*1 PACHTMAN, IMBLER DISTRICT ATTORNEY Argued 74-5435. November 1975 Decided March No. Powell, Burger, J., Court, opinion delivered the which *2 Rehnquist, Stewart, Blackmun, J., JJ., joined. C. and and White, J., opinion concurring judgment, filed in the in which an Marshall, post, p. Stevens, Brennan JJ., J., joined, and 432. part took no in the consideration or decision of the case.
Roger S. Hanson argued the cause and filed brief for petitioner.
John P. Farrell for argued respondent. cause With him on the John brief was Larson. H.
Solicitor Bork General argued the cause the United States as amicus With him on curiae. the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney Keeney, General Deputy Solicitor General Harry Friedman, Sachse, R. Jerome and Feit.* M. opinion delivered the Justice Powell
Me.
Court. question presented
The
in this case is whether a state
attorney
prosecuting
who
scope
acted within
his
duties in
and
initiating
pursuing
prosecution
a criminal
is amenable to suit under 42 U. S.
§ C. 1983 for alleged
deprivations of the defendant's
constitutional
rights.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that he
is not.
I The events which culminated in span this suit many years and judicial several proceedings. They began in
* Evelle Younger, Attorney J. Winkler, Jack R. General, Chief Attorney General, Moore, S. Clark Assistant Attorney Assistant lungerich General, and Russell Fogel, Jr., Deputy Edward T. and Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of California as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Joseph P. Heady Busch and Patrick F. filed a brief Attorneys National District Association as amicus curiae. Los January 1961, attempted when two men to rob a and Angeles market run Morris Hasson. One shot fatally the two fled in different wounded Hasson, days directions. Ten killed Lingo later Leonard was his two attempting robbery while but Pomona, Cal., accomplices escaped. in this petitioner Paul Imbler, turned himself in of those case, day the next as one accomplices. Subsequent Los investigation led the Angeles Attorney District Imbler and believe that Lingo perpetrated had first crime as well, Imbler had killed Hasson. Imbler was with charged first-degree felony murder for Hasson’s death. eyewitness testimony State’s case consisted of *3 from Hasson’s wife and testimony identification three men who had seen fleeing Hasson’s assailants after the shooting. identify Mrs. Hasson was the unable gunman because a hat had obscured his but from face, police photographs she companion identified the killer’s as Lingo. Leonard The witness primary identification was Alfred passerby a Costello, night crime, who testified that he had a clear view both the gun- as man emerged from the market and again a few moments later when the fleeing gunman losing his hat—r —after turned to fire a shot at Costello1 and to his shed coat2 before continuing on. positively . Costello identified Imbler as the gunman. The second wit- identification ness, an attendant at a parking lot which the through gunman ultimately testified that he a side had escaped, and front view as passed. the man Finally, a customer who was leaving Hasson’s market as the robbers entered 1 This shot formed the basis of a second count Imbler assault, which was tried with the murder count. coat, This by identified by Hasson Mrs. as that her worn hus yielded band’s assailant, gun by determined ballistics evidence to be weapon. the murder they then and as good he look testified that had identified All of these witnesses exited moments later. customer also identified Imbler and the gunman, as the cross- Lingo. Rigorous the second man as Leonard any of these witnesses.3 examination failed shake spent Imbler’s defense was an He claimed have alibi. with several night killing bar-hopping the Hasson time the persons, Lingo and to have met the first This attempted robbery before the in Pomona. morning testimony was corroborated other Mayes, the accom- plice in the who also claimed to have Pomona robbery, accompanied Imbler on the earlier rounds of bars. jury punishment guilty found Imbler and fixed appeal Supreme On death.4 Court of California unanimously affirmed over numerous contentions of Imbler, People error. 2d Cal. 371 P. 2d Shortly Deputy Attorney thereafter District Richard who had been Pachtman, at Imbler’s trial respondent who is the this before wrote to Court, the Governor of describing California evidence turned up after trial himself and an for the investigator authority. state correctional In substance, evidence newly consisted of discovered witnesses for corroborating alibi, Imbler’s as as well new revelations about prime *4 witness background Costello’s which indicated he that trustworthy was less represented than he had originally to Pachtman and in his testimony. Pachtman noted leads some this information had been avail- prior able Imbler’s counsel apparently trial but 3 leaving A fourth man who saw Hasson’s killer the scene identi lineup, fied pretrial police Imbler in a but were unable to find him at the time of trial. 4 10-year prison Imbler also received a term on the charge. assault supra. See n.
413 developed, not been that Costello had testified had convincingly cross-examination, and withstood intense of the new evidence conclusive of and that none was explained Imbler’s innocence. He that he wrote a attorney duty belief that “a has to be fair prosecuting a see helpful and that all true whether to the or facts, case should be presented.” not, corpus petition shortly Imbler filed a state habeas after Supreme Pachtman’s letter. The Court of California one of appointed justices its retired as referee to hold hearing, which a Costello was the main attraction. recanted He his trial identification of it and Imbler, also was established that on cross-examination and re- direct he had painted picture background a of his own that was more trüe. flattering than Imbler’s corroborat- ing uncovered inves- witnesses, Pachtman’s also testified. tigations,
In his
Supreme
brief to the
Court of California on
this habeas
Imbler’s
petition,
counsel described Pacht-
post-trial
highest
man’s
detective work as
“[i]n
tradition of law enforcement and
as
justice,” and
premier example
duty.”
of “devotion to
But he also
charged that
the prosecution
knowingly
had
used false
testimony
suppressed
material evidence at Imbler’s
In
thorough opinion by
trial.7
then
Traynor,
Justice
Supreme
unanimously
Court of California
rejected
Imbler,
these contentions and denied the writ.
In re
Respondent,
A,
Brief for
App.
p. 6. The record does not indicate
specific
response
what
action was taken
to Pachtman’s letter. We
August 17, 1962,
do note that the letter
dated
Imbler’s
was
execution,
12, 1962, subsequently
stayed.
September
scheduled for
was
part
permanent
The letter became a
record in the case avail
subsequent litigation.
the courts in all
able to
Respondent
Brief for
5.
Brady
Napue
Illinois,
(1959);
generally
See
S.U.
