*1 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES February 23, Argued 09-10245. June No. 2011 Decided *3 petitioner. argued Jr., Frank W.Heft, the cause for With him the on briefs was Scott T. Wendelsdorf. argued United for the States. the cause E. Gannon
Curtis Katyal, Acting General Solicitor him on the brief were With Deputy Attorney Breuer, Solicitor Gen- Assistant General Romano. Dreeben, John-Alex eral judgment of the Court Kennedy announced Justice opinion, in which and delivered Ginsburg, Justice Jus- join. Kagan and Justice Breyer, tice Sentencing 1984, 18 U. S. Act of C. The Reform Sentencing seq., to in- et calls for the creation judicial unwarranted dis- in order reduce form discretion sentencing. parities retroactive The Act allows in federal where the for cases Guide- amendments the Guidelines against inequality, a bulwark lines become cause adopted, amendment When retroactive Guidelines it. permits sentenced based on a sen- defendants tencing range move for reduced has been modified to sentence. question who enter into defendants here is whether
plea agreements sentence as that recommend eligible guilty plea relief a condition of the 11(c)(1)(C) Rule Crim. Proc. Fed. See Appeals (authorizing plea agreements). The Court such jus- barring miscarriage that, for the Circuit held Sixth who enter into mistake, tice mutual defendants agreements from retroactive Guidelines cannot benefit amendments. *4 judgment agree that this must
Five of the Court Members opinion join plurality this who be reversed. The Justices categorical bar enacted Court of conclude that the 3582(c)(2), 11(c)(1)(C), § Appeals support in Rule no finds every policy case statements. relevant Guidelines impose appropriate judge discretion must exercise by the turn, is framed Guide- discretion, sentence. This regular consulted, in the be lines. And the must conviction was in which the course, whether the case is one plea, pursuant including plea after a trial or a a after to an that recommends a The sentence. dis- judge’s impose trict decision to a therefore sentence agrees plead on the based Guidelines even if the defendant 11(c)(1)(C). guilty impose Rule the decision to Where subject a on sentence is based later to retroactive 3582(c)(2) permits amendment, a sentence reduction. 3582(c)(2)empowers judges Section to correct sen- depend prove tences that on later frameworks that un- justified. deny There is no reason to relief to linger prison defendants who sentences that since-rejected, would not have been afor but exces- range. sive judgment would reverse the on a Sotomayor Justice ground opinion concurring
different set out in the in the judgment. opinion, That like the would dissent, hold that following sentences are on based agreement rather than Guidelines, and therefore that typical relief is not in the available case. But permit petitioner unlike the dissent she would here to plea agreement seek sentence reduction because his in ex- press terms ties recommended the Guidelines sentencing range. that lead reasons those Members of the Court who
join plurality opinion may this be set forth as follows. I
A general Federal courts are forbidden, matter, as to “mod- ify imposed,” a term of it has once been 3582(c); finality subject U. S. C. but the rule to few exceptions. exception narrow Here, is contained in a statutory provision permit enacted to defendants whose has been lowered retro- active amendment to if move for sentence reduction provides: terms of the statute are met. The statute *5 “[I]n been sentenced who has of a defendant the case aon based ato term of Sentencing subsequently lowered has been 994(o)... pursuant the court S. C. to U. Commission may considering imprisonment, after the term of reduce 3553(a) the extent that to the they forth section factors set applicable, is consistent with if such a reduction are Sentencing applicable policy issued statements 3582(c)(2). Commission.” application of the statute to cases concerns the
This case plea agreements under Rule enter into in which defendants 11(c)(1)(C). parties “agree permits That Rule range appropriate specific sentence which] request [a disposition binds the court ease,... agreement.” question accepts plea The once 11(c)(1)(C)agreements into defendants enter is whether who specify particular be said to have been sentencing range, making “based on” a Guidelines sentenced eligible under them for relief
B in 2005for vari- was indicted Petitioner William Freeman including possessing intent distribute co- crimes, with ous (b)(1)(C). 841(a)(1), §§ He entered caine base. U. S. C. agreed in which he into Rule plead guilty charges. the Government all return “agree[d] 106months’ incarceration is that a sentence of App. agree- disposition appropriate The 26a. this case.” independently “[b]oth re- have applicable ment states that Sentencing case,” in this viewed the “[Freeman] agrees his sentence and that have determined Sentencing Id., at to the 27a-28a. Guidelines.” expectation parties’ that Free- reflects 46 to 57 months, man would ibid. face Guidelines (Offense Category IV), History along Level Criminal pos- mandatory minimum of 60 months with consecutive *6 a firearm in sessing furtherance of a crime drug-trafficking 924(c)(1)(A). under U. § 18 S. C. The recommended sentence of 106 months thus with the minimum sentence corresponded in to the suggested by Guidelines, addition 60-month 924(e)(1)(A) § sentence.
The District Court accepted the At the plea agreement. sentencing hearing, of the “adopt[ed] findings officer probation disclosed in the probation report appli- cation guidelines as set out therein.” 47a. App. considered “[EQaving and 18 advisory guidelines USC 3553(a),” the court the recommended 106-month sentence, which was “within the guideline ranges” 46- —the 57-month had anticipated man- plus 924(c)(1)(A) 60 datory § months under “sufficient —and Id., meet the objectives of the law.” at 48a-49a. later,
Three years the Commission issued a retroactive amendment to the Guidelines to remedy the significant dis- parity between the for cocaine base penalties and powder cocaine offenses. See States Sentencing United Commis- (Nov. sion, 2010) C, Manual Arndt. Supp. 706 App. (USSG) (effective id., 2007) Nov. Guidelines); (adjusting (effective 2008) Arndt. 713 3,Mar. Amendment 706 (making retroactive). Its effect to reduce was Freeman’s sentencing range to 37 months, to 46 with the con- again secutive 60-month mandatory minimum. 142a-144a App. (Sealed).
