United States v. GreeneUnited States v. Greene
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In September of 1971, Defendant LaVance Greene committed a horrific crime: he disarmed three United States marshals to assist his half-brother in making a dramatic break from custody during a funeral furlough, and fatally shot a fourth marshal in the course of the planned escape. See United States v. Greene, 834 F.2d 1067, 1068-69 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Greene was convicted of both local and federal crimes after a jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia; in particular, the jury found him guilty of felony murder and armed robbery in violation of two provisions of the D.C. Code, and of rescue of a federal prisoner and the premediated murder of a federal officer, in violation of two federal statutes. See id. A federal district judge (Hart, J.) subsequently sentenced then-23-year-old Greene, and, upon exhausting his direct appeals in 1973, Greene was committed to the D.C. Department of Corrections to serve a prison term of 35 years to life.1
Today, nearly five decades later, Greene is a 72-year-old prisoner with various serious medical conditions who has filed a motion with this Court seeking compassionate release. (See Def.‘s Mot. for Compassionate Release (“Def.‘s Mot.“), ECF No. 12.) Greene has the backing of numerous officers of the United States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP“), who have repeatedly testified during Parole Commission hearings that Greene is a completely reformed and
Before this Court at present is the motion for compassionate release that Greene has filed in this Court, which his counsel has expressly submitted pursuant to section
After careful consideration of the parties’ submissions and for the reasons explained below, this Court concludes that Greene‘s motion must be construed as a motion for compassionate release under federal law—i.e., as a motion for release pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
A. Greene‘s Criminal Offense
In 1971, Greene‘s half-brother, Randolph, was serving a 20-year sentence for armed bank robbery at Lewisburg Penitentiary,
According to the Government‘s account of the offense, which is apparently based on the description of the crime that appears in Randolph‘s presentence investigation report, Greene stood over the marshal‘s body as he “lay helpless on the pavement” and shot him twice more. (See Gov‘t Opp‘n to Def.‘s Mot. for Compassionate Release (“Gov‘t Opp‘n“), ECF No. 13, at 3; see also Ex. M to Def.‘s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 41.) Greene has forcefully contested this version of the facts both at his parole hearings and before this Court (see Ex. M to Def.‘s Mot. at 40–41; Def.‘s Reply to Gov‘t Opp‘n (“Def.‘s Reply“), ECF No. 14, at 10); as Greene remembers the incident, both the marshal and Randolph were lying on the ground at the end of the gun battle, and Greene “looked at both of them in an effort to a[ss]ess what had happened” before helping his brother up and running away (see Ex. M to Def.‘s Mot. at 41). Greene further contends that he was under the influence of heroin, alcohol, and marijuana at the time he committed the offense, and was likely “experiencing a drug induced psychosis” (Ex. A to Def.‘s Mot. at 4); yet, he insists that he did not fire any additional shots at the marshal after he fell to the ground (see Ex. M to Def.‘s Mot. at 40–41; Def.‘s Reply at 10).
It is undisputed that, after the shooting, Greene and Randolph commandeered a car at gunpoint and sped away. Greene I, 489 F.2d at 1147. Multiple police officers then pursued the brothers on a high-speed chase, and after a few miles, both brothers were apprehended and arrested. Id.
B. Procedural History
About a month after these horrific events, Greene was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of seven D.C. Code and federal law offenses. Specifically, he was charged with felony murder and four counts of armed robbery in violation of
In 1973, the D.C. Circuit affirmed Greene‘s D.C. Code convictions, but vacated his federal law convictions, on the grounds that (1) “there had been a ‘merger’ between the felony murder count and the rescue felony on which it was based[,]” and (2) the district court‘s “application of the D.C. insanity burden to U.S. Code offenses raised a serious equal protection issue” that could be avoided by vacating the federal law convictions. Greene II, 834 F.2d at 1069–70 (synthesizing the D.C. Circuit‘s holdings with respect to Greene‘s direct appeal). Because the sentence for premeditated murder of a federal officer ran concurrently with the D.C. Code felony murder charge (see Criminal Docket Sheet at 6), Greene‘s minimum sentence was ultimately reduced only by 20 months (see id.), leaving him with a total sentence of 35 years to life in prison (see Ex. B to Def.‘s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 10).
