*1 ATTORNEY OF LOS YOUNGER, DISTRICT v. HARRIS ANGELES COUNTY et al. 16, Reargued April Argued April 29 and November No. 2. 196 9 February 23, 197 0 Decided Court, in J., opinion of the which BurgeR, delivered the Black, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., Stewart, Blackmun, C. Harlan, joined, post, p. J., J., concurring opinion, in which filed a Harlan, *2 result, in J., opinion concurring in the filed an 54. Brennan, JJ., joined, post, p. 56. Douglas, which and Marshall, White J., dissenting opinion, post, p. filed a 58. Jr., Thompson, Attorney K. General Deputy Clifford on the appellant of the cause for California, argued Jr., Harris, At- second Albert W. Assistant reargument. torney appellant the for on the General, argued cause With original argument reargument. and on the first Attorney Lynch, them on the briefs were Thomas C. Younger, pro Evelle J. se. General, and argued appellees A. L. Wirin the cause for on the Fred With him on the briefs were Okrand rearguments. Rosenwein argued and Frank S. Pestaña. Sam the cause on the him on appellees original argument. With Mr. Pestaña. brief was of opinion Mr. Justice delivered the the Court. Black indicted in a Appellee, Harris, Jr., John was California court, charged with violation California known §§ Penal Code as California Syndicalism Act, Criminal set out below.1 He then filed 11400. “§ Definition “ any syndicalism’ doctrine ‘Criminal as used this article means advocating, teaching aiding abetting precept or or the com- crime, (which hereby meaning sabotage word defined mission of as physical damage injury physical property), and malicious or wilful of or unlawful of force and violence or unlawful methods acts accomplishing change in a means of industrial owner- terrorism as control, effecting any political change.” ship or or Offense; punishment 11401. “§ “Any person who: advocates, By personal spoken or conduct
“1. or written words syndicalism necessity duty, or aids and abets criminal or the teaches committing crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful propriety complaint Court, Federal District asking that enjoin court to appellant, Younger, the District At- torney of Los Angeles County, from prosecuting him, alleging prosecution and presence even the of the Act him inhibited in the exercise of rights his free speech and press, rights him guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Appellees Amendments. Jim Dan and Diane Hirsch intervened plaintiffs in the suit, claiming the prosecution of Harris would inhibit them as members the Progressive Party Labor from peacefully advocating the program party, which was to re- place capitalism with socialism and to abolish the profit system production country. this Appellee Farrell Broslawsky, history instructor in at Los Angeles Val- *3 ley also College, intervened claiming prosecution that the him Harris made uncertain as to whether he could method of terrorism as a of accomplishing means change in indus- ownership control, effecting any trial or political or change; or Wilfully deliberately by “2. and spoken justifies or written words attempts justify or syndicalism criminal or the commission or attempt crime, sabotage, to commit violence or unlawful methods of terrorism approve, with intent to advocate or further the doctrine syndicalism; criminal or Prints, publishes, edits,
“3. publicly or displays issues circulates or any book, paper, pamphlet, document, poster printed or written or any form, matter in containing carrying other or printed or written advocacy, teaching, of,, or aid and advising, abetment or criminal syndicalism; or Organizes
“4. organizing, or knowingly assists or or becomes any of, organization, a member society, group assemblage or persons organized advocate, or assembled to teach or aid and abet syndicalism; or Wilfully by personal conduct, practices
“5. act or any or commits advised, advocated, taught act or aided and abetted the doctrine precept or syndicalism, of criminal with intent accomplish change ownership control, industrial or effecting political change; felony guilty punishable by imprisonment
“Is of a and in the prison years.” one nor more not less than than 14 from the Marx or read of Karl about the doctrines teach All his classwork. part Manifesto Communist restrained court the United States claimed that unless imme- suffer of Harris each would prosecution the state Dis- A Federal injury. three-judge irreparable diate and C. § to 28 U. S. Court, pursuant trict convened to restrain jurisdiction power had and held that it held that the State’s Attorney prosecuting, from District and Syndicalism vagueness Act was void for Criminal the First and Fourteenth in violation of overbreadth the District restrained Amendments, accordingly currently of the Attorney from “further plaintiff alleged Harris for viola- pending against action (1968). F. Supp. 507, tion of the Act.” 281 District appeal by on The case is before us State’s pursuant § to 28 C. 1253. Attorney Younger, U. S. appeal jurisdictional notice of and his statement his (1) whether the deci- appellant presented questions: two California, Whitney sion of this Court U. in 1927 was 357, holding California’s law constitutional (2) on whether the binding the District Court State’s law on its In this Court the brief is constitutional face. California, request, for the filed at our also State who argues only Harris, indicted, standing was has challenge law, State’s issuance judicial a violation of a longstanding was *4 provides: and of 28 which policy 2283, § U. S. C. “A may court of the United not grant States an stay in a proceedings except State court expressly authorized Act of or Congress, where in jurisdiction, protect aid of its or to necessary or effectuate its judgments.” Coast Line R. g., Engineers, e. Atlantic Co. v. See, (1970). Without 281, regard ques- 285-286 to the U. S. Whitney California, tions raised supra, about v. since by Brandenburg Ohio, overruled v. 444 (1969), 395 U. S. constitutionality law, or the of the state we have con- cluded that the judgment Court, enjoin- District appellant ing Younger from prosecuting under these California statutes, must be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding stay federal courts to enjoin pending court proceedings except spe- under cial express circumstances.2 We no view about circumstances under which may federal courts act when prosecution there is no in pending state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun.