Freeman
moved for
sentence
reduction
however,
District
denied
Court,
the mo-
tion, and the
Court
for the
Circuit
Sixth
affirmed.
Appeals
United
v. Goins,
States
(2009).
1
355 Fed.
Adhering
Appx.
Peveler,
its decision in United States v.
This Court certiorari. 561 U. 1058 granted S. II judge every requires law
Federal greater impose but not than sufficient, case to “a necessary, comply purposes of sentenc- federal with” the 3553(a) ing, light factors. 18 and other of the 3553(a). provide a framework or The Guidelines U. S. C. meaning starting point in the commonsense basis, —a g., judge’s E. of discretion. Oxford term —for exercise (2d 1989), per- English Dictionary ed. Rule agree specific prosecutor the defendant and mits *7 agreement appropriate, does not dis- is but that sentence independent obligation charge to exercise the court’s district sentencing, following whether its In the usual discretion. plea, judge’s on the Guidelines will be the reliance trial range apparent, judge as will the Guidelines the for the use analysis impose starting point a sentence within in the (2007). range. States, 38, U. S. the v. United Gall range, judge from the recommended Even where the varies begin- sentencing range judge as the id., if uses the the ning point explain from it, to deviate then the to the decision for the sentence. in a basis a real sense are 11(c)(1)(C) parties’ recommended sentence the
Rule makes accepts plea agree- binding the the court on the court “once policy governing statement confirms the the ment,” but acceptance the based on Guidelines. See is itself court’s §6B1.2. policy forbids the district statement That USSG judge accept without first evalu- an to light ating in of the defendant’s the recommended sentence commentary sentencing range. applicable to 6B1.2ad- 11(c)(1)(C) “only accept court vises that appro- sentence is an if either that such the court satisfied is guideline range priate or, if the sentence -within applicable guideline departs from the that the not, sentence justifiable States, v. United Stinson reasons.” Cf. authoritative). (Guidelines (1993) commentary is 508 U. 36S. contingent bargain Any until the between the agreement. accepts require The Guidelines judge give due consideration relevant sen- tencing range, prosecutor even if the defendant and recom- a, specific guilty plea. mend sentence as condition approach policy support This finds further in the state- applies ment motions. See USSG modifying 1B1.10. It instructs the district court in a sen- only tence substitute amendment retroactive and then original place. all leave Guidelines determinations § 1.10(b)(1). policy IB words, other statement seeks marginal since-rejected whatever isolate effect the Guide- Working line on had the defendant’s sentence. backwards purpose, from proceedings this modification permit should available to the district court to revisit a prior sentence to whatever extent question part analytic awas relevant framework the judge approve used to determine the or to agreement. gov- This is the rule consistent with the policy erning prem- statement, on statement rests range may many ise that a Guideline be one of factors that imposed. determine the sentence purpose Tlius, the text and of the Lineerelevant sources— governing policy statute, Rule, and the statements— *8 require authority the conclusion that the court district has 3582(c)(2) § imposed to entertain motions when sentences are light in of the Guidelines, even if the defendant enters into 11(c)(1)(C) agreement. an
Ill transcript petitioner’s sentencing hearing The reveals original that his sentence on was based the Guidelines. The sentencing range, District Court first calculated as both 3553(a)(4) § 1.2(c) §6B require. App. and It 47a, 49a. ex- plained guidelines advisory that it “considered and 18 3553(a),” fall[s] USC and that “the sentence . . . guideline rang[e] [is] within the and sufficient meet the objectives Apart Id., law.” at 48a-49a. from the de- attorney's that the ease involved a initial statement fense “(C) agree- hearing proceeded as if the plea," id., at 47a, independent expressed court its not exist. The ment did light appropriate in judgment that was the sentence range, was and its decision therefore range. that “based on”
IV Court hold sentences The Government asks this 11(c)(1)(C)agreement, petitioner's, an like which follow are Guidelines, not the on the based ineligible are so sentenced for therefore defendants 3582(c)(2) part § position rests in relief. The Government's upset reached here will on concern that the conclusion bargain prosecutor and defendant. See struck between nothing That, however, has States 42-43. Brief United is on” the do with whether a sentence “based § any event, the concern is over- under And sentencing ranges are in- reductions stated. Retroactive frequent, problem not arise often. Klein so the will & “Leniency,” Thompson, Federal Judicial DOJ’s Attack on Supreme Response, Future of Criminal Sen- and the Court’s (2009). important, tencing, More 44 Tulsa L. Rev. 3582(c)(2) § subject authority court's by significant that can be enforced constraints, constraints appellate review. binding policy governing mo- statement places on district discretion. considerable limits
tions
original
remain
from the
All Guidelines decisions
place,
was
altered
retro-
save
lB1.10(b)(l).
initial
sen-
active amendment. USSG
vary
hearing,
tencing
below the
court can
Guide-
a district
modifications in
but,
contrast, below-Guidelines
lines;
§1B1.10(b)
proceedings
forbidden, USSG
are
(2)(A),
original
except
was itself a down-
where
1.10(b)(2)(B).
departure,
the court must al-
And
IB
ward
*9
danger
ways
seriousness
“consider the nature and
any person
community
may
posed by
or the
a
be
reduc-
§
imprisonment.”
tion in the defendant’s term of
IB 1.10,
l(B)(ii).
authority
comment., n.
