
“[M]uch later in the evening” of October 29, 2022, Deyo was relocated to LCP, where he has remained in custody. See id. at ECF pp. 8–9. While at LCP, Deyo claims that he has been denied medical treatment and subjected to “cruelly low[-]quality foods” and “subpar” living conditions at LCP, including “extreme heat and cold, black mold, [and] terrible food.” Id. at ECF pp. 9, 16. He also claims that LCP is “critically low on medical staff,” that treatment is “often inadequate” and provided on a “first come-first-serve” basis, and that there is an “utter lack of rehabilitative and mental health services available to [him] and his unfortunate counterparts.” Id. at ECF pp. 11-12, 16–17. Deyo alleges that he filed grievances at LCP regarding these issues, but he has not received responses to those grievances. See id. at ECF pp. 9, 10, 12.
Based on all his allegations, Deyo seeks monetary damages totaling $10 million. See id. at ECF p. 19. He also seeks reimbursement of any costs associated with this civil action and his Lancaster County criminal case. See id.
A. Standard of Review – Screening of Complaint Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
Because Deyo is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court must examine whether the amended complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or asserts a claim against a defendant immune from monetary relief. See
[a] court that considers whether an action is malicious must, in accordance with the definition of the term “malicious,” engage in a subjective inquiry into the litigant‘s motivations at the time of the filing of the lawsuit to determine whether the action is an attempt to vex, injure or harass the defendant.
Id. at 1086. “[A] district court may dismiss a complaint as malicious if it is plainly abusive of the judicial process or merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.” Brodzki v. CBS Sports, Civ. No. 11-841, 2012 WL 125281, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2012).
Concerning the analysis under
In addressing whether a pro se plaintiff‘s amended complaint fails to state a claim, the court must liberally construe the allegations set forth in the amended complaint. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (“At this early stage of the litigation, we accept the facts alleged [in the pro se] complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in [the pro se plaintiff‘s] favor, and ask only whether that complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible . . . claim.” (citation, internal quotation marks, and all original alterations omitted)); Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (“We construe Vogt‘s pro se filings liberally. This means we remain flexible, especially ‘when dealing with imprisoned pro se litigants’ like Vogt.” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2013))); Higgs v. Att‘y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339–40 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that “when presented with a pro se litigant, we have a special obligation to construe his complaint liberally” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Yet, conclusory allegations will not suffice. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
Additionally, when construing a pro se plaintiff‘s amended complaint, the court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Vogt, 8 F.4th at 185 (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 244). However, pro se litigants “cannot flout procedural rules—
B. Analysis
In his amended complaint, Deyo generally asserts that the defendants violated his rights under the United States Constitution and is seeking relief for those violations under
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]
1. Claims Based on Conditions of Confinement and Treatment at LCP
In the initial complaint, Deyo raised claims relating to his confinement and treatment at LCP since his arrest. He alleged generally that he had been refused medical treatment, was subjected to “unlivable” conditions, and experienced excessive and public strip searches. See Compl. at ECF pp. 8, 10. The court dismissed these claims without prejudice because Deyo failed to adequately tie those allegations to the defendants named in the complaint. See June 5, 2023 Mem. Op. at 17–18. The court also instructed Deyo that if he intended to pursue claims relating to his confinement and treatment at LCP against appropriate defendants, he needed to file a separate lawsuit. See id. at 18. Instead of following the court‘s direction, Deyo named Warden Steberger as a defendant in the amended complaint, and he again attempts to raise claims pertaining to his confinement and treatment at LCP. See Am. Compl. at ECF pp. 5, 9, 12, 16–17.