I Appellee Harris has been indicted, actually was being prosecuted by California for violation a of its Syndicalism Criminal Act at the time this suit was filed. He thus has acute, live controversy with the State prosecutor. its But none of the parties plain- other tiff in the District Court, Dan, Hirsch, or Broslawsky, has a such controversy. None has been indicted, arrested, or even threatened prosecutor. About these three the three-judge said: court
“Plaintiffs Dan and Hirsch allege that are they members of the Progressive Party, Labor which advocates change industrial ownership and polit- ical change, and they that' feel inhibited in advo- 2Appellees explicitly did declaratory ask for judgment a complaint. They did, however, ask grant the District Court to may “such other and just further relief as to the Court seem proper,” and granted the District declaratory Court fact judgment. opinion today For the stated in reasons our in Samuels Mackell, post, p. declaratory we hold that relief is also im proper when involving challenged pending statute is in state court at the time the federal suit is initiated. *5 through party political of their program
eating presence of the because means, non-violent peaceful, pending and because the Act 'on the books/ Bros- Plaintiff Harris. against prosecution he that alleges he instructor, and history is a lawsky practice normal his as to whether uncertain is Karl doctrines about his students teaching Manifesto from Communist reading Marx and him to subject may works revolutionary and other Supp., 281 F. of the Act.” for violation prosecution at 509. prosecuted under being who is right Harris,
Whatever Bros- Hirsch, and may have, Dan, syndicalism law state had If three him. these it with lawsky cannot share conduct for the prosecuted would be they alleged that had Court and if the District engage in, they planned admission on the to be true —either allegation found this other evidence— or on attorney district the State’s But be said to exist. controversy might genuine then a Broslawsky do not claim Hirsch, and appellees Dan, here prosecution, threatened with have ever been they prosecution a is likely, a or even that prosecution bring this They right claim the remotely possible. complaint, of their because, language in the solely suit this allegation, “feel inhibited.” We do think they jurisdiction true, bring equitable even if is sufficient to play enjoin pending into a of the federal courts stop prosecution A federal lawsuit to prosecution. persons a serious matter. And no having state court is except those that are imaginary fears of state accepted appropriate plain- not to be speculative, are Zwickler, Golden v. tiffs in such cases. See 394 U. S. prosecuted Harris is (1969). actually being Since proceed we him challenged laws, however, under the with proper party. aas
II Since the of beginning country’s this history Congress has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from inter- ference by federal courts. In 1793 an Act uncondition- ally provided: shall a “[N]or writ be granted stay proceedings . . . court of a 335, Stat. c. 22, § 5. A comparison of the 1793 Act with 28 U. S. §C. 2283, its present-day successor, graphically illustrates how and few minor have been the exceptions granted from the flat, prohibitory language of the old Act. all During this lapse of years from 1793 to 1970 the exceptions statutory to the 1793 congressional enactment have been only three: (1) “except as ex- pressly authorized by Act of Congress”; (2) “where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction”; (3) protect “to or effectuate its judgments.” In addition, judicial a exception to the longstanding policy evidenced the statute has been made where person about prose- be cuted in a state court can show that he if will, the proceeding the state court is not enjoined, suffer irrep- arable damages. parte See Ex Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908).3 precise
The reasons for this longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state pro- court ceedings have never been specifically identified but primary sources of policy are plain. One is the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable 3For an interesting discussion of history congressional this policy up Toucey see v. New York Co., Ins. 314 U. S. Life (1941). may orig- doctrine relief.