The district court’s
is lim-
appeals,
ultimately
ited; and
courts
and
Court,
this
plea agree-
can ensure that district
do
overhaul
courts
not
§
thereby abusing
authority
ments,
their
(2010) (review-
See Dillon
States,
v. United
The Government would enact bar on 3582(c)(2) prevent relief. But such a bar would district making inquiry spe- courts from an that is within their own knowledge expertise. cial What is at stake this case eligibility is a defendant’s relief, for not extent of that permitted relief. Indeed, even where a defendant to seek judge may reduction, the conclude that reduction inappropriate. judges would be continuing District have a professional scholarship commitment, based on and accumu- experience, sentencing policy. lated They consistent rely they can on the frameworks have devised to determine whether and to what extent a sentence reduction is war- any They may, ranted considering ease. when 3582(c)(2) § motion, take into account a defendant’s decision 11(c)(1)(C) agreement. to enter into an If the district court, experience judgment, on its based and informed concludes led to a more lenient sentence than would imposed, deny otherwise have been it can for motion, permits require statute but does not the court reduce a sentence. This discretion ensures that does produce a windfall. opinion concurring judgment
As suggests noted, the in the position. opinion argues gen- intermediate that in That following agreements eral defendants sentenced ineligible are sought relief, but relief plea agreement where contemplates itself sentence re- *10 inquiry into however, calls for statute, The duction. that moti- judge’s the reasons sentence, not
reasons sug- parties. as Government If, or informed the vated impose a is based on gests, judge’s decision 3582(c)(2) apply. The agreement, then .does upset And sentence. contract an otherwise-final cannot signifi- consequences rule would be this erroneous By allowing only when the terms of the modification cant. agreement permit
contemplate proposed rule would it, the Sentencing very disparities Act seeks to Reform eliminate. comprehensive sentencing aims
The Act to create severity in crimes of similar which those who commit scheme sentences. similar conditions receive similar See §3553(a)(6); Judging Cabranes, Fear of J. S. C. K. Stith & U. (1998). 3582(c)(2) goal to that contributes 104-105 Section adjust by ensuring sentences im- that district courts range posed the Commission concludes step out of with the seriousness the crime severe, are too analogous sentencing ranges and incon- offenses, and the purposes. with the sistent Act’s example prime of an range un- is
The crack-cocaine here designed disparity to cure. warranted to ef- The Commission amended the crack-cocaine “urgent “partial remedy” compelling” fect a for the problem sentences, which, Commission of crack-cocaine congres- “significantly the various concluded, undermines objectives Sentencing Reform in the Act.” sional set forth Report Congress: Sentencing Commission, United States Policy 2007); (May Sentencing 8-10 see Cocaine Federal Kimbrough Supp. App. 706; v. United C, also Arndt. USSG (2007), States, 552 U. Commission deter- S. 99-100 flawed, and therefore that mined that those Guidelines were ought to reexamined. sentences that relied on them good Commis- is no the benefit of the There reason to extend arbitrary judgment of defendants subset to an sion’s agreed accepted light whose sentences were of a since- rejected plea agree- based on their whether Congress ments refer the Guidelines. enacted remedy systemic injustice, approach and the outlined opinion concurring judgment in the would undercut a systemic solution. 11(c)(1)(C)agree-
Even when a defendant enters into an *11 judge’s accept plea impose ment, the decision the likely recommended is sentence be on the based Guide- eligible lines; is, when it the defendant should seek analysis straightforward relief. This would making arbitrary avoid between similar distinctions defend- agreements. ants plea based on the terms of their itAnd disparities would also reduce unwarranted in federal sen- tencing, purposes Sentencing consistent with the of the Re- form Act.