Following his appeal, Greene filed a motion under
C. Greene‘s Incarceration And Parole Commission Hearings
To serve his affirmed prison sentence, Greene was initially incarcerated at Lorton Reformatory in Virginia, a prison run by the D.C. Department of Corrections, and he remained at that facility for approximately three decades. (Def.‘s Mot. at 8.) There is no dispute that, while at Lorton, Greene took advantage of numerous programming and employment opportunities “in an effort to prepare for his eventual release.” (Letter of Dr. Rosalyn Miles, Ex. I to Def.‘s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 27.) For instance, Greene took courses at the University of the District of Columbia Lorton Prison College Program; became proficient in various computer, software, and office management skills; and worked as a clerk and secretary at the prison‘s medical unit. (See id. at 27–28.)
Greene also managed to endear himself to corrections officials, when, in 1989, he risked his own life to protect two officers during a violent prison riot. According to a letter that one of the two officers wrote in the wake of the incident, inmates “armed with bricks, steel rods, chairs, [and] a steel mopbucket” attempted to take control of the facility, causing the two officers to run into a stairway, where they soon became trapped. (See Letter of Clifford L. Fanucci, Jr. (“Fanucci Letter“), Ex. D to Def.‘s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 16.) As the officers heard “an untold number of residents
For these purportedly heroic and selfless acts—and also his concerted efforts to improve himself while in prison—Greene earned the recognition and praise of individuals both inside and outside of Lorton Reformatory, including the Director of the D.C. Department of Corrections, former mayor Marion Barry (who was at that point a member of the D.C. Council), and two D.C. Councilmembers. (See Letter of Director Margaret Moore, Ex. E to Def.‘s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 18; Letter of Marion Barry, Jr. (“Barry Letter“), Ex. F to Def.‘s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 20–21; Letter of Councilmember Frank Smith, Jr. (“Smith Letter“), Ex. G to Def.‘s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 23; Letter of Councilmember Harry L. Thomas, Sr., Ex. H to Def.‘s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 25.) Some of these officials even advocated for Greene‘s early release, specifically citing his rehabilitation and service to the prison community. (See, e.g., Barry Letter at 21 (advocating for a good time credit award); see also Smith Letter at 23 (urging the Director of the D.C. Department of Corrections to afford Greene a parole hearing).)
In 2001, Greene was transferred from Lorton into BOP custody, where he remains to date. (Def.‘s Mot. at 8.) Greene has continued to engage in extensive programming and educational opportunities while in the federal prison system; for example, he has completed vocational and educational training programs in music, culinary arts, public speaking, Spanish, criminal thinking, and drawing; has obtained his GED; has used his own money to pay for an advanced computer training course at a local community college; and has successfully finished various drug abuse treatment and education programs. (See Ex. A to Def.‘s Mot. at 5; Ex. M to Def.‘s Mot. at 41; Ex. O to Def.‘s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 49–50; Ex. P to Def.‘s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 52-53; Ex. Q to Def.‘s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 59.) Greene has also been heavily involved as a sewing machine operator and instructor at the BOP‘s UNICOR Program, where he has received exemplary performance reviews and is considered an “outstanding” worker. (See Ex. M to Def.‘s Mot. at 41; Ex. S to Def.‘s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 66.) In addition, Greene has acted as a peacekeeper between inmates and officers, and has thereby helped to prevent violence in the prison community. (See Letter of Chrystal McKenzie (“McKenzie Letter“), Ex. J to Def.‘s Sealed Mot., ECF No. 9-3, at 30; Letter of Mark Cantrell (“Cantrell Letter“), Ex. K to Def.‘s Sealed Mot., ECF No. 9-3, at 32.)