Maryland,
The District Court held no hearing. it Instead, de- cided petition upon the including Pacht- record, man’s letter to the Governor and the transcript of the referee’s hearing ordered Supreme Court California. Reading that record quite differently than had justices the seven of the State Supreme Court, District Court found eight instances of state misconduct at Imbler’s trial, the cumulative effect of which required issuance of the writ. Craven, Imbler v. Supp. F. (CD Cal. 1969). Six occurred during Costello’s testimony and amounted in the court’s view culpa- ble use by prosecution of misleading or false testi- mony.8 The other two instances suppressions were 8 The District Court found that given Costello had certain am biguous or misleading testimony, and had flatly lied about his criminal record, education, his and his current income. As to the misleading testimony, the court found that either Pachtman or a
evidence favorable to by Imbler police fingerprint ex pert who testified at trial and the police who investi gated Hasson’s murder.9 The District Court ordered that the writ of habeas corpus issue unless re California tried Imbler within 60 days, and denied a petition for rehearing.
The State appealed to the Court
Appeals
for the
Ninth Circuit, claiming that the District Court had failed
give
appropriate deference to the factual determina-
tions of the Supreme Court of
required
California as
28 U. S.
§C. 2254 (d). The
Appeals
Court of
affirmed,
finding that
the District Court
merely
had
“reached
different conclusions than the state court
in applying
federal constitutional standards to
facts,” Imbler
[the]
California, 424 F. 2d
and
631, 632,
certiorari was denied,
At this point, after a decade of litigation and with free, Imbler now the stage was set for the present suit. In April 1972, Imbler filed a civil rights action, under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and related statutes, against respond- ent Pachtman, the police fingerprint expert, and various other officers of the Los Angeles police alleged force. He police present officer in the courtroom knew misleading. it was As testimony, the false the District Court concluded that Pachtman had “cause to suspect” falsity its although, apparently, no actual knowledge thereof. See Supp., 298 F. at 799-807. The Supreme Court earlier California had rejected addressed and allegations many based on parts same testimony. Costello's It found either an absence of falsehood or an prosecutorial absence of knowl edge in each instance. In Imbler, re See 554, 562-565, 2d Cal. and n. 6, 10-12, P. 2d and n. 3 9 See 298 F. Supp., at Supreme 809-811. The Court of California rejected earlier had allegations. similar Imbler, In supra, re See 566-568, 2d, 387 P. at 12-13. conspiracy among unlawfully that a charge them convict him liberty had caused him loss of and other grievous injury. He $2.7 demanded million in actual exemplary damages defendant, plus from each $15,- 000 attorney’s fees.
Imbler attempted to incorporate complaint into his the District Court’s decision granting the writ of habeas corpus, and for the most part tracked opinion that court’s in setting out the overt acts furtherance of alleged *7 conspiracy. gravamen complaint of his Pachtman was that he had “with intent, and other on occasions with negligence” allowed Costello give false testimony as found the District Court, and that fingerprint expert’s suppression of evidence “charge- was able under federal law” to Pachtman. In addition Imbler claimed that prosecuted Pachtman had him with knowledge of a lie detector test that had “cleared” Imbler, that and Pachtman had used at trial police artist’s sketch of Hasson’s killer shortly made after the crime and allegedly altered to resemble Imbler closely more after the investigation had focused upon him.
Pachtman moved under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b)(6)
to have the complaint dismissed as to him. The District
Court, noting
public
that
prosecutors repeatedly had been
held immune from
liability
civil
for “acts done
part
as
their traditional official functions,” found that Pacht-
alleged
man’s
acts fell into that category and granted
his motion. Following
entry
judgment
final
as to
Pachtman under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (b),
ap-
Imbler
pealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
That
one
court,
judge dissenting, affirmed the District
Court in an opinion finding Pachtman’s alleged acts to
have been committed “during prosecutorial activities
only
which can
be characterized as an ‘integral part of
”
judicial
process,’
Marlowe Coakley, (CA9 2d 1968). F. We granted certiorari important consider the and recur- ring issue of prosecutorial liability Rights under the Civil Act of 1871. 420 (1975). U. S. 945
II Title U. C. 1983 provides S. “[e]very person” that who acts under color of state law to deprive another of a constitutional right shall person be answerable to that a suit for damages.10 The statute species thus creates a of tort liability that its face admits of no immunities, some argued have it applied should be as strin- gently it as reads.11 But has prevailed. view not
This Court first considered the implications of the statute’s literal sweep in Tenney Brandhove, 341 U. S. There it was claimed that members of a state legislative committee had plaintiff called the appear before not proper for a them, legislative purpose, but to him intimidate into silence on certain matters public concern, thereby deprived had him of his con stitutional rights. Because legislators in both England and this country had enjoyed absolute *8 their official actions, Tenney squarely presented the issue of whether the Reconstruction Congress had intended 10Title 42 1983, U. originally S. C. passed § as of the Civil § Rights 1871, 17 Act of 13, Stat. reads in full: “Every person who, under any statute, of ordinance, color regula- tion, custom, usage, any or of or Territory, subjects, State or causes subjected, any to be citizen of the United or person States other jurisdiction within the thereof deprivation to the rights, of any privileges, or immunities secured the Constitution and laws, shall party injured be liable to the law, in an action at in equity, suit proper or other proceeding for redress.” 11See, g., Ray, e. Pierson v. U. (1967) S. J., (Douglas, dissenting); Tenney Brandhove, U. (1951) S. 382-383 J., (Douglas, dissenting). the availability restrict 1983 suits of § those immuni- ties public policy, which and for reasons of historically, had been categories accorded various of officials. Court concluded that immunities “well his- grounded in tory and reason” had not abrogated “by been covert inclusion in the general language” of 1983. 341 S., U. at 376. of Regardless any unworthy purpose animating their actions, legislators were held to enjoy under this statute their immunity usual when “in field acting legislators where power Id., traditionally have to act.” at 379.
The decision in Tenney established that
is to
§ 1983
be read in harmony with general principles of tort im-
munities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.
Before today the Court has had occasion to consider the
liability of
types
several
of government officials in addi-
tion to legislators. The common-law
immunity
absolute
of judges for “acts
within
judicial juris-
committed
their
diction,”
Bradley
Fisher,
see
12 The Court described
immunity
judges
as follows:
“Few doctrines
solidly
were more
established at common law than
judges
liability
damages
for acts com
judicial
mitted within their
jurisdiction,
as
recognized
this Court
when
adopted
it
Bradley
doctrine,
Fisher,
common law. 386
S., U.
at 555-557. We found qualified
immunities appropriate in two recent
In
cases.13
Scheuer
Rhodes,
v.
416 U.
S.
(1974), we concluded that
Governor and other executive officials of a State had a
qualified immunity that varied with “the scope of dis
cretion and responsibilities of the
and
office
all the cir
they
cumstances as
reasonably appeared at the time of
.