i. Conditions of Confinement
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs claims brought by pretrial detainees challenging their conditions of confinement. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Hubbard I”). To establish a constitutional violation under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee plaintiff would have to plausibly allege that the challenged conditions of confinement amount to punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979) (“In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”); see also Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 373 (“Given pretrial detainees’ federally protected liberty interests . . . under the Due Process Clause . . . a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). When analyzing whether a condition of confinement amounts to punishment, the inquiry generally turns on whether the challenged conditions have a purpose other than punishment and whether the conditions are excessive in relation to that purpose. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39 (“A court must decide whether the [particular restriction or condition accompanying pretrial detention] is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.”); Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 326 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining that, when evaluating claims of punitive conditions of confinement, “[t]he touchstone for the constitutionality of detention is whether conditions of confinement are meant to punish or are ‘but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.” (quoting Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Hubbard II”))); Hubbard I at 158 (discussing analysis of
In addition, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances in assessing whether a prisoner‘s conditions of confinement violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hubbard II, 538 F.3d at 236, 238 (examining totality of circumstances to determine whether conditions of confinement constitute Fourteenth Amendment violation); Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining that “to determine whether conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment, it is necessary to examine the totality of the conditions at the institution”); Union Cnty. Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 1000–01 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing that “the overall length of confinement is only one factor among several that must be considered by a district court in evaluating the totality of circumstances relevant to any alleged constitutional deficiency in shelter”).
“Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both objective and subjective components.” Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68. “[T]he objective component requires an inquiry into whether the deprivation was sufficiently serious and the subjective component whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). In general, when alleging a sufficiently culpable state of mind, a detainee must assert that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference, meaning that they consciously
[i]n determining whether restrictions or conditions are reasonably related to the Government‘s interest in maintaining security and order and operating the institution in a manageable fashion, courts must heed our warning that “[s]uch considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.”
Bell, 441 U.S. at 541 n.23 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
ii. Failure to Provide Medical Treatment
To state a constitutional claim based on the failure to provide medical treatment, a prisoner must allege facts indicating that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner‘s serious medical needs.12 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. A prison official is not deliberately indifferent “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
In addition, “[i]f a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236; see also Carter v. Smith, 483 F. App‘x 705, 708 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Prison officials cannot be held to be deliberately indifferent merely because they did not respond to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison medical staff.”). Thus, “absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are
[e]ven where medical care is ultimately provided, a prison official may nonetheless act with deliberate indifference by delaying the treatment of serious medical needs, . . . though the reason for the delay and the nature of the medical need is relevant in determining what type of delay is constitutionally intolerable.
McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
b. Individual Capacity Claims
Deyo‘s claims based on the conditions of his confinement and medical care at LCP against Warden Steberger fail because he simply has not alleged any basis for concluding that the warden was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official‘s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); see also Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677)).13 In addition, to the extent that Deyo attempts to bring claims against Warden Steberger in her individual capacity based on her role as a supervisor, he has failed to allege a plausible claim for relief.
Deyo may not assert a claim against Warden Steberger based merely on allegations that she supervised individuals at LCP because liability under section 1983 cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior basis. See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep‘t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[Plaintiff] cannot predicate liability on her § 1983 claims on a respondeat superior basis.”
To allege a plausible claim for supervisory liability under the first theory—the policy-and-practice strand of supervisory liability—a plaintiff such as Deyo must
(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the supervisor failed to employ, and show that (2) the existing custom and practice without the identified, absent custom or procedure created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, (3) the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, (4) the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underling‘s violation resulted from the supervisor‘s failure to employ that supervisory practice or procedure. Put another way, the inmate must identify the supervisor‘s specific acts or omissions
demonstrating the supervisor‘s deliberate indifference to the inmate‘s risk of injury and must establish a link between the supervisor, the act, and the injury.
Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227 (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001)). For the second theory of supervisory liability—participating in, directing others to, or knowledge and acquiescence of constitutional violation-generalized allegations that a supervisory defendant is “in charge of” or “responsible for” an office or facility are insufficient to allege personal involvement in an underlying constitutional violation. See Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App‘x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“Saisi asserted that some defendants were in charge of agencies that allowed this to happen, and that liability stemmed merely from defendants’ ‘belief’ that their conduct would be ‘tolerated.’ However, a director cannot be held liable ‘simply because of [their] position as the head of the [agency].” (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005))); Zigler v. Warren, Civ. A. No. 21-19474, 2022 WL 903383, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2022) (“In simpler terms, a supervisor is not liable for the unconstitutional conduct of his employees solely because he is a supervisor.”). Additionally, “[a]lthough a court can infer that a defendant had contemporaneous knowledge of wrongful conduct from the circumstances surrounding a case, the knowledge must be actual, not constructive.” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1995); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1201 n.6).
Here, Deyo has set forth only generalized allegations that the conditions of his confinement at LCP, and his medical care there, violated his constitutional rights. Nonetheless, even presuming that his factual allegations could be liberally construed to support constitutional claims, Deyo has not plausibly alleged a claim of supervisory liability against Warden Steberger. He has not pleaded a municipal policy or custom with respect to the alleged constitutional violations, that such policy or custom caused the constitutional violation, or municipal failures amounting to deliberate
2. Official Capacity Claims and Monell Liability
Deyo also seeks to assert constitutional claims against Warden Steberger pursuant to section 1983 in her official capacity, and claims pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). See Am. Compl. at ECF pp. 2, 18.14 Claims against municipal employees, such as Warden Steberger, in their official capacities, are indistinguishable from claims against the governmental entity that employs them, here, Lancaster County. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55)). “[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Id.
To assert plausible claims against Lancaster County, Deyo must allege that it has a policy or custom which caused the violation of his constitutional rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (“We conclude, therefore, that a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government‘s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”). Deyo cannot satisfy this burden by simply paraphrasing the standard for municipal liability because such allegations are too vague and generalized to support a plausible claim. See, e.g.,
It is not enough to allege the existence of a policy or custom. Instead, “[a] plaintiff must also allege that the policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of [their] injuries.” Id. (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996)). For a custom to be the proximate cause of an injury, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant “had knowledge of similar unlawful conduct in the past, failed to take precautions against future violations, and that its failure, at least in part, led to [the plaintiff‘s] injury.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Overall, a plaintiff must “demonstrat[e] an ‘affirmative link’ between the policy or custom and the particular constitutional violation alleged.” Id. (quoting Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850).
Regardless of whether a plaintiff is seeking to impose Monell liability for a policy or a custom, “it is incumbent upon a plaintiff to show that a policymaker is responsible either for the policy or, through acquiescence, for the custom.” Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850 (explaining that in both methods to obtain
In addition,
[t]here are three situations where acts of a government employee may be deemed to be the result of a policy or custom of the governmental entity for whom the employee works, thereby rendering the entity liable under § 1983. The first is where “the appropriate officer or entity promulgates a generally applicable statement of policy and the subsequent act complained of is simply an implementation of that policy.” Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 417, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (Souter, J., dissenting). The second occurs where “no rule has been announced as policy but federal law has been violated by an act of the policymaker itself.” Id. Finally, a policy or custom may also exist where “the policymaker has failed to act affirmatively at all, [though] the need to take some action to control the agents of the government ‘is so obvious, and the inadequacy of existing practice is likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymaker can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” Id. at 417–18, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)); see also Berg, 219 F.3d at 276 (holding that plaintiff must “demonstrat[e] that the municipal action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ to its known or obvious consequences”).
Natale, 318 F.3d at 584 (alterations in original) (internal footnote omitted).
In this instance, Deyo has failed to allege any facts to support Monell liability against Lancaster County through his official liability claim against Warden Steberger. As already noted, Deyo has not identified a municipal policy or custom concerning the alleged constitutional violations, that such policy or custom caused the constitutional violation, or municipal failures amounting to deliberate indifference. Thus, any official capacity claims against Warden Steberger and Monell claims against Lancaster County are implausible as alleged.