During the past seventeen years in BOP custody, Greene has appeared before the U.S. Parole Commission at least six times. At his initial hearing in 2003, the Commission denied Greene parole for reasons that are not entirely clear from the record before the Court, and set a reconsideration hearing for three years later. (See Ex. C to Gov‘t Opp‘n, ECF No. 13-2, at 1–3.) In 2006, the Commission again denied Greene parole, accepting the assigned hearing examiner‘s recommendation to continue further reconsideration of the matter until 2009. (Ex. M to Def.‘s Mot. at 40; Ex. N to Def.‘s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 45–46.) The hearing examiner acknowledged that Greene had “been used as a resource by staff by acting as a role model for other inmates[,]” and that Greene had “engaged in extensive assistance to the institution“; however, the examiner ultimately concluded that the seriousness of Greene‘s crime outweighed “his positive adjustment to incarceration.” (See Ex. N to Def.‘s Mot. at 45.) In the hearing examiner‘s view,
When Greene next appeared before the Parole Commission in 2009 and 2010, the assigned hearing examiner reached a different conclusion. During the hearings, the examiner heard testimony from Greene‘s case manager regarding Greene‘s phenomenal work record, his role as “a mentor to younger inmates[,]” and the respect that he had consistently shown towards BOP staff. (See Ex. L to Def.‘s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 35.) Additionally, the institution‘s captain, who had attended only one other parole hearing in his 35 years at BOP, came to advocate on Greene‘s behalf. In his testimony, the captain stated that Greene was “an outstanding inmate who ha[d] provided considerable cooperation and assistance to prison staff[,]” and that he showed a “genuine concern for the safety of staff and other prisoners.” (Def.‘s Mot. at 15.) Greene also read aloud a letter that he had written to the Marshals Service in 1985 detailing his “profound remorse and regret” for his actions, and explaining that the guns “just started firing[,]” and that he did not mean to kill the marshal. (See Ex. L to Def.‘s Mot. at 35, 37.) In response, the Marshals Service submitted a letter to the Parole Commission opposing Greene‘s release in light of the “extremely serious” nature of his offense. (See id. at 34-35.) Based on all of the evidence presented, the hearing examiner recommended Greene‘s release, noting that he had been “a model prisoner and expresses genuine remorse for his crime.” (See id. at 35–36.) But the Commission disagreed with the examiner‘s recommendation, and denied Greene parole yet again, citing the “brazen and vicious” nature of Greene‘s crime, and the fact that Greene had suggested that his offense was unintentional in the letter he wrote to the Marshals Service—a characterization that, in the Commission‘s view, demonstrated Greene‘s failure to accept full responsibility for his actions. (See Ex. E to Gov‘t Opp‘n, ECF No. 13-3, at 1; Ex. L to Def.‘s Mot. at 36–37.)
By the time Greene‘s next hearing came around in 2015, numerous BOP officials appeared before the Commission to provide testimony in support of his release. For instance, three BOP officials testified that Greene frequently went out of his way to facilitate the safety and wellbeing of the prison community. (See Ex. A to Def.‘s Sealed Mot., ECF No. 9-3, at 2–3.) Another BOP official, one who supervised Greene‘s work in the culinary unit, stated that Greene “has shown a genuine concern for the safety and welfare of BOP personnel” and that he “was a personal recipient of [Greene‘s] concern when he experienced a medical crisis while in the institution and [Greene] came to his aid.” (Ex. A to Def.‘s Mot. at 3.) Two additional BOP officials spoke to Greene‘s “exemplary work ethic” (see id.), and out of the seven BOP officials who testified at the hearing, two specifically voiced their support for having Greene as their neighbor (see id.). The assigned hearing examiner also received letters from the U.S. Marshals Service and a friend of the victim‘s family urging the Commission to deny Greene parole, while the victim‘s nephew (who formerly worked as a correctional officer himself) wrote a letter saying that he did not oppose Greene‘s release. (See id. at 2, 5.)
In addition to hearing these statements for and against Greene‘s parole, the hearing examiner also considered a recent disciplinary infraction that Greene had incurred for throwing grits on a staff member. (See id. at 4.) However, after reviewing all of the evidence concerning that
including employees such as herself. (See Ex. A to Def.‘s Sealed Mot. at 6.) Yet, notwithstanding the hearing examiner‘s recommendation, Greene was again denied parole. According to the executive reviewer‘s statement of reasons, Greene‘s disciplinary infraction, along with his original offense, demonstrated that he still posed a danger to the community and that he lacked self-control. (See Ex. A to Def.‘s Mot. at 6-7.)
Greene last appeared before the Parole Commission in 2017. Consistent with its prior decisions, the Commission denied Greene parole, this time on the ground that his offense of conviction was extremely serious, and that, since his last parole hearing, Greene had incurred another disciplinary infraction for possessing a dangerous weapon and threatening correctional staff. (See Ex. F to Gov‘t Opp‘n, ECF No. 13-4, at 1.)5 The record does not provide a definitive account of the circumstances underlying this alleged disciplinary infraction, but, according to Greene, the dangerous weapon was a “four-inch piece of plastic that he used to trace straight lines for his artwork as part of his Pen and Ink Drawing course[,]” and that he had “reacted verbally” when the officers took it away from him, in part because he “was forcibly kept out of his cell while the disposal of his possessions took place.” (Def.‘s Mot. at 19.) Greene‘s next parole hearing is set for September of 2022. (See Ex. B to Def.‘s Mot. at 11.)