[*] [*] [*] judgment Appeals of the of Court is reversed, and the proceedings. case is remanded for further
It is so ordered. Justice Sotomayor, in the judgment. concurring agree plurality petitioner I with William Freeman eligible is for reduction under 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2), why. my but I differ as to the reason view, imprisonment imposed by pur- the term of agreement by suant to an authorized Rule of Federal Crim- 11(c)(1)(C) ((C) inal agreement) Procedure is “based on” judge’s itself, not on the calculation of the Sentencing (C) Guidelines. I However, believe that if a agreement expressly uses a Guidelines charged to the offense to establish term of imprisonment, range subsequently and is lowered Sentencing United imprison- States term of Commission, the range employed ment is “based on” the and the defendant is eligible for sentence reduction under
H-i imprisonment of term To ask whether range tois ask whether on” a Guidelines “based for of as or foundation the term serves basis imprisonment imprisonment. derived No term of —whether legal until effect or from a otherwise—has applying judgment imposing result, As it. court enters foundation for the term a court must discern sentencing judge. imprisonment imposed As the of judge’s plurality explains, course the district in the normal charged range applicable to the calculation imprisonment term offenses will serve as the basis imposed. 529; States, see Gall v. United ante, at also See (2007). 552 U. S. (C) agreements,
Sentencing however, is different. sentencing, the term of At the time (C) agreement not involve the court’s in to a does
dependent consideration calculation 3553(a) may only The court factors. the other 18 U. S. C. accept *12 accept reject agreement, if it, and it chooses to or the impris sentencing may impose the term of court at the may change agreement court for; the onment the calls (“To 11(c)(3)(A) Crim. Proc. the its terms. Fed. Rule See type specified [Rule plea agreement the is of the extent agreement, reject 11(c)(1)(C)], accept it, the the court presentence the a until the has reviewed defer decision court report”); Advisory on
Allowing district to courts later a term of reduce imprison- ment because simply the court itself considered the Guide- lines in deciding whether to the agreement would accept 3582(c)(2) § transform into a mechanism which courts could (C) rewrite the terms of in agreements not con- ways
537 3582(c)(2) templated parties. time that was the At already that, under well -understood 1984, enacted in it was (C) stipulated imprisonment in a Rule the term of 11, accepted it once court bound 11(e)(1)(C) (1982) agreement. Proc. Fed. Crim. See Rule (C) agreement may “agree (specifying parties to a that the disposition specific appropriate sentence is (CA11 case”); 2 389, 719 2d n. French, 387, F. United States v. 11(e)(1)(C) 1983) curiam) plea agree- (per (noting that a Rule “‘binding’ plea bargain”).1 ment was a statutory any text or In the from absence indication 3582(c)(2) history legislative meant to was fundamen- 11(c)(1)(C) operates, way tally in Rule alter the which plurality’s suggestion that I cannot endorse permit court to the district revisit should understood “to prior extent the in sentence whatever to analytic question part framework the a relevant was approve judge the sentence used determine agreement.” Ante, States, Dillon v. United 530; cf. 3582(c)(2)] (2010) [§ (“Congress 817, intended U. S. adjustment otherwise final authorize limited sentence”).
By that the to a mere fact token, same (C) agreement may the Guidelines in the have considered empower negotiations does course of their imprisonment they the term of to reduce argues. Undoubtedly, ultimately agreed upon, as Freeman the Government and the he is that in most cases correct negotiate in a will the term defendant pro- agreement by applicable reference to the (“[T]he 30-31 Brief Petitioner visions. See plea point starting initial benchmark for are . . . the binding plea agreements provisions governing Prior Rule ll’s 11(e)(1)(C). they largely identical were were Rule In substance located 11(e)(1)(C) 11(c)(1)(C). Proc. Rule Crim. See Fed. to the current rules (2000).
538 negotiations”); (noting Brief for United the “con- States cededly strong parties calculate] . likelihood that will.. potential conside[r] ranges in the Guidelines course of negotiating plea agreement selecting specific sen- tence”). plea bargaining necessarily This makes sense; sentencing in occurs the shadow of the scheme to which the subject. defendant would otherwise be See United States (“[PJlea (2005) Booker, bargaining v. 543 U. S. takes place potential (emphasis in the shadow of ... trial” deleted)). imprisonment imposed
The term of the district court, background negotiations; however, is not “based on” those explained binding agree- as instead, above, it is based on the produced by negotiations. ment those I therefore cannot agree upon with Freeman calls engage free-ranging through par- courts search negotiating history ties' of a search range might have been relevant to the or the acceptance agree plurality court’s of it. can I with the Nor judge’s pro- the district calculation of imprisonment pursu- vides the basis for the term of (C) agreement. ant to a
II These conclusions, however, that a do mean term of (C) imprisonment imposed pursuant to a can §3582(c)(2), never be reduced under as the Government con- 11(e)(1)(C) example, tends. For Rule allows “agree specific sentencing range that a appropriate ... is the disposition delineating agreed-upon of the case.” In imprisonment, agreements term of some call for defendant to be sentenced within a Guidelines sen- tencing range. acceptance such cases, the district court’s agreement obligates the court to sentence defend- accordingly, ant and there that the can be no doubt term of imposes agreed- the court on” is “based upon meaning within If subsequently lowered the Sen- is that Guidelines eligible tencing for sentence Commission, the defendant reduction. *15 specific might provide
Similarly, plea agreement for a a imprisonment of as a number months—but term of —such specified a for the term is the basis clear also make that to sentencing range to the offense Guidelines long guilty. pleaded as that sen- As which the defendant pur- agreement range for tencing itself, the is evident from by imprisonment imposed poses of of the term agreement on” is “based that the court accordance with (C) expressly agreement range. a when Therefore, that the term of to establish uses Guidelines by range subsequently imprisonment, lowered the and is eligible for sentence reduction Commission, the is defendant 3582(e)(2).2 necessarily reject categorical holding, the ad- rule In so I by by the dissent, endorsed vanced the Government (C) artificially agreement express from its which divorces (C) agreement very purpose of a is to terms.3 Because 2 from rulo reoulto a “mistaken shift suggests The dissent that this judge to the intent of analysis” actions of the opinion in this from the J.). post, purpose C. of a of Roberts, parties. (opinion at 547 See (C) sentencing to however, the terms agreement, tois bind supra, at Therefore, 536-537. upon by deter agreed parties. See (C) agreement pursuant to a was “based mine whether a sentence necessarily reviewing court must sentencing range, tho on” a Guidelines agreement look to the itself. 