Id.,
action.
.”.
at 247.14 Last Term in Wood v.
Strickland,
fied immunities important. An absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, long so as the official’s actions were within scope immunity. The fate of an qualified official with depends upon the circumstances and motivations actions, of his as established the evidence at See Scheuer trial. Rhodes, U. S. (1974); 238-239 Wood Strickland, U. S. 320-322 14The elements of this were Scheuer as described follows: “It is the existence of grounds reasonable for the belief formed the time and light circumstances, all the coupled good with belief, faith qualified affords a basis for immunity of executive officers for performed acts in the course of official conduct.” S.,U. at 247-248. Tenney Brandhove, In of course, the Court looked to the *10 420
I II
This
opportunity
case marks our first
address
liability of
§ 1983
a state
officer. The Courts
prosecuting
many
have confronted the issue
however,
Appeals,
times and under
circumstances.
varying
Although
precise contours of their
have been unclear at
holdings
times,
they
virtually
at bottom
are
unanimous that a
prosecutor enjoys
immunity
absolute
from 1983 suits
when
damages
scope
he acts within the
of his prose
cutorial duties.16 These courts sometimes have de
prosecutor’s
scribed the
immunity as a form of “quasi-
judicial” immunity and referred to it as derivative of
the immunity of judges
Ray,
in Pierson
recognized
v.
supra.17 Petitioner
upon
focuses
the “quasi-judicial”
and contends that it illustrates a funda
characterization,
mental illogic in according
immunity
absolute
prose
to a
cutor. He argues that
the prosecutor, ás a member of
the executive
cannot
claim the
branch,
re
served for the judiciary,
only
but
qualified immunity
legislators by
accorded
Constitutions,
the Federal and State
as well
developed
as that
S.,
the common law. 341 U.
at 372-
McMillan,
Doe
generally
375. See
(1973).
v.
akin to that accorded other executive officials this previous Court’s cases.
Petitioner an overly takes simplistic approach to the issue of prosecutorial liability. As noted our above, earlier decisions on § 1983 immunities were products not judicial fiat that officials in different branches of gov- *11 ernment are differently amenable to suit under § 1983. Rather, each predicated was upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant offi- cial at common law and the interests behind it. The liability of a state under § 1983 must be deter- mined in the same manner.
A The function of prosecutor a that most often invites a common-law tort action is his decision to prose a initiate as cution, this may lead to a suit for prosecution malicious if the State’s case misfires. The first American case to address the question of a prosecutor’s amenability to such an action was v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, Griffith N. E. 1001 (1896).18 The complaint charged that a local prosecutor without probable cause added the plaintiff’s name to grand a jury true bill after the grand jurors had refused to indict him, with the result plaintiff was arrested and forced to appear in court repeatedly before the charge finally was nolle prossed. Despite al legations of malice, the Supreme Court of Indiana dis missed the action on the ground that the prosecutor was absolutely immune. Id., at 44 N. at 1002. E., 18The Supreme Court of Indiana in cited an earlier Griffith Massachusetts decision, apparently as authority for its own holding. case, But that Parker v. Huntington, 68 Mass. (1854), involved the elements of a malicious prosecution cause of action rather than the immunity prosecutor. aof See Note, also 73 U. Pa. L. Rev. The view on prosecutorial became Griffith majority clear rule on the issue.19 question The eventually to this came Court on writ of to the certiorari Court of Appeals the Second In Circuit. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F. 2d (1926), the claim was that defendant, Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, maliciously and probable without cause procured plaintiff’s grand jury indictment willful of false and introduction misleading evidence. sought Plaintiff some $300,000 damages for having trial, been subjected to the rigors of which the court ultimately directed a verdict the Govern- ment. District Court dismissed the complaint, and the Court Appeals affirmed. After reviewing the de- velopment of the doctrine of prosecutorial id., immunity, at 399-404, that court stated:
“In opinion our requires law us to that a hold *12 special assistant to the Attorney of the General United States, performance im- duties posed upon him by law, is immune from civil ac- a tion for prosecution malicious based on indict- an ment and prosecution, although it results in a verdict of not guilty rendered by jury. a immunity The is absolute, and grounded on principles public of policy.” Id., at 406.
After briefing and oral argument, this Court affirmed the Court of Appeals per in a curiam opinion. Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U. 503 (1927). S.
The
immunity
common-law
prosecutor
is based
upon the same considerations that underlie the common-
19
Parman,
Smith v.
115,
101 Kan.
(1917);
423 law immunities of judges grand jurors acting and within scope of their duties.20 concern These include by harassment litigation unfounded would cause a de- flection of the prosecutor’s energies public duties, from his possibility and the that he would shade his decisions in- exercising stead of independence judgment re- quired by public his expressed trust. One court both considerations as follows: public
“The office of
prosecutor
is one which must
be administered with courage
independence.
and
Yet how can this be if the prosecutor
subject
is made
to suit
those whom
con-
he accuses and fails to
vict? To
way
allow this would
unlim-
open the
ited harassment
the most
embarrassment
conscientious officials
those who would profit
thereby.
every
There would be involved in
case
possible consequences of a failure to
con-
obtain a
immunity
judge
The
jurisdiction
of a
for acts within his
has
extending
days
Floyd
roots
to the earliest
v.
of the common law. See
Barker,
Eng.
(1608).
Rep.
Coke
Kent
Chancellor
history
Lansing,
(N.
traced some of its
v.
Y.
in Yates
Floyd
See,
Barker, supra,
country.
adopted
this
also has been
g., Turpen Booth,
Mathis,
e.
(1880);
Hunter v.
40 Ind.
424 possi- of question always be a There would
viction. move fit saw to prosecutor in case the civil action ble such of apprehension The . . . case. dismissal uneasiness great tend toward consequences would impartial and weakening the fearless toward and administration characterize policy which should would of the prosecutor The work of this office. away moved have and we would impeded thus be fairer law stricter and objective of the desired Reed, App. 277, 6 2d Cal. v. enforcement.” Pearson (1935). 44 P. 2d 597 592, 287, Goff, v. 12 at 404-406. 2d, also Yaselli See F.