injury equitable if denied to the peculiar circumstances out of inally grown have country, in this applicable system and judicial English juris- equity restraining purpose its fundamental but important under equally limits narrow diction within the role of erosion prevent in order to Constitution, our proceedings legal duplication avoid a jury adequate to suit would single where legal sanctions reason underlying This rights asserted. protect *7 crim- with interfering from equity of courts restraining more vital by' even reinforced prosecutions inal is is, proper that a “comity,” the notion consideration, fact that functions, recognition a for respect state separate of Union up made a country entire is the the belief that and a continuance governments, state if and best will fare States Government the National separate perform to left free their institutions are ways. perhaps separate This, for in their functions way it, to is referred and clearer describe lack of a better and one familiar with many Federalism,” as “Our Con- our Federal debates that ushered profound respect those who is bound into existence stitution of “Our Fed- loyal ideals and dreams remain to the blind deference to concept does not mean eralism.” it centralization any more than means Rights” “States’ in our every important issue National of control over rejected The Framers both and its courts. Government concept represent does What these courses. to the sensitivity legitimate in there is system which Governments, National interests of both State it Government, though anxious in which the National protect rights federal may to vindicate and federal ways to do in always so that will interests, endeavors with the activities of the unduly legitimate interfere not forgotten never be this slogan, It should States. early days born Federalism,” struggling “Our our Union States, occupies highly important place in our history Nation’s and its future.
This brief discussion should be enough to suggest
some
why
of the reasons
it has been perfectly natural
for our
repeat
cases to
time and time again that
when,
normal
thing to do
federal courts are asked to
enjoin
pending proceedings
state courts is not to issue
injunctions.
such
Boykin,
Fenner v.
“Ex Young, 209 U. 123, and following cases have established the doctrine that when abso- lutely necessary protection of constitutional rights courts of the United States power have to en- join state officers from instituting criminal actions. *8 But may this not be done except under extraordinary circumstances where the danger irreparable loss is both great immediate. Ordinarily, there should be no interference with such officers; pri- marily, they are charged with duty the of prosecuting offenders against the laws of the State and must decide when and how this is to be done. The accused should first up rely set upon his defense in the state even courts, though this involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate protection.” Id., at 243-244. principles,
These made clear in the Fenner case, have been repeatedly followed and reaffirmed in other cases involv- ing prosecutions. threatened g., See, e. Spielman Motor
46 Missouri Beal v. (1935); 89 Dodge, 295 U. S. Co. v.
Sales Buck, 313 v. Watson (1941); 45 Co., S. 312 U. Pac. R. Miller, Williams (1941); U. S. Jeannette, 319 U. S. City Douglas v.
(1942); (1943). importance the stressed the Court of these cases
In all prerequisite traditional the injury, irreparable showing however, addition, injunction. obtaining to in of the fundamental view made clear also Court criminal with state interference federal against policy un- is insufficient injury irreparable even prosecutions, Fenner, supra. and immediate.” great “both less is it anxiety, cost, particular, in types injury, Certain single a against having defend and inconvenience of con- not themselves could prosecution, criminal sense of that special legal in the “irreparable” sidered federally plaintiff’s threat to the Instead, term. be eliminated one cannot must be protected rights See, prosecution. single against defense his Young, Thus, in the g., parte supra, at 145-147. e. Ex supra, 400, we case, Buck at stressed: stat- state criminal injunctions against “Federal entirety respect with to their utes, either prohibitions, are to be separate and distinct course, even if statutes matter such as a granted ‘No or member of are unconstitutional. citizen prosecution, immune from community good The imminence alleged for his criminal acts. faith, even to be though alleged of such hence is not alone ground unlawful unauthorized extraordinary which exerts its equity relief prevent irreparable only injury powers *9 Beal seeks its aid.’ v. Missouri who plaintiff Pacific 312 Corp., U. S. 49.” Railroad
47 Douglas, And similarly, supra, we made clear, after reaffirming this that: rule,
“It does not appear from the
that
record
petitioners
have been
any
threatened with
injury other
than
every
incidental
criminal proceeding brought
lawfully
good faith .
..
S.,U.
at 164.
This is where the law stood when the Court decided
Dombrowski
Pfister,
v.
(1965), and held
against
the enforcement of certain
state criminal
statutes
could properly issue under
presented
circumstances
in that
Dombrowski,
case.4 In
4 Neither the cases dealing with standing to raise claims of vague
ness
overbreadth,
g.,
e.
Alabama,
Thornhill v.
(1940),
U.
88S.
nor
loyalty
cases,
oath
g., Baggett
e.
Bullitt,
“But defense of the State’s in which situation prosecution will adequate assure vindication constitutional rights. They that a substan- suggest tial impairment loss of or expression of freedoms of will if appellants occur must await the court’s *11 disposition and ultimate any review of this Court adverse if allegations, true, determination. These clearly irreparable injury.” show S.,U. at 485- 486.
And the Court made clear that even under circum- these stances the injunction District Court the issuing would have power continuing to lift it any at time and remit the plaintiffs tp the state courts if war- circumstances ranted. S., U. at Similarly, 492. in Cameron Johnson, 611 (1968), a divided Court denied an injunction after finding that the record did not estab- necessary lish the bad faith and harassment; the dissent- ing Justices themselves stressed very the limited role to be allowed for injunctions federal against state criminal prosecutions and differed with the only Court on the question particular whether the facts of that case were sufficient to show that the prosecution was brought bad faith.