3 question addrcaood this Appeals have majority Tho of tho Courts of United today. one I take approaches with the See have taken consistent (CA1 2010); Rivera-Martinez, United 283, States v. F. 3d 286-287 607 (CA7 2010); Main, United States v. Ray, States v. 407, F. 409-410 598 3d Scurlark, (CA2 839, F. United States v. 200, 2009); 3d 579 F. 3d (CA8 2009). applied the Third Circuit has appears 842-843 It United States See v. by the Government. the absolute rule advanced Sanchez, (2009). 275, plurality, As noted 282, n. 8 562 F. 3d ante, reduction “to see Sixth Circuit allows ovon tho mistake,” United justice mutual miscarriage correct a avoid sentence, allow the to determine the defendant’s agreement employs when the itself sentencing range applicable charged to the offenses in estab- imprisonment, eligible lishing term the defendant 3582(c)(2).4 to have his sentence reduced under such cases, district court’s reduction the sentence does not plea agreement; agree- instead, rewrite the it enforces ment’s terms. plurality, persuaded
Like the I am not the Govern- argument allowing ment’s term im- (C) posed to a reduced under deprives the the benefit Government of bargain agree- it struck with the defendant. When a explicitly employs particular ment imprisonment, establish term of *16 parties’ itself demonstrates the intent that the term imprisonment range, required of will be on as based for statute,5 sentence reduction under the The Government’s Peveler, (2004) (internal 369, 378, States v. 359 F. quotation n. 4 3d marks omitted). only And Appeals adopted two of have a wide-ranging Courts approach similar suggested by to tho one Freeman. See United States v. Garcia, 209, 214 (CA5 2010) curiam); F. Cobb, 606 3d (“per United States v. (CA10 979, 2009). F. 584 3d 985 4 (C) that, The dissent agreement expressly contends even when a uses Guidelines imprisonment, to tho establish term imposing agreement a sentence to that not does "‘appl[y]”’ range meaning pol within icy post, lB1.10(b)(l)). (citing § statement. See at 548 USSG But in so arguing, the dissent —like the ignore Government--would have courts tho agreement’s express terms, “applie[s]” which the court when imposing tho imprisonment. term of 5 plurality “[tjhere asserts that no good reason to extend the bene [of fit arbitrary to reduction] . . . subset defendants based plea on agreements Ante, whether their refer to Guidelines.” ll(c)(l)(C)’s “good 533-534. But the reason” pur is evident: Rule entire pose is partios’ to allow the intent to determine outcomes. Soo (C) supra, at 536-537. If the parties’ does indicate intent (cid:127) to base the term of particular on subso
541 3582(c)(2) agreements application will concern “unjustified receiving an wind- in certain result defendants misplaced. Brief United States is therefore See fall” 43. believes in where the Furthermore, cases Government reduction authorized that even the limited sentence §1B1.10 improperly benefits the de- and USSG argue it district court that the court fendant, can to the the statute to reduce not exercise its under should discretion (noting in Dillon, S., that, U. at 826 the sentence.6 See 560 §3582(c)(2), applying whether the “consider the court must part, in warranted, whole or reduction is either authorized 3553(a)”). §C.] [18 according to set forth in U. S. the factors Finally, ensure ex ante that a if the Government wants imprisonment will not be re- term of defendant's enough: Nothing prevents simple later, duced the solution is negotiating a defendant secure the Government from with statutory right to seek sentence reduction waiver of his §3582(c)(2), respect, just to de- with as it often does collaterally rights appeal attack the convic- fendant’s §3742; U. S. sentence.7 18 S. C. C. tion and See U.
(2006 Ill); (provision App. Supp. 28a-29a ed., see also expressly waiving rights). both Freeman’s Commission, simply quently does not lowered then apply. might reduce the term example, For- decline diotriet court *17 argu imprisonment light Covernment’o eligible of an defendant drop significant agreement— in the such as mont that it concessions made it not have ping charge charge- a and therefore would forgoing a future agreement made. agreed to the time the was a lower sentence at true, however, necessarily under the read opposite The be would If dis ing by of the Government and the dissent. a proposed authority imprisonment of statutory to reduce a term trict court has no (C) term is never such a imposed pursuant agreement to a —because of meaning sentencing range within the on” a “based effectively confer that parties could is not clear how the —-it by agreement. of authority upon the terms their 8582(e)(2) application eligible short, defendant of does an deprive not—and will benefit of Government not— bargain. its
Ill eligible In order to conclude that Freeman for sentence §3582(c)(2), plea agreement reduction under between Freeman Government must sen- use Guidelines tencing range subsequently by that has been lowered Sentencing imprison- term of Commission to establish the imposed by agree- ment Freeman’s District Court. ment does. agreement “agrees states that Freeman to have his Sentencing
sentence determined to the Guide- lines,” at id., 28a, and that 106 months is the total term of agreement imposed, id., at 26a. The 924(c)(1)(A) also makes clear that the count which Free- agrees plead guilty man carries minimum sentence of 60 consecutively any months, “which must be served to” other imposed. sentence Id., at 27a: This leaves 46 months unac- agreement counted for. The sets Freeman’s offense level at drugs quantity 19, as accept- determined and his responsibility, parties anticipate ance of and states that the history category Looking criminal Id., of IV. at 27a-28a. Sentencing to Guidelines, level of 19 offense history category produce criminal range of IV pt. (sentencing 46 to 57 months.8 5, See USSG ch. A table). contrary sugges- Therefore, to the dissent’s curious way knowing tion th[e] that “there is no what post, was ‘based on,’” at it is evident Freeman’s agreement employed figure at 46-month the bottom end partios’ Because it is the controls swpra, context, see 536-537, if even the District Court had calculated post, range tho differently parties, than (Rodertg, J., tho see at 660-661 C. dissenting), Freeman eligible rcoontencing, long would still be as as parties’ tho chosen one that “subsequently wao was ... lowered the Sentencing Commission,” §