B settled.21 immunity is thus well The common-law rule considera- the same must whether We now determine rule common-law underlie the public policy tions of 1983. § under likewise countenance absolute they We think do. immunity, prosecutor only qualified
If a
had
performance
threat
1983 suits would undermine
§of
common-law
no
his duties
less than would
threat
duty
A
prosecution.
suits for malicious
deciding
in
judgment
bound to exercise his best
both
them in court.
which suits to
in
bring
conducting
suffer if
public
prosecutor’s
trust of
office would
by the
every
making
he were
decision
constrained
liability in a
potential
his
consequences
terms of
own
21
1949),
g., Gregoire
Biddle,
(CA2
See,
cert.
e.
v.
Moreover, suits that survived the pleadings pose would substantial danger of liability even to the honest prosecu- tor. prosecutor’s possible knowledge of a witness’ falsehoods, the materiality of evidence not revealed to defense, propriety of a closing and— argument, ultimately in every case—the likelihood that prosecu- torial misconduct so infected a trial as to deny due process, typical are of issues with which judges struggle in actions for post-trial relief, sometimes to differing conclusions.22 The presentation of such issues in a § 1983 action often would require a virtual retrial the criminal offense in a new forum, and the resolu- tion of some technical issues by the lay jury. It fair to we say, think, the honest prosecutor would greater face difficulty in meeting the standards quali- fied immunity than other or executive administrative officials. Frequently acting under serious constraints of time and even information, a prosecutor inevitably makes many decisions that could engender colorable claims of deprivation. constitutional Defending these decisions, often years after they were made, could impose unique 22 This is illustrated history of the disagreement as to the culpability prosecutor’s conduct in this express case. We opinion no as to which of the courts was correct. See nn. 8 and supra. responsible burdens upon and intolerable *15 for Cf. annually hundreds of indictments and trials. Bradley Fisher, at 349. supra, only immunity to the affording qualified
The of a prosecutor upon also could have an adverse effect the functioning of the justice system. Attaining criminal system’s goal accurately determining guilt the of or inno- requires cence that both the the defense prosecution and have wide discretion in the conduct of the the trial and presentation of in veracity evidence.23 The of witnesses is frequently subject criminal cases to doubt before and they by history after as is the of this testify, illustrated prosecutors If in hampered exercising case. were their by judgment as the use of such witnesses concern personal resulting about the triers of fact in liability, cases often criminal would be denied relevant evidence.24 defamation, In airing the law of a concern for the of all evidence any privilege resulted in an has absolute courtroom statement subject proceeding. relevant to the matter of the In of the case lawyers privilege pleadings the extends to their briefs as well. and generally Cooley, (4th 1932); See 1 T. Law of Torts ed. F. § supra, James, case of Hoar Harper leading & F. 5.22. In the Wood, (1841), expressed policy Chief Justice Shaw Mass. decision as follows:
“Subject whole, relevancy], is, to this restriction it on the [of interest, public purposes and best calculated to subserve justice, conducting the speech, to allow counsel full freedom in constituents; advocating sustaining rights, their causes impaired by ought and this freedom of discussion not to be numerous Id., and refined distinctions.” at 197-198. decide, prosecutor especially A often must in cases of wide sharp interest, proceed there is a public whether to to trial where in appropriate in course of action such the evidence. conflict Yet, may permit jury be to to resolve a case well conflict. understandably go forward with would be reluctant acquittal likely trigger a suit where an would a close case Project damages. Association on Stand- him for Cf. American Bar The ultimate fairness of operation system itself could be weakened subjecting prosecutors liability. § 1983 post-trial procedures Various are avail- able to determine whether an accused has received a fair trial. These procedures include the powers remedial the trial judge, appellate review, and state and federal post-conviction collateral In remedies. all of these the attention of the reviewing judge or tribunal focused primarily on whether there was a fair trial under law. This focus should not be blurred even the subconscious knowledge post-trial that a decision favor of the ac- cused might result in prosecutor’s being upon to called respond damages for his error or mistaken judgment.25
We conclude that *16 the considerations outlined above dictate the same absolute immunity under § 1983 that prosecutor the enjoys at common law. To be this sure, immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress prosecutor whose mali- cious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty. But the alternative of qualifying prosecutor’s would disserve the public broader interest. It would prevent vigorous the performance fearless of the prosecutor’s duty that is essential to the function- proper ards Justice, for Criminal Prosecution Defense Function §3.9 (c) (Approved 1971). Draft possibility personal liability of dampen also could the prosecutor’s exercise duty bring of his to the attention of the proper court or of officials all significant suggestive evidence of inno mitigation. cence or duty At require trial this is enforced process, ments of due but after a conviction the also is bound ethics of his office to authority inform the appropriate after-acquired of or other upon information casts doubt that correctness of the conviction. ABA Respon Cf. Code of Professional sibility (1969); ABA, 7-13 Standards, supra, Indeed, §EC §3.11. suggests record this case respondent’s recognition in of this duty led post-conviction to the hearing which in resulted turn ulti mately in granting the District Court’s corpus. of the writ of habeas ing justice system.26 Moreover, criminal it often prejudice by skewing would defendants criminal cases post-conviction judicial decisions be made that should with the sole purpose insuring justice. the issue With framed, thus we find in agreement Judge ourselves with Hand, Learned who prosecutor’s immunity wrote from actions for prosecution: malicious
“As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either In alternative. this thought instance it has been the end better to leave wrongs unredressed the done by dishonest officers subject try than to those who do duty their to the constant dread of retaliation.” Gregoire Biddle, (CA2 F. 2d 1949), cert. 339 U. 949 (1950). S. denied, Goff, See Yaselli at 404; cf. Wood Strick- 2d, F. land, S.,U. at 320.27 emphasize
We prosecutors 26In addressing consequences subjecting judges to suits damages 1983, the under Court has commented: “Imposing such a judges burden on prin- would contribute not cipled and fearless decision-making but to Pierson v. intimidation.” Ray, S., 386 U. at 554. 27Petitioner contends allowed, that his suit should be even if be, others would not because the District Court’s issuance of the *17 corpus writ of habeas shows that his suit has substance. decline We to carve out exception prosecutorial immunity. such an to Peti habeas, question tioner’s success alleged on where the was the mis by agents, necessarily conduct several state does not establish the rights merit of his only respondent’s alleged civil action where wrongdoing Certainly is at nothing issue. determined on habeas (cid:127) respondent, party. Moreover, using would bind who was not a proceeding subsequent “door-opener” habeas as a civil rights injecting action would create the risk of concerns extraneous proceeding. text, into that As we noted in the consideration of the petition potential habeas could well be colored an awareness of prosecutorial liability.
liability in suits under 1983 does not § leave the public powerless to punish misconduct or to deter that which occurs. This suggested Court has never that policy considerations which civil compel immunity for certain governmental beyond officials place also them the reach of the criminal judges, law. Even cloaked with absolute civil immunity for centuries, punished could be crim inally for willful deprivations rights of constitutional on the strength of 18 U. 242,28 § S. C. criminal analog of § 1983. Littleton, O’Shea 488, 414 U. 503 (1974) ; S. cf. Gravel States, United U. S.