It against is the background principles these that we must judge propriety under the cir- cumstances the present case. Here a proceeding was already pending in the state court, affording Harris an opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. There is no suggestion that this single prosecution against Harris is brought in bad or only faith is one of a series of repeated prosecutions to which he will subjected. In other words, the injury that Harris solely is faces “that incidental every to criminal proceeding brought lawfully in good faith,” Douglas, supra, and there- fore under the settled doctrine we have already described he is equitable not entitled to relief if “even such statutes Buck, are unconstitutional,” supra. Dom- that thought however, Court,
The District availability broadened substantially decision browski and that prosecutions against injunctions equitable may give courts the federal under that decision or faith of bad showing regard relief, without its “on found statute a state harassment, whenever First in violation overly broad, vague to be face” state- are some there recognize We Amendment. seem that would opinion Dombrowski in the ments already seen, have as we But, argument. this support decision to the unnecessary were such statements had plaintiffs found that the Court because case, long-estab- relief under the equitable basis alleged a rea- regard do not addition, we standards. lished jus- position sufficient support this adduced to sons established from the departure such a substantial tify *12 relief. injunctive availability regarding doctrines in Dombrow- stated true, as the Court undoubtedly It is regu- under statute ski, that “[a] imponderables involves usually lating expression the full exer- inhibit may themselves contingencies at 486. S., 380 U. freedoms.” Amendment cise First it, called effect,” as the Court “chilling But this sort In the intervention. justify federal not itself should satisfactorily cannot be chilling effect place, first Dombrowski injunctive federal relief. eliminated to be issued stated that itself the Court “acceptable if the obtained be lifted State an there could from the state courts. Court construction” limiting prosecutions done, this was made clear once then for conduct before the brought occurring could then made, proper was convictions narrowing construction long deprived as the defendants so were could stand S., at n. 7. The kind of warning. of fair in Dombrowski thus does not effectively granted relief uncertainty as coverage the state eliminate statute and leaves most citizens with virtually the same doubts as before regarding the danger that their conduct might eventually be subjected to criminal sanctions. The chilling effect can, of course, be eliminated by injunction that would prohibit any prosecution whatever for conduct occurring prior to a satisfactory rewriting of the statute. But the States would then be stripped of power all prosecute even the socially dangerous and constitutionally unprotected conduct that had been cov- ered by the statute, until a new statute could be passed by the state legislature and approved by the federal courts in potentially lengthy trial and appellate proceed- ings. Thus, Dombrowski itself the Court carefully reaffirmed the principle that even in the direct prosecu- tion in the State’s own courts, a valid con- narrowing struction can be applied to conduct occurring prior to the date when the narrowing construction was made, the absence of fair warning problems.
Moreover,
existence of a “chilling effect,” even in
the area of First Amendment
rights, has never been
considered a sufficient
basis,
and of itself, for pro-
hibiting state action. Where a statute does not directly
abridge free speech, but —while regulating a subject
within the
power
State’s
—tends
have the incidental
effect
inhibiting First Amendment
rights,
it is well
settled that
the statute can be upheld if the effect on
speech is minor in relation to the need for control of
the conduct and the lack of alternative means for doing
*13
so. Schneider v. State,
52 against laws these enforcing task necessary and
portant believes the State conduct harmful socially the its laws under punishable to be faith good Constitution. basic consideration. more another, all this is
Beyond aof statute constitutionality the testing for Procedures contemplated apparently manner in the “on its face” to enforce all action Dombrowski, enjoining and for then approval obtain court the can until State the statute odds with at fundamentally version, for a modified are in our constitutional courts of the federal the function to declare judiciary duty of the plan. power The from derived analysis inis the final unconstitutional laws brought disputes concrete resolving for responsibility its apparently a decision; for statute before courts con- judges, applied by dispute cannot governing a Supremacy under obligations sistently with would of the application statute Clause, when such an Madison, Marbury v. the Constitution. conflict with responsibility, broad (1803). 1 But this vital Cranch 137 power survey to an unlimited not amount is, as it does before on laws pass judgment books and the statute Ever since to enforce them. upon are called the courts rejected proposal the Constitutional Convention Court render advice Supreme of the having members 5 that, clear it has pending legislation been concerning or contro- this involve a suits of kind “case even when III satisfy of Article requirements versy” sufficient proposed analyzing Constitution, task deficiencies, requiring cor- its statute, pinpointing put before the into statute is of these deficiencies rection appropriate judi- for the if ever task effect, rarely 1787, p. (Far- Convention of Records of Federal See 1911). ed. rand
S3 ciary. The combination relative remoteness of the controversy, on the impact legislative process of the relief sought, above the speculative all amorphous required nature line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, see, g., e. Landry Daley, v. 280 F. Supp. (ND Ill. 1968), rev’d sub Boyle nom. Landry, post, p. 77, ordinarily results in a kind of case is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided. light of this conception fundamental of the Framers toas the proper place of the federal courts the govern- mental processes of passing and enforcing laws, it can seldom be appropriate for these courts to exercise power such of prior approval or veto over the legislative process.