543 sentencing range, with the 60-month in combination this 924(c)(1)(A), mandatory to under estab- minimum sentence 3582(c)(2)’s first of Thus the 106-month lish his sentence.9 imprisonment is term of conditions is satisfied—Freeman’s range. sentencing on” a “based provi- the Guidelines In 2007 the Commission amended applicable that the of- such offenses, to cocaine sions base drugs applicable quantity of for which level fense to App. charged from 22 20. See Freeman was was lowered (Sealed); Supp. App. Taking C, Arndt. 706. 142a-143a USSG acceptance of re- for into account the three-level reduction sponsibility, 17, level is re- offense Freeman’s recalculated sentencing range sulting 37 to 46 months. in an amended sentencing Thus there can no that the Guidelines be doubt impris- originally range Freeman’s term used establish by Sentencing subsequently lowered onment “has been §3582(c)(2), “ha[s] the amendment Commission,” that such 9 eligible be for sentence re would dissent asks whether Freeman imprisonment. term of agreement for a 53-month duction if the called had presented by post, question is facts of this Though See at 550. case, agreement If the foregoing discussion: the answer is evident from the impris at 53-month term of parties arrived itself made dear that the applicable to Freeman’s of by determining onment end, its low he figure at would have halving the 106-month fenses then Franklin, v. States 600 F. 3d United eligible been under See (CA7 2010) (C) 893, would not foreclose relief (noting agreement that a term of was provided under if it sentenring range). percent below the low end of the any course, contain references agreement Of if “does not dissenting), way (Roberts, J., there is no C. Guidelines,” post, at 550 knowing “use[d] whether the prisoner supra, at sen- imprisonment,” establish term of eligible. It is not be therefore tenced such an would straightforward inquiry called why unclear the dissent believes that among today “foster confusion” the lower apply the rule I will Post, with already consistent the one approach courts. This 550. 3, supra, and there is no taken Courts of n. indication Appeals, most see they unpalatable, post, at 551. have found it cf. *19 of effect lowering applicable guideline [Freeman’s] 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). As a Freeman’s term of range,” result, 3582(c)(2)’s imprisonment satisfies the second of conditions. I therefore concur in the that he is plurality’s judgment eligi- ble for sentence reduction.
ChieF Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito join, dissenting. and in the plurality the opinion concurring judgment on agree little very on the I other except judgment. agree hand with much of each but on the opinion, disagree I judgment. with the agree concurrence that sentence imposed 11(c)(1)(C) under a Rule agreement is based plea on the agreement, I would, Guidelines. Sentencing however, adhere to that logic whether regardless agree- ment be could said to “use” or a Guidelines “employ” range at the arriving in the sentence specified agree- Ante, ment. at J.). (opinion Sotomayor, In that re- spect I with the agree that the approach con- plurality 11(c)(1)(C) currence to when a Rule sentence determining Ante, reduced is at arbitrary unworkable. 532-534. Section that “in provides the case of defendant who has been sentenced to a term on based imprisonment a sentencing that has been lowered subsequently the Sentencing Commission,” a district court reduce “may the term of if imprisonment... such reduction consistent with applicable policy statements issued Sentencing Commission.” The lone issue here is whether petitioner William Freeman meets the initial prerequisite having been sentenced to a term of “based on” a sub- reduced sequently sentencing range. Sotomayor
I agree with Justice “the term of im- prisonment for is, pur- Ante, §of poses 3582(c)(2), ‘based on’ the agreement itself.” case, 536. this Freeman executed a written plea agree- ment in which the sentence of 106 parties “agree[d] disposition.” appropriate [was] the months’ incarceration pursu- plea was entered App. 26a. Because the 11(c)(1)(C), proposed bind- sentence became to Rule ant agreement. accepted the ing it once on the District Court (the parties’ “request” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. See specific ac- once the court “binds the court “a sentence” determining plea agreement”). cepts when result, As impose Court Freeman, the District on plea thing thing one needed to consult one —the (opinion agreement. ante, at 536-536 See J.) Sotomayor, (“At implements simply sentencing, the court the moment of *20 already accepted”). agreement the terms of the it has agree the “term of Sotomayor I also with Justice sentencing judge by imprisonment imposed is dictated the by parties, agreement the entered into the terms the “[allowing judge’s calculation,” and that the not Guidelines simply imprisonment to term of courts later reduce a the in decid- Guidelines because court itself considered ing accept would transform to whether rewrite courts could into which mechanism (C) ways contemplated by agreements in terms of parties.” Ante, at 536-537. cogently Henry After ex- But then twist: comes 0. why plea plaining sentence is based on the a Rule diverges straight- agreement, from that Sotomayor Justice Freeman nevertheless sat- forward and holds that conclusion According requirement isfies the threshold 11(c)(1)(C)“agreement expressly opinion, to her if a Rule range applicable charged to uses Guidelines imprisonment” if such offense to the term establish —or agreement” the defendant’s use “evident from the —then range employed imprisonment on’ the “term is ‘based eligible reduction under for sentence and the defendant is 3582(c)(2).” my exception is in This Ante, 534, 539. plurality position basi- view as mistaken as the —and cally for the same reasons. begins departure Sotomayor from her own
Justice innocently enough. explains, agree- rule As she “some ments call for the be sentenced defendant to within sentencing range.” Ante, at 538. In according case, such a can there Sotomayor, Justice imposes prison “no doubt” term the court is “based agreed-upon sentencing range, on” the and therefore the de- eligible fendant is for sentence reduction. Ibid. provides support Whether or not true, that is it no for the step: next
“Similarly, plea agreement might provide for a specific term of as a number of —such speci- months—but make clear also that the basis for the sentencing range applicable term is a fied pleaded guilty. the offense to which defendant As long agree- as that is evident from the imprisonment imposed by ment itself... the term of accordance with that is ‘based on' range.” Ante, at 539. category This of cases is not “similar” the first at all. thing say It is one that a sentence agreement expressly providing that the court will sen- *21 tence the defendant within an Guidelines is range. quite “based on” that It is another conclude that agreement providing specific an “similarly” for a term is range, simply a specified based on Guidelines because the term range. can be said to reflect
According parties simply the concurrence, if the “con- sidere] “negotiate the Guidelines” or ... reference” to eligible them, the defendant is not for a sentence reduction. Ante, spe- at 537. a If, however, the sets forth spec- cificterm but it is somehow “clear that the basis for the sentencing range,” ified term is a then Guidelines the defend- eligible ant is a Ante, for sentence at reduction. 539. This head-scratching negotiating by distinction between refer- spec- using a basis the them as for to the Guidelines ence yield only test that can for an unworkable term makes ified arbitrary results. varying compounded standards the in confusion is agree- is whether the test concurrence.