The prosecutor would fare no better for his willful acts.29 Moreover, a prosecutor perhaps unique, stands among officials whose deprive acts could persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability professional discipline by an association of peers.30 his These checks undermine the argument imposition liability of civil only way to insure prosecutors are of mindful the con rights stitutional persons of accused of crime.
28 “Whoever, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, under color of custom, or willfully subjects any any State, Territory, of inhabitant or any District to rights, the deprivation privileges, of or immunities protected by secured or the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to punishments, pains, penalties, different or account of alien, color, race, such inhabitant being an or reason his or than prescribed citizens, are punishment for the shall be fined not $1,000 more than imprisoned year, both; or not more than one or and if subject imprisonment any death results shall be term years or for life.” appears provide punishment California also for criminal respondent by who commits some of the acts ascribed to petitioner. (1970); Branch, Cal. In re Penal Code 127 70 Cal. cf. § 200, 210-211, 174, 181 (1969). 2d 449 P. 2d 30 ABA Responsibility See Code of Professional EC See 7-13. ABA, generally Standards, supra, (c), (e), n. 1.1 and Commen §§ tary, pp. 44-45. *18 430
IV
holding.
boundaries of our
to delineate the
It remains
empha-
Appeals
the
of
supra,
As
at
Court
416,
noted,
was
respondent’s
activities
challenged
of
sized that each
2d, at
part
judicial process.”
of the
600 F.
“integral
an
upon
Appeals’
Court of
focus
purpose
1302. The
the
of
re-
nature of the activities rather than
the functional
spondent’s
standing
to
and leave
distinguish
status was
in
in
which hold
those
its Circuit and
some others,
cases,
in
investigative
a
certain
activi-
engaged
that
enjoys,
ties
not the absolute
with
associated
judicial process,
com-
only
good-faith
but
defense
Ray,
parable
policeman’s.31
Pierson
to
See
v.
Appeals
with
Court of
agree
at 557. We
S.,U.
respondent’s
intimately
activities were
associated
judicial phase
with
thus
process,
the criminal
were
to which
the reasons
absolute immu-
functions
nity apply with full
no
force.32 We have
occasion
consider
or
require
whether like
similar reasons
aspects
prosecutor’s responsibility
those
investigative
cast him in the role of an administrator or
Mulhearn,
Hampton
City
Guerro v.
2d,
1256;
v.
498 F.
at
Chicago,
Ronan,
2d,
608-609;
Robichaud v.
F.
351 F. 2d
Purdy,
(CA9 1965);
1969);
cf. Madison (CA5
officer than rather that of advocate.33 We hold only that a initiating prosecution and presenting the State’s prosecutor case, the is immune from a civil suit for dam- ages under § 1983.34 The judgment of the Ap- Court of peals for the Ninth Circuit is accordingly
Affirmed. 33We recognize that the duties of prosecutor the in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of prosecution a and apart actions from the prose courtroom. A cuting attorney required is constantly, in the duty of his course as such, to make decisions on a wide variety of sensitive issues. These questions include of present whether to a grand ease to jury, a whether to file an information, whether and prosecute, when to whether to dismiss an indictment against particular defendants, which witnesses call, and what other evidence present. Preparation, both the initiation of the process criminal trial, and may require for a the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence. point, At some and with respect to decisions, some the prosecutor no doubt func tions as an administrator rather than an as of officer the court. Drawing proper a line between these may present functions difficult questions, but this require does case not anticipate us to them. 34Mr. White, Justice concurring in judgment, the would distin guish between by willful prosecutor use a perjured testimony of suppression willful prosecutor of exculpatory information. In the former Mr. case, Justice agrees White absolute that is appropriate. thinks, He however, only qualified is appropriate where information relevant to the defense is “unconsti tutionally withheld . .. Post, the court.” at 443. do not accept We urged by distinction Mr. Justice White several reasons. As a principle, matter of perceive we no less ,n infringement of a rights by defendant’s knowing per- use of ured testimony than {or deliberate withholding exculpatory of [information. The conduct in either reprehensible, case warranting prosecution criminal as well as supra, disbarment. See at 429 nn. 29 Moreover, 30. susceptible is not practical ap- distinction of plication. A using claim perjured-testimony simply may be re- framed and asserted a claim suppression as upon the evidence which the knowledge perjury rested. types That the two of claims can thus be viewed is clear from our discussing cases the constitu- prohibitions tional practices. Mooney both Holohan, Mr. Justice took no in the consideration part Stevens or of this decision case. Bren-
Mr. Justice with Justice White, whom Mr. nan and Mr. Justice Marshall in the concurring join, judgment.
I concur in judgment of the Court and in much of I reasoning. agree its grava- with the Court complaint men of the in this case is that *20 knowingly perjured used prosecutor and that a testimony; absolutely is money damages immune from suit for under 42 presentation testimony U. C. § S. of de- later termined to have been of false, presentation where the unjconstitutional such testimony 'alleged to have been solely because the prosecutor did not it should believe or ’ not I have believed it be write, however, true. be- I cause opinion may believe that the Court’s be read as 103, (1935); U. Texas, 28, S. (1957) ; Alcorta v. 355 U. S. 31-32 Brady Maryland, 83, (1963); Pate, 373 U. S. Miller v. 1, Giglio (1967); States, U. S. 4 — 6 150, v. United 405 U. S. 151-155 (1972). by history It is also illustrated the of this case: at least (cid:127) charges prosecutorial by one of the of misconduct the discussed Federal suppression District Court in terms of of evidence had been Supreme discussed the Court of in California terms of use of perjured testimony. Compare Craven, Imbler Supp., 298 F. at 809-811, Imbler, 2d, 566-567, 2d, In re with 60 Cal. at 12- 387 P. at Denying immunity suppression 13. absolute claims could thus eviscerate, many situations, in immunity the absolute from claims of using testimony. perjured suggestion, post, We further think Mr. Justice White’s 440 n. at
5, immunity only prosecu that absolute should be accorded when the tor makes casting upon a “full disclosure” of all facts doubt testimony, place upon prosecutor duty exceeding State’s would Brady requirements S., progeny, the disclosure of and its see 373 U. Illinois, Donnelly 87; 786, (1972); Moore v. 408 U. S. cf. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 647-648 It also would weaken adversary system seriously at the same time it interfered with prosecutorial legitimate exercise of discretion.
extending to a an broader than that to which he was entitled law; at common broader than is necessary this case; to decide and broader is neces- than sary I protect judicial process. seriously, Most disagree any with implication that absolute prosecutors extends to suits based on of uncon- claims suppression stitutional I evidence because believe such injure a rule would threaten to judicial process and to Congress’ interfere with in purpose enacting 42 U. C.S. any statutory without in support language § or history.