For these reasons, fundamental not only to our federal system but also to the basic functions of the Judicial Branch of the National Government under our Constitu- tion, we hold that the Dombrowski decision should not be regarded as having upset the settled doctrines that always have very confined narrowly the availability of injunctive relief against state prosecutions. We do not think opinion stands for the proposition that a federal court can properly enjoin enforcement of a solely statute on the basis of a showing that statute “on its face” abridges First Amendment rights. There may, of course, be extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment. For example, long ago as the Buck case, supra, we indicated:
“It is of course conceivable that a might statute be flagrantly and patently violative of express con- stitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against *15 apply to it.” be made might an effort
whomever at 402. S., intervention calling for federal unusual situations Other in point attempting no our arise, but there is might also is sufficient they might what be. It specify now to do, as we purposes present hold, case face” possible unconstitutionality of a statute "on its good- does not justify injunction against itself an Harris attempts it, appellee faith to enforce and that any showing faith, harassment, has failed to make of bad or other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable holding relief. Because our rests on the ab- necessary sence the factors under equitable principles justify intervention, federal we have no occasion to consider whether 28 2283, prohibits § U. S. C. which injunction against state proceedings “except court expressly authorized Act of Congress” would of itself controlling under the circumstances of this case.
The judgment of the District reversed, Court is the case is remanded for further proceedings not incon- opinion. sistent with this
Reversed. Stewart, Mr. Justice with whom Mr. Justice Harlan joins, concurring* questions today Court decides important are Perhaps
ones. as important, however, is a recognition today’s of the areas into which do holdings not neces- sarily In extend. all of these cases, the Court only deals opinion applies 7, also to No. Samuels et al. v. *[This Mackell et 9, and No. Fernandez v. Mackell al., 66; al., post, p. et No. Dyson Stein, post, p. 200; et al. 83, Byrne and No. et al. v. Kara al., post, p. lexis et 216.] by a federal court be followed proper policy to
with the declaratory by injunction to intervene when asked contempo- which is in a criminal judgment in a state court. raneously pending the Court policy grounds, on its decisions basing independent concerning questions does not reach any anti-injunction statute, 28 U. S. C. force of the federal “in- not decide whether the word Thus we do § 2283. interpreted to include a 2283 should be junction” § stay declaratory or whether an judgment, “expressly court is authorized” in a state proceedings *16 C. 1871, 1 Act of now 42 U. S. Rights of the Civil § criminal all these cases involve state 1983.1 And since § the considerations that do not deal with prosecutions, we to federal court when it is asked intervene govern a should where, reasons, for various proceedings, in state civil differently.2 Finally, the Court might be struck balance problems involved when a today not resolve the does declaratory or injunctive to give court is asked federal prosecutions. criminal from state relief future 1 Johnson, 613-614, 611, 3; Dom v. 390 U. S. n. See also Cameron 479, Pfister, 484 n. 2. browski v. 380 U. S. traditionally greater equity shown reluctance have Courts ante, at prosecutions than in civil cases. See in criminal intervene Douglas City Jeannette, 157, 163-164. The 319 U. S. 43-44; v. likely proceeding. A less in a civil state interests is to be offense to indica- classify provides criminal some conduct as State’s decision prompt and unencum importance it has ascribed to cation of the contrast, might By not even its law. State enforcement of bered statute. proceeding under a civil party in a Wadmond, Rights Council v. Civil Research Law Students Cf. Constantineau, 433; v. 400 U. S. Rosado 154; v. post, p. Wisconsin Wyman, 397. 397 U. S. sure, support not, distinction would to be These considerations 28 U. C. proceedings the ban of S. criminal should civil and between by distinction, be held unaffected 2283, no such which makes § C. 1983. U. S. §
The Court confines itself to deciding policy con- siderations that in our system federal prevail must when federal courts are asked to interfere with pending prosecutions. area, Within this we hold that a federal court must not, save exceptional and extremely limited circumstances, way intervene by either declaration an existing state prosecution.3 Such only circumstances exist when there is a threat of irreparable injury “both great and immediate.” A threat of this nature might be if shown the state criminal stat- ute question were patently and flagrantly unconsti- tutional on ante, its face, at 53-54; cf. Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U. S. or if there has been bad faith and harass- ment —official lawlessness —in a statute’s enforcement, ante, at 47-49. In such circumstances the reasons policy for deferring adjudication to state are outweighed by the injury flowing from the very bringing the state proceedings, the perversion of very process is supposed to provide vindication, the need for speedy and effective action protect federal rights. Cf. Georgia Rachel, 780.