the Sometimes range, "expressly ante, uses” a Guidelines ment (“explicitly employs”). Other ante, at 540 534, 539; at see ante, “evident,” at 539, use is the test is whether such times (“clear”). option A third is at 542; ante, 543, see n. parties’ agreement “indicate[s] intent whether imprisonment on a term of base the added).
range.” (emphasis Ante, n. concurring largely opinion is attributable in the The error opin- analysis. first half In the a mistaken shift in judge properly inquiry He is, to what does: ion, the looks approv- imposes sentence. After all, the one who after only ing agreement, judge term considers fixed actually imposes agreement, is he in so the sentence “based on” the Guidelines. analysis opinion, however, the
In the second half of the they suddenly parties: Did “use” on the shifts, focuses arriving “employ” at the term in their the Guidelines § agreement? with concerned whether But is to a term a defendant “has been sentenced added.) (Emphasis Only sentencing range.” on a based is so there no basis exam- defendant, can sentence particular prison ining why term. on settled Sentencing United States This conclusion dovetails with lB1.10(b)(l) (Nov. 2010) Commission, Manual (USSG) policy gov- Sentencing statement Commission’s —the erning eligible for a reduction under whether defendant explained Term, last re- As we quires instruc- follow the Commission’s district court “to prisoner’s eligibility for a tions 1B1.10 determine States, 560 U. S. Dillon v. United modification.” *22 (2010). lB1.10(b)(l), According court the must 817, 827 guideline range first determine “the amended that would retroactively have been to the if the defendant” provision in at time amended had been effect the of his sentencing. making “In the court determination, such shall corresponding substitute the for the amendments ... guideline provisions applied that were when defend- 1B1.10(b)(1), p. (emphasis ant was s. sentenced.” USSG added). noted,
As the District Court sentenced Freeman specified plea agreement; “ap- the term his it never plied” provision impris- imposing in Guidelines his term of “use[d] onment. The fact have yardstick deciding accept Guidelines as a whether (C) agreement imprisonment does not mean term imposed by particular the court is ‘based on’ J.). sentencing range.” (opinion Ante, Sotomayor, “employed” by if Even the Guidelines “used” or were parties arriving at the Rule term, they “applied were not when the defendant was sentenced.” accepted agreement, Once the District Court all that was “applied” agreement. later was the sentence set forth in that wrong Sotomayor to assert that her standard Justice plea agreement” “does not rewrite the but rather “enforces agreement’s According Ante, terms.” at 540. to the “[w]hen agreement explicitly employs concurrence, to establish the term imprisonment, par- itself demonstrates the ties’ intent that the term of will be range,” subject based on that and therefore to reduction if subsequently range. the Commission lowers that Ibid. this case, Justice Sotomayor concludes Freeman’s agreement contemplated though even reduction, such a parties “agree[d] had that a sentence of months’ incarcer- appropriate disposition App. ation is the of this case.” 26a. There is, no however, indication whatever that the contemplated prospect of lowered sen- *23 suppose par- tencing ranges. that the And it is fanciful they really if what meant would have said “106months” ties applicable “a end of the Guide- at the lowest was range.” (parties in this id., at case recom- 25a lines Cf. mending the at the end of Guide- “a fine lowest concluding Range”). otherwise, the concurrence line “ignore[s] agreement’s express at Ante, 540,n. 4. the terms.” parties reality choose that the a fixed is whenever knowing way. that term, sentence was there is no of what prosecutor could on.” The defendant well “based concluding quite for that 106 had different reasons have good Perhaps prosecutor wanted to was a deal. months to a different area his office devote limited resources try activity, Perhaps case. this of criminal rather than credibility question of one his defendant had reason to longer key sentence if the ease went witnesses, and feared a to trial. uncertainty may about be how
Indeed, the fact that there appropriate be the could to calculate the plea term in a under Rule for on a fixed basis 11(c)(1)(C). agreement made clear that there was Here the App. 28a calculations. See the Guidelines some doubt about (“Both object parties right to the USSG reserve history”); §4A1.1 criminal ibid. calculation defendant’s (the acknowledge that their calculations binding upon and that the "defendant the Court” “are not independently calculate the the Court will understands not withdraw and defendant Guidelines at agree plea guilty solely does not Court because application”). Sentencing [the] . . . with Guideline agreements plea parties frequently enter In addition, pursue particular prosecutorial not to reflect decisions agrees counts, three counts. If a defendant faces pursue plead prosecutor two, the other if does not one 11(c)(1)(C)agreement in sentence reflected in Rule is the any for sense “based on” the Guidelines pleaded? Surely to which one count the defendant not. tacitly suggests The concurrence it concedes as much when “drop[] charge forgot] a future charge” ultimately grounds reducing could the de- really fendant’s Ante, sentence. n. 6. But what this adopted by shows a basic flaw in the “based on” test opinion. *24 Finally, approach will foster confu- Sotomayor’s Justice clarity.