I Title 42 provides: U. S. C.
“Every person
any statute,
color
who, under
any
or
ordinance, regulation, custom,
usage,
State
any
or Territory, subjects,
subjected,
or causes to be
citizen of the United
or
person
States
other
within
jurisdiction
deprivation
any
thereof to the
rights,
or immunities secured
the Con-
privileges,
.
. shall
to the
party injured
stitution
.
be liable
an
suit
law,
equity,
proper
action at
or other
*21
proceeding for redress.”
As
itself makes
language
purpose
central
clear,
parties deprived
to
to
“give
remedy
§ 1983 is
privileges
immunities
an
rights,
constitutional
and
Monroe
365
position.”
Pape,
of his
abuse
v.
official’s
(1961)
added).
172
United
167,
(emphasis
U. S.
places substan-
among
things,
States Constitution
other
upon
action,
tial
state
and the cause of action
limitations
fundamentally
in 42
C. 1983 is
one
provided
§
U. S.
law and
power, possessed
virtue of state
“[m]isuse
only
wrongdoer is
with
possible
because the
clothed
made
Classic,
United States v.
313
authority of state law.”
(1941).
It is
then that all state
manifest
U. S.
officials as a class
absolutely
cannot be immune
from
damage suits
under
§
U. S. C. 1983
that to extend
immunity
absolute
any
group of
officials is to
state
negate pro tanto the very remedy
appears
which it
Con
gress sought
Rhodes,
to create. Scheuer v.
U. S.
(1974).
Thus, as there is no
in 42
language
U. S. C.
1983 extending any immunity
§
any
state officials, the
Court has not extended
immunity
absolute
to such
officials in the absence of the most convincing showing
immunity
necessary.
Accordingly, we have
declined to construe § 1983 to extend
absolute
damage
suits
variety
to a
of state officials, Wood
Strickland,
v.
judges absolutely be from liability immune for their judicial acts, supra.2 Pierson Ray,
In
immunity
justifying absolute
for certain officials,
both at common law and under 42 U. S.
courts
C.
invariably
have
rested
proposition
their decisions on the
that such
is
immunity
necessary to protect the decision-
making process in which the official is engaged. Thus
legislative immunity
justified
was
ground
that
such
was
protect
essential
“freedom of
and
speech
action in the legislature” from the dampening
effects of
Brandhove,
threatened lawsuits. Tenney v.
supra, at 372.
absolute
Similarly,
immunity for judges
justified
was
on the ground that no matter how high
proof
the standard of
the burden of
set,
defending
suits
damage
brought by disappointed litigants would
“contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making
but
to intimidation.”
Pierson v.
supra,
Ray,
at 554.
In Bradley
Fisher,
“For it
general
is a
principle of the highest
im-
portance to the proper
justice
administration of
judicial
that a
officer, in exercising the authority
vested
him, shall be free to
upon
act
his own
convictions, without apprehension
personal
con-
sequences to himself. Liability to
every
answer to
one who might feel himself aggrieved by the action
of the judge, would be inconsistent with
posses-
sion of this
freedom,
destroy
would
inde-
“Speech
in the
or Debate
many
Clause”
into
state constitutions
S.,
as well. 341 U.
at 372-373.
2 The Court concluded solidly
“[f]ew doctrines were more
established at common law
than
judges
liability
damages
for acts committed
judicial
within
juris
their
diction, as this
recognized
Court
when it adopted the doctrine in
Bradley
Fisher,
(1872).”
See cases F. (CA2 1926), summarily 399-401 275 U. aff’d, S. majority articulates consequences other adverse which result suits to be may permitting maintained from public against may expose officials. suits the offi- Such unjust to 425; cial an at such suits damage award, ante, expensive will be to prevails defend even if the official ante, will away take the official’s job, time his 425; liability and the of a for unconstitu- tional behavior might induce a federal court in a habeas corpus to proceeding deny a valid constitutional claim ante, at 427. How- protect order to prosecutor, ever, these consequences adverse present respect with are to suits against school policemen, teachers, and other executives, and have never before been thought sufficient to an absolutely immunize official no matter how out- his rageous conduct. these Indeed, present reasons are respect with against to suits all state officials3 must necessarily rejected by have been Congress as a basis for immunity absolute under 42 U. S. for its en- C. 3 Even the risk that decisions in habeas corpus proceedings will be skewed is applicable policemen; in the case of supplies and if it a sufficient immunity reason to extend prosecutors,- absolute to it should have been a sufficient reason to extend such policemen. Indeed, sa.y it is fair to corpus far more habeas petitions constitutionality turn by policemen of action taken than turn on the constitutionality prosecutors. action taken simply rely ability We on the judges correctly federal apply the law to the facts with knowledge overturning a conviction grounds on constitutional hardly dooms the official in question payment damage of a light qualified award in possesses, which he inapplicability and the of the res judicata doctrine, ante, at 428 n. 27.
actment is a clear indication that at least some officials should be accountable damages for their official acts. unless the Thus, threat of suit is also thought to injure the governmental decisionmaking process, the other un- fortunate consequences flowing from damage suits state officials are sufficient only to extend qualified *24 immunity to the official question. in Accordingly, question whether prosecutor a enjoys an absolute immu- nity damage suits under § 1983, only or qualified a immunity, depends upon whether the common law and reason support the proposition that extending absolute immunity is necessary protect to the judicial process.
II
public
The
prosecutor’s absolute immunity from suit
at common law is not so firmly entrenched as a judge’s,
but it has
support.
considerable
The general rule was,
and is, that
prosecutor
a
is absolutely immune from suit
prosecution.
malicious
1 F. Harper & F. James, The
Law of
Torts
4.3, p. 305
7n.
(1956) (hereafter Harper
& James), and cases
cited;
there
Yaselli Goff,
v.
supra;
Gregoire Biddle,
v.
177
2d
(CA2
F.
579
1949); Kauffman
Moss,
v.