Mr. Justice with Brennan, whom Mr. *17 Justice White and Mr. Justice Marshall join, in concurring the result.
I agree that the judgment of the District Court should be reversed. Appellee Harris had been indicted for viola- tions Syndicalism California Criminal Act before he in sued federal court. He has not alleged that prosecution brought was in bad faith to harass him. His constitutional may contentions be adequately adjudi- 3 negative pregnant in this sentence —that a federal may, court aas matter of policy, intervene such “exceptional when extremely limited circumstances” are subject found —is any further limita may tions that placed be on by such intervention 28 U. S. C. 2283. § in cated the state criminal proceeding, and federal inter vention at his instance was therefore improper.*
Appellees Hirseh and Dan have alleged they that “feel inhibited” by the statute and of Harris from advocating the program of the Progressive Labor Party. Appellee Broslawsky has alleged that he “is un- certain” whether as an instructor in college history he can under the statute give instruction relating to the Communist Manifesto and similar revolutionary works. None of appellees these has any stated ground for a rea- expectation sonable he will actually that prosecuted under the statute for taking actions contemplated. The court below expressly rely declined to any on finding “that Dan, . . . Hirseh or Broslawsky stand in any [s] danger prosecution by the [State], because of the they activities that ascribed to themselves in the com- *The District erroneously Court interpreted Koota, Zwickler v. (1967), U. S. as.authorizing federal court consideration of a constitutional at claim issue a pending state proceeding, whether or not the plaintiff federal court presented had his claim to the state It court. suffices here to note that in Zwickler no state proceeding was pending at jurisdiction the time attached in the federal court. The court thought also significant below it appellee that Harris had raised his constitutional claim the state courts in a motion to dis- miss the indictment and in petitions in the state appellate courts for prohibition. questioned writ It was argument at oral whether constitutional properly issues could be raised the procedures in- voked Harris, and it suggested was the denial of Harris’ motions did necessarily rejection involve of his constitutional However, claims. even if the California courts had at that inter- locutory stage rejected Harris’ constitutional arguments, re- jection would provided not have justification for intervening by the District Court. Harris sought could have direct review of that rejection of his constitutional claims or he could have renewed the requests claims in instructions, and on direct review of con- viction in the state courts this Court. These the proper were *18 presentation modes for and these the proper forums for consideration of the constitutional issues.
58 true,
plaint Supp. 507, . . . F. 516. It prose- pointed court below that out, “[w]ell-intentioned the vice neutralize judicial cutors and do not safeguards 360, 373 Bullitt, Baggett of a v. 377 U. S. vague law,” controversy under but there must be a live (1964), still appellees of these III. Art. No threats alleged Hirsch have alleged. Although are Dan and Labor they Progressive doctrines of the desire to advocate advocacy will be Party, they have not asserted that prosecu- brought which on the genre of the same as that to think that short, tion of there is no reason Harris. controversy them. any ripe with See California has Perez v. Zwickler, (1969); Golden v. 394 U. S. Ledesma, J., concurring post, p. (Brennan, dissenting).
Mr. Douglas, dissenting.* Justice when period history The that we are in a fact imposed on those extrajudicial enormous sanctions are rights unpopular who their First Amendment assert emphasizes Pfister, Dombrowski causes the wisdom of recognized 479. There we times of re- pression, powerful spokesmen gener- when interests with symbolic ate pogroms against nonconformists, federal judiciary, special with charged Congress vigilance protection rights, special responsibilities of civil has prevent an erosion of the individual’s constitutional rights.
Dombrowski represents an exception general to the rule that federal courts should not interfere with state prosecutions. exception does not arise merely prosecutions because are threatened to which the First Amendment proffered will be the Dom- defense. browski statutes which governs are a blunderbuss opinion applies 4, Boyle, Landry Judge, also to No. et al. v.