D. Greene‘s Compassionate Release Motion
Greene is now 72 years old, and has served 49 years of his prison sentence. (Id. at 9, 11.) On November 24, 2020, Greene‘s counsel filed a motion for compassionate release in this Court under
On December 2, 2020, this Court issued a Minute Order directing the Government to respond to Greene‘s motion for compassionate release. (See Min. Order of Dec. 2, 2020). In the order, the Court also instructed the parties to address the applicability of the federal compassionate release statute in addition to the D.C. compassionate release statute, and to discuss Greene‘s entitlement to relief under both statutory schemes. (See
In its opposition brief, the Government maintains that the D.C. compassionate release statute is the proper statute to apply to this case, because Greene is serving time for D.C. Code offenses; in the Government‘s view, the federal compassionate release statute does not apply to D.C. Code offenders even if they were sentenced in federal court. (See Gov‘t Opp‘n at 1 n.1.) The Government additionally asserts that Greene is not entitled to compassionate release under the D.C. compassionate release statute, because he committed a “violent murder of an on-duty [U.S.] Marshal” and “has minimized his role in the offense throughout the years[.]” (Id. at 2.) The Government also emphasizes that the U.S. Marshals Service opposes Greene‘s motion, and that the Parole Commission has consistently denied Greene‘s requests for release. (See id.)
In his reply, Greene also contends that this Court should apply the D.C. compassionate release statute to his case, because, in his view, the D.C. statute‘s eligibility standards are more generous than those of the federal statute. (See Def.‘s Reply at 2–7.) Yet, he further argues that, if the Court does apply the standards set forth in
On December 18, 2020, this Court held a hearing on Greene‘s motion. (See Min. Entry of Dec. 18, 2020.) Defense counsel waived Greene‘s presence at the hearing, both to expedite this Court‘s review of Greene‘s motion and also because Greene‘s urinary incontinence prevented him from sitting through a court hearing without interruption. (Mot. Hr‘g Tr. at 26:14–20.) At the end of the hearing, the Court advised the parties that it would issue a ruling after carefully considering the full evidentiary record and the parties’ oral and written submissions. (Id. at 44:3–9.) The Court has now completed that review.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) Of Title 18 Of The U.S. Code
As a general matter, federal courts are “forbidden . . . to modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed[.]” Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
First, in cases where a defendant moves for compassionate release under section
Next, even if a defendant satisfies section
A defendant can also demonstrate eligibility for compassionate release under the second prong of section
Finally, even when the court determines that the defendant satisfies section
B. Section 24-403.04 Of The D.C. Code
In April of 2020, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted a compassionate release statute that is loosely modeled on section
Other extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a modification, including . . . Elderly age, defined as a defendant who:
- Is 60 years of age or older;
- Has served at least 20 years in prison or has served the greater of 10 years or 75% of his or her sentence; and
- Suffers from a chronic or serious medical condition related to the aging process or that causes an acute vulnerability to severe medical complications or death as a result of COVID-19[.]
In order to grant a defendant‘s motion for compassionate release under
III. ANALYSIS
Greene‘s status as a federal inmate who is presently serving time in BOP custody
The parties here insist that the D.C. Code‘s release provision governs defendants like Greene, who are federal inmates serving time for exclusively D.C. Code offenses (see Gov‘t Opp‘n at 1 n.1; Def.‘s Reply at 2–7), but this Court concludes that the standards that Congress has set forth in
A. Federal Law, And Not The D.C. Code, Governs Greene‘s Motion For Compassionate Release
The Court‘s analysis of the threshold question of which set of legal
and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto”). Moreover, and as relevant here, Congress has specifically authorized federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over individuals who have been accused of violating criminal provisions of the
It is also well established that federal courts must apply the substantive law of the District of Columbia that underlies a given
Against this backdrop, the Court sees nothing in the Federal Code or in the
Significantly for present purposes, federal law also establishes the circumstances under which a federal district judge can change a sentence that the court has previously imposed.