Based on the court‘s analysis above, the court will dismiss without prejudice Deyo‘s claims based on the conditions of his confinement at LCP, and medical care there.15 Once again, the court
2. Claims Against ADAs Wade and Miller
Deyo‘s claims against ADAs Wade and Miller are based on their actions taken during the prosecution of his state criminal case. See Am. Compl. at ECF pp. 7–8, 15 (alleging ADA Wade advised Officer Eck to falsely charge Deyo with weapons offenses); id. at ECF p. 16 (alleging that ADA Miller has “relentlessly pursued these malicious charges” and conspired with Deyo‘s public defender to secure guilty plea). As prosecutors, ADAs Wade and Miller are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under section 1983 for acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” such as “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State‘s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31 (1976). Moreover, district attorneys and other supervisory prosecutors are likewise entitled to absolute immunity from claims based on their role in pursuing a prosecution on behalf of the Commonwealth. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 348–49 (2009). Further, absolute immunity extends to instances of “soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and probable cause hearings,” Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1465 (3d Cir. 1992), presenting a state‘s case at trial, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, and appearing before a judge to present evidence, Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020). Prosecutors are not absolutely immune when they are “not acting as ‘an officer of the court,’ but . . . instead engaged in other tasks, [such as] investigative or administrative tasks.” Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 342 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33). In the end, “whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity depends on whether [they] establish[] that [they were] functioning as the state‘s ‘advocate’ while engaging in the alleged conduct that gives rise to the constitutional violation.” Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006). Because Deyo‘s claims against ADAs Wade and Miller are based upon their actions as prosecutors representing the Commonwealth in the judicial phase of Deyo‘s state criminal proceedings, each is entitled to absolute immunity. Accordingly, the court will dismiss with prejudice Deyo‘s claims against them.
3. Claims Based on Miranda Rights
Deyo suggests that there was some delay in advising him of his Miranda rights during his arrest and subsequent detention. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (holding that when engaging in custodial interrogation, police officers must inform suspect that “[they have] the right to remain silent, that anything [they] say[] can be used against [them] in a court of law, that [they have] the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if [they] cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for [them] prior to any questioning, if [they] so desire[]”); see also Am. Compl. at ECF pp. 8, 12–13 (alleging delay in reading Miranda warnings). To the extent that Deyo seeks to assert a section 1983 claim based on a violation of his Miranda rights, the court must dismiss it with prejudice because Miranda violations do not “provide[] a basis for a claim under § 1983.” Vega v. Tekoh, 142 S. Ct. 2095, 2101 (2022); see also id. (reasoning that “a violation of Miranda is not itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment” and finding “no justification for expanding Miranda to confer a right to sue under § 1983”).
Deyo‘s remaining claims against Officers Eck, Tice, Haas, and Torres are best construed as alleging violations of his rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court understands Deyo to be asserting Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and unreasonable search and seizure.17 He also asserts a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the alleged fabrication of evidence against him.18 Despite Deyo‘s assertion of these claims, the
This court is obliged to abstain from considering certain types of cases pursuant to the principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). “To promote comity between the national and state governments,” the Younger abstention doctrine “requires federal courts to abstain from deciding cases that would interfere with certain ongoing state proceedings.” Malhan v. Sec‘y United States Dep‘t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Sprint Commc‘ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77–78 (2013)). When determining whether Younger abstention is proper, the court first must examine the underlying state court litigation to determine whether it falls into one of three categories of cases: (1) criminal prosecutions, (2) civil enforcement proceedings, and (3) civil proceedings involving orders in furtherance of the state courts’ judicial function. See PDX N., Inc. v. Comm‘r N.J. Dep‘t of Labor & Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871, 882 (3d Cir. 2020)