*[This al., post, p. et 77.] *19 en masse —those that
themselves when used have sweep. otherwise, “overbroad” “If the rule were contours of would to be hammered out regulation have case only by hardy case—and tested those enough to risk proper to determine the scope Id., regulation.” at 487. It was context overbroad state spoke “chilling statutes that we effect upon exercise of First Amendment rights” prosecutions. caused Ibid. respects
As overbroad statutes we early said at least as as 1940 that when dealing with First Amendment rights we would insist on “narrowly prevent statutes drawn to supposed Connecticut, evil.” Cantwell v. 310 U. S. 296, 307. special circumstances when federal intervention in
a state criminal proceeding permissible is are not re- stricted to bad faith on the part of state officials or the multiple prosecutions. threat of They also exist where reason the state statute being enforced is uncon- stitutional on its face. As Mr. Justice Butler, writing for the Court, said in Terrace Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 214:
“Equity jurisdiction will be exercised to enjoin the threatened enforcement of a state law which contravenes Federal Constitution wherever it is essential effectually order protect property rights and the rights persons against injuries otherwise irremediable; and in such a case a person, who as an officer of the State clothed with the duty of its enforcing laws and who threatens and is about to commence proceedings, either civil or criminal, to enforce such a law against parties af- may fected, enjoined from such action by a fed- eral court of equity.” Dombrowski
Our decision only was another facet of problem. the same defined so syndicalism” is Younger, “criminal socialism is “teaching” jeopardize as to
broadly enterprise. to free preferable advocating leaflets distributing Harris’ “crime” was action. through political ownership in industrial change *20 indicted was the one he was under which The statute California, 357, a de- Whitney v. 274 U. S. involved Ohio, Brandenburg 444, S. cision we overruled 449.1 “advocacy” attempt used was an
If the which Harris bullets, bombs, the use of persuasion through at But Harris is would have a different case. arson, we only advocating po- with leaflets charged distributing objective. litical action toward his He tried unsuccess- fully to have the state court dismiss indictment on grounds. ap- constitutional He resorted to the state pellate prohibition prevent court for writs of to the trial, but to no avail. He went to the federal court as a matter of last resort in an effort keep to this unconsti- tutional trial from saddled on being him. “anti-injunction” statute, 28 U. C. 2283,2 § not a bar to a federal injunction under these circum stances. That statute was adopted in 1 1793, 5,§ Stat. 335,3 early reflected the view of the proper role of the federal courts within American federalism.
1 Linde, Danger” See “Clear and Present Reexamined: Dissonance Brandenburg Concerto, 22 (1970). Stan. L. Rev. 1163 may “A court grant of the United States injunction stay proceedings except expressly in a by State court authorized Act Congress, necessary or where in aid jurisdiction, pro its or to judgments.” tect or (Emphasis added.) effectuate its “ “anti-injunction” In its initial form the provided: Act or shall [N] injunction granted [by any writ of court of the United States] stay any proceedings in court of a state.” There excep were no subsequently by tions. 1874 it was modified an insertion of the Whatever the balance of pressures of localism and nationalism prior to the War, they Civil were funda- mentally altered the war. The Civil War Amend- ments made civil rights a national concern. Those Amendments, especially § 5 the Fourteenth Amend- ment, cemented the change in American federalism brought on by the war. Congress immediately com- menced to use its powers new pass legislation. Just as the first Judiciary 1Act, 73, Stat. and the “anti-injunc- tion” represented statute early views of American federalism, the Reconstruction statutes, including the enlargement of federal jurisdiction,4 represent a later view of American federalism.
One of the jurisdiction-enlarging
passed
statutes
dur-
ing Reconstruction was the Act of April
1871. 17
Revisers to read:
“The writ of
shall
granted
not be
*21
court of the
stay
United States to
proceedings
any
in
State,
court of a
except in cases
where such
may
any
be authorized by
law relating
proceedings
in bankruptcy.” Rev. Stat. 720.
§
Toucey
v.
York
Co.,
New
Ins.
314
118, 133-134,
U. S.
Life
in discussing
statutory
exceptions
“anti-injunction”
to the
Act
we
that,
only
noted
while
bankruptcy
explicit
was the
exception,
(1)
there were others.
qualify pro
“Removal Acts
tanto
(2)
Act of 1793.”
The Act
limiting shipowners’
of 1851
liability
“[b]eing
‘subsequent
a
statute’ to the Act of
.
operates
1793 . .
as
implied
legislative amendment to it.”
(3)
We also added
In-
terpleader
(4)
Act of 1926 and
Act,
the Frazier-Lemke
47 Stat. 1473.
Toucey limited a
dealing
line of cases
with nonstatutory exceptions
to the “anti-injunction”
Shortly
Act.
thereafter
the current
lan
guage of 2283 was written into the
§
Judicial Code. The Reviser’s
Note states:
revised
“[T]he
section restores the
generally
basic law as
interpreted prior
understood and
Toucey
to the
decision.” Both
pr e-Toucey
-Toucey
and post
recognize implied legislative
decisions
exceptions
“anti-injunction”
to the
Act. See
v. Dicken,
Porter
328
252;
U.
States,
S.
Leiter
Minerals United
I
in the “ex-
1983 is included
§
hold to the view that
point not
pressly
exception
2283,6
§
authorized”
Douglas v.
in the much-discussed
raised or considered
Jeannette,
good
There is no more
City
157.
with fed-
dealing
statute
allowing
general
reason for
century
the end of the 18th
to control
passed
eralism
at
federalism, passed
dealing
also
with
another
statute
early
years
than to conclude that
later,
almost 80
the Civil
changed
of federalism were
concepts
War.