The Government’s suggestion that, because
Greene’s argument that this Court should nevertheless apply the
Moreover, and in any event, once the defendant is sentenced, either pursuant to federal statutes and guidelines or under the
Greene’s alternative argument for applying the
The primary problem with this argument is the fact that it assumes that this Court has the authority to select the compassionate release standard that is the least onerous for defendants, when, as has already been explained, the circumstances under which a federal district judge can modify a previously imposed sentence are dictated by Congress, notwithstanding any allegedly less burdensome pathway that the
The bottom line is this: notwithstanding the fact that the federal district court previously sentenced Greene for both federal and local crimes and that he is currently being detained for the local crimes alone, federal courts derive their sentencing authority from Congress under federal law, and, by their nature, compassionate release statutes dictate the criteria and procedures pursuant to which a federal court can modify a term of imprisonment that it previously imposed. Therefore, this Court is confident that federal standards govern its determination of whether and to what extent Greene’s previously imposed federal sentence may be modified in response to his request for compassionate release, which means that this Court lacks authority to change Greene’s sentence pursuant to the compassionate release standards that the
B. Given The Standards Set Forth In Section 3582(c)(1)(A), Greene’s Motion For Compassionate Release Is Properly Before This Court, And The Requested Modification Of His Sentence Is Warranted
As previously explained, a federal court can entertain a defendant’s motion for compassionate release under
For the reasons that follow, it is readily apparent that administrative exhaustion would have been futile in the instant case, and that “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for Greene’s release exist, as defined by and identified in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual.
1. It Would Have Been Futile For Greene To Attempt To Exhaust Administrative Remedies
To satisfy section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement, a defendant must request that the BOP file “an agency-sponsored motion for compassionate release” on his behalf, Johnson, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 36, and then either “exhaust[] all administrative rights to appeal” the BOP’s failure to file such a motion,
This Court and others have concluded that section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional in the sense that a court is barred from hearing an unexhausted claim. See Johnson, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 28 (collecting cases). Instead, the requirement “is best understood” as a “claims processing rule that determines who moves for release and when.” United States v. Jennings, No. 18-cr-17, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70800, at *4–5 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2020); see also Fort Bend Cty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019) (explaining that “nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules . . . seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). As such, a court can excuse or waive section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement for equitable reasons, including if, for example, exhaustion would be futile, meaning “completely ineffective” and “not . . . lawfully and reasonably sufficient.” See Randolph-Sheppard Vendors of Am. v. Weinberger, 795 F.2d 90, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (alteration in original) (quoting Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 468 (1977)). It is also well established that “[r]esort to the administrative process” will generally be considered futile “if the agency will almost certainly deny any relief either because it has a preconceived position on, or lacks jurisdiction over, the matter.” See id. Thus, courts in this district have excused a defendant’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under
In the instant case, there is no dispute that Greene did not exhaust his administrative appeal rights nor did he undertake to request that the BOP file a motion for compassionate release on his behalf. (See Gov’t Opp’n at 1 n.1; Def.’s Reply at 8.) Instead, presumably because Greene mistakenly believed that the
Greene’s failure to at least ask the BOP for relief would ordinarily bar his attempt to proceed in federal court, and the Government argues as much here. (See Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 12:18-23.) But this Court has not seen a clearer set of circumstances warranting application of the well-established futility doctrine. Indeed, by the Government’s own admission, it is the BOP’s long-held position that
2. Greene’s Age, Length of Incarceration, And Age-Related Deterioration In Health Provide Extraordinary And Compelling Reasons For Reducing His Term of Imprisonment
With exhaustion addressed, the Court turns to the substantive standards for modification of a previously imposed term of imprisonment under
Section 1B1.13 of the Guidelines Manual—which Congress mandated, see
Based on the factual representations in Greene’s motion and at his motion hearing, this Court has no doubt that Greene meets those criteria: he is 72 years old, has served 49 years in prison, and his medical records show that he suffers from a litany of physical ailments, including hypertension, shingles, dermatitis, abdominal hernia, and urinary incontinence. (See Ex. GG to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 132.) And perhaps most significantly, in terms of Greene’s physical deterioration, Greene’s counsel represented that his age-related urinary incontinence has reached the point in which it significantly disrupts his sleep and hinders his day-to-day functioning—to the extent that he had to waive his presence at the motion hearing in this case. (See Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 26:3-23.)