At the second stage, the court must consider three factors, whether: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in the state proceeding. See Malhan, 938 F.3d at 462–64 (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assoc., 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). The Younger requirements are clearly met in this case. First, the publicly available docket for Deyo‘s criminal case indicates that the proceeding is still pending. Second, the state proceedings implicate the important interest of enforcing the Commonwealth‘s criminal laws. Third, the criminal proceedings provide Deyo an adequate opportunity to raise in the state forum federal constitutional defenses to his prosecution. See Jaffery v. Atl. Cnty. Prosecutor‘s Office, 695 F. App‘x 38, 40–41 (3d Cir. 2017) (concluding Younger applied where “[t]here are ongoing state criminal proceedings in the Superior Court of New Jersey that are judicial in nature, the state proceedings implicate the important state interest in prosecuting criminal behavior, and the state proceedings provide Jaffery an opportunity to raise federal constitutional defenses to prosecution”). Further, Deyo has failed to plausibly allege that his claims fall within any of the narrow exceptions to the Younger doctrine.19 See Stagliano v. Coll, No. 22-2691, 2023 WL 3943732, at *4 (3d Cir. June 12, 2023) (per curiam) (affirming district court‘s application of Younger doctrine where plaintiff failed to plausibly plead that state proceedings were being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstances
Based on the above, this court finds that it is appropriate to abstain from entertaining the claims against Officers Eck, Tice, Haas, and Torres out of deference to the state judicial process. Accordingly, the court will stay Deyo‘s claims for damages based on alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during the pendency of the state criminal proceedings. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393–94 (2007) (“If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before [they] have been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.”);20 Rex v. Fisher, Civ. A. No. 12-4045, 2012 WL 3537846, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2012) (staying false arrest and illegal search claims for damages in light of pending criminal prosecution when plaintiff “ha[d] the opportunity to raise his Fourth-Amendment challenges in the course of his criminal proceeding”); Ellis v. Mondello, No. Civ. A. 05-1492, 2005 WL 1703194, at *3 (D.N.J. July 20, 2005) (“[A]ssuming the criminal action is still pending in a state trial or appellate court, review of the state court proceedings would be barred; a district court cannot interfere in a pending state criminal action in order to consider issues that a plaintiff can raise there.” (citation omitted)); see also Borowski v. Kean Univ., 68 F.4th 844, 855 (3d Cir. 2023)
III. CONCLUSION
As set forth more fully above, the court will dismiss without prejudice Deyo‘s claims based on the conditions of his confinement at LCP, and his medical care there, for the failure to state a claim. The court will also dismiss without prejudice any purported state-created danger claim. Because these claims are (1) asserted only against Warden Steberger, (2) independent of the claims subject to the Younger stay, and (3) would be otherwise severable under
As for Deyo‘s claims against Officers Eck, Tice, Haas, and Torres, the court will stay those claims pursuant to Younger. Deyo may move to reopen this aspect of his case following resolution of his criminal case.23
The court will enter a separate order.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Edward G. Smith
EDWARD G. SMITH, J.
Notes
441 U.S. at 538–39 (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted).Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn on whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it]. Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to punishment. Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.
Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496–97 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, . . . whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight[,] . . . the duration of the [officers‘] action[s], whether the action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time.
Black, 835 F.3d at 372 (footnote omitted).[a]side from the causation requirement, there are other hurdles facing a plaintiff alleging a due process violation for fabrication of evidence. For instance, . . . a . . . plaintiff[] . . . [must] demonstrate that the fabricated evidence “was so significant that it could have affected the outcome of the criminal case.” See Halsey, 750 F.3d at 295. In addition, there is a notable bar for evidence to be considered “fabricated.” . . . “[T]estimony that is incorrect or simply disputed should not be treated as fabricated merely because it turns out to have been wrong.” Id. There must be “persuasive evidence supporting a conclusion that the proponents of the evidence” are aware that evidence is incorrect or that the evidence is offered in bad faith. Id. [As such, it] will be an unusual case in which a police officer cannot obtain a summary judgment in a civil action charging him with having fabricated evidence used in an earlier criminal case.” Id. at 295.