sion an area in need of noted, As courts will be pressed apply referring hard to the distinction between to relying range. questions on Guidelines Other abound: agreement ifWhat the contains Guidelines agreement’s stipulated calculation the but sentence is outside parties’ predicted range? the Guidelines test in the concurring opinion agreement is whether the “uses” or “em ploys” sentencing range a Guidelines to establish the term imprisonment, ante, at 534, not that term whether falls range. within the ease, term this what if the was 53 exactly sentencing range half the low end of the months— anticipated by parties? the Is it “evident” in that ease that employed the Guidelines were used or to establish the agreed-upon sentence?* plea agreement any if the
What does not contain refer- partial ences the Guidelines—not even the and tentative agreement Guidelines calculations in Freeman’s the —but binding parties corresponds exactly sentence selected the applicable range? the low end the Is it “evi- dent” in that case that the is based on a sentenc- ing range? applicable
ifWhat the District Court calculates the Guide- range differently parties? lines than the is no This academic Sotomayor *Justice responds itself “[i]f made oloar” that the parties by determining arrived at the 53-month figure sentencing range and then halving range's low eud-'-lOG months —then Ante, 543, sentence could be reduced. at 9. Does the n. 53-month 2GVí¡ figwe make figure itself that clew? if the What is muntlis? g., Franklin, v. F. hypothetical. States 600 3d See, e. United 2010) (CA7 (noting “the district court set- 893, 896-897 guidelines range contemplated higher than that tled on 11(c) 11(c)(1)(C)] agreement”). plea [Rule Is a Rule in the (1)(C) parties subject if the relied sentence still to reduction wrong sentencing-range? sur- Sotomayor’s on Justice though “yes,” 8, prising n. even ante, answer is see specifies governing provision that a defendant only eligible if amended Guide- reduction applicable lowering the defendant’s line has “the effect of guide- guideline range” presumably correct — lB1.10(a)(2)(B), Relying p. range. s. on line See USSG looking consequence just one error is unforeseen 11(c)(1)(C)agreement, specified but in- term in Rule agree trying led the to reconstruct what stead place. that term in the first very thing confusion will invite This Justice Soto- “free-ranging search” claims to disavow:
mayor history negotiating parties’ “through search courts might have been relevant a Guidelines *25 particularly agreement.” un- This is Ante, at 538. point given of Rule whole fortunate certainty agreements provide with about is to sentencing.
[*] [*] [*] 11(c) entering any negotiation, parties a Rule As with (1)(C) plea with the take the bitter sweet. must gets today’s Freeman more however, decision, Because either side bar- than the Government more bitter sweet and really gained left with sour who will for. But those charged today’s courts the lower with taste after are decision making going sense of it forward. respectfully
I dissent. Notes 1979Amendments Committee’s App., pp. 11, 18 S. C. Fed. U. 583-584 to Rule Crim. Proc. (C) (1982 ed.) (“[C]ritieal agreement is that the to a ... de sentence”); agreed-to accord, . United fendant receive the . . (CA1 2010); 283, 286 Rivera-Martinez, 607 F. 3d States v. (CA2 2010). 432, F. 438 Green, 595 3d United States v. (C) binding agreement it is context, therefore, the the impris- plea agreement for term foundation the of that is the to is sentenced. At the mo- onment which the defendant implements sentencing, simply the terms ment of court it has to Contrary agreement already accepted. ante, view, see at fact that plurality’s 529-530, United Commission, 6B1.2(c) States Manual Sentencing (Nov. 2010) (USSG), court to use instructs district Guidelines as yardstick whether deciding accept (C) does not mean agreement imprisonment that the term by the court imposed is “based on” particular Guidelines sentencing range. The term of imposed by is terms of the sentencing judge agree- dictated ment entered into by the parties, not judge’s calculation. In short, the term of imprisonment imposed (C) to a is, 3582(c)(2), purposes “based on” the agreement itself. To hold otherwise would be to contravene the very pur- (C) pose agreements bind and allow —to the Government and the defendant to determine what sen- tence he will receive. courts Although district ordinarily have significant discretion in determining appropriate Gall, be on a defendant, see 46, atS., U. under Rule it is the parties’ agree- ment that determines the sentence see Advi- imposed, Committee’s sory Notes on 1999 Amendments to Fed. Rule (2000 ed.) Crim. Proe. 18 U. S. C. p. App., (noting that, under a “the agreement, and defense government have agreed on actually what amounts to an appropriate sen- tence .... [TJhis on court once binding it”). the court To be accepts sure, the court “retains abso- lute discretion whether agreement,” ibid., accept plea but it once it is does bound give effect to the parties’ agreement as to the term of appropriate imprisonment.