The Government does not dispute that Greene satisfies the age and time in prison requirements of section 1B1.13, nor does it appear to challenge the representation that Greene is experiencing a deterioration in his health. Rather, the Government argues that Greene’s demonstrated health-related issues are not sufficiently serious, because he does not “requir[e] a medical facility placement” (see id. at 32:16–17), and because the BOP has classified him as a “care level 1 inmate[,]” meaning that he is “healthy or [requires] simple chronic care” (id. at 29:10–13). But, notably, nothing in the “Age of the Defendant” commentary mandates a showing of that sort. That is, the Sentencing Commission does not suggest that a demonstration that a 65-plus-year-old defendant necessitates intensive treatment because of his deteriorating health, or that he is unable to care for himself, is required; to the contrary, a mere showing that the defendant is experiencing “a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process” suffices. See
Thus, in this Court’s view, and as relevant here, the commentary to guidelines section 1B1.13 permits a fact-specific, flexible analysis of potentially extraordinary and compelling reasons for release that turns on the defendant’s age and the particular conditions and circumstances presented by his physical and mental health. And for defendants who meet the threshold age requirement, medical conditions that “impair[]” a defendant’s “basic human functions” plainly suffice. See United States v. Ebbers, 432 F. Supp. 3d 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (explaining that the “Age
C. The Purposes Of Punishment Set Forth In Section 3553(a) Do Not Require Greene’s Continued Incarceration
The final question that Greene’s motion for compassionate release presents is whether releasing Greene at this time, as the circumstances warrant, comports with the purposes of punishment laid out in
Beginning with the “nature and circumstances” of Greene’s offense, there is no dispute that Greene committed a grave and serious crime. Indeed, killing another person (and especially a person who was on duty serving as a U.S. marshal) and disarming three other federal officers while attempting to free a prisoner from custody, is perhaps one of the most serious crimes a person can commit. But the severity of the offense of conviction is only one aspect of the nature and circumstances analysis, and it does not, in and of itself, demonstrate that just punishment or any of the other purposes of punishment require more time in prison than the nearly 50 years that Greene has served for his commission of that crime. Shortly after Greene committed the crime at issue here, he was appropriately sentenced to a minimum of 35 years in prison to reflect the seriousness of his actions, see
The record before this Court amply demonstrates that the rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation goals of the lengthy prison sentence that the court imposed on Greene in 1972 have been satisfied. As for Greene’s rehabilitation, the sworn testimony of the various BOP officials who have spoken on his behalf during his Parole Commission hearings strongly supports the conclusion that Greene has reformed himself while in prison. As described above, at Greene’s parole hearing in 2015, seven BOP staff members (including Greene’s case manager) appeared on his behalf, vouching for his exemplary behavior and genuine rehabilitation. (See Ex. A to Def.’s Mot. at 2-3.) And two of those BOP officials went so far as to declare that they would have “no problem” having Greene as their neighbor. (See id. at 3.) One former BOP official submitted a letter to this Court in support of Greene’s motion for compassionate release stating that Greene was “a model inmate” and that she
The trust that Greene has earned among BOP officials is a testament not only to his rehabilitation, but also to his present lack of dangerousness. When evaluating the risk of releasing a defendant into the community, the Court must look beyond the inherent dangerousness of the offense that the defendant committed, and must consider the threat that the defendant posed at sentencing, and also the extent to which that threat remains at the time he seeks compassionate release. See, e.g., Johnson, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 40–41; see also United States v. Dunlap, No. 17-cr-207, 2020 WL 5231359, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 2, 2020). While the transcript for Greene’s original sentencing is unavailable, the Court has no doubt that Greene would have been considered profoundly dangerous at the time his sentence was imposed in the early 1970s; he had disarmed three U.S. marshals in a “crowded church,” had fatally shot a marshal, and had “commandeered” a car at gunpoint. See Greene I, 489 F.2d at 1147. But the record provides no reason to believe that Greene still poses that same grave risk to other persons now after serving 49 years in prison. To the contrary, it appears that Greene has steadfastly undertaken to serve others in his prison community during his incarceration, as evidenced by his decision to put his own life at risk to protect the lives of two correctional officers during a violent prison riot in 1989. (See Fanucci Letter at 16.) What is more, in the decades since that incident, Greene has routinely put the needs and safety of BOP staff and inmates before his own, in order to help prevent violent unrest within the prison community. (See Ex. A to Def.’s Sealed Mot. at 3.) Indeed, it is Greene’s selfless efforts to quell danger over the years that has generated the highly unusual level of support that he has received from the numerous correctional officials who have consistently advocated for his release, both during his parole hearings and with respect to the instant motion. In short, Greene’s demonstrated dedication to ensuring the safety of inmates and officers points in only one direction with respect to the Court’s evaluation of his motion for release: that he no longer presents the significant risk of danger that his offense of conviction suggests, and that conclusion is all the more compelling given his advanced age and medical issues, and the fact that the BOP has determined that Greene has a minimal risk of recidivism (see Ex. T to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 68). See also, e.g., Hammond, 2020 WL 1891980, at *10 (noting that the defendant’s “advanced age and reduced mobility . . . make it difficult to imagine that he will endanger the community”).