*22
5
requires no exhaustion of state
already
1983
held
haveWe
§
Education,
668.
Board
373 U. S.
v.
remedies. McNeese
of
6
Goodman,
Honey
2d 333
v.
432 F.
the view are
In accord with
(CA3). Opposed
Hutchinson,
2d 119
(CA6),
Cooper v.
184 F.
City
(CA7),
v.
Illinois,
and Baines
Danville, F. 2d 579 337 Against Court Injunctive Relief State Maraist, Federal And see Dombrowski, Tex. L. Rev. Proceedings: Significance of The seq. (1970). 591 et Boyle case, in the Judge
That was the view of Will In speaking 223. Landry Daley, Supp. 200, v. 288 F. revolu- as “a constitutional the Civil Amendments War federalism” he said: in the nature of American tion represents a historical revolution, turn, in “This concern emphasizes overwhelming the It judgment. protection for the Congresses Reconstruction the By inter- freedmen. newly rights of the won the states between government the federal posing to sought Congresses these inhabitants, their by the rights of these the risk of nullification avoid Act of of the subsequent passage states. With by plan this implement to sought 1871, Congress power. Section judicial the federal expanding importance only expression is, therefore, by infringement from rights federal protecting desire to also, necessary, where the states but between the state place government the national Ibid. its citizens.” to “commit “intimidation” makes the statute Boyle court three-judge offense” an offense.
any criminal said: follow- as the threats such . . makes criminal
“It . engage by groups threats dissentient ing: (1) of a by residents disorderly conduct, threats weapons carry concealed neighborhood high-crime mothers to and threats protection, own demonstrate highway dangerous block Indeed, safety measures. increased need for offense’ is so broad ‘commit phrase punish- to commit misdemeanors threats to include are not These evils so substantial only. fine able the threat of prohibiting interest the state’s public giving legiti- interest outweighs them Landry a wide berth.” discussion political mate Supp. 938, 964. F. Daley, 280 *23 challenging action a class Landry brought and others Illinois of the five sections validity the constitutional two of under all but They arrests alleged statutes. they trial abandoned before Just challenged sections. The District of the five sections. of two challenge their constitutional sections remaining held one of Court uncon- “intimidation” sections “mob action” and and the deter- appealed the have Appellants stitutional. Illinois of the section “mob action” that mination is unconstitutional. statutes no there is case because this
The Court dismisses as on what it describes injury irreparable showing states: at 81. Court Post, “flimsy allegations.” allegations in the contained nothing “There is any one or infer that one could from which complaint this suit brought citizens who more of the if the irreparable injury State suffering jeopardy of intimidation statute under the prosecute free to is left Landry asso- Ibid. and his manner.” in the normal are appellants using however, allege that ciates, other sections along with several section intimidation them in the normal prosecute them, not to harass arresting are them appellants They allege manner. cause, detaining them probable warrants or without are made They that the arrests allege on excessive bail. any expecta- and without demonstrations peaceful during Landry sum, convictions. securing valid tion is one the “intimidation” section allege his group en masse appellants using which are statutes several discourage harass them and plan to of a part rights. Amendment There is thus First of their exercise controversy case or lively existing concerning And I believe that the fed- rights. Amendment First in our finest tradition when it issued acted eral court stay. As the certainty standards of in statutes containing *24 criminal sanctions are higher than in those statutes con- taining civil sanctions, so are the certainty standards of touching on freedom of expression higher those in than other York, areas. Winters Newv. S. 515- 516. “There must be ascertainable of guilt. standards Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning enactment. The vagueness may be from uncertainty in regard persons within scope the of the act ... or in regard applicable tests to ascertain guilt.”
Where expression freedom of is at stake require- these ments sedulously must be more enforced. Younger
In there is a prosecution under an unconsti- tutional statute relief is denied. Boyle there is harassment yet but as prosecution. no Allegations of or harassment under facially unconstitu- tional statutes should be sufficient for the exercise of federal equity powers.
Dombrowski and 42 U. C. why § indicate Boyle federal intervention against enforcement of the state laws is appropriate. The case of Younger is even stronger. There the state statute challenged the proto- is type of one we held unconstitutional Brandenburg Ohio, supra.
The eternal temptation, course, has been to arrest the speaker rather than to correct the conditions about which complains. he I see no why reason ap- these pellees should made to walk ground treacherous of these statutes. They, like other need citizens, umbrella of the First Amendment as they study, analyze, discuss, debate troubles of days. these prosecutions When criminal can be leveled against them they express unpopular because views, the society of the dialogue danger.