420 F. 2d
(CA3
1270
1970);
Heisel,
Bauers v.
361
F.
(CA3
2d 581
1965); Tyler Witkowski,
v.
439 prosecutors absolutely Public were also immune at common defamatory law from suits for remarks made during judicial to proceeding, Harper relevant a & James §§5.21, 5.22; Yaselli at 402- Goff, F. 2d, 403; and this immunity was also policy based protecting the judicial process. Im Veeder, Absolute munity in Defamation: Proceedings, Judicial 9 Col. L. Rev. special pub The was not to lic prosecutors lawyers but making extended to accused of defamatory false and statements, eliciting or of false and defamatory testimony witnesses; applied and it to suits witnesses for delivering themselves false and defamatory testimony. Harper pp. & James § 5.22, Skinner, cited; King and cases there Lofft 423-424. Eng. Rep. 529, (K. 1772) (per B. Lord Mans field) ; Goff, Yaselli 2d, F. at 403. The reasons for precisely this rule are also substantial. It is the function judicial procéeding determine where the truth lies. ability Garefully proce of courts, developed under dures, separate falsity, importance truth from and the accurately resolving disputes (and factual in criminal civil) cases are such in judicial pro those involved ceedings “given every encouragement should be to make a full disclosure of all within pertinent information their 1 Harper p. & 424. For knowledge.” James 5.22, this permitted testify means must be witness, he testimony without fear of sued if his is disbelieved. being it lawyer, permitted For a means that he must be to call if being witnesses without fear of sued the witness dis *26 lawyer it alleged believed and is that the knew or should testimony have known witness’ was Of that the false. course, encouraged testify witnesses. should not be to falsely lawyers nor encouraged to call witnesses who testify falsely. However, having if the risk of to defend damage against civil suit is added to the deterrent such a conduct already provided by per- criminal laws jury and subornation of the risk of self-censor- perjury, ship becomes too great. particularly This is because so it very is attorneys difficult if not to be impossible absolutely certain of the objective falsity truth or of the testimony they which present. A prosecutor faced with a decision whether or not to call a witness whom he believes, but whose he credibility knows will be in doubt testimony whose may be disbelieved jury, the should given be every incentive to submit witness’ that testimony to the crucible of judicial process the so the may factfinder consider it, after cross-examination, together with the other evidence case determine where the truth lies.
“Absolute privilege has been conceded on obvious grounds public policy to insure freedom of speech where it essential that freedom of speech should exist. It is essential to the justice ends of that all persons participating in judicial (to proceedings take typical class for illustration) enjoy should freedom speech in the discharge public of their duties or in pursuing their rights, without fear of conse- quences.” Veeder, supra, 9 Col. Rev., L. at 469. For the above-stated I agree reasons, with majority that history and policy support an absolute immunity prosecutors from suits solely based on claims5 that they knew or should have known that the testimony of a witness called prosecution was false; I and would not Congress attribute to an intention to remove such immunity in enacting 42 U. S. C. 1983. 5 For the III, reasons set forth infra, in Part absolute would apply not to independent claims has withheld tending facts falsity demonstrate of his witness’ testi
mony where alleged sufficiently facts are important justify finding of unconstitutional part prosecutor. conduct
441 in this case complaint gravamen Since that have known prosecutor knew or should that him untrue was testimony certain of a witness called allega- forth below—the other and since—for reasons set tions in fail to a cause of action complaint state I in this case. any judgment concur in the theory, other majority’s opinion implies an However, insofar as the suits for constitutional violations absolute decision prosecutor’s on the than those based other bringing information or his actions proceedings initiate I particularly Most disagree. or to the argument court, im- I the absolute any implication with disagree sup- charging suits unconstitutional munity extends to Brady Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 pression of evidence. v. (1963).
III
law for
immunity at common
There was no absolute
for
immunity from suits
prosecutors other than absolute
sim-
There were
and defamation.
prosecution
malicious
brought
at common law
ply no other causes
action
of-
in their
against
for conduct committed
prosecutors
reported case
example,
for
no
capacity.6
is,
ficial
There
sup-
against
suit
common law
Thus,
exculpatory evidence.
or nondisclosure of
pression
which
accepted
proposition,
if
even
this Court had
6
was,
Immunity
for false arrest
unlike
public
officials
absolute,
Harper
1
prosecution, not
public officials for malicious
sued
prosecutors were
3.18;
when
& James
3.17
§§
v.
immune. Schneider
absolutely
tort,
they
not held
for that
were
result has
Shepherd,
A similar
Mich.
158 N.
182
192
W.
42
under
courts
suits
U. S. C.
obtained in the lower
§
Robichaud
v.
initiating
arrests.
unconstitutional
prosecutors
Chicago,
Hampton
Ronan,
F. 2d
(CA9 1965);
v.
The absolute
prosecutors
extended to
designed
defamation cases is
them
encourage
bring
to
to
information to the court which will
resolve
criminal
justification.
they
is its single
case. That
Lest
withhold
questionable
valuable but
evidence or
from mak-
refrain
ing
questionable
valuable but
arguments, prosecutors are
protected
liability
submitting
before the court
information later determined to have been false to their
It
knowledge.7
would stand this
on its
rule
head, however,
it
apply
to a suit based on a claim that
making
prosecutor
absolutely
reasons
a
immune from
apply
equal
suits for defamation would
with
force to other suits
solely upon
prosecutor’s
based
designed
conduct
the courtroom
bring
arguments
either
facts or
to the attention
of the court.
Thus,
a
would be immune from a
suit based
a claim
deliberately
that his
was
summation
unconstitutional
or that he
hearsay
elicited
evidence in violation of the Confrontation Clause.
the prosecutor unconstitutionally withheld information
from the court.
Immunity from suit
upon
based
claim
the prosecutor
suppressed or withheld evi
dence
discourage
would
precisely the disclosure of evi
sought
dence
to be encouraged by the rule granting
prosecutors
immunity from defamation suits. Denial
of immunity for unconstitutional withholding of evidence
would encourage such disclosure. A prosecutor seeking
protect
himself from liability for failure to disclose
may
evidence
be induced to disclose more than is re
quired.
this will
But,
hardly injure
judicial
process.8
Indeed,
it will help it. Accordingly, lower courts have
held that unconstitutional
suppression of exculpatory
beyond
evidence is
the scope of “duties constituting an
*29
integral part of
judicial
process” and have refused
to extend absolute immunity to suits based on such
claims. Hilliard Williams,
v.