The fact that Greene has incurred some disciplinary infractions during his time in prison (see Ex. U to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 12-1, at 70–71) does not undermine this finding. It is not unusual for inmates to receive reprimands in the prison context. Moreover, the nature of Greene’s infractions does not raise the kinds of concerns that might reasonably cast doubt on the conclusion that his release would not pose a danger to society. For example, the two most serious infractions in Greene’s record are apparently for flinging grits at a BOP
The Government opposes the conclusion that releasing Greene at this time would be consistent with the purposes of punishment set forth in section 3553(a), and urges the Court to deny Greene’s motion for compassionate release for three main reasons: (1) Greene committed an “egregious” and violent crime (see Gov’t Opp’n at 9); (2) the Parole Commission has consistently found that Greene’s release is “not compatible with the welfare of society” given the severity of his offense and his recent disciplinary infractions (see id. at 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); and (3) the U.S. Marshals Service has expressed its opposition to Greene’s release (see id. at 12). In this Court’s view, none of these objections is persuasive.
First, as explained above, the nature and circumstances of a defendant’s offense of conviction is just one factor in the section 3553(a) analysis, and one that this Court has given due consideration. And to the extent the Government suggests that some crimes are just too egregious to warrant granting a defendant’s request for compassionate release, this Court disagrees. In enacting
It is also clear to this Court that, in placing so much emphasis on the horrendous nature of Greene’s offense of conviction, the Government misunderstands the nuanced analytical framework that Congress has provided in section 3582(c), which plainly differentiates a sentence modification from other sentencing procedures. Under section 3582(c), the default
Notably, nothing in this analysis authorizes the court to deny a motion for compassionate release simply and solely because the defendant’s offense of conviction is an egregious and dangerous crime. Rather, the court must reassess the purposes of punishment in light of the extraordinary and compelling reasons for reducing the term of imprisonment that was previously imposed for such an egregious offense, and must thereby evaluate, for instance, whether the defendant remains too dangerous to release, or whether he has not yet served enough of the sentence to have been justly punished for his offense. Here, for the reasons already discussed, the Court finds that Greene’s advanced age, medical conditions, and 49 years in prison are extraordinary and compelling reasons that justify his release, and that continued incarceration is not necessary either to provide just punishment for the horrific crime that he committed almost fifty years ago or to further promote his rehabilitation, nor is he likely to commit another offense due to his age and medical issues. (See supra Part III.B.2.)
For largely the same reason, the Court also firmly rejects the Government’s reliance on the Parole Commission’s repeated decisions to deny Greene parole. The Parole Commission and a federal court have decidedly different aims with respect to evaluating release requests, and they do so by applying markedly different standards. The federal court must apply the criteria that Congress has established in section 3582(c)(1)(A), which includes the analysis of the applicable section 3553(a) factors in the manner described above, to determine whether there are extraordinary and compelling reasons to modify a defendant’s sentence, and, if so, whether the purposes of punishment require rejection of the release request. By contrast, the Parole Commission seeks to determine a defendant’s “suitability” for release based on specific guidelines, see Daniel v. Fulwood, 766 F.3d 57, 59–60 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing
IV. CONCLUSION
In extraordinary cases, federal courts may exercise their limited authority to reduce a sentence that the court previously imposed, and they may do so only in accordance with the specific procedures and criteria that Congress has provided in
DATE: February 2, 2021
Ketanji Brown Jackson
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON
United States District Judge