Equally important, unlike constitutional violations committed improper in- summations, courtroom — troduction of hearsay evidence in violation of the Con- frontation Clause, knowing presentation of false testi- mony truly are an “integral part of —which judicial process,” ante, at judicial process has no way to prevent or correct the constitutional violation of suppressing evidence. judicial The process bywill defini- tion be ignorant of the violation when it occurs; and it is may There be circumstances which ongoing investigations or even the life of an might informant jeopardized be by public dis closure of thought possibly information to be exculpatory. How ever, may these adequately situations be by dealt with in camera disclosure to the judge. trial These considerations do not militate disclosure, merely but affect the manner of disclosure. suspect reasonable to that most such violations never It surface. all the important, then, more to deter such violations permitting damage under U. C. actions S. § 1983 to be maintained in instances where do violations surface.
The stakes are
In
high.
Williams,
Hilliard
supra,
a woman was convicted of second-degree
upon
murder
entirely circumstantial evidence. The most incriminat
ing item of evidence was the
jacket
fact
that the
worn
the defendant at
the time of arrest —and
cur
some
appeared to have bloodstains on them. The
tains —
defendant denied that
the stains were
but
bloodstains
was convicted and subsequently spent
year
in jail.
Fortunately,
in that
the defendant
case,
later found out
that an FBI report
which the prosecutor had knowl
—of
edge
the time of the trial and the
existence which
he instructed a state investigator not to mention during
his
after
testimony concluded,
testing,
the stains
—
were not bloodstains. On retrial,
the defendant was
acquitted. She sued
and the state inves
tigator
under
U. S.
§C. 1983 claiming
FBI
report was unconstitutionally withheld
Brady
under
Maryland,
conduct, very and it is to easy identify an injury to the process resulting a rule which not permit does such suits. Where the reason rule extending absolute immunity to prosecutors disappears, truly it would be “monstrous deny recovery.” Gregoire Biddle, F. 2d, 581.
IV
complaint
in this case, while
based
fundamentally
on the claim that
prosecutor
knew or
have
should
known that his witness
falsely
had testified
in certain
respects, does contain
allegations
some
that exculpatory
evidence and evidence
relating
the witness’ credibility
had
suppressed.
been
Insofar as
complaint
is based
oil allegations of suppression or failure to disclose, the
prosecutor should
not,
the reasons
forth
set
be
above,
absolutely immune.
as the
However,
majority notes,
suppression
of fingerprint evidence and the alleged
suppression of information relating to certain pretrial
lineups is not alleged to
been
have
known in
fact
simply
is
claimed that
the suppression is
—it
legally chargeable to him. While this may be so as a
matter of federal habeas corpus
it
law,
is
untrue
damage
civil
action. The result of a lie-detector
test
claimed to have
been
suppressed
allegedly
was
known to
but it
respondent,
would have been inadmis-
sible at Imbler’s trial and is thus not constitutionally
required to be disclosed. The alteration of
police
artist’s composite sketch after Imbler was designated as
the defendant
not alleged
to have been suppressed—
fact appears not to have been suppressed. The
opinion of the
Supreme
California
Court on direct re-
view of Imbler’s conviction states
picture
that “the
was
modified later,
following suggestions of Costello and
other witnesses,” and that court presumably had before
it only the
record.
trial
The other items allegedly sup-
*31
pressed all
to background
only
relate
information about
one
eyewitnesses
three
to
testify
the State,
part
were
large
coneededly known to the defense
may
and thus
accurately
not be
suppressed.
described as
The single alleged fact
coneededly
not
known to the
defense which might
helpful
have been
to the defense
was that the State’s witness had written some bad checks
for small amounts and that
criminal
based
charge
one check was outstanding against him. However, the
witness had an extensive criminal
record which was
known to but
fully
not
used
the defense. Thus, even
taken as true, the failure to disclose the
charges
check
is patently
insufficient
to support
a . claim of un-
constitutional
suppression of evidence.9 The Court
majority
The
points out
knowing
that
perjured
use of
testi
mony
reprehensible
is as
as the
suppression
deliberate
exculpa
tory evidence. This is beside
point.
The
permitting
reason for
suits
prosecutors for suppressing evidence
sup
is not that
pression is especially reprehensible
only
but that
effect on the
process of permitting such suits will be a beneficial one—more
information will be disclosed to
court;
whereas one of the
effects
permitting suits for knowing
perjured
use of
testimony
will be detrimental
the process prosecutors
to
may
ques
withhold
—
tionable but
testimony
valuable
from the court.
majority argues
any
that
using perjured
“claim of
testimony
simply may be reframed and asserted as a claim of suppression.”
Our treatment
allegations
in this
conclusively
case
refutes
argument.
relatively
.the
It
easy
to allege
government
falsely
witness testified
prosecutor
that the
did not believe the
witness; and, if the prosecutor’s subjective belief is a sufficient basis
liability,
the case would almost certainly
go
have to
to trial.
If such suits were'permitted,
this case
go
would
have
to trial.
It is another matter entirely to allege specific objective facts known
of sufficient importance
justify
a conclusion
that he violated a
duty
constitutional
to disclose. It is no coinci-
petitioner
dence
failed to
any
make
such allegations in this
case. More to
point
quite apart from the relative diffi-
—and
culty of pleading a
Brady
violation of
Maryland,
has
regard
due
having
the fact
that
obligation
the
the government
to disclose
exculpatory
is
exception
evidence
an
opera-
the normal
tion of
adversary system
an
on
justice,
state
imposed
prosecutors a
obligation
constitutional
to turn over such
only
evidence
when the
is of
evidence
far greater signifi-
cance than that
Illinois,
involved here. See Moore v.
unlike prosecutor’s suits based on testimony the disbelief of a witness’ will have no detrimental process. being effect on the Risk of sued for suppression impel will prosecutor the to err if at on all the side of overdisclosure. Risk of sued being disbelieving a witness will impel prosecutor to err on the questionable side of withholding majority evidence. appear does respond not point. to this Any suggestion that the suppres- between distinction suits on based' sion helpful of facts to the defense suits based other kinds of constitutional violations cannot be judges understood district who apply would have to mystifying. rule The distinction is simple one. Finally, majority suggested states rule in this con- curring opinion place “would upon prosecutor duty exceeding requirements Brady disclosure progeny.” and its The rule suggested opinion in this no thing. does such The constitutional obligation of utterly unchanged. remains We would simply grant not him absolute committing suits for pre-existing violations of requirements, constitutional disclosure if he committed those violations in bad faith.